Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided May 1, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that an officer cannot deviate from the exact wording  of the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory if the deviation is inaccurate or misleading.

In Nash, the Petitioner was stopped in Hennepin County by the Minnesota State Patrol.  The trooper noted Nash appeared lethargic, his skin was sweaty, he had a “thick tongue” when speaking, and his pupils did not react to light. The trooper believed that Nash was under the influence, but she was not sure whether the cause was alcohol or a different substance. The trooper  had Nash exit the vehicle and perform a horizontal-gaze- nystagmus (HGN) test, which is generally used to test for depressants. Nash also completed a one-leg balance test and a walk-and-tum test. The trooper thought that all three tests indicated that Nash was under the influence. Gerhard asked Nash if he was on any medications, and Nash replied that he was not. 

Nash provided a preliminary breath test, which produced a 0.000 result. Nash then completed a fourth test, which did not reveal any signs of impairment. The trooper nonetheless told Nash that she believed he was under the influence and placed him under arrest.

The trooper applied for and obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. Next, while seated in her squad car with Nash in the back seat, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” Gerhard showed Nash the warrant, but she did not “let him hold it and look through it.”

The blood test result revealed the presence of methadone and the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license.  

The Petitioner challenged the license revocation alleging the trooper did not read the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, (3). 

The District Court sustained the revocation but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177 (2022) governs the revocation of driving privileges based on a search warrant for the collection of a blood or urine sample from a person suspected of driving while impaired. If such test results indicate “the presence of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols, the commissioner shall revoke the person’s license or permit to drive.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 5. If a person refuses to submit to a blood or urine test as requested by a peace officer pursuant to a search warrant, then a test must not be given. Id., subd. 13. However, it is a crime for a person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood or urine pursuant to a search warrant under section 171.177. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022)."

"Section 171.177, subdivision 1, requires that “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant... the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Nash argues that he is entitled to rescission of his license revocation because the officer did not advise him that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime and instead merely advised him that she had applied for a search warrant for a blood draw and that refusal to take a test was a crime."

***

"This court has held that the advisory requirement in Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous, has no exceptions, and requires an officer to inform an individual of the criminal consequences of test refusal. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). We therefore apply the statute’s plain meaning, with guidance from caselaw."

***

In Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “[compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.” 368 N.W.2d at 280. The supreme court reasoned that “the legislature intended that a driver’s license be revoked pursuant to the implied consent law . . . only if the provisions of the law were complied with by the police.” Id. at 281 (emphasis added). Because the police did not provide a statutorily required implied-consent advisory, the test results in Tyler “could not properly serve as the basis for a revocation of [Tyler’s] license pursuant to the implied consent law.” Id.

***

"The Jensen court applied the supreme court’s reasoning from Tyler and concluded that the commissioner may not revoke a driver’s license based on blood-test results under section 171.177, subdivision 5, unless the officer directing the test gives the driver the advisory required under subdivision 1 of the statute. 932 N.W.2d at 847. This court held that, because the peace officer in Jensen never warned the driver that refusing to submit to a blood test is a crime, the commissioner could not revoke her license based on her test results. Id. at 848 (reversing and remanding for the district court to rescind the license revocation).

"Under Jensen, it is clear that a license revocation cannot be sustained based on the results of a chemical test if the driver was not provided an advisory regarding the criminal consequences of failing to submit to a test. Id. at 846 (stating it was undisputed that law enforcement did not advise Jensen that refusal to submit to a blood test is a crime). But, as the commissioner notes, Jensen does not address the issue presented here: whether an advisory that deviates from the language of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is nonetheless adequate to sustain a revocation."

"The commissioner argues that “there is no specific form the advisory must take,” and that Nash “was accurately informed of the legal consequences of refusing to submit to the blood test that was requested.” The commissioner relies on McCormick v. Commissioner of Public Safety, in which this court announced the rule that whether an implied-consent advisory complies with statutory requirements “depends on whether the given advisory, considered in its context as a whole, is misleading or confusing.” 945 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. App. 2020). The statute at issue in McCormick required that “[a]t the time a breath test is requested, the person must be informed . . . that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(2) (2018) (emphasis added). The officer in McCormick informed the driver that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” and not that “refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” 945 N. W.2d at 57 (emphasis added)."

"McCormick argued that the statute required officers to read its language verbatim and that the officer’s failure to state “breath” directly before “test” misstated the law. Id. at 58. This court rejected that argument, noting that the plain language of the statute did not require officers to “read” or “recite” the statute’s language verbatim. Id. at 59. This court also noted that it had upheld advisories that deviated from the language of the implied-consent statute “so long as the information the officer provide[d] [was] not misleading or confusing.” Id. This court reasoned that, because the officer informed McCormick that “this is the breath test advisory” and that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” without mentioning any other test and offering only a breath test, the context of the advisory adequately informed McCormick that refusal to take a breath test is a crime. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). The advisory was therefore sufficient to sustain the revocation of McCormick’s driving privileges. Id.

"The McCormick rule is consistent with an earlier decision of this court in which it said that “[u]niformity in giving the implied consent advisory is highly encouraged” and recommended “that police officers read the exact words of the statute in order to avoid any possibility of confusion or improper deviation from the statute.” Hallock v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 372 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Minn. App. 1985). But this court also stated that if an officer deviates from the exact words of a statutory advisory, a revocation may nonetheless be based on that advisory so long as the advisory was not “an incorrect statement of the Minnesota law, or so confusing as to render the advisory illegal.” Id. (affirming district court’s order sustaining a driver’s license revocation)."

"We agree with the commissioner that the McCormick rule applies here. But for the reasons that follow, we disagree that the advisory in this case was adequate under that rule. See Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes). Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2, provides that:

'The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.'"

"In this case, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” As the commissioner concedes, if Nash had refused the blood test, the circumstances would not have supported a test-refusal charge because the trooper did not offer him a urine test. See Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (“Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered . . . Thus, the advisory was an inaccurate statement of Minnesota law and misleading. Nothing about the context of the trooper’s advisory changes our view. Although the search warrant authorized a blood or urine test, the trooper did not mention the urine test. And although the trooper “show[ed]” Nash the warrant, the commissioner does not claim, and the record does not suggest, that Nash had an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to submit to the test."

"In sum, the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading. The advisory therefore cannot serve as the basis for revocation of Nash’s driving privileges, and the revocation cannot be sustained. See Tyler, 368 N.W.2d at 280 (“Compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.”); Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes)."

Moral Of The Story: You can't enforce the law if you do not  read the law.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided April 24, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a court cannot order restitution without discussing the defendant's ability to pay the ordered amount.

In Martinez, the Defendant was driving his vehicle in Blue Earth County when the police observed his vehicle did not have a red cover on one taillight. The officer attempted to make a traffic stop of Mr. Martinez, but instead of stopping, Mr. Martinez increased his speed, ran stop signs and reached a speed of 115 miles per hour. Eventually, law enforcement attempted a pursuit-intervention-technique (PIT) maneuver, causing Martinez’s vehicle to come to a stop. Martinez admitted to smoking methamphetamine and being under its influence while driving.

Mr. Martinez pled guilty and the state filed two affidavits for restitution, one from the Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust seeking $8,068.20 and one from Blue Earth County Finance seeking $1,000. The affidavits attested to the cost of repairs to the squad car that was damaged while pursuing Martinez.

Probation filed a presentence-investigation (PSI) report, which recommended a restitution award of $9,068.20 and also stated that if Martinez “chooses to execute his commitment,” restitution should “be paid out of prison earnings.” The PSI report specified that Martinez “has not maintained steady employment for the last five years” and that “his last employment was Burger King ... in January 2021,” where he worked for “three to four months until he started using drugs and left.” The report also noted that Martinez has “to pay child support but is behind on payments” and “would like the amount lowered.”

The district court “ordered [Martinez] to pay restitution in the amount of $9,068.20 that is to be paid out of any prison earnings” by April 25, 2024, and stated it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution.

The Defendant appealed the restitution order and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as the lower court failed to establish it had considered the Defendant's ability to pay the restitution amount.  Or, as stated by the Appellate Court:

"In Wigham, the supreme court reversed and remanded a restitution award because the district court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. 967 N.W.2d at 664, 666. In doing so, the supreme court held that the “district court fulfills its statutory duty to consider a defendant’s income, resources, and obligations in awarding and setting the amount of restitution when it expressly states, either orally or in writing, that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 664 (emphasis added). The district court need not “make specific findings about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to support [its] express statement that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay,” but doing so is “best practice.” Id. at 665 & n.6. Even if the district court makes specific findings, “the record must include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered.” Id. at 665."

***

"The state first argues that the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay by reviewing the PSI report, which “contained information regarding [Martinez’s] income and employment,” and by determining that Martinez “was financially unable to obtain counsel” when the district court appointed a public defender for Martinez. But this argument rests on the faulty premise that the district court need not expressly state that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay restitution. See Wigham, 967N.W.2d at 666 (holding that the district court “must expressly state” it considered the defendant’s “ability to pay—his income, resources, and obligations—when ordering restitution”). Thus, neither the district court’s review of the PSI report nor its appointment of a public defender, which occurred before the sentencing hearing, satisfied the district court’s statutory duty to expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution."

"Second, the state relies on the district court’s statement that restitution should be paid out of Martinez’s prison earnings as showing the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The state cites State v. Tenerelli, 583 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1998), affd as modified by 598 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1999), which significantly predates Wigham. In Tenerelli, we determined that the district court’s reference to the defendant’s prison earnings as the source of restitution payments showed it had considered the defendant’s ability to pay. 583 N.W.2d at 3. But the supreme court adopted a bright-line rule in Wigham, stating it sought to “avoid[] the need to scour bits and pieces of information to try to glean what the district court may have considered.” 967 N.W.2d at 664 n.5 (emphasis omitted). Wigham teaches that the district court’s reference to Martinez’s prison earnings does not fulfill its statutory duty under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045."

"For the same reason, we reject the state’s third argument, which urges us to conclude that the district court’s decision not to fine Martinez also shows the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The district court’s statement that it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution” does not “expressly” state it considered Martinez’s “ability to pay” restitution. See id. at 666."

"In sum, we conclude that because the district court did not expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay, it failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant and abused its discretion in ordering restitution. Thus, we reverse and remand. In considering restitution on remand, the district court may in its discretion reopen the record and order an updated PSI report to include information on Martinez’s income, resources, and obligations."

Moral Of The Story: You can't get blood out of a turnip!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

 

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Taybom (Decided April 10, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the officer's failure to record in his report all of the reasons for the vehicle stop is irrelevant.   

On November 21, 2019 a police officer stopped the Defendant while she was driving her vehicle on Seventh Street in St. Paul, MN. Ms. Taybom was ultimately charged with gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI for refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2018), and gross-misdemeanor third-degree DWI for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2018). 

At a contested omnibus hearing, Taybom moved to suppress all evidence related to the traffic stop. She argued that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the stop based on any traffic infraction and specifically contended that the reason provided in the officer’s police report—passing another vehicle on the right—was not unlawful. The state opposed the motion, arguing that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the stop based on three separate traffic violations observed by the officer: failing to yield to oncoming traffic, crossing the centerline, and passing another vehicle on the right in an unsafe manner.

At the hearing, the officer testified that he observed the following driving conduct by Taybom prior to the stop. First, Taybom’s car failed to yield to his car at a stop sign, “causing [him] to have to hit [his] brakes to stop from hitting [Taybom’s] vehicle.” Second, he saw the wheels of Taybom’s car touch the centerline of the road as he followed the car westbound on 7th Street. Third, as he continued to follow Taybom’s car, he observed her car slow down as it approached another vehicle. That vehicle was stopped at a red light. When the light turned green, Taybom’s car veered onto the right shoulder (which was also a bus stop) and “quickly accelerated” to pass the other vehicle while driving through the intersection. After observing Taybom’s car pass the other vehicle, the officer initiated the traffic stop. During his testimony, the officer acknowledged that his police report indicated only that he stopped Taybom for passing on the right and that it “failed to document” the other two alleged violations—failing to yield and crossing the centerline. But the officer testified that he “did see those other violations.”

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order denying Tayborn’s motion to suppress. The district court determined that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on at least two traffic violations: Tayborn’s failure to yield to oncoming traffic and the wheels of Taybom’s vehicle touching the road’s centerline. As a result, the district court concluded that it did not need to consider whether the third potential traffic violation argued by the state— passing a vehicle on the right through an intersection—also justified the stop. But the district court noted in the fact section that the officer conducted the traffic stop “based upon [Taybom] failing to properly yield to [the officer’s] car, crossing the centerline[,] and passing the stopped car on the right through the intersection.”

On appeal, Taybom argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the record does not show that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on his observation of any traffic violation. Specifically, Taybom challenged the district court’s factual finding that the officer stopped Taybom’s car based on three separate traffic violations: failing to yield, crossing the centerline, and passing another car on the right in an intersection. Taybom argued that this factual finding is clearly erroneous because the officer’s police report identified only one reason for the stop—passing another car on the right. Taybom further claimed that the district court’s reliance on the officer’s testimony regarding the two other traffic violations was clearly erroneous because the officer did not testify that he was subjectively aware of these violations prior to the stop. Taybom also challenged the district court’s implicit determination that the officer testified credibly regarding his observation of Taybom’s driving conduct. Taybom therefore urged the appellate court to conclude that the district court erred by denying Taybom’s motion to suppress based on its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Taybom for failing to yield and for veering onto the centerline of the road.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court stating:

"The record supports the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. First, video from the officer’s dashboard camera supports the district court’s findings that Taybom failed to yield to the officer, that the left-side tires of her car touched the road’s centerline, and that she passed another vehicle on the right at an intersection. In other words, the district court’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record. See Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 403. Second, the officer testified at the motion hearing that he “did see” all three potential violations. The district court implicitly credited that testimony, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. See Wilkes v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 111 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[Credibility determinations are the province of the district court.”). Third, both of the noted actions relied on by the district court were traffic infractions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.20, subd. 3, .18, subds. 4(4), 7(1) (2018); Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 823 (stating that an officer’s observation of any traffic violation can form the basis for a traffic stop). We therefore conclude that the record shows an objective basis for the stop."

"We are not persuaded otherwise by Taybom’s emphasis on the officer’s failure to document two of the potential traffic violations in his police report. “An officer’s failure to articulate observed violations of law as a basis for stopping a defendant is irrelevant under an objective standard.” State v. Beall, 111 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 755 n.5 (explaining that “the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is an ‘objective test’ and is not based on the subjective beliefs of the officer”). In Beall, a police officer initiated a traffic stop on the basis that the vehicle had a “brake light out.” 771 N.W.2d at 42. The officer also observed littering from the vehicle but did not record littering as a reason for the stop. Id. The driver argued that there was no basis for the stop because his vehicle, which had three brake lights, was still equipped with two working lights and littering was not the reason for the stop. Id. The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence from the stop. Id. This court reversed, explaining that the reasonable-suspicion standard is objective and concluding that both the inoperable brake light and the littering justified the traffic stop because both were unlawful. Id. at 44-45. With respect to the littering in particular, we emphasized that the officer observed the littering prior to the traffic stop. Id. at 45. “Therefore, even if [the officer’s] subjective basis for the stop was the nonfunctioning center brake light, the stop was also [objectively] justified based on [the officer’s] observation of littering.” Id. Applying that reasoning here, we conclude that the stop of Taybom was objectively justified based on the officer’s stated observation of two traffic violations—failure to yield and veering onto the centerline—even though the officer failed to document those violations in the police report."

Moral Of The Story: Writing things down is vastly overrated.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. McElree (Decided April 3, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to walk up to the police after you have been drinking and driving.  

In McElree, police officers for the city of Jordan received an harassment complaint. The complainant, J.L., alleged that his neighbor across the street, Defendant MacElree, had parked multiple vehicles in front of J.L.’s home, including two vehicles parked on either side of J.L.’s car. J.L. alleged that the vehicles on either side of his car were parked so close that he could not get into his car. J.L. also alleged that, while parking the vehicles, MacElree threatened to “tear [J.L.] apart” and knock his teeth out. J.L. showed the officers videos taken by his doorbell camera that seemed to confirm J.L.’s allegations. The videos showed the same man, later identified as MacElree, moving at least two vehicles and parking them in front of J.L. ’s home. The timestamps on the videos reflected that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles between approximately 8:55 and 9:05 p.m.

At about 9:48 p.m., while the officers were still on the scene, MacElree and a companion approached the responding officers. The officers were standing near the parked vehicles. One of the officers noticed that MacElree “smelled strongly of alcohol.” He asked MacElree if he had been drinking. MacElree responded with an expletive, claimed that his companion had driven the vehicles, and aggressively insisted that he had not driven anything. The officer did not ask MacElree to perform any field sobriety tests because of his “agitated state.” But the officer placed MacElree under arrest for suspicion of DWI. A breath test later showed that MacElree had an alcohol concentration of 0.28.

The State charged MacElree with two counts of Second Degree DWI. MacElree filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the two DWI counts for lack of probable cause to justify his arrest. In an accompanying memorandum, MacElree argued that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWI because he was not driving erratically, he did not demonstrate “other physical indicia of impairment,” the officer did not administer field sobriety or breath tests before his arrest, and he could have consumed alcohol “in the interim” between moving the vehicles and interacting with the officers some time later.

The state filed a brief opposing MacElree’s motion. The state argued that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI because the officer observed multiple signs of impairment, including a strong odor of alcohol and MacElree’s belligerent and uncooperative demeanor. In support of its position, the state filed several exhibits including: the complaint and supplemental police reports; videos taken by J.L.’s doorbell camera; and body-worn camera videos from multiple officers on the scene. The district court received these exhibits without objection from MacElree.

The district court granted MacElree’s motion and dismissed the DWI charges. The district court acknowledged that J.L. “told the officers that he saw [MacElree] drive the vehicles across the street and [the] officers identified the person in the doorbell videos as [MacElree] driving.” But the district court went on to explain that it could not “assume that [MacElree] did not consume alcohol between the time that he parked the cars and when he encountered police.” Therefore, there was “no way to prove that [MacElree] was under the influence of alcohol at the time he operated the car[s].” On that basis, the district court determined that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI and dismissed the two DWI counts against him.

The State appealed the district court's dismissal and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"The level of proof required to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest is “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). In making a probable-cause determination, courts must look to “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.” State v. Perkins, 582 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn. 1998). “The inquiry is objective, and the existence of probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual case.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly, we examine whether the district court considered all relevant facts known to the arresting officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest and whether those facts objectively establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI."

***

"The undisputed facts are sufficient to support the officer’s probable-cause determination under the applicable legal standard. The record reflects that MacElree drove at least two different vehicles near in time to when his neighbor reported being harassed, that MacElree was belligerent and generally combative with both his neighbor and police, and that the officer who arrested MacElree smelled a “strong” odor of alcohol coming from MacElree about 45 minutes after he drove the vehicles.  For the following reasons, we conclude that these facts reasonably warranted the officer’s belief that MacElree drove under the influence of alcohol. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120."

First, police observed multiple signs of MacElree’s intoxication. Only one objective indication of intoxication is required to establish probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence of alcohol. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678. Here, police noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from MacElree and observed his belligerent and combative behavior. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120 (identifying the odor of alcohol as an indication of intoxication); Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678 (identifying “an uncooperative attitude” as an indication of intoxication). Significantly, MacElree also exhibited belligerent behavior— as evidenced by the neighbor’s doorbell videos—when he shouted threats at his neighbor.

Second, the record reflects that MacElree drove two vehicles and parked them near the neighbor’s car close in time to when he was belligerent to his neighbor. But, when asked by police whether he was driving, MacElree was evasive and untruthful. He asserted that his companion had driven the vehicles instead, a claim directly contradicted by the doorbell videos showing MacElree driving and parking the vehicles in front of his neighbor’s home. And, when asked if he had been drinking, MacElree did not deny consuming alcohol but insisted that he had not been driving. Taken together, the relevant facts known to the officer—the strong smell of alcohol, the belligerent behavior, the driving of vehicles, and the untruthful and evasive responses to questions about drinking and driving—are sufficient to establish probable cause for the officer to believe that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles while under the influence of alcohol. See Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (considering defendant’s lying to police, belligerent behavior, and strong odor of alcohol, among other facts, as part of the totality of the circumstances supporting probable cause for DWI arrest).

***

"Here, the district court did not appear to properly consider whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest reasonably warranted the belief that MacElree was under the influence when he drove and parked the vehicles near his neighbor’s car. See id. Instead, the district court focused on the absence of evidence as to what MacElree was doing between when the neighbor observed him driving and when the officer spoke with MacElree about 45 minutes later. As a result, the district court mistakenly concluded that the state had not established probable cause for MacElree’s arrest. But, applying the proper legal standard, the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest support a conclusion that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI, regardless of the time gap."

Moral Of The Story: If you are a mean drunk, stay home!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Anderson (decided March 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a sentence within the sentencing guidelines is not going to be disturbed on appeal.

In Anderson, the Defendant was charged with felony DWI as his alcohol concentration level was over the legal limit and he had a prior felony DWI from 2006. (Once a felony, always a felony unless the felony DWI is from another state). Mr. Anderson subsequently pled guilty and the district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI). The probation officer who authored the PSI report recommended that the district court impose a prison sentence of 54 months (the fixed sentence duration within the applicable sentencing range of 46 to 64 months), stay execution of the sentence, place Anderson on probation, and order him to serve one year in jail. 

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in June 2022. The state requested that the district court impose an executed prison sentence of 48 months. The prosecutor noted that Anderson has five prior DWI convictions and two prior felony convictions, that Anderson’s alcohol concentration was more than twice the 0.08 threshold at the time of the offense, that he was driving in heavy traffic, and that his offense occurred only six months after he was charged with another felony DWI offense in Washington County. The prosecutor acknowledged that Anderson had remained sober while charges were pending but attributed his sobriety to the fact that he was subject to random testing.

Anderson’s attorney requested a downward dispositional departure on the ground that Anderson is particularly amenable to probation. Based on the information in the PSI report, Anderson’s attorney argued that Anderson had been sober for many years between his 2006 DWI conviction and his mid-2020 arrest for DWI in Washington County and had maintained sobriety again since being charged there. The attorney explained that, at the time of the offense in this case, Anderson was unemployed and had lost his home but that he since had regained employment and housing and was attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings three times per week. The attorney introduced four letters of support written by persons who have attended AA meetings with Anderson.

The district court stated that it had read the letters of support and had “spent a lot of time looking at this and thinking about it.” The district court commended Anderson for doing well on probation for the Washington County offense. But the district court emphasized the fact that this is Anderson’s third felony DWI conviction. The district court noted its concern for public safety and stated that, in committing the current offense, Anderson had endangered others. The district court concluded by finding that Anderson is not particularly amenable to probation and that there are no substantial and compelling mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the district court denied Anderson’s request for a downward dispositional departure and imposed an executed sentence of 48 months of imprisonment.

On Appeal, the Defendant argued that the district court erred by not exercising discretion in denying his request for a downward dispositional departure. He asserted that the district court did not consider the mitigating facts contained in the PSI report and, instead, focused on the fact that this offense is Anderson’s third felony DWI conviction. He relies on this court’s opinion in State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App. 1984), in which the court remanded for reconsideration after concluding that the district court had not considered all relevant mitigating factors. 

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines generally provide for presumptive sentences for felony offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (2020). For any particular offense, the presumptive sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2020). Accordingly, a district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable [presumptive] range . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D. 1 (2020)."

"The sentencing guidelines provide non-exclusive lists of mitigating and aggravating factors that may justify a departure. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3 (2020). One of the listed mitigating factors is “particular amenability to probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7). In determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, a district court may consider, among other factors, “the defendant’s . . . prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d28, 31 (Minn. 1982)."

"This case is meaningfully different from Curtiss. In that case, the district court stated that there was “no justifiable reason” to depart from the presumptive sentence. Id. at 263. We determined that the district court had “abandoned” the possibility of a downward dispositional departure without “comparing reasons for and against.” Id. In this case, in contrast, the district court expressly mentioned the facts that Anderson’s attorney had cited in his argument for a departure, such as Anderson’s renewed sobriety, his success on probation in the Washington County case, and the letters of support submitted on his behalf. The record shows that the district court did consider the mitigating factors that might support a departure but determined that they did not outweigh other factors and did not allow a finding of substantial and compelling reasons for a departure. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so."

Moral Of The Story:  If you do the crime, you are presumed to do the time.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Maas v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 20, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that "physical control" of a motor vehicle is broader than "driving" or "operating" same.

In Maas, a Faribault County deputy observed a 2007 Dodge Durango (the Durango) in a snow-filled ditch. Upon approaching the Durango, the deputy noticed it was unoccupied, locked, and turned off. Through the Durango’s window, the deputy observed a plastic cup in the center console containing an amber liquid. The deputy recognized the plastic cup as a type bars and other establishments use to sell alcohol. The deputy left the Durango and did not interact with anyone.

Approximately two hours later, the deputy passed the Durango again. This time, the deputy noticed a man, later identified as the Petitioner, next to the Durango. The deputy observed appellant on the passenger side attempting to dig the Durango’s wheels out of the snow. Maas waved to the deputy seeking assistance. The deputy activated the emergency lights and parked near the Durango. The deputy did not observe anyone other than Petitioner within or near the Durango. At this time, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Mr. Maas admitted he drove the Durango into the ditch.The deputy noticed the Petitioner exhibit indicia of intoxication and arrested Mr. Maas after he failed field tests and refused to submit to a preliminary breath test.

Mr. Maas filed a challenge to the revocation of his driver's license asserting the deputy did not have probable cause to believe Petitioner was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. The district court sustained the revocation finding probable cause, stating (1) “[appellant]’s vehicle was running, and he was in the process of trying to dig it out of the snow”; (2) “by [appellant]’s own admission, he had been consuming alcohol”; (3) appellant showed “physical symptoms of intoxication (e.g., watery and bloodshot eyes, slurring of speech and odor of alcohol)”; (4) the deputy observed a “plastic cup filled with amber liquid in the Durango’s center console”; and (5) the deputy observed “numerous empty beer cans littering the trunk of the Durango.” 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"We give the term “physical control . . . the broadest possible effect” to “enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes” and to “deter individuals who have been drinking from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers.” Shane, 587 N.W.2d at 641 (quotations omitted). Thus, “physical control” encompasses more than “drive” or “operate.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. 1992). But “mere presence in or about the vehicle is insufficient [to show] physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative.” Id. at 838. Courts consider several factors when determining whether a driver exercised physical control over a vehicle, including: “the person’s location in proximity to the vehicle; the location of the keys; whether the person was a passenger in the vehicle; who owned the vehicle; and the vehicle’s operability.” State v. Fleck, 111 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010)."

"Appellant asserts that he did not exercise physical control because the deputy never observed appellant seated in the Durango. But a person does not need to be seated behind the steering wheel to exercise physical control over the vehicle. For example, in State v. Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 927-28 (Minn. App. 1987), we concluded a motorist standing alone outside the rear of her vehicle was in “physical control” when the engine was running with the key in the ignition. We noted that “a person is in physical control of a vehicle if [they have] the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle and [they are] in close proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle.” Id. (quoting State v. Duemke, 352 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Minn. App. 1984))."

"Appellant also argues that he did not exercise physical control because the Durango was inoperable. But we have repeatedly held that a person may exercise “physical control” over a temporarily disabled vehicle. Flamang v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. July 27, 1994); see also Woodward, 408 N.W.2d at 927-28 (concluding appellant exercised physical control even though the vehicle had a flat tire); Abeln v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding appellant exercised physical control over a vehicle with a dead battery); Duemke, 352 N.W.2d at 429, 432 (concluding the sleeping appellant stuck in a snow-filled ditch exercised physical control over the vehicle). “Inoperability or, more precisely, the nature and duration of any inoperability, is simply a factor or circumstance to be evaluated with all the surrounding facts and circumstances ... in determining whether the situation gives rise to physical control.” Starfield, 481 N.W.2dat 839."

***

"The deputy found appellant, by himself, digging the Durango out of the snow. When the deputy arrived, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Additionally, appellant admitted the Durango belonged to him and that he drove the Durango into the snow-filled ditch. In this case, the “overall situation” supports the district court’s decision that appellant exercised physical control over the Durango. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838; Fleck, 111 N.W.2d at 236."

Moral Of The Story:    If you have been drinking, don't get near any of your vehicles except as a passenger.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Dolby (Decided March 6, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person can commit the crime of DWI refusal to submit to testing if their conduct tends to frustrate the process.

In Dolby, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was subsequently charged with Second Degree Refusal to submit to testing. The Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and had the matter decided by a district court judge.  The district court found the Defendant guilty of DWI refusal. On appeal, the Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"The officer then read Doby the breath-test advisory form. Doby stated that he did not understand and needed an interpreter. But at trial, Doby testified that he grew up in St. Paul and spoke English as his native language. He explained that when he asked for an interpreter, he “felt like [he] needed a mediator” to help him understand what was happening. The breath-test advisory began at 1:36 a.m. and finished at 1:41 a.m., when the officer decided to treat Doby’s actions as a refusal to test. The officer testified that Doby never said he would take the test, while Doby testified that he never refused to cooperate with the test."

***

"The implied-consent statute provides that a driver may be obligated to submit to a chemical test of their blood, breath, or urine when an officer has probable cause to believe the driver has been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and the driver has been lawfully placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(a), (b)(1) (2018). It is a crime to refuse to submit to this chemical test. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2018). When the officer requests that the driver perform the test, the driver must be informed of specific information set out in the implied-consent statute. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2018). The statute does not state that verbal refusal is required. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1). Rather, circumstantial evidence, such as the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances, can establish refusal without a direct statement of unwillingness. Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 102. An individual’s actions that completely frustrate the implied-consent procedure constitute test refusal. State v. Collins, 655 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. App. 2003)."

"Here, the district court found that the state proved that Doby constantly interrupted the officer during the reading of the implied-consent advisory, asked for an interpreter three times but had no need for an interpreter, and refused to respond three times when the officer asked if Doby wanted an attorney. Further, the district court found that when the officer asked Doby if he would take a breath test, Doby indicated that he needed an interpreter and that he did not understand, but never said yes or no. Doby argues that these circumstances support the alternative rational hypothesis that he did not refuse the test because he was not given enough time to consider his options and the officer did not sufficiently explain the test requirement. We disagree."

"Doby’s actions were inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than that he intended to frustrate the implied-consent procedure. There is no evidence in the record other than Doby’s testimony that he ever affirmatively indicated a willingness to take the test. The officer read the required advisory to Doby and gave him time to decide before treating Doby’s behavior as a refusal, and the body-camera footage does not show Doby asking for additional time. These actions demonstrate nothing other than an actual unwillingness to submit to chemical testing."

"Still, Doby argues that the officer did not give him enough time to process the implied-consent advisory and make an informed decision, and that he was not refusing. Rather, he asserts that he was asking for more time to make his decision. But the statute includes no minimum time period for giving the advisory; it only includes the information that an officer must convey to a person at the time of the breath test. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2. And an “officer is not required to wait for the driver to decide at his convenience whether or not he will submit to testing.” Gabrick v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a reasonably prompt decision whether the driver will take the test aligns with the purpose of the statute to protect the public from the hazards of intoxicated drivers). Furthermore, the officer asked Doby three times if he would submit to a test, and we have held that refusing to reply after three implied-consent advisories frustrates the testing process. Busch v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 257, 260 (Minn. App. 2000)."

"Finally, Doby posits that because his conduct was not persistent, extreme, offensive, and abusive from beginning to end, his conduct did not frustrate the testing process. But we have held that a simple refusal to answer the question “will you take the breath test” after it is asked once is enough to constitute a refusal to test. Gabrick, 393 N.W.2d at 25. Doby’s attempt to move the bar so that his conduct clears it is unavailing."

Moral Of The Story: Actions speak louder than words.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.