Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case If The Week is State v. Klatt (Decided September 8, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it doesn't take much to justify the expansion of a traffic stop.

In Klatt, the Defendant was stopped for driving a vehicle with an inoperable taillight.  The officer making the stop testified he had met Mr. Klatt on two previous occasions.  The officer testified that at their first meeting, Klatt’s “eyes were clear and his manners were calm, and [the deputy] did not observe any signs of impairment."

The officer testified that at their second meeting, he “observed a change in behavior from the first time that [he] saw [Klatt].” He testified that Klatt’s “eyes were bloodshot and watery” and that Klatt was “kind of in an excited state.” During the conversation, Klatt admitted that he uses alcohol and cannabis and “stated that he would not stop.”

The officer testified that during the taillight stop, he he did not immediately observe any alcohol containers or drug paraphernalia, did not detect the smell of alcohol or marijuana, and did not observe any visible smoke. But he testified that, upon speaking with Klatt, the deputy “immediately recognized that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his pupils were dilated.” The deputy explained that, in response to the light from his flashlight, Klatt’s pupils did not restrict and remained instead “more dilated than [he] would expect normally.” The deputy testified that he suspected Klatt was impaired based on his dilated pupils, his bloodshot and watery eyes, and his prior knowledge that Klatt used drugs and alcohol.

The deputy asked Klatt to step out of the vehicle and observed that Klatt’s “balance and coordination seemed fine.” Klatt submitted to field sobriety testing during which the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. The deputy placed Klatt under arrest and searched his vehicle. Inside Klatt’s vehicle, the deputy found several open alcohol containers.

Mr. Klatt was subsequently charged with underage drinking and driving and violating the open bottle law.  

The district court, however, suppressed all of the evidence, ruling that the officer unlawfully expanded the traffic stop into a driving while impaired (DWI) investigation because “the [deputy’s observation of [Klatt] with bloodshot and watery eyes, and dilated pupils, [was] insufficient to provide reasonable [articulable] suspicion of intoxication,” and that the deputy’s prior interactions with Klatt did not support such a suspicion.

The State appealed the District Court's ruling and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, noting:

"“An officer seeking to expand the duration or scope of the traffic stop beyond its original justification may only do so if he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion . . . [must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (l)the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonable suspicion as defined by Terry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn 2004)."

*    *    *

"The state argues that the deputy justifiably expanded the traffic stop because Klatt’s dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes constituted two indicia of impairment, and two indicia of impairment are sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.  We agree."

"In Klamar, a trooper pulled behind a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the freeway. Id. at 690. After asking the driver to step out of the vehicle, the trooper “noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from [the driver] and that [the driver]’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.” Id. The trooper expanded the scope of the stop and conducted a DWI investigation. Id. The investigation indicated that the driver was intoxicated, and she was charged with DWI. Id. The district court determined that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the stop and dismissed the charge. Id. We reversed, concluding that “[t]he trooper’s observation of two indicia of intoxication specific to [the driver] reasonably justified further intrusions in the form of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing.” Id. at 696.

Here, as in Klamar, the deputy observed two indicia of impairment specific to Klatt: dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. But the district court noted that, although the deputy observed those two indicia, he observed “no others” and pointed out that the deputy did not observe Klatt slurring his speech or exhibiting an unsteady gait, and did not observe an odor of alcohol or marijuana. The district court concluded that, in the totality of the circumstances, the indicia that did indicate that Klatt was impaired were “rather weak” because “the majority of the circumstances . . . did not indicate [that Klatt] was impaired.” (Emphasis added.)"

"The district court’s analysis was incorrect. Reasonable suspicion does not require that an officer observe a driver exhibiting a majority of the known indicia of impairment. In this case, the deputy observed Klatt with dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. Consistent with our decision in Klamar, his observations provided an “independent basis” of suspicion that justified expansion of the traffic stop. Moreover, in the context of the more-demanding probable-cause standard, we have said that the absence of certain indicia does not invalidate or negate the existence of other indica. See, e.g.. State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding that driver “perform[ing] well” on field sobriety tests did not negate other indicia of impairment supporting probable cause), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); State v. Grohoski, 390 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that district court “improperly focused on the absence of other indicia of intoxication” because a “DWI suspect need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication in order to support a determination of probable cause”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986)."

"Because the deputy observed Klatt exhibiting two indicia of impairment, we conclude that the district court erred in determining that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion justifying the expansion of the traffic stop."

Moral Of The Story:  Where is Visine when you need it?

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Brehmer (Decided April 28, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that even if the defendant was arrested before the police had probable cause, the evidence obtained was still admissible under the "inevitable-discovery" rule.

In Brehmer, the police saw the Defendant was driving the wrong way down a one-way street.  Defendant then hit his brakes and drove backwards into a parking lot.  The police activated their emergency lights to perform a traffic stop.  As the officers approached the Defendant's vehicle, one of the officers shouted, "Watch out. Watch out."

The officers exited the squad car with their firearms drawn and yelled at Brehmer to put his hands up. Brehmer moved his hands up and down several times before raising both hands, with one hand outside of the car window. One officer observed that Brehmer made “a lot of furtive movements . . . with the hands kind of up, down, side to side,” and specifically noted that he “reach[ed] to the right side.” 

One of the officers opened the driver-side door and pulled Brehmer from the car. The officers both pushed Brehmer to the ground face down and cuffed his hands behind his back. While Brehmer was handcuffed on the ground, one of the officers patted Brehmer’s pockets and pulled up his shirt to reveal his waistband. The officer then stood Brehmer up while handcuffed and brought him over to the squad car. The officers pat-frisked Brehmer next to the squad car, reaching into his front pants pocket and removing his wallet. During the frisk, one of the officers felt an object near Brehmer’s “right buttock area in his underwear.” He asked Brehmer what the object was, and Brehmer replied that it was “just a pipe.” The other officer removed a glass pipe from Brehmer’s underwear and, after inspecting it, concluded that it was a drug pipe containing drug residue.

One of the officers then ran information from Brehmer’s driver’s license in the police database and, after Brehmer stated that he did not have a license, confirmed that Brehmer’s license was suspended. The officer stated that he wanted to do “one more frisk search” before putting Brehmer in the back of the squad car. The officer reached into Brehmer’s front and back pockets and pat-frisked Brehmer’s body. The officer then placed Brehmer, still handcuffed, in the back of the squad car. During this time, the other officer observed that Brehmer exhibited several indicia of drug use, including pinpoint pupils, bloodshot eyes, sweating, and fast head movements. Officers also searched Brehmer’s car and found whiskey plates for the car.

One of the officers applied for and received a search warrant for Brehmer’s blood or urine for chemical testing. Officers obtained a urine sample from Brehmer that tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.

The State of Minnesota charged Brehmer with felony DWI pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2020). Brehmer moved to suppress evidence including the search of his person and car, his statements to the officers on the scene, and the chemical test of his urine, arguing that the police violated his right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. 

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed stating:

"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10. And unless an exception applies, evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018). One such exception is the inevitable-discovery doctrine, which permits a court to admit evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure “[i]f the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). To meet this burden, the state’s showing must “involve[] no speculative elements but focus[] on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984)."

"It is uncontested that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Brehmer after observing his erratic driving and had reasonable concern for officer safety such that a Terry frisk was lawful. This frisk would have inevitably revealed the drug pipe with drug residue in Brehmer’s underwear. Indeed, the officer testified that he would have found the pipe “regardless” of any of Brehmer’s statements during the encounter."

"Similarly, the district court found that “a routine records check inevitably would have been performed” and would have revealed that Brehmer’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety and that the vehicle was subject to whiskey plates. Brehmer does not assert that this finding was clearly erroneous. One officer agreed during his testimony that it was “standard operating procedure to identify an individual” during a traffic stop, that the officer would have learned that Brehmer’s license was canceled, and that the officer would have discovered that the vehicle should have been displaying whiskey plates when stopped. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846-47."

"Based on these inevitabilities, the officers would have had probable cause to arrest Brehmer for operating a vehicle while his license was canceled as inimical to public safety—a gross misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. §§ 171.04, subd. 1(10), .24, subd. 5(1) (2020). And given that probable cause to arrest, officers would have inevitably discovered the drug pipe with residue on Brehmer in a search incident to arrest. Brehmer’s erratic driving, drug pipe with residue, and his canceled license and vehicle-registration status, taken together, formed sufficient probable cause to support a warrant for chemical testing for DWI."

Moral Of The Story: If someone continues to drive and act the wrong way, they will inevitably get into trouble.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Payton (Decided November 18, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police will be believed without definitive proof to the contrary.

In Payton, the Defendant was arrested and charged with Third Degree DWI - Refusal to submit to testing. Mr. Peyton challenged the legality of the initial stop but the district court ruled that the stop was valid. On appeal, Mr. Peyton alleged the district court "clearly erred" when it ruled his vehicle crossed a white-dashed centerline without signaling, thereby giving the police officer reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle.   

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling stating:

"When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a pre-trial suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We 'will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)."

***

"Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he observed Payton swerve 6-12 inches over the white-dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet before recentering the vehicle in the appropriate lane. The officer indicated his belief that this conduct violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), which states, “When any roadway has been divided into two [lanes] ... a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” The officer testified that he “clear[ly]” observed the violation and indicated exactly when the violation occurred in the dash-camera video. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.  See State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555- 56 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). Based on this evidence, the district court found that Payton’s vehicle “swerve[d] and cross[ed] the dashed white line separating the two lanes without signaling.” We conclude that the evidence amply supports the district court’s finding that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling."

"Payton disagrees, arguing the district court clearly erred when it found he crossed the white-dashed centerline. Payton relies on his assertion that the dash-camera video does not support the officer’s testimony. But contrary to Payton’s argument, though dark and poor quality, the dash-camera video does not contradict the officer’s testimony. While the white-dashed centerline does not appear in the dash-camera video, the dash-camera video plainly captures Payton’s vehicle veering slightly to the right at the time the officer testified that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline. Although not dispositive, the dash-camera video bolsters the officer’s testimony that a traffic violation occurred."

"For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not clearly err when it found Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling and, thereby, violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). As such, the district court correctly determined the officer had the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting the traffic stop and, therefore, the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion."

Moral Of The Story: It's too bad that police cameras are far inferior to those used in viewing football. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided May 1, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that an officer cannot deviate from the exact wording  of the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory if the deviation is inaccurate or misleading.

In Nash, the Petitioner was stopped in Hennepin County by the Minnesota State Patrol.  The trooper noted Nash appeared lethargic, his skin was sweaty, he had a “thick tongue” when speaking, and his pupils did not react to light. The trooper believed that Nash was under the influence, but she was not sure whether the cause was alcohol or a different substance. The trooper  had Nash exit the vehicle and perform a horizontal-gaze- nystagmus (HGN) test, which is generally used to test for depressants. Nash also completed a one-leg balance test and a walk-and-tum test. The trooper thought that all three tests indicated that Nash was under the influence. Gerhard asked Nash if he was on any medications, and Nash replied that he was not. 

Nash provided a preliminary breath test, which produced a 0.000 result. Nash then completed a fourth test, which did not reveal any signs of impairment. The trooper nonetheless told Nash that she believed he was under the influence and placed him under arrest.

The trooper applied for and obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine test. Next, while seated in her squad car with Nash in the back seat, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” Gerhard showed Nash the warrant, but she did not “let him hold it and look through it.”

The blood test result revealed the presence of methadone and the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license.  

The Petitioner challenged the license revocation alleging the trooper did not read the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, (3). 

The District Court sustained the revocation but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177 (2022) governs the revocation of driving privileges based on a search warrant for the collection of a blood or urine sample from a person suspected of driving while impaired. If such test results indicate “the presence of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols, the commissioner shall revoke the person’s license or permit to drive.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 5. If a person refuses to submit to a blood or urine test as requested by a peace officer pursuant to a search warrant, then a test must not be given. Id., subd. 13. However, it is a crime for a person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood or urine pursuant to a search warrant under section 171.177. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022)."

"Section 171.177, subdivision 1, requires that “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant... the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Nash argues that he is entitled to rescission of his license revocation because the officer did not advise him that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime and instead merely advised him that she had applied for a search warrant for a blood draw and that refusal to take a test was a crime."

***

"This court has held that the advisory requirement in Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous, has no exceptions, and requires an officer to inform an individual of the criminal consequences of test refusal. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). We therefore apply the statute’s plain meaning, with guidance from caselaw."

***

In Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “[compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.” 368 N.W.2d at 280. The supreme court reasoned that “the legislature intended that a driver’s license be revoked pursuant to the implied consent law . . . only if the provisions of the law were complied with by the police.” Id. at 281 (emphasis added). Because the police did not provide a statutorily required implied-consent advisory, the test results in Tyler “could not properly serve as the basis for a revocation of [Tyler’s] license pursuant to the implied consent law.” Id.

***

"The Jensen court applied the supreme court’s reasoning from Tyler and concluded that the commissioner may not revoke a driver’s license based on blood-test results under section 171.177, subdivision 5, unless the officer directing the test gives the driver the advisory required under subdivision 1 of the statute. 932 N.W.2d at 847. This court held that, because the peace officer in Jensen never warned the driver that refusing to submit to a blood test is a crime, the commissioner could not revoke her license based on her test results. Id. at 848 (reversing and remanding for the district court to rescind the license revocation).

"Under Jensen, it is clear that a license revocation cannot be sustained based on the results of a chemical test if the driver was not provided an advisory regarding the criminal consequences of failing to submit to a test. Id. at 846 (stating it was undisputed that law enforcement did not advise Jensen that refusal to submit to a blood test is a crime). But, as the commissioner notes, Jensen does not address the issue presented here: whether an advisory that deviates from the language of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is nonetheless adequate to sustain a revocation."

"The commissioner argues that “there is no specific form the advisory must take,” and that Nash “was accurately informed of the legal consequences of refusing to submit to the blood test that was requested.” The commissioner relies on McCormick v. Commissioner of Public Safety, in which this court announced the rule that whether an implied-consent advisory complies with statutory requirements “depends on whether the given advisory, considered in its context as a whole, is misleading or confusing.” 945 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. App. 2020). The statute at issue in McCormick required that “[a]t the time a breath test is requested, the person must be informed . . . that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(2) (2018) (emphasis added). The officer in McCormick informed the driver that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” and not that “refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime.” 945 N. W.2d at 57 (emphasis added)."

"McCormick argued that the statute required officers to read its language verbatim and that the officer’s failure to state “breath” directly before “test” misstated the law. Id. at 58. This court rejected that argument, noting that the plain language of the statute did not require officers to “read” or “recite” the statute’s language verbatim. Id. at 59. This court also noted that it had upheld advisories that deviated from the language of the implied-consent statute “so long as the information the officer provide[d] [was] not misleading or confusing.” Id. This court reasoned that, because the officer informed McCormick that “this is the breath test advisory” and that “refusal to take a test is a crime,” without mentioning any other test and offering only a breath test, the context of the advisory adequately informed McCormick that refusal to take a breath test is a crime. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). The advisory was therefore sufficient to sustain the revocation of McCormick’s driving privileges. Id.

"The McCormick rule is consistent with an earlier decision of this court in which it said that “[u]niformity in giving the implied consent advisory is highly encouraged” and recommended “that police officers read the exact words of the statute in order to avoid any possibility of confusion or improper deviation from the statute.” Hallock v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 372 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Minn. App. 1985). But this court also stated that if an officer deviates from the exact words of a statutory advisory, a revocation may nonetheless be based on that advisory so long as the advisory was not “an incorrect statement of the Minnesota law, or so confusing as to render the advisory illegal.” Id. (affirming district court’s order sustaining a driver’s license revocation)."

"We agree with the commissioner that the McCormick rule applies here. But for the reasons that follow, we disagree that the advisory in this case was adequate under that rule. See Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes). Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2, provides that:

'The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.'"

"In this case, the trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” As the commissioner concedes, if Nash had refused the blood test, the circumstances would not have supported a test-refusal charge because the trooper did not offer him a urine test. See Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (“Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered . . . Thus, the advisory was an inaccurate statement of Minnesota law and misleading. Nothing about the context of the trooper’s advisory changes our view. Although the search warrant authorized a blood or urine test, the trooper did not mention the urine test. And although the trooper “show[ed]” Nash the warrant, the commissioner does not claim, and the record does not suggest, that Nash had an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to submit to the test."

"In sum, the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading. The advisory therefore cannot serve as the basis for revocation of Nash’s driving privileges, and the revocation cannot be sustained. See Tyler, 368 N.W.2d at 280 (“Compliance with the procedures of the implied consent law is a prerequisite to revocation pursuant to the implied consent law.”); Jensen, 932 N.W.2d at 847 (applying to section 171.177 caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes)."

Moral Of The Story: You can't enforce the law if you do not  read the law.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Jones (Decided May 2, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that one should not pull into the parking lot of a closed business late at night.

In Jones, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and challenged the validity of the initial stop of her vehicle. The arresting officer testified that around 11:00 p.m., he was following a car traveling northbound on Highway 25 when the car turned left into the parking lot of a closed business. At the next opportunity, the trooper made a U-tum and parked along the right shoulder of southbound Highway 25 to observe the car. The trooper saw the car park in the front section of the dimly lit lot, which abutted the highway. After approximately 30 seconds, he saw the car drive further into the lot and move to a darker area between two buildings where the trooper lost sight of the car. About 30 seconds later, the trooper observed the car travel back to the front section of the lot, come to a complete stop, exit the lot, and reenter Highway 25, continuing northbound. The trooper initiated a traffic stop and arrested the car’s sole occupant, later identified as Jones, after detecting signs of intoxication.

The trooper testified that he considered Jones’s driving conduct to be suspicious. The trooper testified that he became suspicious because he knew the business was closed, the lot was not well-lit, and there were other lots along the highway with much better lighting. The trooper also testified that although he considered the driver might be custodial staff or have pulled over to look at a map, he no longer thought that was the case when he observed the vehicle travel from the dimly lit front area of the lot to a darker area of the lot hidden from his view. The trooper testified that he became particularly suspicious when the vehicle moved to the dark area of the lot out of his view because the trooper knew that buses were parked in that area, and he thought it was possible that someone could be vandalizing the building, stealing tires, or engaged in drug use. 

The district court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the MInnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, stating:

"For a stop to be supported by reasonable suspicion, there must be “specific, articulable facts” showing that the officer “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Id. at 842-43 (quotations omitted). The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.2008) (quotations omitted). This standard is satisfied when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). If a seizure is not supported by reasonable suspicion, however, all evidence obtained because of the seizure must be suppressed. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842."

***

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. Around 11:00 p.m., the trooper saw Jones drive into the front section of the lot of a closed business and, 30 seconds later, drive out of sight between two buildings. According to the trooper, there was no apparent reason for someone to enter the parking lot at that time of night because the business was closed. The trooper also concluded from his observations that Jones was not an employee because instead of entering the business, she proceeded to drive into the dimly lit area between the two buildings. The trooper articulated that he suspected Jones of vandalism, tire theft, or taking drugs when she drove from the front parking lot to the darker area of the parking lot specifically based on his knowledge that tire thefts had occurred at “dealership lots here,” and in his experience, “people do[] drugs ... in some empty lots.” Like the behaviors of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Jones’s conduct caused the trooper to form a reasonable belief that she could be engaged in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story: Don't stop at any business that is not open 24 hours!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Wadekamper v. Commissioner of Public Safety which stands for the proposition that a DWI license revocation is never to old to effect your license.

In Wadekamper, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI on June 3, 2020. Mr. Wadekamper had five prior impaired-driving incidents from 1974, 1977, 1983, 1986, and 1994. Pursuant to statute, the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license for six years.

The Petitioner filed a challenge to the license revocation seeking a judicial review hearing.  The hearing was held, at which time the Petitioner conceded that there were no factual disputes but that he wanted to challenge the length of the six-year license revocation. Petitioner told the district court he only wanted to submit written briefs as testimony or oral argument was not required.

Petitioner submitted a written argument in the form of a letter to the district court, again challenging only the lawfulness of the six-year license-revocation period. He acknowledged that, under the license-revocation statute, the revocation period is not less than six years for a person with four or more prior impaired-driving offenses and conceded that he had more than four prior DWIs. Petitioner nevertheless argued that his prior DWIs should not be considered in determining the length of his license revocation because the prior impaired-driving incidents were “stale.” Petitioner also argued that the license-revocation statute requiring the district court to consider all prior DWIs, without requiring a prior enhancement warning, violated due process. Petitioner cited no legal authority in support of his due-process argument.

The district court rejected Petitioner's arguments and sustained the commissioner’s license revocation. The district court first determined that, because the length-of- revocation issue is outside of the exclusive list of issues that the district court is authorized to review at an implied-consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), appellant could not raise it. See Axelberg v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Minn. 2014) (holding that issues a driver may raise at an implied-consent hearing are limited to those falling within topics listed in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)). The district court then stated that the revocation period is mandated by the license-revocation statute and the commissioner had no discretion to ignore any qualifying prior impaired-driving offenses. The district court noted that Petitioner cited no legal authority for his claim that the lack of an enhancement-warning requirement in the license-revocation statute violated his due- process rights and declined to consider it. 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Appellant appears to argue that the district court denied him procedural due process by denying him a meaningful hearing. Whether the government violated a person’s procedural due-process rights is a question of law that we review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the state from depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. The suspension of a driver’s license implicates a property interest that triggers due-process protections. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Due process generally requires “adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N. W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976))."

"Here, appellant received a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The district court granted his request for an implied-consent hearing after the commissioner revoked his license. Appellant had an opportunity to argue his case before the district court. At the hearing, appellant stated that “the only issue was the length of his license revocation” and told the district court that he just wanted to submit briefs. The district court allowed appellant to submit a written argument after the hearing, which he did in the form of a letter. Appellant therefore had every opportunity to argue his case before the district court in both oral and written form. He received a meaningful hearing and all the procedural due process to which he was entitled."

"To the extent that appellant’s argument on appeal could be construed as a challenge to the district court’s denial of his constitutional claim that the lack of an enhancement warning violated his due-process rights, appellant’s argument still fails. In his letter to the district court, appellant’s only explicit reference to his due-process claim is a single line stating that “The legislation . . . permitting the use of incidents over twenty years ago to be used, without an enhancement warning, as a lifelong stepping stone for six years of ignition interlock is a violation of due process.”  The district court declined to address appellant’s due-process challenge because he cited no legal authority in support of his position. Courts do not consider claims that are unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, 614 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). We therefore discern no error in the district court’s rejection of appellant’s undeveloped constitutional challenge."

Moral Of The Story: A License Revocation Never Forgets!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Halverson (Decided April 26, 2021, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that entering a home uninvited is sufficient suspicious conduct to justify a vehicle stop.

In Halverson, the police received a report of a suspicious person on Allendale Drive in St. Cloud. The suspicious person had entered a home to see “Crystal,” who did not live there. The suspicious person did not apologize for entering the home uninvited or further inquire about “Crystal” before fleeing the scene. The report described the suspicious person as a white male with short hair, a black shirt, and blue jeans who fled in a black car.

As the officer responded to the report, he passed a person driving a black car. He thought the person and car matched the descriptions in the report. A bicyclist flagged the officer down and stated that the black car that the officer had just passed nearly hit him. The officer saw Defendant Shane Kenneth Halverson driving his car, which matched the descriptions of the car and person from the report, and then stopped him. The  Defendant was subsequently arrested for a DWI, driving after cancellation and trespass.

The Defendant challenged the legality of the traffic stop arguing that the "suspicious-person" description was too general. He also argued that the bicyclist's tip could not have supported the stop because the officer did not observe any driving conduct consistent with the tip. 

The District Court upheld the legality of the stop and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the district court noting:

"In considering whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001); see also State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Minn. 2000) (noting we are deferential to police officer training and experience). But an officer may not act on “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted)."

"The undisputed facts here are that the officer responded to a reported trespass involving a white male with short hair, a black shirt, and blue jeans who fled in a black car. Within ten minutes of the report,  the officer stopped appellant, a white male with short hair driving in a black car near the reported trespass. The officer relied on appellant’s proximity to “the exact area of the suspected trespass” in deciding to conduct a traffic stop."

***

"Considering the description of the car and suspicious person, the officer’s testimony about the proximity of the stop to the reported trespass, and the relatively short time that elapsed between the report and the stop, we conclude that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant’s car. Consequently, we decline to address appellant’s alternative argument."

Moral Of The Story: Not every house is your home.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

 The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is LaClair v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 27, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the police cannot enter the curtilage of a home in the early morning hours based upon a whim or idle curiosity.

In LaClair, a Lino Lakes police officer noticed a car, with its lights on, sitting in the driveway of a residence.  When the officer drove by the residence an hour later, the vehicle lights were still illuminated.  

The officer got out of his squad and walked up the driveway to the vehicle.  The officer walked up to the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed Mr. LaClair passed out in the driver's seat.

The officer walked over the the driver's side and opened the door without knocking.  Mr. LaClair woke up and admitted to drinking and driving.  LaClair was subsequently placed under arrest and his license was revoked.  

Mr. LaClair challenged the license revocation but the district court upheld the loss of his license.  On appeal, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court noting:

"Police must have a warrant to enter a constitutionally protected area, subject to limited exceptions. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10; Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. App. 2004). “If police enter a constitutionally protected area without a warrant, that entry is presumed to be unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed” if no exception applies. Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 747."

"These protections extend to the “curtilage,” or the area adjacent to a home. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). The path to the front door, however, invites visitors to approach and knock, and an officer may use this implied license just as any other citizen. Id. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The relevant question is whether an officer’s behavior falls within the scope of the implied license that extends to any member of the public. See id. (“Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). The scope of an implied license is limited in time and purpose as determined by social norms. See State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 586-88 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that officer violated social norms by taking a circuitous route and by lingering too long). 

***

"A late-night approach does not fall within the purview of an implied license absent an emergency or some evidence that the homeowner accepts visitors during those hours. United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2016); People v. Frederick, 895 N.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Mich. 2017) (discussing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415); see also United States v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the time of day is a relevant circumstance when analyzing whether a consent to search is voluntary)."

"The record shows, and the commissioner concedes, that there was no sign of emergency when Officer Cree entered LaClair’s driveway or approached the residence. LaClair was not visible in his vehicle. Officer Cree did not testify that anyone else was present. He did not observe any indication of imminent danger to anyone. There is no evidence that the lights in the home were illuminated or of any other sign that the occupants of the home would welcome visitors during sleeping hours. And the circumstances observed by Officer Cree before his entry onto the property did not give rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Instead, Officer Cree testified that he entered the property only to alert the homeowner of the potential for a dead car battery, which the commissioner concedes is a non-emergency. These are not the circumstances where an ordinary citizen would approach a home in the middle of the night. Accordingly, Officer Cree entered a constitutionally protected area without a warrant or an implied license, and evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed."

Moral Of The Story:  Don't entice the police with shiny objects.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Yemane (Decided March 16, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a change in the law does not allow for a collateral attack upon a prior DWI conviction.

In Yemane, the Defendant was charged with a First Degree (felony) DWI because he managed to rack up 4 DWIs within a 10 year period. His attorney sought to challenge the use of his 2013 conviction to enhance the current offense to a felony arguing, the "2013 offense may not be used to enhance his present offense because, in March 2013, he was advised that refusal to submit to a blood test was a crime before submitting to the blood test on which his guilty plea was based and it was later determined that such refusals could not be prosecuted criminally without a warrant. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016); State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 2016)."

The district court overruled the challenge and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"...even though advising a defendant that refusing a warrantless blood test is a crime now precludes prosecution for driving with a particular alcohol concentration, “prosecution [may] still proceed for the general offense of driving while under the influence, based on other evidence of impairment.” State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. 2006). We agree with the district court’s conclusion that here, “there was ample other evidence to sustain a prosecution and conviction for driving while impaired under a different subdivision of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, even if the district court had suppressed the unconstitutional blood draw."

"Because collateral attacks of criminal convictions undermine the finality of judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988), quoted in Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 538 n.4. A change in the law following a conviction is not a unique case. There is no basis to reverse the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to exclude the March 2013 conviction."

Moral Of The Story: Be careful that your past does not come back to haunt you.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Palke v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 27, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the Courts are not going to allow any expert to impugn the general reliability of a Data Master breath test with evidence of margin of error, uncertainty of measurement or machine bias.

In Palke, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI and tested at 16% breath alcohol concentration level.  Mr. Palke filed a challenge to the license revocation and sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the reliability and accuracy of his breath test results.

The Commissioner of Public Safety moved to exclude the expert testimony and the District Court granted the motion.  On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, noting:

"In May 2018, Palke notified the commissioner that he intended to offer the testimony of a “BCA Breath Testing Expert” concerning the reliability and accuracy of his breath-test result in light of “the uncertainty of measurement values that apply to . . . breath test results, the metrological traceability of these test results, and the ultimate accuracy of the results.” *** "Thereafter Palke filed a memorandum of law  ... arguing that the expert witness’s testimony would be relevant to the reliability of the DataMaster instrument and the “interpretation, accuracy, and probative value of this particular set of tests.”

The Minnesota Court of Appeals then explained its decision, stating:

"“[T]he results of a breath test” are, as a matter of law, “admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath,” so long as the breath test was “performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument . . . pursuant to training given or approved by the commissioner of public safety or the commissioner’s acting agent.” Minn. Stat. § 634.16 (2018). If the requirements of section 634.16 are satisfied, the results of a breath test “are admissible into evidence without antecedent expert testimony establishing that the instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of alcohol concentration.” In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 528 n.3 (Minn. 2012); State v. Norgaard, 899 N.W.2d 205, 207-08 (Minn. App. 2017). In addition, if the requirements of section 634.16 are satisfied, the results of a breath test are “presumed trustworthy and reliable.” In re Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007). “But section 634.16’s presumption of reliability may be challenged in a proceeding under section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b)(10), which specifically permits a driver to challenge the reliability and accuracy of his or her test results.” Id.; see also State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 n.4 (Minn. 2009)."

***

"If a party seeks to introduce expert evidence at an implied-consent hearing, the district court may admit the evidence if the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the factfinder “understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Minn. R. Evid. 702; see also Hayes, 773 N.W.2d at 136. “The basic consideration in admitting expert testimony under Rule 702 is the helpfulness test—that is, whether the testimony will assist the [factfinder] in resolving factual questions presented.” State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997)."

***

"Palke acknowledges that the district court excluded his proffered expert evidence on the ground that it would not be helpful to the factfinder. Palke contends, however, that “the expert testimony would have been helpful to the district court judge, as the testimony would have explained the difference between bias, uncertainty of measurement, and margin of error,” which Palke asserts are “distinct and separate issues,”  and that “the expert testimony would show how bias specifically affected the test results at the .16 level.”

"In response, the commissioner argues primarily that Palke’s expert evidence is “insufficient as a matter of law,” and thus irrelevant, on the ground that the commissioner “is not required to prove an alcohol concentration within some alleged margin of potential error.”  The commissioner also argues that the district court correctly analyzed the helpfulness of Palke’s expert evidence on the ground that Palke’s proffer related merely to “the general concept of bias and how it could or might affect a test result” but did not include “anything specific to this test or this instrument.”

***

"The district court’s ruling on the admissibility of Palke’s expert evidence appropriately considered the general nature of Palke’s proffer. The district court reasoned that Palke had “failed to proffer sufficient information regarding the expert testimony beyond his allegation that the administration of [his] test was biased and that there is a chance [he] was below the legal threshold of 0.16.” The district court further reasoned that “[t]he limited information proffered . . . would not be helpful to the court."

"The district court’s reasoning is supported by the record. Palke’s proffer was general in nature and somewhat speculative about the testimony that the expert witness would give. There is no indication that the expert testimony would have helped the district court resolve the disputed factual issues in this particular case, such as whether Palke’s test results “were . . . accurately evaluated,” see Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(10), or whether Palke’s alcohol concentration actually was 0.16 or more,  see Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a), 4(a)(1). Palke argues on appeal that the expert witness would have testified about the probability that his “true alcohol concentration” was less than 0.16, but he does not state that probability, and there is no such information in any version of the proffer that he presented to the district court."

Moral Of The Story:  When it comes to horseshoes, hand grenades and license revocations, close is good enough.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Cruz (decided December 30, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that disclosure of a urine sample test result to the district court, obtained pursuant to a jail booking procedure, does not violate the Minnesota Data Privacy Act.  (Why it does not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is beyond me but it does not appear the defense raised a constitutional objection).

In Cruz, the Defendant was arrested for driving after his license had been cancelled.  Mr. Cruz was taken to the Nobles County Jail where, as a part of the booking procedure, he was asked to submit to a urine test.  The test result revealed the presence of methamphetamine.  The jail informed the arresting deputy of the test result and the deputy then applied for a search warrant to obtain a sample of the Defendant's blood.

The district court issued the search warrant, and the blood sample confirmed the presence of methamphetamine in Defendant's system. The Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of gross misdemeanor driving after cancelation—IPS, and one count of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of a controlled substance.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the blood test result arguing arguing that the search warrant was invalid because it “was based solely on private medical data which was improperly disclosed by jail staff to an investigating police officer during the course of a criminal investigation.” The district court determined that data stemming from a “urine sample collected as part of the booking process is ‘corrections and detention data’” under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA). The district court also determined that although this corrections and detention data is classified as private under the MGDPA, see Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, it “may be released to law enforcement if necessary for law enforcement purposes” under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5. The district court, therefore, denied appellant’s motion to suppress because the results of the urine test were “appropriately reported to law enforcement.”

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"The MGDPA “regulates the collection, creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and access to government data in government entities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subds. 1, 3. A government entity is “a state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7a. The MGDPA differentiates between “data on individuals” and “data not on individuals.” See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subds. 4, 5. “After the initial classification as either data on individuals or not on individuals, the data is categorized as either public, private, or confidential.” Int 7 Bhd. Of Elec Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. 2009). Public data on individuals is accessible to the public. Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 15. Private data on individuals is data which is made not public by statute or federal law, but is accessible to the subject of the data. Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 12. Confidential data on individuals is data made not public by statute or federal law, and is not accessible to the individual subject of that data. Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 3. While private data and confidential data generally may not be disclosed to the public, private data may be disclosed as specficially authorized by law. Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 4(b)."

"Under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, certain “corrections and detention data on individuals are classified as private.” “Corrections and detention data” is data on individuals that is “created, collected, used or maintained because of their lawful confinement or detainment in state reformatories, prisons and correctional facilities, municipal or county jails, lockups, workhouses, work farms and all other correctional and detention facilities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 1. Corrections and detention data may be released “to any law enforcement agency, if necessary for law enforcement purposes, or to the victim of a criminal act where the data are necessary for the victim to assert the victim’s legal right to restitution.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5. And Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 4 provides that “[a]fter any presentation to a court, any data made private or confidential by this section shall be public to the extent reflected in court records.”

"Here, the parties agree that the test results from the urine sample collected at the county jail are private “corrections and detention data” within the meaning of the MGDPA. Appellant appears to concede that the jail was authorized to release the results of the urine test to the deputy for “law enforcement purposes” under section 13.85, subdivision 5. But appellant argues that because the district court “is part of the judiciary,” which is separate and distinct from law enforcement, the deputy lacked authority under the MGDPA to release appellant’s urine-test results to the court in the warrant application. ***

"Construing section 13.85 as a whole, and its words and sentences in light of their context, we conclude that the disclosure of appellant’s urine-test results to the district court in the search-warrant affidavit did not violate the MGDPA. Although appellant’s urine-test results are private corrections and detention data under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, these results may be released “to any law enforcement agency, if necessary for law enforcement purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5. A search warrant serves a law enforcement purpose."

"Additionally, subdivision 4 of the statute provides that “[a]fter any presentation to a court, any data made private ... by this section shall be public to the extent reflected in court records.” Id., subd. 4. The fact that Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 4 contemplates that private data under section 13.85 may be presented to a court indicates that private corrections and detention data may be disclosed by law enforcement to the district court “for law enforcement purposes” without violating the MGDPA. And the provision in subdivision 4 that the private corrections and detention data becomes public only “to the extent reflected in court records” demonstrates that the filing of private data with the courts is not the same as disclosing private data to the public and is permitted by the MGDPA."

***

"As the state points out, if the MGDPA precludes law enforcement from filing private corrections and detention data with the courts in a search-warrant application, then law enforcement would also be precluded from disclosing criminal investigative data to the courts. See Minn. Stat. § 13.82, subd. 7 (“[I]nvestigative data collected or created by a law enforcement agency in order to prepare a case against a person, whether known or unknown, for the commission of a crime ... for which the agency is the primary investigative responsibility are confidential or protected nonpublic while the investigation is active.”). If that were the case, then law enforcement would be severely hampered in obtaining search warrants and investigating crimes."

The district court's judgement was, therefore, affirmed. But I  do not understand why the defense did not raise a constitutional challenge to the search.  It is well established that a jail can conduct intrusive searches to prevent contraband from being introduced into their facility.  But what is the justification for taking a person's urine without probable cause? I don't get it.

Moral Of The Story:  Urine is now data.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Wolden which stands for the proposition that the police can enter your home without a warrant if they reasonably believe "emergency aid" is required for an occupant.  

In Wolden, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Shane Michael Wolden with criminal vehicular operation: causing great bodily harm while under the influence of alcohol.  On December 10, 2016, several police officers responded to a motor-vehicle accident at 5900 Westbrook Road in Golden Valley. Upon arrival, the officers observed a vehicle with extensive damage. Photographs of the accident scene showed that the windshield of the vehicle was shattered and contained a large hole on the driver’s side. Those photographs also showed debris strewn around the front end of the vehicle, one of the vehicle’s wheels on the ground across the street from the vehicle, a light pole sheared off from its base, the detached lamp from that light pole, and a downed street sign. Blood was visible on both the driver’s and passenger’s sides of the vehicle, including on top of the vehicle’s sunroof. Sergeant Buffie testified that the caller who reported the accident was at the scene and told the officers that the occupants of the vehicle “had left on foot.” The officers determined that Wolden was a registered owner of the vehicle.

Officers were informed that there was a man with a severe head injury in front of a different caller’s residence. Officers responded to that residence and spoke to the man, who was identified as C.T. C.T. had been a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident. C.T. had severe injuries. Sergeant Buffie testified that C.T.’s “eye was bulging out of his head really bad, filled with blood,” that he had “numerous lacerations on his head and was actively bleeding with blood running down his face,” and that he “looked horrific.”

Police dispatch informed the officers that Wolden had prior contact with law enforcement at a residence at 5630 Kentley Avenue, which was less than a mile from the accident scene. Officers went to that address and found, outside the garage of the residence, a man’s watch and what appeared to be a key fob for the same make and model as the vehicle involved in the accident. Officers elected not to set up a perimeter around the residence. Instead, officers entered the residence and announced their presence. Sergeant Buffie testified that he entered the residence because he believed that the driver of the vehicle, Wolden, was potentially in worse condition than C.T. and could have been severely injured.

Officers went to the basement and saw Wolden lying on a bed, under the covers. Officers observed that Wolden’s breathing and heartbeat were rapid. While Wolden was talking to the officers, they detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed that his speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Wolden told officers a second time that he did not need an ambulance. Law enforcement administered field sobriety tests, and Wolden performed poorly on the tests.  Wooden subsequently tested a .19 BAC on the Data Master Machine.

Wooden moved to suppress the evidence of his test result, etc. arguing that the police entry into his home was made without his consent or exigent circumstances to justify the entry.  The District Court disagreed finding that the "emergency aid" exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry.  On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, stating:

"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980) (quotation omitted). “Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law enforcement officers . . . ‘may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’” State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787-88 (Minn. 2007) ."

"The Minnesota Supreme Court uses a two-part test to determine whether a search was reasonable under the emergency-aid exception. Ries, 2018 WL 6332362, at *9 (citing Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788). First, the police must have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” Id. (quoting Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788). And second, “[tjhere must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788). “Under the emergency-aid exception, it does not matter if officers have reason to believe some criminal activity is afoot as long as they are objectively motivated by the need to give aid.” Id. (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S. Ct. at 1948)."

"...the district court found that the vehicle “had extensive damage in multiple areas” and that “there was blood visible on both the driver’s side and passenger’s side of the vehicle.” This finding is unchallenged, and the photographs of the vehicle and accident scene support it. The district court also found that when officers encountered C.T. he had “severe injuries including numerous lacerations, and blood running down his face and head.” That finding is supported by the record, particularly, Sergeant Buffie’s testimony regarding C.T.’s “horrific” appearance. The totality of these circumstances provided the officers objectively reasonable grounds to suspect that Wolden might be seriously injured and need immediate aid."

***
"We turn to the second part of the emergency-aid test: whether there was some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.  Here, police dispatch informed the officers that Wolden had prior contact with law enforcement at the residence to be searched, which was less than a mile from the accident scene. Officers found, outside the garage of the residence, a man’s watch and what appeared to be a key fob for the same make and model as the vehicle involved in the accident. Based on the information from police dispatch connecting Wolden to the residence, the proximity of the residence and accident scene, and the discovery of a key fob, outside of the garage of the residence, for a vehicle with the same make and model as the accident vehicle, there was a reasonable basis approximating probable cause to believe Wolden was at the residence and to associate the emergency with the residence."

Moral Of The Story:  You can run but you cannot hide!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.