Monday, August 27, 2018

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Mike (Decided August 27, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that even if the police disobey the law in obtaining a blood or urine test the test results will still not be suppressed in the criminal case.  This is a terrible decision and will lead to absurd results.

In State v. Mike, the Defendant was arrested for a Minnesota DWI and the police obtained a search warrant authorizing the collection of sample of his blood for chemical testing.  The arrested officer never informed Mr. Mike that refusal to submit to a warranted blood test was a crime.  The test result of the blood sample revealed an alcohol concentration level of .23%.

Mike moved to suppress the test result arguing that Minnesota Statute §171.77 requires a person be informed that refusal to submit to a warranted blood test is a crime.  The District Court agreed with the Defendant and suppressed the test.  But on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, stating:

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"Having concluded that compliance with the advisory requirement in section 171.177, subdivision 1, was necessary, we must next determine whether suppression of Mike’s test results is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance."

"The purpose of suppression is not to vindicate a defendant’s rights nor to affirm the integrity of the courts, but to deter police from engaging in illegal searches.” State v. Cook, 498 N. W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. 1993). “In other words, the risk of having seized evidence suppressed is intended to persuade police officers to follow the rules and to act lawfully when searching and seizing private property.” Id. The supreme court “[has] indicated in a number of cases . . . that [it] will not require suppression of all evidence seized in searches constituting, or resulting from, a violation of a statute.”

"...suppression based on a statutory violation is justified only if the violation subverts the purpose of the statute. We therefore consider the purpose of section 171.177, subdivision 1. Two cases inform our consideration. The first is Tyler v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985). In Tyler, the supreme court considered, in the context of a license-revocation proceeding, the appropriate remedy for the state’s failure to provide a standard implied-consent advisory before obtaining a driver’s consent to testing. 368 N.W.2d at 278, 280-81. The supreme court stated that “[i]t would be improper and unfair to revoke a driver’s license for refusing to take a test if an advisory were not given,” but that “failure to give an advisory should not make any difference in a case where the revocation is based on test results showing that the driver had an [illegal] blood alcohol concentration.” Id. at 280. The supreme court reasoned, “The advisory is not designed to persuade a driver not to take a test; rather it is aimed at letting a driver know the serious consequences of his refusal to take a test.”
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"Because the purpose of the advisory in section 171.177, subdivision 1, is to encourage submission to testing, and not refusal, that purpose is not subverted if a driver submits to a test without being read the advisory. And because the statutory purpose is not subverted in such circumstances, failure to provide the advisory does not justify suppression of ensuing test results. We therefore hold that failure to comply with the advisory requirement in Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 1, does not justify suppression of the test results in a criminal prosecution for DWI.  The district court therefore erred by suppressing Mike’s blood-test results on the ground that the state failed to inform Mike that refusal to take a warranted blood test is a crime."

The Court of Appeals reasoning appears to be flawed for two reasons:

(1) The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.  The exclusionary rule is not limited to police search misconduct.  When the police disobey the law, by not informing an individual of the consequences of refusal, they have engaged in misconduct and the evidence should be suppressed.

(2) According to the logic of the Court of Appeals, anyone who is subjected to a warranted search of their blood and who is not advised of the consequences of refusal pursuant to § 171.77, should ALWAYS refuse to submit to testing as they could not be prosecuted for the refusal crime.

Moral Of The Story:  Just say no!



If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.



Tuesday, August 21, 2018

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is State v. Yaeger (Decided August 20, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule only applies where the police are relying on established court precedent.

In Yaeger, the Defendant was stopped as one of the headlights on his vehicle was out.  The trooper noticed Yaeger's pupils were dilated "way above average" and asked Yaeger to submit to standardized field-sobriety tests, which he failed.  Yaeger admitted that he had taken Cymbalta, an antidepressant, about two hours before the traffic stop.  As the troopers were placing Yaeger under arrest, they told Yaeger that he was "not gonna get charged tonight."

Trooper Elzen read Yaeger the implied-consent advisory. Yaeger decided to consult with an attorney, but before speaking with an attorney asked the troopers, "So is it ultimately, is this, you guys are trying to get it into like a DWI?" Trooper Elzen replied that Yaeger had been arrested for "DWI, a controlled substance." Yaeger said that "the medication that I'm on[,] I was told I can drive on those medications." Trooper Bormann replied, "Yeah there's ... a prescription defense to that, however we don't know tonight how much you took, if you took other things." Yaeger then consulted an attorney and agreed to take a urine test. The urine test came back positive for alpha-hydroxyalprazolam, also known as Xanax, as well as Zolpidem.

On November 18, 2015, Yaeger was charged with one count of DWI—operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance. Yaeger moved to suppress "any evidence acquired as a result of the unlawful search . . . ." The district court held a hearing on Yaeger's motion to dismiss, at which he argued that he did not consent to the search, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, and that his due-process rights had been violated as a result of an incorrect implied-consent advisory.

Ruling from the bench, the district court "d[id] not find that consent was voluntary." The district court, "[considering the totality of the circumstances[,]" noted first that the implied-consent advisory read to Yaeger was not accurate. The district court stated that the incorrect advisory "is one thing that [it] can consider." In addition, the district court considered "other things that occurred," including that troopers told Yaeger he was not going to be charged that night, they were "just getting the test to see what comes back on the test, and . . . if there's things in there that are impairing, then you could get charged with a DWI." The district court stated that it was "inclined to look at that statement as one that's not supporting consent, that [Yaeger] [wa]s being told, more or less, that his acquiescence to the test [wa]s one thing that they'll consider in releasing him tonight and ultimately whether or not he's going to be charged." The district court then considered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court found that the troopers "acted appropriately" and that "[t]here isn't anything in the record that suggests that there was police misconduct." The district court also found that the implied-consent advisory was correct at the time it was read to Yaeger. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and that the urine-test results were admissible.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, correctly finding that:

"Here, the district court found that Yaeger did not voluntarily consent to the urine test. The district court's finding was not based solely on the inaccurate statement of law contained in the implied-consent advisory. The district court also considered the statements made by the troopers suggesting that"[Yaeger's] acquiescence to the test is one thing that they'll consider in releasing him tonight and ultimately whether or not he's going to be charged." The troopers also downplayed the consequences of taking the urine test. Additionally, Trooper Bormann mistakenly informed Yaeger that there was a "prescription defense" to DWI.1 The state does not argue that the district court erred by finding that Yaeger's consent was invalid. Accordingly, the district court's finding is presumed to be correct."

"Yaeger challenges the district court's application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The supreme court stated in Lindquist that "[t]he exclusionary rule does not apply . . . when law enforcement acts in good-faith, objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent."   869 N.W.2d at 864.   The supreme court reiterated that "deterrence of police misconduct" is the "central purpose of the exclusionary rule" and concluded that "applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent would have no deterrent value on police misconduct." Id. at 871."

"The district court erred by applying the good-faith exception. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply only if the incorrect advisory was the sole factor that rendered Yaeger's consent involuntary...Here, in addition to the incorrect advisory, the troopers told Yaeger that he would be released without being charged after he took the urine test, downplayed the consequences of the test, and misled him to believe that there was a prescription defense to DWI. The state cites no binding appellate precedent that authorizes such conduct.  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by reversing its direction and ultimately admitting the urine-test results under the good-faith exception."

Moral Of The Story:  In order for the police to act "in good faith" they must follow ALL of the rules!



If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Monday, August 6, 2018

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Grey v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided August 6, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that a constitutional challenge to the application of the Minnesota Implied Consent Statute can be raised even though the statute limits the types of challenges that can be raised in the revocation hearing.  

In Grey, the Appellant was an out-of-towner from Iowa, who received a notice and order of revocation following a failed breath test at the sheriffs office. But in the midst of being transported to detox, the notice was left behind. A few days later, the notice and order of revocation was mailed to him. Gray requested an implied-consent hearing at which he contended that his license revocation should be rescinded because his due-process right was violated in light of not receiving the revocation notice and because of an ambiguity in the notice stemming from his driver's license being issued by Iowa, not Minnesota. The district court disagreed, determining that Gray properly received the notice, and due to his own conduct, left the document behind.  The district court also found that the Appellant could not raise a procedural due process challenge as it is not a challenge listed as permissible for hearing in a license revocation case.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on other grounds but it significantly found that:

"Individuals are entitled to seek administrative or judicial review after receiving a notice and order of revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 1-2 (2016). For a judicial-review hearing, also known as an implied-consent hearing, the statute explicitly limits the issues that can be addressed. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2016) (stating that the "scope of the hearing is limited to the issues" listed). Arguments concerning procedural due process are not among the listed issues."

"Whether an argument not listed in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b), can be raised at an implied-consent hearing was addressed in Axelberg, where the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a petitioner who attempted to raise a necessity defense at an implied-consent hearing. 848 N.W.2d at 207-08. Through a statutory-interpretation analysis, the supreme court determined that because the necessity defense was not one of the delineated issues in the statute, the individual could not raise the defense.6 Id. at 208, 212. It reasoned that the language in the statute, "[t]he scope of the hearing is limited to the issues" listed, meant exactly that—the legislature limited the issues that can be raised. Id. at 208-09."

"Before us is a similar situation as that faced by the Axelberg court, but with a distinct difference. Here, as in Axelberg, Gray attempted to raise an issue outside the scope of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b), at the implied-consent hearing. But Gray's argument concerned his constitutional right to procedural due process, unlike the issue from Axelberg, which considered the common-law defense of necessity. 848 N.W.2d at 206 (noting that the defense of necessity is a common-law defense). We discern that this distinction—between a common-law affirmative defense and the constitutional right to due process—is significant, and conclude that Gray can raise a due-process argument at his implied-consent hearing."

"It is the critical nature of the constitutional right to due process, and its guarantee of fundamental fairness, that drives our determination. The importance of due process in judicial proceedings cannot be overstated, as it "is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom." Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1, 20, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1439-40 (1967) (describing due process as "the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise"). The hallmark of the procedural protections afforded by the due process clause is "fundamental fairness." Ford v. Wainwright, All U.S. 399, 424, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2609 (1986). And while difficult to define exactly what procedural due process requires, courts have explained that it is this "fundamental fairness" that must be ascertained for a given situation. Lassiter v. Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2158 (1981). And proper notice is engrained in the concept of due process. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S. Ct. 240, 243 (1957). Simply put, as Justice Marshall explained, "it is procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2715 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because of the importance of due process, it would be improper to determine that an individual cannot raise procedural due-process concerns at an implied-consent hearing."

"Furthermore, while the Minnesota Legislature may limit what arguments can be raised at an implied-consent hearing, it cannot legislate away constitutional rights."

Moral Of The Story:  The constitution trumps legislation every time!


If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI or are facing the DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and forfeiture questions.