The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Helget v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 23, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the Court of Appeals continues to erode the distinction between reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest.
In Helget, a caller notified law enforcement that a white pickup truck was “all over the road” in New Ulm. The caller provided his name, the pickup’s license-plate number, and updates regarding the pickup’s location as he followed it. Officer Patrick Fay received word of the caller’s report from police dispatch and suspected that the pickup’s driver might be impaired.
Fay drove his marked squad car to the area described by the caller and saw a pickup matching the description of the suspect vehicle. While passing the pickup, Fay saw its driver and its license-plate number, which matched the plate number provided by the caller. As Fay passed the pickup, the caller in some way indicated to him that this pickup was the vehicle that the caller had observed “all over the road.”
Fay located the pickup parked on the apron to a garage behind 810 North Payne Street in New Ulm. He parked his squad car behind the pickup and turned on his white “takedown” lights, but not his emergency lights. While doing so, he saw the driver of the pickup, later identified as appellant Jesse Lee Helget, get out of the pickup and walk to the comer of the garage. Fay got out of his marked squad car and yelled at Helget to stop. Helget, who was about 25 feet away, looked back over his shoulder in Fay’s direction, but he kept walking. Helget turned at the comer of the garage and walked toward the house located beyond the garage.
For a brief period, the garage blocked Fay’s view of Helget. After Fay walked past the garage, he saw Helget standing in the back yard of the residence at 806 North Payne Street, which was next door to the residence where Helget had parked. Fay observed that a three-foot-high chain-link fence ran between the two properties and surmised that Helget had climbed over the fence.
Upon seeing Helget, Fay again yelled at Helget to stop; this time, Helget complied. Fay, who was still on the 810 North Payne side of the fence, asked Helget to walk toward him so the two could talk. Helget did not comply. He remained standing on the far side of the adjoining lot.
The police eventually got close to Mr. Helget and one of the officers could smell alcohol on Helmet's breath.
One of the officer's then grabbed Helget’s left wrist, and told him to put his hands behind his back. Helget minimally resisted but was quickly subdued by the officers. The officers handcuffed Helget and escorted him to Fay’s squad car, where they asked him to take a seat in the back.
At the squad car, Helget repeatedly refused commands to sit in the squad car and stated, “I’m not being detained.” Helget did not comply until an officer threatened to tase him. He then refused to slide his feet into the squad car, despite repeated commands to do so.
Helget repeatedly asked why he was being detained, and Gramentz replied, “You’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” In response, Helget noted that he had not fled and that he had stopped. Later, again in response to Helget’s inquiries, Gramentz told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations.”
The State of Minnesota charged Helget with third-degree test refusal, fourth-degree DWI, obstruction of legal process or arrest, and public urination. Helget moved the district court to suppress the evidence against him and to dismiss the criminal charges, again asserting that his arrest was not supported by probable cause.
The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, noting:
"Helget does not dispute that reasonable articulable suspicion justified a temporary warrantless seizure to investigate whether he had been driving while impaired. Instead, he asserts that the police converted his lawful seizure into an illegal arrest and argues that the circumstances did not satisfy the higher probable-cause standard necessary for a warrantless arrest.
"To determine whether there was probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI, we must first determine the point at which Helget was arrested. “The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman, 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984). There is no bright-line test separating a legitimate investigative stop from an unlawful arrest. Instead, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003)."
"The supreme court has held that “briefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the back of a squad car while the investigation proceeds.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999). Here, the police handcuffed Helget, escorted him to a squad car, and threatened to tase him if he did not enter the back seat of the squad car. Those circumstances alone might lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn. 1993) (“[Defendant] was under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and put in the squad car.”). But in this case there is one additional circumstance that makes that conclusion unavoidable. As the officers placed Helget in the squad car, Gramentz told him, “Tow ’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” (Emphasis added.) Although Gramentz subsequently told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations,” under the circumstances, Gramentz’s statement that Helget was “under arrest. . . right now” would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. We therefore consider whether at that point, the objective facts were such that a person of ordinary care and prudence would have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that Helget had committed the crime of DWI."
"The relevant facts were as follows. A known citizen called the police around 1:00 a.m. to report that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” Time of day is a relevant consideration when assessing suspicion of DWI because DWI offenses are common in the early morning hours. See Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (considering 1:20 a.m. on a Saturday morning to be a “time of day when drinking is often found to be involved”). Fay located the pickup and observed Helget driving it. Although Fay did not observe Helget commit any moving offenses, the citizen caller generally alleged that Helget’s truck was “all over the road.” That comment reasonably suggested that Helget’s pickup was being driven all over the road and likely in violation of traffic laws. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2018) (“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”)."
"After Helget parked and exited his pickup, he was evasive. As Helget walked away from his pickup, Fay yelled at Helget to “stop.” Helget looked back over his shoulder toward Fay and kept walking away from the officer. Fay pursued Helget and observed him in the adjacent yard. Fay also observed a three-foot-high fence that Helget had to cross to get there. Although Helget stopped in response to Fay’s second command to do so, he did not comply with Fay’s subsequent command to approach."
"When Gramentz arrived and got within two feet of Helget, he noticed that Helget emitted an odor of alcohol, a common indication of intoxication. See State v. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Common indicia of intoxication include an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an uncooperative attitude.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2004). Helget told Gramentz that he was in his own back yard, even though he was standing in another person’s yard and had to cross over a fence to get there. Helget’s statement reasonably suggested either further evasive behavior or confusion stemming from intoxication. Lastly, Helget displayed an uncooperative attitude, which is another recognized indication of intoxication. See id. His refusal to cooperate progressed from verbal to physical resistance as the police tried to secure him in the squad car while they pursued their lawful investigation."
"Admittedly, some might view the existence of probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI in this case as a close call. On one hand, the assertion of impaired driving conduct is limited to the citizen caller’s general allegation that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” And the record indicates that the police wanted to do more to confirm their suspicion of DWI. Indeed, the record supports a conclusion that the officers did not subjectively believe that there was sufficient probable cause for a DWI arrest. But our probable-cause determination is based on an objective standard; it is not limited to the beliefs or motives of the arresting officers. “[T]he issue is not whether the officers subjectively felt that they had probable cause but whether they had objective probable cause.” Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (noting that it was “not clear from the record that the arresting officers subjectively believed that they had probable cause to believe Costillo was under the influence”). Moreover, the possibility of innocent explanations for Helget’s otherwise suspicious behavior does not preclude a finding of probable cause to arrest."
But, as noted by Judge Ross in his dissenting opinion:
"If all it takes to be arrested for and charged with drunk driving is a caller asserting generally that a car was “all over the road” and an officer noticing that the driver smells like he consumed any amount of alcohol, then the Fourth Amendment doesn’t do much in Minnesota to prevent unreasonable seizures. I respectfully dissent".
***
"The majority does not address the district court’s primary conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing on foot. A person who is not in a vehicle commits the misdemeanor offense of fleeing if, “for the purpose of avoiding arrest, detention, or investigation” by “running, hiding, or by any other means” he “attempts to evade or elude a peace officer” who is discharging an official duty. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2018). Officer Fay’s uncontradicted testimony and the video footage reveal that, contrary to the district court’s findings, the officer never activated his emergency lights and Helget likely did not know a police officer had ordered him to stop. And the record likewise also uncontradictably establishes that Helget stopped immediately once Officer Fay identified himself. Helget could not have walked away and entered his neighbor’s yard “for the purpose of’ evading a police officer because, according to the officer who testified about it, Helget was unaware he was walking away from police. The circumstances did not establish probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing.
I am convinced that the same is so regarding the district court’s alternative conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for drunk driving. In numerous cases, we have considered whether circumstances like those the officers faced here (an imprecise nighttime complaint about bad driving and the odor of an alcoholic beverage) support an officer’s reasonable suspicion to investigate the driver for drunk driving. But we have never suggested what the majority holds today, which is that these circumstances justify leapfrogging reasonable suspicion and landing all the way at probable cause to arrest the driver for drunk driving with no further inquiry necessary—no need to closely observe the driver, no need to question the driver, no need to look for clear characteristics of impairment, and no need to administer field sobriety tests."
***
"Lacking more information, we simply cannot say that Helget’s driving even began to establish probable cause of alcohol-based impairment. When considering whether a caller’s report meets even the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, “If the police chose to stop on the basis of the tip alone, the anonymous caller must provide at least some specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegation of criminal activity.” Olson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985). I believe that the imprecise report and odor of alcohol here support no more than reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate. The officers chose instead to arrest first and investigate later. In doing so, they did not honor the Fourth Amendment with proper, constitutional policing."
Moral Of The Story: If you have been drinking, try to say out to the neighbors yard.
If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.
