Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Sanchez (Decided October 14, 2024 Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that amenability to treatment is also a basis for the District to depart downward from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.

In Sanchez, the Defendant was found guilty by a jury of Felony DWI.The Defendant moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that she was particularly amenable to probation if she received chemical-dependency treatment.

A pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) noted that Sanchez has a lengthy criminal history, including four previous felony DWI convictions. Sanchez was also on probation when she committed the current offense. The PSI did not support a probationary sentence based on Sanchez’s continued use of drugs and alcohol and public-safety concerns. The probation agent recommended the presumptive 75-month prison sentence.

The district court granted Sanchez’s motion, finding that with Sanchez’s participation in DWI court comes a “high degree of monitoring” and “a higher probability” that Sanchez will successfully abstain from drugs and alcohol. Instead, the district court stayed the execution of the sentence for five years.

On appeal, the State argued the district court abused its discretion when it granted the dispositional departure. But the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court stating:

"A district court may depart from the presumptive sentence only when “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D. 1 (2022). This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant a motion for a dispositional departure for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). This court will rarely reverse the district court’s decision because of the district court’s considerable discretion in sentencing. Id. at 305, 307-08. We will affirm a district court’s decision “as long as the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a [sentencing] determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985)."

"I am going to grant the motion, because in this situation ... I don’t know about particular amenability. ... I don’t know that she’s going to be successful at treatment and stop, but I think there are substantial and compelling reasons and that one of those is she’s going to be monitored very, very, very, very, very closely from DWI Court and any kind of slip¬up, she’s probably going to be back in front of me for a probation violation."

"[T]hings will really be scrutinized if you come back with a probation violation, because you belong in prison, according to the guidelines. And you, just by yourself, are not a person that there should be a departure."

"But you with DWI Court provides a situation where you’ll have exceptional monitoring, potentially monitoring for a longer period than you would if you were in prison, because the probationary period will be for a full five years. And so there’s a much higher probability that you are going to be successful with probation, with the longer supervision and the accountability."

***

"The state argues that the district court should not have granted the departure because it did not find Sanchez particularly amenable to probation. But the district court noted that Sanchez would be very closely monitored and monitored longer than if she went to prison. See State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating that district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing impact of shorter prison sentence with no guarantee of treatment against treatment program and longer, highly structured probation), rev. denied (Minn Apr. 21, 1994). The district court is afforded great discretion, and it carefully considered the sentence."

Moral Of The Story: If a person does not stop driving drunk, they will end up dead or in prison.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

 The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is LaClair v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 27, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the police cannot enter the curtilage of a home in the early morning hours based upon a whim or idle curiosity.

In LaClair, a Lino Lakes police officer noticed a car, with its lights on, sitting in the driveway of a residence.  When the officer drove by the residence an hour later, the vehicle lights were still illuminated.  

The officer got out of his squad and walked up the driveway to the vehicle.  The officer walked up to the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed Mr. LaClair passed out in the driver's seat.

The officer walked over the the driver's side and opened the door without knocking.  Mr. LaClair woke up and admitted to drinking and driving.  LaClair was subsequently placed under arrest and his license was revoked.  

Mr. LaClair challenged the license revocation but the district court upheld the loss of his license.  On appeal, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court noting:

"Police must have a warrant to enter a constitutionally protected area, subject to limited exceptions. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10; Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. App. 2004). “If police enter a constitutionally protected area without a warrant, that entry is presumed to be unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed” if no exception applies. Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 747."

"These protections extend to the “curtilage,” or the area adjacent to a home. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). The path to the front door, however, invites visitors to approach and knock, and an officer may use this implied license just as any other citizen. Id. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The relevant question is whether an officer’s behavior falls within the scope of the implied license that extends to any member of the public. See id. (“Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). The scope of an implied license is limited in time and purpose as determined by social norms. See State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 586-88 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that officer violated social norms by taking a circuitous route and by lingering too long). 

***

"A late-night approach does not fall within the purview of an implied license absent an emergency or some evidence that the homeowner accepts visitors during those hours. United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2016); People v. Frederick, 895 N.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Mich. 2017) (discussing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415); see also United States v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the time of day is a relevant circumstance when analyzing whether a consent to search is voluntary)."

"The record shows, and the commissioner concedes, that there was no sign of emergency when Officer Cree entered LaClair’s driveway or approached the residence. LaClair was not visible in his vehicle. Officer Cree did not testify that anyone else was present. He did not observe any indication of imminent danger to anyone. There is no evidence that the lights in the home were illuminated or of any other sign that the occupants of the home would welcome visitors during sleeping hours. And the circumstances observed by Officer Cree before his entry onto the property did not give rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Instead, Officer Cree testified that he entered the property only to alert the homeowner of the potential for a dead car battery, which the commissioner concedes is a non-emergency. These are not the circumstances where an ordinary citizen would approach a home in the middle of the night. Accordingly, Officer Cree entered a constitutionally protected area without a warrant or an implied license, and evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed."

Moral Of The Story:  Don't entice the police with shiny objects.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Kalkbrenner (Decided August 12, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police can make stuff up to justify an automobile stop and as long as the court calls their claim a "reasonable mistake of fact" the stop will be upheld.

In Kalkbrenner, a police officer observed that the taillights on appellant’s vehicle were not illuminated and initiated a traffic stop. While speaking with appellant, the officer noticed multiple indicia of intoxication and placed appellant under arrest. Appellant was charged with third-degree impaired driving and a taillight infraction. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that the officer mistakenly thought the vehicle’s taillights were not illuminated and his mistake was objectively unreasonable. The parties stipulated to the underlying facts of the case and submitted the police reports and a statement from an automotive expert, which stated it is impossible to turn on the headlights without also turning on the taillights and that an examination of the vehicle four days after the stop indicated that all the lights were in working order. The district court did not hear any testimony and decided the matter based on the stipulated facts and briefing by the parties. The court assumed that the officer’s “observation of the taillights on [appellant]’s vehicle [w]as a mistake of fact,” and denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officer’s mistake was reasonable.

On appeal the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"Given the unrebutted expert testimony and the report from the body shop, the district court found that the officer “may have made a mistake of fact” regarding the taillights. However, the court concluded that “[b]ased upon the stipulated record before the Court, assuming [the officer]’s observation of the taillights on [the] vehicle as a mistake of fact, the Officer’s mistake was reasonable.”2 Minnesota law recognizes that an officer’s “honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003). Further, a good-faith and reasonable mistake of fact will not invalidate an otherwise valid stop. See State v. Sanders, 339 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. 1983) (holding that stop based on a reasonable mistake of identify was lawful). Even if the officer made a mistake of fact as to the taillights, there is no evidence in this record that his mistake was the product of “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” or unreasonable. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996). As such, the officer’s traffic stop was not “unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254."

I can't object to the appellate court's analysis as they were stuck with the district court's finding that the mistake was "reasonable". But the district court's ruling that the mistake was "reasonable" is absurd.  Either the tail lights were on or they were off.  Their condition is not something that is "reasonably mistaken". I know that when I drive down the highway, I often cannot tell if the car in front of me has working tail lights at night.  I mean, give me a break.

Moral Of The Story:  Get the squad video for every DWI case.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is State v. Preston (Decided August 5, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police may conduct a traffic stop if they observe a partially obscured license plate.

In Preston, Beltrami County Sheriff's Deputy Bender was monitoring traffic when the Defendant drove past.  The Deputy was unable to read Defendant's license plate number as it was obstructed by a dangling light.

Deputy Bender initiated a traffic stop. He then approached the car and recognized the Defendant. Deputy Bender knew Defendant's driver’s license was cancelled. Preston was arrested and Deputy Bender searched the vehicle and found numerous smoking devices, marijuana, and an open container of alcoholic iced tea. Appellant admitted to smoking methamphetamine six hours earlier. A search warrant was obtained and executed, and appellant’s blood tested positive for methamphetamine.

Defendant was charged with driving after cancellation, DWI and 5th Degree possession. Mr. Preston filed a motion to suppress arguing the initial stop of his vehicle was not valid. 

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:

"Minnesota law prohibits obstructing the view of a license plate. “The person driving the motor vehicle shall keep the plate legible and unobstructed ... so that the lettering is plainly visible at all times.” Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subd. 7 (2016). In finding that appellant violated this traffic law, the district court relied on a photograph of the license plate and testimony from Deputy Bender. The photograph, taken at the time of the traffic stop, shows a light dangling over the last three letters of the license plate. One letter is obstructed and another letter is partially obstructed. Further, Deputy Bender testified that the light made the license plate “difficult to see.” Because the record supports the district court’s factual finding that the license plate was obstructed and this provided Deputy Bender with a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant’s vehicle, we affirm."

Moral Of The Story: He should have joined the "clean plate" club!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Handeland (Decided June 24, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that ANY time spent in a Minnesota jail or for a mental evaluation must be credited when imposing jail time for an unrelated offense.

In 2012, the Defendant was convicted of First Degree DWI in Mille Lacs County and was given a sentence of 42 months stayed, with the Defendant to serve to 180 days jail, 60 of which were done in the jail facility with the remainder on electronic home monitoring. 

Mr. Handeland was arrested in April 2016 in Benton County for Felony DWI.  The District Court in Benton County found the Defendant incompetent to stand trial and he was ordered into the state's competency restoration program at the  Anoka County Treatment Center. Mr. Handeland was found competent in November 2016 and his Benton County case resumed, resulting in a guilty plea in April 2018.

In between the Defendant's return to competency and his April 2018 plea, he managed to get arrested on two separate fifth-degree controlled-substance offenses and spent additional days in local jails related to those offenses.

At the Defendant's 2018 sentencing in Benton County, the district court sentenced Handeland to 60 months in prison, stayed execution of the sentence and placed him on probation for seven years. The court awarded the Defendant 194 days of jail credit.

Mille Lacs County then brought the Defendant back to face a probation revocation hearing. The district revoked Handeland's probation and sentenced him to 42 months in prison and only awarded the Defendant eight days of custody credit.  How stupid!

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lack of custody credit and does a nice job explaining when a Defendant is entitled to credit for jail time and treatment. As stated by the Court:

"Between his 2012 Mille Lacs County arrest for DWI and the 2018 execution of his 42-month sentence for that DWI, Handeland spent approximately 389 days in custody. Those days largely fall into three buckets: the days spent in the Mille Lacs County jail related to the 2012 DWI; the days spent in local jails related to other convictions (primarily an additional DWI arrest and conviction in Benton County) and days spent in examination and treatment as part of his competency restoration. To properly calculate Handeland’s custody credit, we first address the Mille Lacs County jail time, clearly related to the underlying DWI conviction. Next, because both the second and third buckets of days involve unconnected cases, we then turn to the issue of how to evaluate credit for intrajurisdictional custody. Finally, we address the custody-credit standards for secure treatment for competency-restoration purposes."

60 Days In Mille Lacs County Jail:

"The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly state that a criminal defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody “in connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B) (emphasis added). As the state concedes on appeal, although these days were not discussed at Handeland’s probation-violation hearing, they clearly were time spent in custody in connection with the original sentence and should count as custody credit."

Credit for Custody in Unconnected Cases:

In State v. Brown, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that jail time spent out-of-state will not be credited unless it is connected to the offense for which the Defendant is being sentenced.  But this does not apply to in-state, but unrelated cases.  The reason is, "In evaluating credit for intrajurisdictional custody, we seek to avoid four potential concerns: “de facto conversion of a concurrent sentence into a consecutive sentence; indigent persons serving effectively longer sentences as a result of their inability to post bail; irrelevant factors . . . affecting the length of incarceration; and manipulation of charging dates by the prosecutor so as to increase the length of incarceration"(citations omitted).

"Having reviewed the governing approach to intrajurisdictional credit, we turn to the time Handeland spent in other local jails. This constitutes 194 days—primarily related to the Benton County DWI—between his original Mille Lacs County sentencing and his probation revocation five years later....To deny credit without evaluating these days in light of the intrajurisdictional approach described above was error."

Mental Health Treatment Credit:

The Court of Appeals notes that Rule 20.01, subd. 11, states: "If the defendant is convicted, any time spent confined to a hospital or other facility for a mental examination under this rule must be credited as time served."

"As the state suggests, the rule only dictates jail credit for the examination period. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 11. But our inquiry does not end with this rule. As this court explained in Bonafide, the language of the rule may simply not address—rather than affirmatively exclude—credit for competency-restoration treatment during a commitment."

"And to examine this issue of credit for treatment, the Bonafide court first looked at the supreme court’s expansion of custodial credit, in light of “the philosophy behind the rule.” Id. at 214. This court also, citing other state court decisions, explained that “the degree of deprivation of liberty in a mental commitment facility is equivalent to a jail or prison facility.” Id. And this court took note of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard, which provides that a defendant detained for examination of competence “or treatment... to effect competence to stand trial should receive credit against any sentence ultimately imposed for the time of such pretrial confinement.” Id. at 215. As a result, the Bonafide court interpreted rules 20.01 and 27.03, subd. 4, as requiring credit against sentence for custodial time spent in a secure hospital under a rule 20 presentence commitment procedure.  We see no reason to retreat from Bonafide, to the more restrictive reading of rule 20 the state suggests."

Moral Of The Story:  In Minnesota, we give credit where credit is due!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Anderson (Decided June 17, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that the use of a prior implied consent license revocation to enhance the severity of the current DWI charge does not violate due process provided the prior implied consent license revocation is "final" prior to the conviction for the current offense.  This case just basically follows State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 2007).

In Anderson, the defendant was arrested for DWI on October 2, 2016 and on December 18, 2016.  Anderson filed a challenge to the October DWI license revocation but in April 2017, Anderson waived his right to further judicial review of the October license revocation.

On August 7, 2017. the state charged Anderson with 2nd Degree DWI Refusal using the October license revocation to enhance the charges stemming from his December 2016 arrest.

The Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss the 2nd degree charge arguing that at the time the December offense was committed, the challenge to the October license revocation was not "final" and the revocation could not be used to enhance the present charge.  The Court of Appeals rejected the argument stating"

"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee due process of law for criminal defendants. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. Due process requires an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” State v. Krause, 817 N.W.2d 136, 145 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)) (other quotation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that when an administrative proceeding, such as a license revocation, plays a “critical role” in imposing a subsequent criminal sanction, “there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding.” United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (1987). Accordingly, some “means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense."

***

"In Wiltgen, the supreme court applied the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at 568-70 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903). After weighing the Mathews factors, the supreme court determined that the combined private interest and risk of an erroneous deprivation outweighed the government interest. Id. The supreme court held that the potential prejudice to the defendant “from the use of an unreviewed administrative revocation to enhance a subsequent DWI rises to the level of a violation of [the defendant’s] right to procedural due process.” Id. at 570."

"In footnote seven of Wiltgen, the supreme court considered whether the state was prejudiced by its ruling and determined that it was not. Id. at 572 n.7. The supreme court reasoned that, in future cases, the state “can delay the issuance of a second-degree DWI complaint until after the implied consent hearing has been conducted and the revocation has been sustained, or can charge third-degree DWI before the implied consent hearing and amend the complaint to add a second-degree DWI charge after the hearing."

***

"Like the defendant in Heino, Anderson filed, then waived review of, his petition for judicial review of his 2016 license revocation before the state served a complaint that asserted an aggravating factor for his 2016 DWI. Although Heino involved a defendant’s property interest, and Anderson’s due-process claim involves his liberty interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is slight for Anderson. See Heino, 762 N.W.2d at 264 (concluding that “the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal”). If Anderson had proceeded with judicial review of the 2016 license revocation and successfully obtained a rescission, then the state could not have used his revocation as an aggravating factor for his 2016 DWI."

Moral Of The Story:  If you can delay and delay and delay justice, you may be able to deny it!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Platt v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided April 29, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you act like a jerk, you will get jerked around.

In Platt, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI and the arresting officer obtained a search warrant for a sample of Mr. Platt's blood or urine. Platt refused to submit to blood testing and said that he would submit to urine testing, but demanded time and water in order to provide the sample. Over the next hour, the officer would check in to see if Platt was prepared to give the sample, but Platt repeatedly indicated that he needed more time. In all of his interactions with the officer, Platt was insulting and profane, frequently shouting over the officer. The officer determined that Platt’s conduct amounted to test refusal, and so informed the commissioner of public safety, leading the commissioner to revoke Platt’s license.

Platt filed a challenge to the license revocation in district court arguing that : (1) his license cannot be revoked as the officer did not read him the statutorily mandated advisory and (2) that his right to due process was violated as he was not told that his refusal to submit to testing was a crime.

The district court upheld the license revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed noting that they need not decide the merits of Mr. Platt's arguments as there are a long line of cases which hold that a driver's misbehavior constitutes a waiver of rights under the implied consent law. Or, as stated by the Court:

"Drivers who are arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated have a duty to avoid frustrating the implied-consent testing process. State v. Collins, 655 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003). When a driver’s conduct prevents officers from completing the implied-consent procedure, the driver is deemed to have waived his or her rights under that process. See State v. Busch, 614 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that a driver who frustrated the implied consent process by his silence had waived his right to an attorney). Thus, where a driver prevented an officer from reading the implied-consent advisory by “screaming, swearing, making accusations of rape, and insisting that she would not listen,” the driver could be convicted for test refusal even though the implied-consent advisory was not read and she was never provided with an opportunity to contact an attorney. Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 658. Although Collins and Busch address the limited right to counsel, their rationale applies here. See id.; Busch, 614 N.W.2d at 259-60; see also Sigfrinius v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 378 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that a driver’s conduct frustrates administration of the test where his conduct is “calculated to avoid any ‘suspension’ of his license”). Accepting Platt’s argument that implied consent cases also apply to Minn. Stat. § 171.177, a driver receiving a warrant advisory may not frustrate the advisory and then contest the revocation because the advisory was not given."

Moral Of The Story:  If you have been arrested, don't make matter worse for yourself by being a jerk.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Rusthoven which stands for the proposition that if you act like you have something to hide, you are going to get searched by the police.

In Rusthoven, the Defendant was stopped for speeding in Swift County, Minnesota. When Deputy Hoffman approached the Defendant's truck, he noticed Mr. Rusthoven was, "very fidgety and very agitated".  When Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven if he was under the influence of a controlled substance, Rusthoven became “even more agitated.”

The deputy returned to his squad car to look up Rusthoven’s driver’s license. The search revealed that Rusthoven’s license was restricted, requiring that, if any drugs were found in his system, his license would be invalidated. The deputy returned to speak with Rusthoven and observed that, "his arms were constantly moving, just back and forth, up and down. He would take his hat over [sic] very quickly and put it on very quickly and he was always, you know, it appeared that he was always digging around inside the vehicle or moving his arms inside the vehicle."

Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit the vehicle, but Rusthoven refused. This made the deputy “fairly nervous.” The deputy waited to take further action until a second deputy arrived.

When a second deputy arrived, Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit his vehicle again. After several requests from both deputies, Rusthoven did so. Deputy Hoffman performed a pat-down search for weapons and thought that he felt a methamphetamine pipe in Rusthoven’s front pocket. Deputy Hoffman told Rusthoven that he was under arrest.

A search warrant was obtained to get a sample of Rusthoven's blood. The blood tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mr. Rusthoven was charged with felony DWI and he moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing the deputy did not have a reason suspicion to expand the stop and conduct a pat-down for weapons.  The district court denied Rusthoven’s motions, finding that each expansion of the stop was justified.  

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"To be constitutional, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). The supreme court has summarized Terry as follows: “[E]ven in the absence of probable cause, the police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted); accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)."

***

"Based on the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. The deputy observed indicia of drug use and found that Rusthoven’s license was restricted from prior drug use. In addition, Rusthoven was unwilling to cooperate with the deputies’ requests to exit the vehicle. Based on those facts, combined with Rusthoven’s “erratic and agitated” movements, including “digging around inside the vehicle,” “moving his arms inside the vehicle,” and “fidgeting with everything,” the deputy reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. At that point, given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman possessed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous, justifying a pat-down frisk for weapons."

Moral Of The Story:  If you get fidgety, the cops will get frisky!


If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Shaw (Decided April 15, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a fish house, within the curtilage of a home, is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

In Shaw, the police received a report that the Defendant hit a utility pole with his vehicle and then left the scene.  The police were given the license plate number of the vehicle and they used this information to go to the Defendant's residence.  When the police arrived at the home, they came in contact with the Defendant's mother who told them that Defendant was not in the residence.  She refused to allow the police to search the home.  Defendant's mother did consent to a search of the garage.

The police searched the garage but did not find Shaw. The deputies observed Shaw’s vehicle, the one involved in the accident, parked in the grass behind the home. They noted that the engine was warm to the touch, indicating that it had recently been driven, and a deputy testified that he also observed patches of dead grass indicating that a vehicle had been parked in the backyard at other times. Behind the home, the deputies also found an old, dilapidated fish house with grass growing around it. The grass in front of the fish house was matted down, indicating that someone had recently entered it. A deputy approached the fish house and called out for Shaw, who did not respond. The deputy opened the door to the fish house and discovered Shaw inside. Shaw subsequently failed field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of DWI.

The Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that the fish house was a constitutionally protected area which the police could not enter without a warrant.  The district court denied the motion but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"In State v. Larsen, the supreme court considered whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a fish house. 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002)....The supreme court considered “the nature of the premises [in Larsen]—a fish house, erected and equipped to protect its occupants from the elements and often providing eating, sleeping, and other facilities—as providing privacy for activities recognized and permitted by society.” Id. at 149 (quotation omitted). The supreme court noted that “[w]hile clearly not a substitute for one’s private dwelling, during the period of occupancy important activities of a personal nature take place” within a fish house. Id. The supreme court concluded that Larsen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his fish house."  

But in this case the Court of Appeals held that Larsen does not apply as, "The record here does not suggest that Shaw was living in the fish house. Moreover, a dilapidated, overgrown fish house located in the backyard of a residence does not provide “eating, sleeping, and other facilities” as a fish house located on a lake would. Id. This case is distinguishable from Larsen, and therefore Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fish house."

The Court of Appeals further ruled, however, that:

"The “land immediately surrounding and associated with the home,” the curtilage, is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984). To determine whether an area is located within the curtilage of the property, appellate courts look to “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection."

"The United States Supreme Court has identified four relevant factors to use when determining whether a disputed area falls within the curtilage:

[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
[2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 
[3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and 
[4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.

"The fish house was located in the backyard of a residential, single-family home. “The backyard and driveway of a home are often considered to be within the curtilage of a home.” State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2018). Like the defendant in Chute, Shaw “does not live on a large piece of rural property” but rather “lives in a single-family home.” See id. Thus, the first Dunn factor—proximity to the home—weighs in Shaw’s favor."

"The record is less clear regarding the remaining Dunn factors. There was no testimony as to whether the property was enclosed by a fence, shielded by trees, or otherwise protected from observation. “The curtilage of a home, however, need not be completely shielded from public view.” Id. at 585. Thus, the second and fourth factors are neutral. As to the third Dunn factor, one deputy testified that it appeared from patches of dead grass that a vehicle had been parked in the backyard before, and the deputies discovered Shaw’s vehicle parked in the backyard that day. This indicates that Shaw may have used the backyard as a place to park his vehicle, and this kind of use is “closely related to the home and associated with the privacies of life.” See id. (concluding that portion of defendant’s backyard where he had parked a camper was curtilage). Therefore, this factor weighs in Shaw’s favor."

"In sum, consideration of the Dunn factors demonstrate that the backyard in which the fish house was located was within the curtilage of Shaw’s home, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and the deputies therefore were required to obtain a warrant to search the fish house..."

Moral Of The Story:  Even if something fishy is going on, the police still need a warrant to enter the house! 

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Junker v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 25, 2019, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that a person who burps during the observation period is not entitled to have the data master test result thrown out unless they can prove the test results were affected by the burp.

In Junker, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and tested at a .09 % BAC on the data master machine.  Petitioner challenged his license revocation arguing that he burped during the observation period and, therefore, the test result was unreliable.  The district court sustained the revocation of the license and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:

"...the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and officer training require that a driver be observed for at least 15 minutes before a breath test is administered. The purpose of the observation period is to ensure that mouth alcohol does not contaminate a driver’s breath samples. For breath-test results to be admitted into evidence, the commissioner has the burden of establishing that the test is reliable and that the administration of the test conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure its reliability. State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. 1977). To meet this burden, a breathalyzer test must be “conducted by a certified operator,” and the commissioner must establish “that the machine was in proper working order and the chemicals in proper condition.” Bielejeski v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 351 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Minn. App. 1984). After the breath-test results are admitted, the burden shifts to the driver to challenge the credibility of the results."

"...the district court found that Junker burped during the observation period. But even though Junker proved that he burped during the observation period, he failed to demonstrate that the burping actually affected his breath- test results. See Hounsell, 401 N.W.2d at 96 (stating that to meet burden, driver must sufficiently demonstrate that his test results were affected by the burping)."

"...the caselaw is clear: “Even if a driver can prove that he had something in his mouth, he must also demonstrate that the substance actually affected his results.” Id. Additionally, the commissioner offered substantial evidence that DataMaster has built-in safeguards that provide an invalid result if the system detects mouth alcohol. The Trooper Anderson testified that Junker’s test results passed the machine’s internal test, and Junker did not refute this evidence."

Moral Of The Story:  When you burp, it is not enough to say "excuse me".

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Stark (Decided March 18, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that an officer's observations of DWI impairment are direct and not circumstantial evidence.  

In Stark, a police officer was following a vehicle when he observed it rapidly accelerate and pass another vehicle without signaling. The officer estimated that the vehicle was traveling between 75 and 80 miles per hour on a gravel road.   The officer gave chase and observed numerous traffic violations during his pursuit, including failure to signal turns and a lane change, failure to stop at stop signs, and speeding. The officer turned on his emergency lights in order to initiate a traffic stop. The driver of the vehicle did not stop, but instead continued to speed, drive erratically, and take turns at dangerous speeds. The officer testified that he felt that, based on his observations of the vehicle and the manner in which the driver would approach intersections and turns, the driver’s depth perception was off.

After an eight-mile chase, the vehicle stopped at an intersection. The officer announced to the driver that he was under arrest and ordered him to put his hands out of the window. The driver put his hands out of the window, with his middle fingers extended, and repeatedly swore at the officer, stating that he would not listen. This behavior continued for around eight minutes before a police dog was brought to the driver’s side of the vehicle, and, although the driver refused to open his door, eventually several officers were able to remove the driver and place him under arrest for fleeing a police officer. The driver was then identified by his ID as appellant. Despite being handcuffed, Defendant remained defiant to commands. At this time, the officer suspected Defendant was impaired due to the officer’s observation of his erratic driving.

At the jail, the officer spoke to Defendant and observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his pupils were dilated. Based on the officer’s drug-recognition-expert training, he knew these to be indications of impairment either by alcohol or controlled substances. Based on the officer’s training, the next step in his investigation of possible impairment was to subject appellant to standardized field sobriety assessments. When the officer attempted to conduct the first test, which involved shining a light in appellant’s eyes and having him follow movement, Defendant informed the officer that he would not comply with any testing. The officer read Defendant the implied-consent advisory and requested a breath test. Defendant refused. The officer asked again if Defendant would submit to a breath test, but he again refused.

Defendant was charged with first-degree DWI—test refusal, three counts of DWI— impaired driving, fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle, and driving after cancellation.  The District Court dismissed the three DWI counts but not the fleeing or test refusal count.  The Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as to the test refusal charge.

The Defendant urged the Court of Appeals to find the state’s evidence of probable cause of impairment, which consisted of squad and booking-room video evidence and testimony from the arresting officer regarding his direct observations, was circumstantial.  Defendant, therefore, argued the appellate court should apply the two-step analysis for evaluating the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant's argument noting that:
 "...State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (“[W]hen reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, our first task is to identify the circumstances proved. . . . Our second step is to examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved; this includes inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” 

"Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step that is not required with direct evidence. Id."

"Probable cause of appellant’s impairment was proved with direct, and not circumstantial, evidence. The officer’s direct observations of appellant were sufficient to support probable cause of impairment by alcohol, drugs, or both."

Moral Of The Story: You can run but you cannot hide!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Lane (Decided March 4, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you are told by the district court that it rejects the plea deal and affords you the opportunity to withdraw said plea, you can't complain about the subsequent sentence if you continue with the guilty plea.  Well, duh.  Sometimes I don't understand why people bother to appeal.

In Lane, the Defendant was charged with First Degree DWI and First Degree DWI Refusal.  Ms. Lane reached an agreement with the prosecutor wherein she agreed to plead guilty to felony refusal in exchange for bottom-of-the-box sentence.

The pre-plea sentencing worksheet indicated the Defendant had a criminal history score of six.  According the the sentencing guidelines, the Defendant was looking at a maximum penalty of 84 months, with a bottom-of-the-box score of 62 months. The Defendant pled guilty and the district court explained it would reserve acceptance of the plea until sentencing.

A pre-sentence investigation report was completed and it was learned the Defendant's criminal history score was four instead of six.  This gave the Defendant a lower bottom-of-the-box score of 51 months.

The district court rejected the previously deferred plea agreement. It informed the Defendant that, if she chose to maintain her plea of guilty and proceed to sentencing, the district court’s intention was to impose a top-of-the-box prison term of 72 months based on a criminal history score of four. The district court explained that it would allow the Defendant to either withdraw her guilty plea or proceed with sentencing. Defendant conferred with her attorney and then informed the district court that she wanted to maintain her plea of guilty and proceed with sentencing for the felony test-refusal offense. The district court sentenced Defendant to 72 months in prison, with 84-days credit for time served and a five-year conditional release period.

On appeal, Ms. Lane argued the court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting:

"When a plea is entered and the defendant questioned, the trial court judge must reject or accept the plea of guilty on the terms of the plea agreement.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1). The district court may postpone its acceptance or rejection until it has received the results of a presentence investigation (PSI). Id. “If the court rejects the plea agreement, it must advise the parties in open court and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.” Id. see also Tyska, 448 N.W.2d at 549 (further explaining Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1)).

"Appellant argues that the district court’s rejection of her plea was arbitrary, and that she is entitled to receive the agreed-upon bottom-of-the-box sentence. But because the district court expressly withheld acceptance or rejection of this plea until sentencing, and provided appellant with the opportunity to withdraw or affirm her guilty plea after it declined to accept the agreement, the district court acted within its discretion."

Moral Of The Story:  There ain't no deal until the court says there's a deal!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.