Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Patton (Decided November 25, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a hit and run and a DWI do not necessarily arise from the same behavioral incident.

In Patton, a 911 caller reported his vehicle had been struck by a Ford truck in Isanti County.  An officer in Anoka County subsequently located and stopped the truck.  The Defendant was driving the Ford and was subsequently arrested for DWI.

The Defendant pled guilty to Hit and Run in Isanti County and subsequently moved to dismiss the Anoka County DWI, asserting that pursuant to Minnesota Statute  609.035, subd. 1, if the person engages in conduct that “constitutes more than one offense . . . , the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction ... of any one ... is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.”

The district court denied the motion, finding the DWI and hit-and-run offenses did not occur in substantially the same place because they occurred approximately 6.5 miles apart and in different counties. The district court found that the hit-and-run offense was reported at 7:50 p.m. and Patton was arrested for DWI at 8:20 p.m. But the court found no evidence as to precisely when the first offense occurred.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, stating:

"The determination whether multiple offenses arose from the same behavioral incident necessarily depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case."

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"In Johnson, our supreme court established the test that guides our analysis. After pleading guilty to driving over the center line, Johnson moved to dismiss a related DWI charge on the ground that its prosecution was barred by Minn. Stat. § 609.035 because it arose from the same behavioral incident. 141 N.W.2d at 520. The Johnson court recognized that when intent is not a factor, two or more offenses result from a single behavioral incident when they “occur at substantially the same time and place and arise out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincidental errors of judgment.” Id. at 525; see State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Johnson)} Because Johnson committed the two offenses “within a period of a few minutes and a distance of two blocks,” and his conduct “manifest[ed] an indivisible state of mind,” the supreme court concluded that they flowed from the same behavioral incident. 141 N.W.2d at 525".

"Because Patton was charged with both unintentional and general-intent crimes,  we focus on the three-prong Johnson test."

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"The circumstances of Patton’s offenses do not demonstrate the proximity of time and place that was present in Johnson, Corning, and other cases Patton cites."

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"The actual time between Patton’s two offenses likely exceeds 30 minutes as that time frame does not include the period during which the other driver pursued Patton before calling the police. Either way, we are not persuaded that the offenses occurred at substantially the same time. The undisputed 30- minute interval between Patton’s offenses is markedly longer than those found in other cases. In Corning, the second offense occurred very close in time to the first offense— while police were obtaining initial information at the accident scene. 184 N.W.2d at 605. In Gladden, the offenses occurred “within a few minutes.” 144 N.W.2d at 780. And the same in Johnson. 141 N.W.2d at 525."

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"In sum, the time and place prongs of the Johnson test do not support a determination that Patton’s crimes arose from the same behavioral incident. Because the three prongs of the Johnson test—time, place, course of conduct—are joined by the conjunctive “and,” all three must be satisfied to conclude that Patton’s offenses arose from the same behavioral incident."

I do not think this case makes a lot of sense.  Under its logic, if you get caught right away, you can only be convicted of one offense.  But if you manage to escape for a short period, the State can pile on the convictions.

Moral Of The Story:  If you commit more than one offense, turn yourself in.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vos (Decided November 18, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition it is not a "seizure" if you are already stopped. Okay then.

In Vos, Officer Schleichert of the Lonsdale Police Department received a report of a suspicious vehicle parked on the side of the road at a rural intersection in Rice County. When he arrived at the location, Officer Schleichert pulled behind the parked car and activated his emergency lights.

The officer found Mr. Vos in the driver's seat and Vos was unresponsive.  After having Mr. Vos submit to field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest for DWI by the officer.

The Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that when the officer activated his emergency lights, he was illegally seized as the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to make the seizure.  The district court agreed and threw out the case but on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

[A] “Seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). Whether a seizure has occurred is analyzed from the objective perspective of the person alleged to have been seized. (“Under the Minnesota Constitution, a person has been seized if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was [not] free to . . . terminate the encounter.” (quotation omitted). 

(So far, so good.  But then the Court says:)

"Therefore, the question before us is whether the activation of the officer’s emergency lights transformed the interaction into a seizure."

"The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this very question in State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1993). There the court declined to hold that a police officer’s use of their emergency lights when parked behind an already stopped car is per se a seizure, and instead adopted a fact-specific approach. Id. at 220. The supreme court noted that “[i]t may be that in many fact situations the officer’s use of the flashing lights likely would signal to a reasonable person that the officer is attempting to seize the person for investigative purposes,” but declined to find so where “[i]t was dark out and the cars were on the shoulder of the highway far from any town.” Id. Under the circumstances of the encounter in Hanson, the supreme court determined that a reasonable person would know that the emergency lights were used to alert oncoming motorists to be careful due to the officer’s presence along the shoulder of a dark road at night. Id."

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"While Vos urges this court to determine that in these circumstances a reasonable person in Vos’s shoes would not have felt free to leave, the supreme court already made that assessment to the contrary. It is not for us to second guess the Hanson court here."

ARRGH!

The problem with the Court of Appeals decision is twofold:

(1) In Hanson, the Defendant was stopped on the side of a HIGHWAY in Scott County, where officer and public safety would be a concern.  In this case, the Defendant was stopped on a rural road in the middle of nowhere. If there is no traffic to protect, what is a defendant supposed to think when the lights come on behind their vehicle?

(2) The standard to reverse the district court's factual findings is  "clearly erroneous".  And it does not appear that this district court was clearly erroneous in determining the Defendant felt "seized" at the time the emergency lights were activated. Or, as stated by the Supreme Court in Hanson, "It may be that in many fact situations the officer's use of the flashing lights likely would signal to a reasonable person that the officer is attempting to seize the person for investigative purposes. In this case, however, under all the facts, the officer's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person in these physical circumstances that the officer was attempting to seize the person. State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn. 1993).

Moral Of The Story:  Only in the Court of Appeals would a person feel free to leave when the police hit their emergency or "take-down" lights.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. McEachem (Decided November 12, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you have eight prior DWI's, you are not likely to catch a break from the courts.

In McEachem, the Defendant was arrested for First Degree (felony) DWI while still on probation for a previous felony DWI.  McEachem subsequently pled guilty to the First Degree charge and moved the district court for a downward dispositional sentencing departure claiming he was amenable to probation.

At the sentencing hearing, McEachem argued that, since his arrest nearly two years earlier, he had successfully completed treatment, maintained sobriety, obtained employment, and secured his own housing. The Defendant expressed remorse for his crime and reminded the court that he cooperated with the court throughout the case.  The district court declined to depart from the sentencing guidelines. It imposed a guidelines sentence of 62 months in prison.

On appeal, McEachem argued the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure.  But the Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, noting:

"Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A district court may depart from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines only in the presence of substantial and compelling circumstances. Id. at 308. To maintain proportionality and uniformity in sentencing, departing from the sentencing guidelines is discouraged. State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017)."

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"When determining whether to grant a downward dispositional departure and place a defendant on probation, a district court’s primary focus should be on “the defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). There are a number of relevant factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Such factors include “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” 

"Appellant argues that he is amenable to probation and that the Trog factors weigh substantially in his favor. Appellant cites his successful completion of treatment, his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, cooperation, positive attitude in court, and support of his friends and family as reasons the court should depart from the guidelines and place him on probation and not in prison."

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"While it need not have provided any further explanation for imposing a guidelines sentence, the district court noted appellant’s history of “using, relapsing and then driving.” The district court’s thoughtful and deliberate consideration of appellant’s departure request is reflected on the record. The district court accepted appellant’s arguments as having some merit, but also recognized that this was appellant’s “fourth felony DWI,” his eighth DWI in total, and that appellant’s “risk to public safety in [the] matter is just too significant for the court to grant [appellant’s] request for a downward dispositional departure."

"We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial and compelling reasons to depart do not exist, and that public safety would best be served by a guidelines sentence. The district court acted within its sentencing discretion."

Moral Of The Story:  Fool me once...

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Carstensen (Decided November 4, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that everyone is presumed to know the law unless you happen to be a police officer plying your trade on the streets of Minnesota.

In Carstensen, the Defendant was driving a vehicle with Iowa plates on July 2, 2018. The expiration date on the Iowa plates was June 2018.  A Beltrami County sheriff's deputy observed the vehicle and made a traffic stop, eventually arresting Mr. Carstensen for DWI.

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing the initial stop was illegal because Iowa’s registration-expiration statute provides, “[a] person shall not be considered to be driving a motor vehicle with an expired registration for a period of one month following the expiration date of the vehicle registration.”  And the Minnesota reciprocity statute provides that "a vehicle properly registered in Iowa will be treated as properly registered in Minnesota even if the Iowa requirements are different. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2018)".  The Defendant's motion to suppress was denied.

In State v. George, the Minnesota Supreme Court held "...that an officer’s mistaken belief as to Minnesota law cannot support an objective basis for an investigatory stop." So one would think that the Court of Appeals would have reversed the district court.  But no...

The Minnesota Court of Appeals instead affirmed the conviction, stating:

"We conclude that this case is distinguishable from George and Anderson. In George and Anderson, the circumstances that the officers observed could not have constituted violations of Minnesota law and were premised on the officers’ mistaken belief as to the meaning of a Minnesota statute. Here, Deputy Birt’s discovery of the registration with a June 2018 expiration could have been a violation of the general Minnesota statute. Only by way of the reciprocity statute was Carstensen’s registration valid. While the record is admittedly sparse, nothing indicates that Deputy Birt was mistaken as to the meaning of a Minnesota statute in this case."..."Because Deputy Birt was unaware that the Iowa vehicle registration was not expired for one month beyond the Minnesota requirements, it was not unreasonable for him to stop Carstensen’s vehicle for violating Minnesota Law".

Moral Of The Story: Ignorance is bliss!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.