Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waldron (Decided December 26, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to talk to the police.

In Waldron, the defendant approached a house in Hibbing Minnesota looking for held after a single-car crash.  Waldron was injured and smelled of alcohol, and the homeowners summoned emergency assistance. A state trooper was the first emergency worker to arrive. The trooper located the car, which was in a ditch about 40 yards away from the road, and he confirmed that it was unoccupied. Then, the trooper went to the house to meet with Ms. Waldron.

Waldron was lying on the entryway floor, bloodied, and crying, and the homeowners were nearby. The trooper called for an ambulance. When the trooper asked Waldron for her name, she did not respond and moaned in pain. The homeowners told the trooper that Waldron had told them her name and had said her boyfriend was the driver. When the trooper asked Waldron what she had been doing at the time of the crash and whether she had been wearing a seatbelt, Waldron said she was not driving and asked about her boyfriend’s whereabouts. The trooper radioed for assistance in locating the missing boyfriend.

Another officer arrived at the home, and asked Waldron for the name of the boyfriend they should be looking for. This officer asked Waldron whether the boyfriend had been driving. Waldron responded that her boyfriend was not the driver.

Ms. Waldron was taken to a local hospital and her blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant.  The blood test result revealed an alcohol concentration level of .188%.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and moved to suppress the statements she had made to law enforcement arguing the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"To determine whether an individual was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda requirement, a court should consider the surrounding circumstances. State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012). Factors suggesting that a person was in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;

(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And factors suggesting that an individual was not in custody include brief questioning, a nonthreatening environment, an explicit statement by police that the person is not under arrest, and police allowing the person to make phone calls or leave after they gave their statement. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

"Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 10-11 (quotation omitted); see also Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

***

"Based on the district court’s undisputed factual findings, we determine, based on our independent review, that there was no custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, considering the surrounding circumstances, Waldron was not in custody when she was questioned. At the outset of Waldron’s encounter with law enforcement—and, indeed, for the majority of that encounter—there was just one law enforcement officer present. The homeowners were also present during the encounter, and they were also interacting with law enforcement. Waldron was not in a police station, jail, or a squad car. She was lying on the floor of a house that she entered on her own initiative. And the responding trooper made clear that medical help had been summoned for Waldron. The questions posed by law enforcement were not accusatory. Rather, they were open-ended attempts to figure out what had happened and whether there was another injured person outside in the cold. The totality of these circumstances indicates that Waldron was not in custody when she made the statements at issue. See Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11 (instructing district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual is in custody for the purpose of a Miranda warning).

Second, there was no interrogation. Police are not required to give a Miranda warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. This includes “on-the-scene questioning” of individuals suspected of driving while under the influence. See Steinberg v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”). Here, law enforcement officers asked Waldron general on-the-scene questions after responding to a serious car accident. These questions did not amount to an interrogation."

"Because there was no custodial interrogation, no Miranda warning was required."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Ness v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the failure to read verbatim the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory is not fatal as long as the advisory given is not inaccurate, misleading or confusing.

In Ness, the Petitioner was arrested for driving while impaired and was taken to jail.  The arresting officer asked the Petitioner if he preferred to take a blood or a urine test. The Petitioner responded that the officer was not going to obtain either test from him.

The officer obtained a search warrant authorizing him to procure either a blood or urine sample from appellant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer approached Petitioner's holding cell, stated Petitioner's name, and asked Petitioner to come talk to him. Petitioner was lying down on the cell bed, was wrapped in a blanket with his eyes closed, and did not get up or respond to the officer. The officer informed Petitioner, “as I told you before, I was drafting a search warrant for your blood or urine because of the DWI, and I have a signed search warrant in my hand, and refusing to submit to that search warrant is a crime.” The officer asked Petitioner if he understood. The officer testified that appellant did not respond and was ignoring him, but that at one point Petitioner opened his eyes and looked at him while adjusting his blanket before continuing to ignore him.  The officer asked Petitioner if he was refusing to give the officer a test, to which Petitioner did not reply.

The officer then told Petitioner that he was taking his silence as a refusal, and asked if Petitioner understood. Petitioner again did not reply. The officer informed Petitioner that he was leaving Petitioner a copy of the search warrant but Petitioner's noncompliance with the warrant would be considered a refusal and he would be charged with an additional crime. The officer then issued a Notice and Order Of Revocation of the Petitioner's driver's license.

The Petitioner challenged the revocation of his license asserting that his refusal to submit to testing was not properly obtained.  Petitioner claimed that since the officer failed to read the search warrant advisory statutory language verbatim, and failed to offer both a blood or urine test, the revocation of his license must be rescinded.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4. “At the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Id., subd. 1. 

"Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 2, provides, in part, that:

The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test,     the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine.

Action may only be taken against a person who is offered and refuses both a urine test and a blood test. Id., subd. 2."

"This court has determined that the warning requirement under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous and law enforcement is required to inform a defendant that refusal to submit to a warranted blood or urine test is a crime. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103,110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20,2019)."

***

"In Nash, this court considered whether law enforcement provided the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, when a state trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” 989 N.W.2d at 706. Even though the warrant also permitted a urine test, the trooper did not mention the possibility of a urine test, and Nash did not have an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to the blood test. Id. at 710. We concluded that “the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading,” and could not be a basis for Nash’s license revocation. Id. at 710-11. We held that if a search-warrant advisory deviates from the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, it “is insufficient to sustain the revocation of a person’s driving privileges if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing when considered in its context as a whole.” 

"Although here the officer’s search-warrant advisory did not comply with the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, Nash supports that a deviation is only problematic if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing in its context. 989 N.W.2d at 711. Here, the officer’s advisory was legally accurate and properly advised appellant of the consequences of his refusal. The officer testified that at the jail and prior to applying for a search warrant, he asked appellant whether he preferred a blood or urine test, to which appellant responded that he would provide neither. After applying for and receiving a search warrant, the officer told appellant that he had obtained a signed search warrant for appellant’s blood or urine, and that refusing to submit to the search warrant was a crime."

"The plain language of subdivision 2 does not require law enforcement to separately direct the tests. A peace officer who directs a test “shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant,” and if the warrant authorizes both, the peace officer “may direct whether the test is ofblood or urine.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If a person objects to one test, the peace officer shall offer the other test. Id. The statute does not prohibit a peace officer from simultaneously offering a urine or a blood test. “Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.” Id. Here, the officer testified to offering both types of tests to appellant before the officer obtained a search warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer again indicated to appellant that both tests were authorized by the search warrant before informing appellant that refusal to comply with the search warrant was a crime. The officer therefore complied with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2."

Moral Of The Story: Close enough for government work. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Graham (Decided November 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the unintentional destruction of the squad video does not violate Due Process.

Mr. Graham was charged with second-degree DWI and he challenged the stop and arrest.  The arresting officer testified that he observed Mr. Graham drive his vehicle over the fog line and make a "sloppy right turn, and cross into oncoming traffic before correcting into the proper lane. The arresting officer testified that his squad car’s video system automatically activates when an officer turns on the vehicle’s emergency lights, and the captured footage will often include a few minutes of video prior to the activation of the lights. He further testified he believed Graham’s driving conduct was automatically recorded by the squad camera.

Defense counsel was then given leave by the Court to obtain a copy of the squad video. The state later informed the district court that the squad video did not exist and requested that the record be closed.  Graham moved the district court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the loss or destruction of the squad video constituted a due-process violation. The district court held a second omnibus hearing and received testimony from the arresting officer and his chief of police.

The police chief testified testified that he oversees the sergeants assigned to managing, transferring, and storing videos; that he searched for and could not locate the video recording of Graham’s traffic stop; and that all recordings labeled as medical calls were “deleted for 2019 to free up some space on our server.” He testified that “it’s to the point where test recordings, traffic warnings and medicals take up a lot of space on our internal storage, and it’s my belief that after a year or two if there haven’t been any complaints” then “we just delete them,” and that “[t]he only person in our department that has the password to remove the files [is] myself.” He testified, “I might have deleted it if it was labeled as a test recording, as a medical or as a traffic warning.”

The district court denied Graham’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that there was “an equal likelihood the squad video could have inculpated [Graham] as it could have exculpated him.” The district court determined that the squad video was not destroyed in bad faith, that the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent "at the time of destruction".

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court stating:

"In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Thus, “[u]nder Brady, the suppression by the [s]tate, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Walen v. State, 111 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010)."

"The three elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Id. If evidence that is only potentially useful to a defendant is destroyed, then the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state to establish a due-process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 (1988)."

*    *    *

"The district court reasoned that the video was not material because there was an equal likelihood that the video was inculpatory, and not exculpatory...The district court’s reasoning is sound, and we agree that the video was not “material.” There must be something beyond mere “hope” that the destroyed evidence could be exculpatory before it will be protected as the type of “material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady”.

"Because the video was not material and was only “potentially useful,” Graham must show bad faith on the part of the state to succeed on his due-process claim. The United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have identified two indices of bad faith: (1) the state’s purposeful destruction of evidence favorable to a defendant so as to conceal it; and (2) the state’s failure to follow standard procedures when destroying evidence. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 373."

"The record does not support a conclusion that the state purposely destroyed the video.  The district court expressly found that “while the video may have been destroyed due to mistake or gross negligence, the [c]ourt does not find the video was intentionally destroyed.” And the circumstances do not suggest that the state was attempting to conceal the video. In fact, but for Officer Etshokin’s testimony at the initial omnibus hearing, which revealed the existence of the video, Graham would not have known about the video. Nor does the record support a conclusion that the state failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the video."

"In sum, because the video was not “material” and the record does not show that the video was destroyed in bad faith, the district court did not err by denying Graham’s motion to dismiss for a due-process violation."

Moral Of The Story: Counsel should have immediately obtained the squad video as reference thereto is always contained in the police reports.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Baumgartner v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 2, 2023, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that where the facts conflict, the lower court's findings prevail.

In Baumgartner, Olivia Police Sergeant Aaron Clouse initiated an investigative traffic stop after observing that a vehicle’s driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate. Mr. Baumgartner was subsequently arrested for DWI and he filed a challenge to the revocation of his license arguing that the officer did not have a basis to make the initial stop.

Officer Clouse testified at the license revocation hearing that he saw Baumgartner’s vehicle activate its righthand turn signal as it approached an intersection. Clouse observed that the vehicle’s turn signal illuminated but not the driver’s side brake light. Clouse testified that it was “very clear” that the driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate. Clouse stopped the vehicle for the equipment violation. Baumgartner testified that his brake lights did not illuminate because he drives manual transmission and prefers to reduce speed by downshifting the vehicle rather than use his brakes.

The district court received the video recording of the stop taken from the camera on Clouse’s squad car into evidence at the hearing. The video shows the passenger’s side brake light illuminate for a moment before the vehicle’s turn signal began blinking. The driver’s side brake light, however, did not illuminate as the passenger’s side light did. The squad video also depicts Baumgartner and Clouse testing the vehicle’s lights after Baumgartner pulled over. As Baumgartner pressed on the brakes of his vehicle, the video shows that the brake lights did not immediately illuminate. Eventually, however, both the driver’s and passenger’s side brake lights illuminated as Baumgartner and Clouse tested the brake lights.

The district court issued an order sustaining the revocation of Baumgartner’s driver’s license. It found that Clouse initiated the traffic stop based on his observation of an equipment violation—that the driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate—and that this observation provided sufficient suspicion to initiate the investigative detention.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"Clouse’s testimony and the squad video support the district court’s finding. Clouse testified that he stopped Baumgartner’s vehicle because he “observed that the driver’s side [brake] light did not illuminate.” Clouse further explained that this it was “very clear” that the light failed to illuminate as the vehicle slowed down. In addition, the district court determined that “the vehicle[’s] . . . driver’s side brake light did not illuminate” but, “[t]he other taillights, including the passenger’s side brake light, appeared to be in working order.” Our review of the squad video does not leave us with the firm conviction that the district court erred in making this finding. Rather, consistent with Clouse’s testimony, the driver’s side brake light does not appear to illuminate as the passenger’s side brake light does before the turn signal begins to blink."

"Baumgartner directs us to his testimony that he would routinely downshift the manual transmission in the vehicle to avoid braking. The district court, however, discounted Baumgartner’s testimony, determining that Baumgartner’s testimony was “evasive, inconsistent, and not credible at times.” We must we defer to this credibility determination. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Based on the findings, we must assume that the district court found [the petitioner to be] credible.”); Umphlett v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995) (determining that the district court “implicitly found that officer’s testimony was more credible”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995)."

"We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual finding that Clouse observed the driver’s side brake light malfunction because we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, do not reweigh conflicting evidence, and there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding."

Moral Of The Story: A fact is not a fact until the district court finds that it is.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Majors (Decided September 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a district court judge is not required to find that something is true just because a state trooper claims that it is true!

In Majors, the defendant was stopped late Saturday night by a state trooper for driving the wrong way on a one-way street in downtown Minneapolis.  When the trooper approached the vehicle, Ms. Majors explained that she was on her way to work nearby and turned onto Second Avenue, despite knowing it is a one-way, because her usual path to her parking location was blocked. 

The trooper requested her driver’s license and insurance card, which she provided “without delay or difficulty” while reiterating that she was on her way to work. He then asked, one minute into their interaction, “What time was your last drink?” She said it was at midnight and, upon further questioning, acknowledged having two drinks. The trooper directed her to get out of the vehicle for field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT), which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.15. He arrested Majors, and she was charged with two DWI offenses.

Majors moved to suppress evidence of her intoxication obtained after the trooper asked her about drinking, arguing that the inquiry impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. In support of the motion, Majors submitted the video recording from the trooper’s body-worn camera. During the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that he asked Majors about alcohol consumption because she turned the wrong way on a one-way street, there was an “overwhelming” odor of alcohol coming from the car, and Majors had bloodshot, watery eyes and “heavily slurred” speech. He explained that slurring meant running words together, slow speech, garbled words, or “drawing words out louder.” He also testified that the timing of the stop was “meaningful” because there tend to be more impaired drivers on the road at night and Saturday night is when “most people” go out drinking.

On cross-examination, the trooper acknowledged that the brief wrong-way driving was Majors’s only concerning driving conduct; he did not observe swerving, speeding, or other traffic violations. When asked to identify where, in the recording, Majors’s speech was heavily slurred, he pointed to several moments before and after he asked about alcohol consumption. He maintained that her speech was heavily slurred “[throughout the entire time” he interacted with her but agreed that he had no difficulty understanding her. He also acknowledged that Majors’s eyes did not look bloodshot in the recording. Regarding the accuracy of the recorded image, he testified that the body-worn camera captures “only a small snippet of what’s actually happening” because it does not capture his full field of vision. But he agreed that the recording captures what was directly in front of him, including Majors’s eyes. He also clarified that the fact Majors was driving shortly after midnight was “[n]ot at all” an indication of impairment.

The district court found that the trooper’s testimony that Majors had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech was not credible because the recording showed neither. And because he was not credible on those points, the district court declined to “rely on” his testimony about smelling an odor of alcohol. The district court also found that the time of day did not create reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, pointing to Majors’s work-related reason for being out at that time and the trooper’s testimony that, while Saturday is a common time for people to drink, he did not consider the timing suspicious or indicative of impairment in this case. After concluding that there is no credible evidence to support expansion of the traffic stop, the district court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges.

The State appealed the dismissal but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"In assessing credibility, a district court may weigh conflicting testimony and determine which witness to believe. State v. Kramer, 668 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). It may accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony. Id. And it may determine the weight of any corroborating evidence. See State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1987). When there is video evidence of a traffic stop, the district court may make factual findings from its independent review of the video, including discrediting contrary testimony from the officer who conducted the stop. State v. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Minn. App. 1999)."

"The district court found that the trooper was not credible in testifying that Majors’s eyes were bloodshot because the body-worn recording “did not support” the testimony. Review of the recording confirms that, during the one-minute interaction before the trooper asked about alcohol, Majors exhibited no redness in her eyes. Indeed, the trooper acknowledged in his testimony that her eyes do not appear red in the video. This evidence supports the district court’s credibility determination."

"The state ... faults the district court for not explaining its determination that the trooper was not credible, such as findings addressing his experience or his demeanor while testifying. But it identifies no authority requiring a district court to do so. To the contrary, a finding that testimony conflicts with video evidence is sufficient justification for discrediting the testimony. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d at 186.  Because the district court made such a finding here, and the body-worn recording supports it, the state has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by discrediting the trooper’s testimony regarding bloodshot eyes."

"The district court also discredited the trooper’s testimony that Majors had “heavily slurred” speech because the recording “did not support” the testimony. The court found that Majors spoke rapidly but “did not slur her speech.” Again, review of the recording supports the district court’s findings: During their one minute of contact before the trooper inquired about alcohol consumption, Majors spoke quickly but intelligibly and did not slur her words."

"The state argues that the district court should have credited the trooper’s testimony because he described Majors’s speech as heavily slurred and discerned slurred speech at several points in the recording. But the district court was not bound to accept the trooper’s description of the recording. See id. The state’s contention that the court should have deferred to the trooper’s training and experience is similarly unpersuasive. The trooper explained that his training and experience led him to look for a person running words together, using slow or garbled speech, or drawing words out louder. The recording reveals none of these indicators, just normal, if rapid, speech. And while courts defer to law- enforcement officers’ training and experience because it enables them to make inferences and deductions that may “elude an untrained person,” Mesenburg v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 969 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022), officers are not uniquely expert in assessing whether a person’s speech suggests impairment, see State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that an officer’s opinion as to impairment is not “expert” testimony). On this record, we discern no clear error by the district court in finding the trooper’s testimony that Majors had heavily slurred speech not credible."

"The district court acknowledged that, unlike with the other physical indicia the trooper described, the recording does not provide an independent basis for assessing whether Majors smelled of alcohol. But the court reasoned that, “given the [trooper’s] lack of credibility” in testifying that Majors had bloodshot eyes and “heavily slurred” speech, it would “not rely on any alleged odor of alcohol in making its ruling.”

"The state contends that this implicit credibility finding is clearly erroneous because the record contains evidence that corroborates his testimony about smelling alcohol—Majors’s admission that she drank alcohol recently, her poor performance on field sobriety tests, his comment at a later point in the recording that she smelled strongly of alcohol, and her 0.15 PBT result. This argument is unavailing. The district court was clearly aware of this evidence and its potential corroborative value, as its comments during the suppression hearing reflect. But the court was not required to accept the trooper’s testimony as to odor of alcohol, even with corroborating evidence, particularly in light of its supported finding that the trooper’s testimony regarding other physical indicia of impairment was not credible. See Harris, 405 N.W.2d at 229. Moreover, the district court disagreed that Majors’s performance on field sobriety tests provided corroboration, finding “little support” in the recording for a finding “that [she] was impaired.”

"Given the district court’s supported credibility determinations regarding other indicia of impairment, and its express consideration of potential corroborating evidence, the state has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by implicitly finding that the trooper was also not credible in testifying that Majors emitted an odor of alcohol."

Moral Of The Story: The Court is not bound to accept the testimony of someone "lying like a cop in court".

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Wilson (Decided August 7, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is virtually impossible to collaterally attack a prior license revocation being used to enhance the severity of the current charge.

In Wilson, the Defendant was charged with Third Degree DWI (i.e. two DWI's within 10 years).  The charge was enhanced to a third-degree offense because Wilson’s driver’s license had been revoked two months earlier based on a November 24, 2019 DWI-related traffic stop. Wilson did not seek judicial review of the prior revocation within the statutory 60-day period. After the judicial review period to contest the driver’s-license revocation had ended, Wilson successfully moved to suppress the evidence of impairment in the prior related criminal DWI proceeding.

In the present case, Wilson moved to exclude evidence of the license revocation from being used to enhance the DWI charge. She argued that the state could not use the revocation as an aggravating factor because the evidence of impairment had been suppressed in the criminal case related to the November 24 stop. The district court denied Wilson’s motion and, in a stipulated-facts trial, found Wilson guilty of third-degree DWI.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"Use of an unreviewed license revocation as an aggravating DWI factor does not violate a defendant’s due-process rights. State v. Coleman, 661 N.W.2d 296, 301 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). A challenge to the validity of the underlying revocation used as an aggravating factor is a collateral challenge to the revocation. Anderson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 930 (Minn. App. 2016). A collateral challenge attacks the final outcome of another proceeding which is being used as an element of a charged offense. Davis v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 391-92 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994). Because collateral challenges weaken the finality of judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988); Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 930 (citing this aspect of Warren in the implied-consent context)."

"Wilson argues that hers is a unique case because she was indigent and unable to afford counsel to help her seek review of the driver’s-license revocation. Wilson additionally argues that, had she been able to afford counsel and sought judicial review of the driver’s-license revocation, her license revocation would have been rescinded because evidence of intoxication in the related criminal proceeding was suppressed. We are not persuaded that Wilson presents a unique case."

"First, parties in civil implied-consent proceedings do not have the right to court-appointed counsel. Thole, 831 N.W.2d at 22. Thus, Wilson’s indigency and lack of counsel do not present a unique case."

"Second... Because the proceedings for license revocation and DWI are separate such that issues decided in one proceeding are not precluded from being relitigated in the other, suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the DWI charges related to the November 24 stop do not indicate that revocation of Wilson’s license would have been rescinded, had she challenged it."

"Additionally, Wilson mistakenly relies on Anderson as support for her claim. There, we concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition for judicial review of a license revocation and the petitioner’s due-process rights were not violated because he had adequate notice of the revocation despite alleged mental incompetence. Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 927-28. In dicta, we also noted that arguments about the use of prior revocation as an enhancement “should be raised at the time a person is charged with a crime,” not in an implied-consent proceeding. Id. at 930 (quotation omitted). Like in Anderson, Wilson did not timely challenge her license revocation, and, as discussed, allowing a collateral challenge is not warranted in her case."

Makes you wonder what would constitute a "unique" case.

Moral Of The Story:  Lack of haste makes waste. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. London (Decided May 22, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that being overcharged initially does not require a dismissal of the subsequent correct charge.  

In London, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was initially charged with First Degree (i.e.Felony) DWI based upon a prior Wisconsin felony DWI conviction.  Once a felony DWI, always a felony DWI, provided the previous felony DWI was from Minnesota.  Since the previous felony in this case was from Wisconsin, the Anoka County Attorney eventually recognized the mistake and dismissed the felony charge.

Prior to the felony dismissal, London posted $5,000 bail and was released with conditions, including compliance with the Intensive Supervision Alcohol Program (ISAP). After two ISAP violations alleging a positive test for alcohol and a failure to abstain from alcohol, as well as London’s failure to appear for a court hearing, the district court revoked London’s release with conditions. London spent a total of 45 days in custody related to the felony charge. 

The Fridley City attorney then took over the case and charged Mr. London with Gross Misdemeanor DWI refusal and Misdemeanor DWI. London then moved to dismiss these charges “in the interests of justice,” citing the district court’s authority to dismiss under Minnesota Statutes section 631.21 (2022) and Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.02. London argued that he was improperly deprived of his liberty and suffered financial loss because the bail and the conditions of release associated with the felony case should never have been imposed. The state opposed the motion to dismiss, and the district court denied it.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"Under section 631.21, a district court “may order a criminal action, whether prosecuted upon indictment or complaint, to be dismissed.” The district court “may order dismissal of an action either on its own motion or upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 631.21. Because the use of the word “may” in the statute implies the exercise of discretion, we review the district court’s denial of London’s motion to dismiss for an abuse of that discretion. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2022); cf State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 2016) (stating that rule 30.02’s use of “may” “connotes discretion, which means that the district court’s denial of [defendant’s] motion ‘to dismiss the complaint, indictment, or tab charge’ is reviewed only for abuse of such discretion”)."

"London argues that the district court improperly limited its discretion by applying the wrong standard to his motion to dismiss. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred by requiring him to prove undue delay, establish prejudice, and prove prosecutorial misconduct."

"In its order denying the motion to dismiss, the district court recounted the events of the county’s and the city’s cases against London. It found that London had failed to demonstrate that the city attorney had unnecessarily delayed bringing the case to trial, that London had been prejudiced by the city attorney’s action, or that the city attorney had acted improperly or sought an unfair advantage. The district court also characterized as “mere speculation” London’s contention that he could have avoided custody had conditions never been imposed in the felony case. Finally, the district court rejected the argument that the public would not be served by further prosecution given the district court’s “serious concerns” about London’s use of alcohol and the danger it poses to the public. The district court concluded, “After considering all the circumstances, including the effects upon Mr. London, the prosecution, and society as a whole, the Court believes more harm than good would flow from dismissing this matter.”

"...London’s argument mischaracterizes the district court’s order. London asserts that the district court limited its review to the requirements for a dismissal pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.02, which authorizes a district court to dismiss a case based on undue delay, but only if the defendant shows they have been prejudiced. See State v. Banks, 875 N.W.2d 338, 341, 345 (Minn. App. 2016), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2016). But, as described above, the order denying London’s motion demonstrates that the district court did not so limit its analysis. To the contrary, the district court reviewed London’s arguments, the prior proceedings in both this case and the felony case, and the surrounding circumstances and decided not to dismiss the charges. London also does not identify additional facts or arguments the district court should have considered and thus has not demonstrated that the district court limited its discretion when evaluating his motion to dismiss."

Moral Of The Story: If there is any basis for a court's ruling it will rarely if ever constitute an abuse of discretion.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided May 1, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that an officer cannot deviate from the exact wording  of the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory if the deviation is inaccurate or misleading.

In Nash, the Petitioner was stopped in Hennepin County by the Minnesota State Patrol.  The trooper noted Nash appeared lethargic, his skin was sweaty, he had a “thick tongue” when speaking, and his pupils did not react to light. The trooper believed that Nash was under the influence, but she was not sure whether the cause was alcohol or a different substance. The trooper  had Nash exit the vehicle and perform a horizontal-gaze- nystagmus (HGN) test, which is generally used to test for depressants. Nash also completed a one-leg balance test and a walk-and-tum test. The trooper thought that all three tests indicated that Nash was under the influence. Gerhard asked Nash if he was on any medications, and Nash replied that he was not. 

Nash provided a preliminary breath test, which produced a 0.000 result. Nash then completed a fourth test, which did not reveal any signs of impairment. The trooper nonetheless told Nash that she believed he was under the influence and placed him under arrest.

The trooper applied for and obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. Next, while seated in her squad car with Nash in the back seat, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” Gerhard showed Nash the warrant, but she did not “let him hold it and look through it.”

The blood test result revealed the presence of methadone and the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license.  

The Petitioner challenged the license revocation alleging the trooper did not read the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, (3). 

The District Court sustained the revocation but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177 (2022) governs the revocation of driving privileges based on a search warrant for the collection of a blood or urine sample from a person suspected of driving while impaired. If such test results indicate “the presence of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols, the commissioner shall revoke the person’s license or permit to drive.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 5. If a person refuses to submit to a blood or urine test as requested by a peace officer pursuant to a search warrant, then a test must not be given. Id., subd. 13. However, it is a crime for a person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood or urine pursuant to a search warrant under section 171.177. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022)."

"Section 171.177, subdivision 1, requires that “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant... the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Nash argues that he is entitled to rescission of his license revocation because the officer did not advise him that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime and instead merely advised him that she had applied for a search warrant for a blood draw and that refusal to take a test was a crime."

***

"This court has held that the advisory requirement in Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous, has no exceptions, and requires an officer to inform an individual of the criminal consequences of test refusal. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). We therefore apply the statute’s plain meaning, with guidance from caselaw."

***

In Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “[compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.” 368 N.W.2d at 280. The supreme court reasoned that “the legislature intended that a driver’s license be revoked pursuant to the implied consent law . . . only if the provisions of the law were complied with by the police.” Id. at 281 (emphasis added). Because the police did not provide a statutorily required implied-consent advisory, the test results in Tyler “could not properly serve as the basis for a revocation of [Tyler’s] license pursuant to the implied consent law.” Id.

***

"The Jensen court applied the supreme court’s reasoning from Tyler and concluded that the commissioner may not revoke a driver’s license based on blood-test results under section 171.177, subdivision 5, unless the officer directing the test gives the driver the advisory required under subdivision 1 of the statute. 932 N.W.2d at 847. This court held that, because the peace officer in Jensen never warned the driver that refusing to submit to a blood test is a crime, the commissioner could not revoke her license based on her test results. Id. at 848 (reversing and remanding for the district court to rescind the license revocation).

"Under Jensen, it is clear that a license revocation cannot be sustained based on the results of a chemical test if the driver was not provided an advisory regarding the criminal consequences of failing to submit to a test. Id. at 846 (stating it was undisputed that law enforcement did not advise Jensen that refusal to submit to a blood test is a crime). But, as the commissioner notes, Jensen does not address the issue presented here: whether an advisory that deviates from the language of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is nonetheless adequate to sustain a revocation."

"The commissioner argues that “there is no specific form the advisory must take,” and that Nash “was accurately informed of the legal consequences of refusing to submit to the blood test that was requested.” The commissioner relies on McCormick v. Commissioner of Public Safety, in which this court announced the rule that whether an implied-consent advisory complies with statutory requirements “depends on whether the given advisory, considered in its context as a whole, is misleading or confusing.” 945 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. App. 2020). The statute at issue in McCormick required that “[a]t the time a breath test is requested, the person must be informed . . . that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(2) (2018) (emphasis added). The officer in McCormick informed the driver that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” and not that “refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” 945 N. W.2d at 57 (emphasis added)."

"McCormick argued that the statute required officers to read its language verbatim and that the officer’s failure to state “breath” directly before “test” misstated the law. Id. at 58. This court rejected that argument, noting that the plain language of the statute did not require officers to “read” or “recite” the statute’s language verbatim. Id. at 59. This court also noted that it had upheld advisories that deviated from the language of the implied-consent statute “so long as the information the officer provide[d] [was] not misleading or confusing.” Id. This court reasoned that, because the officer informed McCormick that “this is the breath test advisory” and that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” without mentioning any other test and offering only a breath test, the context of the advisory adequately informed McCormick that refusal to take a breath test is a crime. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). The advisory was therefore sufficient to sustain the revocation of McCormick’s driving privileges. Id.

"The McCormick rule is consistent with an earlier decision of this court in which it said that “[u]niformity in giving the implied consent advisory is highly encouraged” and recommended “that police officers read the exact words of the statute in order to avoid any possibility of confusion or improper deviation from the statute.” Hallock v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 372 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Minn. App. 1985). But this court also stated that if an officer deviates from the exact words of a statutory advisory, a revocation may nonetheless be based on that advisory so long as the advisory was not “an incorrect statement of the Minnesota law, or so confusing as to render the advisory illegal.” Id. (affirming district court’s order sustaining a driver’s license revocation)."

"We agree with the commissioner that the McCormick rule applies here. But for the reasons that follow, we disagree that the advisory in this case was adequate under that rule. See Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes). Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2, provides that:

'The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.'"

"In this case, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” As the commissioner concedes, if Nash had refused the blood test, the circumstances would not have supported a test-refusal charge because the trooper did not offer him a urine test. See Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (“Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered . . . Thus, the advisory was an inaccurate statement of Minnesota law and misleading. Nothing about the context of the trooper’s advisory changes our view. Although the search warrant authorized a blood or urine test, the trooper did not mention the urine test. And although the trooper “show[ed]” Nash the warrant, the commissioner does not claim, and the record does not suggest, that Nash had an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to submit to the test."

"In sum, the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading. The advisory therefore cannot serve as the basis for revocation of Nash’s driving privileges, and the revocation cannot be sustained. See Tyler, 368 N.W.2d at 280 (“Compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.”); Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes)."

Moral Of The Story: You can't enforce the law if you do not  read the law.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided April 24, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a court cannot order restitution without discussing the defendant's ability to pay the ordered amount.

In Martinez, the Defendant was driving his vehicle in Blue Earth County when the police observed his vehicle did not have a red cover on one taillight. The officer attempted to make a traffic stop of Mr. Martinez, but instead of stopping, Mr. Martinez increased his speed, ran stop signs and reached a speed of 115 miles per hour. Eventually, law enforcement attempted a pursuit-intervention-technique (PIT) maneuver, causing Martinez’s vehicle to come to a stop. Martinez admitted to smoking methamphetamine and being under its influence while driving.

Mr. Martinez pled guilty and the state filed two affidavits for restitution, one from the Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust seeking $8,068.20 and one from Blue Earth County Finance seeking $1,000. The affidavits attested to the cost of repairs to the squad car that was damaged while pursuing Martinez.

Probation filed a presentence-investigation (PSI) report, which recommended a restitution award of $9,068.20 and also stated that if Martinez “chooses to execute his commitment,” restitution should “be paid out of prison earnings.” The PSI report specified that Martinez “has not maintained steady employment for the last five years” and that “his last employment was Burger King ... in January 2021,” where he worked for “three to four months until he started using drugs and left.” The report also noted that Martinez has “to pay child support but is behind on payments” and “would like the amount lowered.”

The district court “ordered [Martinez] to pay restitution in the amount of $9,068.20 that is to be paid out of any prison earnings” by April 25, 2024, and stated it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution.

The Defendant appealed the restitution order and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as the lower court failed to establish it had considered the Defendant's ability to pay the restitution amount.  Or, as stated by the Appellate Court:

"In Wigham, the supreme court reversed and remanded a restitution award because the district court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. 967 N.W.2d at 664, 666. In doing so, the supreme court held that the “district court fulfills its statutory duty to consider a defendant’s income, resources, and obligations in awarding and setting the amount of restitution when it expressly states, either orally or in writing, that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 664 (emphasis added). The district court need not “make specific findings about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to support [its] express statement that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay,” but doing so is “best practice.” Id. at 665 & n.6. Even if the district court makes specific findings, “the record must include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered.” Id. at 665."

***

"The state first argues that the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay by reviewing the PSI report, which “contained information regarding [Martinez’s] income and employment,” and by determining that Martinez “was financially unable to obtain counsel” when the district court appointed a public defender for Martinez. But this argument rests on the faulty premise that the district court need not expressly state that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay restitution. See Wigham, 967N.W.2d at 666 (holding that the district court “must expressly state” it considered the defendant’s “ability to pay—his income, resources, and obligations—when ordering restitution”). Thus, neither the district court’s review of the PSI report nor its appointment of a public defender, which occurred before the sentencing hearing, satisfied the district court’s statutory duty to expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution."

"Second, the state relies on the district court’s statement that restitution should be paid out of Martinez’s prison earnings as showing the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The state cites State v. Tenerelli, 583 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1998), affd as modified by 598 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1999), which significantly predates Wigham. In Tenerelli, we determined that the district court’s reference to the defendant’s prison earnings as the source of restitution payments showed it had considered the defendant’s ability to pay. 583 N.W.2d at 3. But the supreme court adopted a bright-line rule in Wigham, stating it sought to “avoid[] the need to scour bits and pieces of information to try to glean what the district court may have considered.” 967 N.W.2d at 664 n.5 (emphasis omitted). Wigham teaches that the district court’s reference to Martinez’s prison earnings does not fulfill its statutory duty under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045."

"For the same reason, we reject the state’s third argument, which urges us to conclude that the district court’s decision not to fine Martinez also shows the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The district court’s statement that it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution” does not “expressly” state it considered Martinez’s “ability to pay” restitution. See id. at 666."

"In sum, we conclude that because the district court did not expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay, it failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant and abused its discretion in ordering restitution. Thus, we reverse and remand. In considering restitution on remand, the district court may in its discretion reopen the record and order an updated PSI report to include information on Martinez’s income, resources, and obligations."

Moral Of The Story: You can't get blood out of a turnip!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

 

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Taybom (Decided April 10, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the officer's failure to record in his report all of the reasons for the vehicle stop is irrelevant.   

On November 21, 2019 a police officer stopped the Defendant while she was driving her vehicle on Seventh Street in St. Paul, MN. Ms. Taybom was ultimately charged with gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI for refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2018), and gross-misdemeanor third-degree DWI for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2018). 

At a contested omnibus hearing, Taybom moved to suppress all evidence related to the traffic stop. She argued that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the stop based on any traffic infraction and specifically contended that the reason provided in the officer’s police report—passing another vehicle on the right—was not unlawful. The state opposed the motion, arguing that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the stop based on three separate traffic violations observed by the officer: failing to yield to oncoming traffic, crossing the centerline, and passing another vehicle on the right in an unsafe manner.

At the hearing, the officer testified that he observed the following driving conduct by Taybom prior to the stop. First, Taybom’s car failed to yield to his car at a stop sign, “causing [him] to have to hit [his] brakes to stop from hitting [Taybom’s] vehicle.” Second, he saw the wheels of Taybom’s car touch the centerline of the road as he followed the car westbound on 7th Street. Third, as he continued to follow Taybom’s car, he observed her car slow down as it approached another vehicle. That vehicle was stopped at a red light. When the light turned green, Taybom’s car veered onto the right shoulder (which was also a bus stop) and “quickly accelerated” to pass the other vehicle while driving through the intersection. After observing Taybom’s car pass the other vehicle, the officer initiated the traffic stop. During his testimony, the officer acknowledged that his police report indicated only that he stopped Taybom for passing on the right and that it “failed to document” the other two alleged violations—failing to yield and crossing the centerline. But the officer testified that he “did see those other violations.”

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order denying Tayborn’s motion to suppress. The district court determined that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on at least two traffic violations: Tayborn’s failure to yield to oncoming traffic and the wheels of Taybom’s vehicle touching the road’s centerline. As a result, the district court concluded that it did not need to consider whether the third potential traffic violation argued by the state— passing a vehicle on the right through an intersection—also justified the stop. But the district court noted in the fact section that the officer conducted the traffic stop “based upon [Taybom] failing to properly yield to [the officer’s] car, crossing the centerline[,] and passing the stopped car on the right through the intersection.”

On appeal, Taybom argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the record does not show that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on his observation of any traffic violation. Specifically, Taybom challenged the district court’s factual finding that the officer stopped Taybom’s car based on three separate traffic violations: failing to yield, crossing the centerline, and passing another car on the right in an intersection. Taybom argued that this factual finding is clearly erroneous because the officer’s police report identified only one reason for the stop—passing another car on the right. Taybom further claimed that the district court’s reliance on the officer’s testimony regarding the two other traffic violations was clearly erroneous because the officer did not testify that he was subjectively aware of these violations prior to the stop. Taybom also challenged the district court’s implicit determination that the officer testified credibly regarding his observation of Taybom’s driving conduct. Taybom therefore urged the appellate court to conclude that the district court erred by denying Taybom’s motion to suppress based on its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Taybom for failing to yield and for veering onto the centerline of the road.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court stating:

"The record supports the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. First, video from the officer’s dashboard camera supports the district court’s findings that Taybom failed to yield to the officer, that the left-side tires of her car touched the road’s centerline, and that she passed another vehicle on the right at an intersection. In other words, the district court’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record. See Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 403. Second, the officer testified at the motion hearing that he “did see” all three potential violations. The district court implicitly credited that testimony, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. See Wilkes v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 111 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[Credibility determinations are the province of the district court.”). Third, both of the noted actions relied on by the district court were traffic infractions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.20, subd. 3, .18, subds. 4(4), 7(1) (2018); Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 823 (stating that an officer’s observation of any traffic violation can form the basis for a traffic stop). We therefore conclude that the record shows an objective basis for the stop."

"We are not persuaded otherwise by Taybom’s emphasis on the officer’s failure to document two of the potential traffic violations in his police report. “An officer’s failure to articulate observed violations of law as a basis for stopping a defendant is irrelevant under an objective standard.” State v. Beall, 111 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 755 n.5 (explaining that “the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is an ‘objective test’ and is not based on the subjective beliefs of the officer”). In Beall, a police officer initiated a traffic stop on the basis that the vehicle had a “brake light out.” 771 N.W.2d at 42. The officer also observed littering from the vehicle but did not record littering as a reason for the stop. Id. The driver argued that there was no basis for the stop because his vehicle, which had three brake lights, was still equipped with two working lights and littering was not the reason for the stop. Id. The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence from the stop. Id. This court reversed, explaining that the reasonable-suspicion standard is objective and concluding that both the inoperable brake light and the littering justified the traffic stop because both were unlawful. Id. at 44-45. With respect to the littering in particular, we emphasized that the officer observed the littering prior to the traffic stop. Id. at 45. “Therefore, even if [the officer’s] subjective basis for the stop was the nonfunctioning center brake light, the stop was also [objectively] justified based on [the officer’s] observation of littering.” Id. Applying that reasoning here, we conclude that the stop of Taybom was objectively justified based on the officer’s stated observation of two traffic violations—failure to yield and veering onto the centerline—even though the officer failed to document those violations in the police report."

Moral Of The Story: Writing things down is vastly overrated.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.