Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. McElree (Decided April 3, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to walk up to the police after you have been drinking and driving.  

In McElree, police officers for the city of Jordan received an harassment complaint. The complainant, J.L., alleged that his neighbor across the street, Defendant MacElree, had parked multiple vehicles in front of J.L.’s home, including two vehicles parked on either side of J.L.’s car. J.L. alleged that the vehicles on either side of his car were parked so close that he could not get into his car. J.L. also alleged that, while parking the vehicles, MacElree threatened to “tear [J.L.] apart” and knock his teeth out. J.L. showed the officers videos taken by his doorbell camera that seemed to confirm J.L.’s allegations. The videos showed the same man, later identified as MacElree, moving at least two vehicles and parking them in front of J.L. ’s home. The timestamps on the videos reflected that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles between approximately 8:55 and 9:05 p.m.

At about 9:48 p.m., while the officers were still on the scene, MacElree and a companion approached the responding officers. The officers were standing near the parked vehicles. One of the officers noticed that MacElree “smelled strongly of alcohol.” He asked MacElree if he had been drinking. MacElree responded with an expletive, claimed that his companion had driven the vehicles, and aggressively insisted that he had not driven anything. The officer did not ask MacElree to perform any field sobriety tests because of his “agitated state.” But the officer placed MacElree under arrest for suspicion of DWI. A breath test later showed that MacElree had an alcohol concentration of 0.28.

The State charged MacElree with two counts of Second Degree DWI. MacElree filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the two DWI counts for lack of probable cause to justify his arrest. In an accompanying memorandum, MacElree argued that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWI because he was not driving erratically, he did not demonstrate “other physical indicia of impairment,” the officer did not administer field sobriety or breath tests before his arrest, and he could have consumed alcohol “in the interim” between moving the vehicles and interacting with the officers some time later.

The state filed a brief opposing MacElree’s motion. The state argued that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI because the officer observed multiple signs of impairment, including a strong odor of alcohol and MacElree’s belligerent and uncooperative demeanor. In support of its position, the state filed several exhibits including: the complaint and supplemental police reports; videos taken by J.L.’s doorbell camera; and body-worn camera videos from multiple officers on the scene. The district court received these exhibits without objection from MacElree.

The district court granted MacElree’s motion and dismissed the DWI charges. The district court acknowledged that J.L. “told the officers that he saw [MacElree] drive the vehicles across the street and [the] officers identified the person in the doorbell videos as [MacElree] driving.” But the district court went on to explain that it could not “assume that [MacElree] did not consume alcohol between the time that he parked the cars and when he encountered police.” Therefore, there was “no way to prove that [MacElree] was under the influence of alcohol at the time he operated the car[s].” On that basis, the district court determined that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI and dismissed the two DWI counts against him.

The State appealed the district court's dismissal and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"The level of proof required to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest is “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). In making a probable-cause determination, courts must look to “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.” State v. Perkins, 582 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn. 1998). “The inquiry is objective, and the existence of probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual case.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly, we examine whether the district court considered all relevant facts known to the arresting officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest and whether those facts objectively establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI."

***

"The undisputed facts are sufficient to support the officer’s probable-cause determination under the applicable legal standard. The record reflects that MacElree drove at least two different vehicles near in time to when his neighbor reported being harassed, that MacElree was belligerent and generally combative with both his neighbor and police, and that the officer who arrested MacElree smelled a “strong” odor of alcohol coming from MacElree about 45 minutes after he drove the vehicles.  For the following reasons, we conclude that these facts reasonably warranted the officer’s belief that MacElree drove under the influence of alcohol. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120."

First, police observed multiple signs of MacElree’s intoxication. Only one objective indication of intoxication is required to establish probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence of alcohol. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678. Here, police noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from MacElree and observed his belligerent and combative behavior. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120 (identifying the odor of alcohol as an indication of intoxication); Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678 (identifying “an uncooperative attitude” as an indication of intoxication). Significantly, MacElree also exhibited belligerent behavior— as evidenced by the neighbor’s doorbell videos—when he shouted threats at his neighbor.

Second, the record reflects that MacElree drove two vehicles and parked them near the neighbor’s car close in time to when he was belligerent to his neighbor. But, when asked by police whether he was driving, MacElree was evasive and untruthful. He asserted that his companion had driven the vehicles instead, a claim directly contradicted by the doorbell videos showing MacElree driving and parking the vehicles in front of his neighbor’s home. And, when asked if he had been drinking, MacElree did not deny consuming alcohol but insisted that he had not been driving. Taken together, the relevant facts known to the officer—the strong smell of alcohol, the belligerent behavior, the driving of vehicles, and the untruthful and evasive responses to questions about drinking and driving—are sufficient to establish probable cause for the officer to believe that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles while under the influence of alcohol. See Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (considering defendant’s lying to police, belligerent behavior, and strong odor of alcohol, among other facts, as part of the totality of the circumstances supporting probable cause for DWI arrest).

***

"Here, the district court did not appear to properly consider whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest reasonably warranted the belief that MacElree was under the influence when he drove and parked the vehicles near his neighbor’s car. See id. Instead, the district court focused on the absence of evidence as to what MacElree was doing between when the neighbor observed him driving and when the officer spoke with MacElree about 45 minutes later. As a result, the district court mistakenly concluded that the state had not established probable cause for MacElree’s arrest. But, applying the proper legal standard, the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest support a conclusion that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI, regardless of the time gap."

Moral Of The Story: If you are a mean drunk, stay home!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Helget v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 23, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the Court of Appeals continues to erode the distinction between reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest.

In Helget, a caller notified law enforcement that a white pickup truck was “all over the road” in New Ulm. The caller provided his name, the pickup’s license-plate number, and updates regarding the pickup’s location as he followed it. Officer Patrick Fay received word of the caller’s report from police dispatch and suspected that the pickup’s driver might be impaired.

Fay drove his marked squad car to the area described by the caller and saw a pickup matching the description of the suspect vehicle. While passing the pickup, Fay saw its driver and its license-plate number, which matched the plate number provided by the caller. As Fay passed the pickup, the caller in some way indicated to him that this pickup was the vehicle that the caller had observed “all over the road.”

Fay located the pickup parked on the apron to a garage behind 810 North Payne Street in New Ulm. He parked his squad car behind the pickup and turned on his white “takedown” lights, but not his emergency lights.  While doing so, he saw the driver of the pickup, later identified as appellant Jesse Lee Helget, get out of the pickup and walk to the comer of the garage. Fay got out of his marked squad car and yelled at Helget to stop. Helget, who was about 25 feet away, looked back over his shoulder in Fay’s direction, but he kept walking. Helget turned at the comer of the garage and walked toward the house located beyond the garage.

For a brief period, the garage blocked Fay’s view of Helget. After Fay walked past the garage, he saw Helget standing in the back yard of the residence at 806 North Payne Street, which was next door to the residence where Helget had parked. Fay observed that a three-foot-high chain-link fence ran between the two properties and surmised that Helget had climbed over the fence.

Upon seeing Helget, Fay again yelled at Helget to stop; this time, Helget complied. Fay, who was still on the 810 North Payne side of the fence, asked Helget to walk toward him so the two could talk. Helget did not comply. He remained standing on the far side of the adjoining lot.

The police eventually got close to Mr. Helget and one of the officers could smell alcohol on Helmet's breath.

One of the officer's then grabbed Helget’s left wrist, and told him to put his hands behind his back. Helget minimally resisted but was quickly subdued by the officers. The officers handcuffed Helget and escorted him to Fay’s squad car, where they asked him to take a seat in the back.

At the squad car, Helget repeatedly refused commands to sit in the squad car and stated, “I’m not being detained.” Helget did not comply until an officer threatened to tase him. He then refused to slide his feet into the squad car, despite repeated commands to do so.

Helget repeatedly asked why he was being detained, and Gramentz replied, “You’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” In response, Helget noted that he had not fled and that he had stopped. Later, again in response to Helget’s inquiries, Gramentz told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations.”

The State of Minnesota charged Helget with third-degree test refusal, fourth-degree DWI, obstruction of legal process or arrest, and public urination. Helget moved the district court to suppress the evidence against him and to dismiss the criminal charges, again asserting that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. 

The district court denied the motion to suppress  and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, noting:

"Helget does not dispute that reasonable articulable suspicion justified a temporary warrantless seizure to investigate whether he had been driving while impaired. Instead, he asserts that the police converted his lawful seizure into an illegal arrest and argues that the circumstances did not satisfy the higher probable-cause standard necessary for a warrantless arrest.

"To determine whether there was probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI, we must first determine the point at which Helget was arrested. “The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman, 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984). There is no bright-line test separating a legitimate investigative stop from an unlawful arrest. Instead, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003)."

"The supreme court has held that “briefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the back of a squad car while the investigation proceeds.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999). Here, the police handcuffed Helget, escorted him to a squad car, and threatened to tase him if he did not enter the back seat of the squad car. Those circumstances alone might lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn. 1993) (“[Defendant] was under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and put in the squad car.”). But in this case there is one additional circumstance that makes that conclusion unavoidable. As the officers placed Helget in the squad car, Gramentz told him, “Tow ’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” (Emphasis added.) Although Gramentz subsequently told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations,” under the circumstances, Gramentz’s statement that Helget was “under arrest. . . right now” would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. We therefore consider whether at that point, the objective facts were such that a person of ordinary care and prudence would have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that Helget had committed the crime of DWI."

"The relevant facts were as follows. A known citizen called the police around 1:00 a.m. to report that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” Time of day is a relevant consideration when assessing suspicion of DWI because DWI offenses are common in the early morning hours. See Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (considering 1:20 a.m. on a Saturday morning to be a “time of day when drinking is often found to be involved”). Fay located the pickup and observed Helget driving it. Although Fay did not observe Helget commit any moving offenses, the citizen caller generally alleged that Helget’s truck was “all over the road.” That comment reasonably suggested that Helget’s pickup was being driven all over the road and likely in violation of traffic laws. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2018) (“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”)."

"After Helget parked and exited his pickup, he was evasive. As Helget walked away from his pickup, Fay yelled at Helget to “stop.” Helget looked back over his shoulder toward Fay and kept walking away from the officer. Fay pursued Helget and observed him in the adjacent yard. Fay also observed a three-foot-high fence that Helget had to cross to get there. Although Helget stopped in response to Fay’s second command to do so, he did not comply with Fay’s subsequent command to approach."

"When Gramentz arrived and got within two feet of Helget, he noticed that Helget emitted an odor of alcohol, a common indication of intoxication. See State v. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Common indicia of intoxication include an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an uncooperative attitude.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2004). Helget told Gramentz that he was in his own back yard, even though he was standing in another person’s yard and had to cross over a fence to get there. Helget’s statement reasonably suggested either further evasive behavior or confusion stemming from intoxication. Lastly, Helget displayed an uncooperative attitude, which is another recognized indication of intoxication. See id. His refusal to cooperate progressed from verbal to physical resistance as the police tried to secure him in the squad car while they pursued their lawful investigation."

"Admittedly, some might view the existence of probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI in this case as a close call. On one hand, the assertion of impaired driving conduct is limited to the citizen caller’s general allegation that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” And the record indicates that the police wanted to do more to confirm their suspicion of DWI. Indeed, the record supports a conclusion that the officers did not subjectively believe that there was sufficient probable cause for a DWI arrest. But our probable-cause determination is based on an objective standard; it is not limited to the beliefs or motives of the arresting officers. “[T]he issue is not whether the officers subjectively felt that they had probable cause but whether they had objective probable cause.” Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (noting that it was “not clear from the record that the arresting officers subjectively believed that they had probable cause to believe Costillo was under the influence”). Moreover, the possibility of innocent explanations for Helget’s otherwise suspicious behavior does not preclude a finding of probable cause to arrest."

But, as noted by Judge Ross in his dissenting opinion:

"If all it takes to be arrested for and charged with drunk driving is a caller asserting generally that a car was “all over the road” and an officer noticing that the driver smells like he consumed any amount of alcohol, then the Fourth Amendment doesn’t do much in Minnesota to prevent unreasonable seizures. I respectfully dissent".

***

"The majority does not address the district court’s primary conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing on foot. A person who is not in a vehicle commits the misdemeanor offense of fleeing if, “for the purpose of avoiding arrest, detention, or investigation” by “running, hiding, or by any other means” he “attempts to evade or elude a peace officer” who is discharging an official duty. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2018). Officer Fay’s uncontradicted testimony and the video footage reveal that, contrary to the district court’s findings, the officer never activated his emergency lights and Helget likely did not know a police officer had ordered him to stop. And the record likewise also uncontradictably establishes that Helget stopped immediately once Officer Fay identified himself. Helget could not have walked away and entered his neighbor’s yard “for the purpose of’ evading a police officer because, according to the officer who testified about it, Helget was unaware he was walking away from police. The circumstances did not establish probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing.

I am convinced that the same is so regarding the district court’s alternative conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for drunk driving. In numerous cases, we have considered whether circumstances like those the officers faced here (an imprecise nighttime complaint about bad driving and the odor of an alcoholic beverage) support an officer’s reasonable suspicion to investigate the driver for drunk  driving. But we have never suggested what the majority holds today, which is that these circumstances justify leapfrogging reasonable suspicion and landing all the way at probable cause to arrest the driver for drunk driving with no further inquiry necessary—no need to closely observe the driver, no need to question the driver, no need to look for clear characteristics of impairment, and no need to administer field sobriety tests."

***

"Lacking more information, we simply cannot say that Helget’s driving even began to establish probable cause of alcohol-based impairment. When considering whether a caller’s report meets even the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, “If the police chose to stop on the basis of the tip alone, the anonymous caller must provide at least some specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegation of criminal activity.” Olson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985). I believe that the imprecise report and odor of alcohol here support no more than reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate. The officers chose instead to arrest first and investigate later. In doing so, they did not honor the Fourth Amendment with proper, constitutional policing."

Moral Of The Story: If you have been drinking, try to say out to the neighbors yard.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jante v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided November 16, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you will lose if your attorney does not raise the correct issue.

In Jante, a Douglas County Sheriff's deputy was on routine patrol when he saw a pickup truck stopped in a turn lane with its emergency lights on. The deputy stopped and approached the vehicle on the passenger side. Petitioner was standing outside of the vehicle next to the front passenger door. The door was open. At the Petitioner's feet were empty beer bottles and the truck’s ignition keys.

Seated in the backseat of the vehicle was a passenger.  Both the Petitioner and the backseat passenger claimed the other person was driving.  The Petitioner was arrested for DWI and his license was revoked.

The Petitioner filed a challenge to the license revocation challenging, "whether there was probable cause that the Petitioner was in physical control of the vehicle".   The Petitioner testified he was not the driver. The passenger also testified that she had lied to the police (because she was already on probation) and was in-fact the driver of the vehicle.

In addition, other witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf that they saw the Petitioner leave in his truck with the alleged passenger driving his vehicle.  

The district court sustained the revocation finding that the police had probable cause to believe the Petitioner was driving or in physical control of the motor vehicle.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, confining its analysis to whether there was "probable cause" to believe the Petitioner drove or was in physical control of the motor vehicle.

There are a number of cases [Eg. Liona v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 389 N.W.2d 210 (MN.App. 1986); Winder v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 392 N.W.2d 21 (MN.App. 1986); Rademacher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, _ N.W.2d _ (MN App. 2007, Unpublished)] which hold that when the Petitioner alleges (in his revocation petition )that he or she was not, in fact, the driver or operator or in physical control of the motor vehicle, the Commissioner then has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the  evidence, that Petitioner was, in fact, the driver.

In the present case, it appears the Petitioner only alleged the police did not have "probable cause" to believe he was in physical control, which is a much easier standard for the Commissioner to meet.

Moral Of The Story: If you have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, hire an experienced lawyer who will not snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is Kulla v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided June 23, 2014, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that if an officer does not observe any driving conduct, he better investigate all the facts and circumstances before arresting an individual for DWI.

In Kulla, the Hastings Minnesota Police were called to the Defendant's home in response to a report of domestic abuse.  The Defendant was located in one of the bedrooms of the residence and he told the police that he had driven home from a bar approximately one hour before they arrived at his home.  The police observed that the Defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot and watery eyes and the odor of alcohol coming from his breath (i.e. the holy trinity of cop observations).

Mr. Kulla told the police he had had "plenty to drink" and that he had consumed one to two drinks after arriving at his residence.  The officer did not inquire as to how many drinks the Defendant had consumed at the bar.  The officer did not observe any driving conduct nor did he conduct any field sobriety test at the scene.

The officer arrested Mr. Kulla for DWI based on his observations of the defendant's level of intoxication and based on the knowledge the Defendant had been home for only an hour and had consumed some amount of alcohol.  

The District Court ruled that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Kulla for DWI. But on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and rescinded the license revocation stating:

"Probable cause to arrest for DWI and to require a chemical test exists when there are facts and circumstances known to the officer which would warrant a 'prudent man' in believing that the individual was driving or was operation or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired. The probable cause standard asks whether the totality of the facts and circumstances known would lead a reasonable officer to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime. This is an objective inquiry that is conditioned by the officer's own observations, information, and experience".  

"We recognize that, for a probable-cause determination under the implied-consent statute, an officer need not observe a defendant driving. And a driver's admission of alcohol consumption, when combined with other indicia of intoxication, may establish probable cause. But here, the connection between defendant's admission that he drove home from the bar and his appearance of intoxication an hour later is simply to attenuated to establish probable cause to arrest him for DWI...."

"...these circumstances necessitated further investigation, such as asking the defendant how many drinks he had before driving home, or questioning the victim, with whom the defendant had been drinking at the bar.  Because no such investigation occurred, and because the record lacks additional evidence about appellant's alcohol consumption or level of intoxication while driving, the district court erred by concluding that probable cause existed to arrest him for DWI".

MORAL OF THE STORY: If the police work is sloppy, the client should go free!!

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney, Minnesota DUI Lawyer, Minneapolis DWI Attorney, Minneapolis DUI Lawyer