Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Mauch v. One 2015 Chevrolet Silverado (Decided November 26, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the current statutory "innocent owner defense" is not retroactive.

In Mauch, David Mauch was arrested for DWI in November 2015 while driving a 2015 Chevrolet Silverado.  The title to the vehicle was jointly held by David Mauch and his spouse, Helen.  The police seized the vehicle for forfeiture.  

In December 2015, the Mauches filed a timely demand for judicial determination of forfeiture of motor vehicle. The district court held a bench trial to determine the legality of the forfeiture in February 2017. In April 2017, before the district court had made a decision, the Minnesota Legislature amended the vehicle forfeiture statute to expand the innocent-owner defense in Minnesota forfeiture cases. The 2017 language provides that “[a] motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture under this section if any of its owners who petition the court can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence” that they are innocent owners. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). Prior to amendment, the statute provided a narrower innocent-owner defense (i.e. if one of the joint-title holders was the drunk driver then the innocent owner defense was not available to the other title holder).

The more expansive innocent owner defense became law after the offense in this case but before the case was final in the district court.  The district court held that the vehicle should be forfeited to the state and on appeal, the issue was whether the 2017 statute is retroactive.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the more expansive innocent owner defense is not retroactive stating:

"David’s DWI occurred in November 2015. At that time, the innocent-owner defense was not available to a joint owner of a vehicle who was unaware of the other owner’s unlawful use of the vehicle. See Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 439 (Minn. 2009). In other words, the innocent-owner defense was not available in DWI forfeiture matters unless all owners of the vehicle were “innocent.” Id. But the vehicle forfeiture statute was amended in April 2017 to permit a joint owner to keep a forfeited vehicle if they could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they individually were an innocent owner. See 2017 Minn. Laws eh. 12, § 1, at 37-38. The statutory amendment contained no effective date, so the effective date defaulted to August 1, 2017. See Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2016) (mandating an effective date of August 1 unless a different date is specified). Therefore, the only question remaining is whether the legislature clearly and manifestly intended the statutory amendment to apply retroactively. Minn. Stat. § 645.21."

"We see no clear and manifest intent on the part of the legislature that the amendment apply retroactively. There is no language in the amendment to suggest any such intent. See 2017 Minn. Laws Ch. 12, § 1, at 37-38. We therefore conclude that Helen was not entitled to claim the innocent-owner defense under the statute in effect at the time of David’s DWI."

Moral of the Story:  While you may be found "not guilty", you can't be innocent after you did it.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Willis v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (Decided November 19, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if the police read a misleading advisory to a person under arrest for DWI, the arrestee must testify he or she relied on the misleading advisory in order to establish a due process violation.

These cases keep coming up over and over in the Court of Appeals and the reason is this:  It used to be, under Olinger v. Commissioner of Public Safety, that all the defense had to show was that the advisory was misleading in order to establish a due process violation. It did not matter if the defendant testified or not. And it did not matter if the defendant submitted to testing or not. But all that has changed under the recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases of Morehouse and Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety.

In Morehouse and Johnson, the Supreme Court held that in order to establish a due process violation, the Defendant must establish three things:

(1) That the person whose license was revoked submitted to a breath, blood or urine test;
(2) The person prejudicially relied on the implied consent advisory in deciding to undergo testing; and 
(3) The implied consent advisory did not accurately inform the person of the legal consequences of refusing to submit to testing.

Since everyone was relying on Olinger, no attorney was having their Minnesota DWI client testify that they relied upon what they were told when the police read the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory. And so now, all those Olinger-type cases are getting reversed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. AARRGH!!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Windsor v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided November 5, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that if the police read a misleading advisory to a person under arrest for DWI, the arrestee must testify he or she relied on the misleading advisory in order to establish a due process violation.

In Windsor, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and was read a Minnesota Implied Consent advisory and was asked to submit to a blood test.  The advisory falsely advised the Petitioner that refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test was a crime.  The Petitioner submitted to a blood test and the test result indicated the presence of amphetamine.

The commissioner revoked Windsor’s license to drive based on the results of the blood test. Windsor petitioned the district court for rescission of the license revocation. The district court held an implied-consent hearing, at which the court received the following evidence: a peace-officer certificate, a copy of the implied-consent advisory that was read to Windsor, and a copy of Windsor’s test results. Windsor did not testify at the hearing.

The district court rejected Windsor’s Fourth Amendment argument, reasoning that Windsor “freely and voluntarily” consented to the blood test. However, the district court relied on McDonnell and found that the state violated Windsor’s right to due process because “[i]t was not a crime for [Windsor] to refuse a warrantless request for a blood test” and that Windsor was therefore “misled when he was told refusal was a crime.” The district court concluded, “Since the portion of the Implied Consent Advisory that informed [Windsor] that ‘test refusal is a crime’ was unconstitutional, his driver’s license revocation is rescinded.

The State appealed and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, noting:

"In its recent decision in Johnson, the supreme court stated that a due-process violation under McDonnell does not occur 'solely because a driver [has] been misled' by an implied-consent advisory. 911 N.W.2d at 508. Instead, the supreme court stated:

A license revocation violates due process when: (1) the person whose license was revoked submitted to a breath, blood, or urine test; (2) the person prejudicially relied on the implied consent advisory in deciding to undergo testing; and (3) the implied consent advisory did not accurately inform the person of the legal consequences of refusing to submit to the testing. Id. at 508-09 (citing McDonnell, 473 N.W.2d at 853-55)."

***

"The circumstances here are identical to those in Morehouse. Although Windsor submitted to a blood test, he did not establish that he prejudicially relied on the implied- consent advisory in deciding to submit to the test. He therefore is not entitled to due- process relief under McDonnell."

Moral Of The Story: Only the squeaky wheel gets the grease!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Went (Decided October 29, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that stopping by the side of the road and then attempting to drive away does not justify a seizure by the police. Well duh, except the prosecutor did not know that.

In Wento, the Defendant was driving southbound on Highway 53 in Koochiching County, Minnesota.  A Minnesota State Trooper was traveling northbound along the same highway when he saw Wento’s car. He observed no traffic violations as he passed her, but waited until Wento’s car was out of sight before turning around to follow her. Down the highway, Wento had pulled off to the side of the road. As the trooper pulled up behind her car, he saw the passenger door open and someone crouched beside it. The unidentified person got back into the car and closed the door, and the car pulled away from the side of the road. The trooper activated his squad car lights and stopped Wento’s car.

The trooper walked up to Wento’s car to talk with her. He learned that Wento had pulled to the side of the road because her passenger had to vomit. The trooper could smell a moderate odor of alcohol and noticed that Wento slurred her words as she spoke. Wento admitted to having a couple beers earlier in the day, and the trooper ordered her out of the car to do field sobriety tests. After showing various indicators of being impaired and failing the preliminary breath test, Wento was arrested and later consented to a breath test. Her alcohol concentration was above the legal limit and she was charged with fourth-degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.27, subd. 1 (2016) and operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2016). Wento filed a motion to dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause and a motion to suppress all evidence seized.

At the motion hearing, the trooper testified that he stopped Wento’s vehicle to perform a welfare check. The district court found that instead he initiated a traffic stop when he activated his lights and had no reasonable articulable suspicion for such a seizure. Finding that all evidence seized was in violation of Wento’s constitutional rights because the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, the district court granted Wento’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of probable cause. 

The State appealed the District Court's ruling, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court noting:

"A seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn 1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16 (1968)). To determine if a seizure has taken place, this court looks to “whether a police officer’s actions would lead a reasonable person under the same circumstances to believe that she was not free to leave.” State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. App. 2005). This analysis depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see also E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783."

"In this case, the trooper testified at the motion hearing that he did not activate his emergency lights when he pulled up behind Wento’s car, but instead waited until she “started driving away.” It is generally established that a seizure occurs when a police officer stops a vehicle. See State v. Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that a “driver confronted with a trailing squad car with flashing red lights inevitably feels duty bound to submit to this show of authority by pulling over”); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979). The state relies on State v. Hanson, which holds that activating squad lights alone does not constitute a seizure on an already stopped vehicle and can instead be construed by a reasonable person as a welfare check. 504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn. 1993). In this case, though, Wento was not parked on the side of the road and was instead driving away from the trooper when he activated his emergency lights. Unlike a welfare check, the use of emergency lights signaled to Wento “that the officer [was] attempting to seize [her] for investigative purposes.” Id. The state provides no argument to counter the trooper’s testimony at the hearing: that he activated his lights after Wento pulled away from the side of the road. Therefore, because a reasonable person would feel restrained in this situation, the district court did not err in finding the seizure took place when the trooper activated his lights."

"Here, the trooper pulled up behind Wento’s car and noticed the passenger’s door was open with someone crouched outside. The passenger returned to the car and closed the door, and the car pulled away. Only after initiating the stop did the trooper learn that the passenger had been throwing up. The trooper testified at the hearing that he did not “know what [was] happening in that vehicle,” indicating that he was not motivated by the need to render aid. Additionally, he was not called to this scene to check on anyone’s wellbeing. See Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23 (noting that “an officer responding to a call to investigate someone unconscious or sleeping in a vehicle is justified in investigating the welfare of that individual”). Further, a reasonable person under these circumstances would not believe an emergency existed when a vehicle briefly pulled off to the side of the road, then eventually drove away with no traffic violations. Because the trooper was not reasonably motivated by the need to render assistance and no reasonable person would believe an emergency existed, the emergency-aid exception does not apply and the stop was constitutionally unreasonable."

Moral Of The Story: If you have to stop by the side of the road, make it short!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI or are facing the DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and forfeiture questions.