Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case If The Week is State v. Klatt (Decided September 8, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it doesn't take much to justify the expansion of a traffic stop.

In Klatt, the Defendant was stopped for driving a vehicle with an inoperable taillight.  The officer making the stop testified he had met Mr. Klatt on two previous occasions.  The officer testified that at their first meeting, Klatt’s “eyes were clear and his manners were calm, and [the deputy] did not observe any signs of impairment."

The officer testified that at their second meeting, he “observed a change in behavior from the first time that [he] saw [Klatt].” He testified that Klatt’s “eyes were bloodshot and watery” and that Klatt was “kind of in an excited state.” During the conversation, Klatt admitted that he uses alcohol and cannabis and “stated that he would not stop.”

The officer testified that during the taillight stop, he he did not immediately observe any alcohol containers or drug paraphernalia, did not detect the smell of alcohol or marijuana, and did not observe any visible smoke. But he testified that, upon speaking with Klatt, the deputy “immediately recognized that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his pupils were dilated.” The deputy explained that, in response to the light from his flashlight, Klatt’s pupils did not restrict and remained instead “more dilated than [he] would expect normally.” The deputy testified that he suspected Klatt was impaired based on his dilated pupils, his bloodshot and watery eyes, and his prior knowledge that Klatt used drugs and alcohol.

The deputy asked Klatt to step out of the vehicle and observed that Klatt’s “balance and coordination seemed fine.” Klatt submitted to field sobriety testing during which the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. The deputy placed Klatt under arrest and searched his vehicle. Inside Klatt’s vehicle, the deputy found several open alcohol containers.

Mr. Klatt was subsequently charged with underage drinking and driving and violating the open bottle law.  

The district court, however, suppressed all of the evidence, ruling that the officer unlawfully expanded the traffic stop into a driving while impaired (DWI) investigation because “the [deputy’s observation of [Klatt] with bloodshot and watery eyes, and dilated pupils, [was] insufficient to provide reasonable [articulable] suspicion of intoxication,” and that the deputy’s prior interactions with Klatt did not support such a suspicion.

The State appealed the District Court's ruling and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, noting:

"“An officer seeking to expand the duration or scope of the traffic stop beyond its original justification may only do so if he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion . . . [must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (l)the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonable suspicion as defined by Terry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn 2004)."

*    *    *

"The state argues that the deputy justifiably expanded the traffic stop because Klatt’s dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes constituted two indicia of impairment, and two indicia of impairment are sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.  We agree."

"In Klamar, a trooper pulled behind a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the freeway. Id. at 690. After asking the driver to step out of the vehicle, the trooper “noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from [the driver] and that [the driver]’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.” Id. The trooper expanded the scope of the stop and conducted a DWI investigation. Id. The investigation indicated that the driver was intoxicated, and she was charged with DWI. Id. The district court determined that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the stop and dismissed the charge. Id. We reversed, concluding that “[t]he trooper’s observation of two indicia of intoxication specific to [the driver] reasonably justified further intrusions in the form of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing.” Id. at 696.

Here, as in Klamar, the deputy observed two indicia of impairment specific to Klatt: dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. But the district court noted that, although the deputy observed those two indicia, he observed “no others” and pointed out that the deputy did not observe Klatt slurring his speech or exhibiting an unsteady gait, and did not observe an odor of alcohol or marijuana. The district court concluded that, in the totality of the circumstances, the indicia that did indicate that Klatt was impaired were “rather weak” because “the majority of the circumstances . . . did not indicate [that Klatt] was impaired.” (Emphasis added.)"

"The district court’s analysis was incorrect. Reasonable suspicion does not require that an officer observe a driver exhibiting a majority of the known indicia of impairment. In this case, the deputy observed Klatt with dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. Consistent with our decision in Klamar, his observations provided an “independent basis” of suspicion that justified expansion of the traffic stop. Moreover, in the context of the more-demanding probable-cause standard, we have said that the absence of certain indicia does not invalidate or negate the existence of other indica. See, e.g.. State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding that driver “perform[ing] well” on field sobriety tests did not negate other indicia of impairment supporting probable cause), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); State v. Grohoski, 390 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that district court “improperly focused on the absence of other indicia of intoxication” because a “DWI suspect need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication in order to support a determination of probable cause”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986)."

"Because the deputy observed Klatt exhibiting two indicia of impairment, we conclude that the district court erred in determining that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion justifying the expansion of the traffic stop."

Moral Of The Story:  Where is Visine when you need it?

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Brehmer (Decided April 28, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that even if the defendant was arrested before the police had probable cause, the evidence obtained was still admissible under the "inevitable-discovery" rule.

In Brehmer, the police saw the Defendant was driving the wrong way down a one-way street.  Defendant then hit his brakes and drove backwards into a parking lot.  The police activated their emergency lights to perform a traffic stop.  As the officers approached the Defendant's vehicle, one of the officers shouted, "Watch out. Watch out."

The officers exited the squad car with their firearms drawn and yelled at Brehmer to put his hands up. Brehmer moved his hands up and down several times before raising both hands, with one hand outside of the car window. One officer observed that Brehmer made “a lot of furtive movements . . . with the hands kind of up, down, side to side,” and specifically noted that he “reach[ed] to the right side.” 

One of the officers opened the driver-side door and pulled Brehmer from the car. The officers both pushed Brehmer to the ground face down and cuffed his hands behind his back. While Brehmer was handcuffed on the ground, one of the officers patted Brehmer’s pockets and pulled up his shirt to reveal his waistband. The officer then stood Brehmer up while handcuffed and brought him over to the squad car. The officers pat-frisked Brehmer next to the squad car, reaching into his front pants pocket and removing his wallet. During the frisk, one of the officers felt an object near Brehmer’s “right buttock area in his underwear.” He asked Brehmer what the object was, and Brehmer replied that it was “just a pipe.” The other officer removed a glass pipe from Brehmer’s underwear and, after inspecting it, concluded that it was a drug pipe containing drug residue.

One of the officers then ran information from Brehmer’s driver’s license in the police database and, after Brehmer stated that he did not have a license, confirmed that Brehmer’s license was suspended. The officer stated that he wanted to do “one more frisk search” before putting Brehmer in the back of the squad car. The officer reached into Brehmer’s front and back pockets and pat-frisked Brehmer’s body. The officer then placed Brehmer, still handcuffed, in the back of the squad car. During this time, the other officer observed that Brehmer exhibited several indicia of drug use, including pinpoint pupils, bloodshot eyes, sweating, and fast head movements. Officers also searched Brehmer’s car and found whiskey plates for the car.

One of the officers applied for and received a search warrant for Brehmer’s blood or urine for chemical testing. Officers obtained a urine sample from Brehmer that tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.

The State of Minnesota charged Brehmer with felony DWI pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2020). Brehmer moved to suppress evidence including the search of his person and car, his statements to the officers on the scene, and the chemical test of his urine, arguing that the police violated his right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. 

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed stating:

"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10. And unless an exception applies, evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018). One such exception is the inevitable-discovery doctrine, which permits a court to admit evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure “[i]f the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). To meet this burden, the state’s showing must “involve[] no speculative elements but focus[] on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984)."

"It is uncontested that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Brehmer after observing his erratic driving and had reasonable concern for officer safety such that a Terry frisk was lawful. This frisk would have inevitably revealed the drug pipe with drug residue in Brehmer’s underwear. Indeed, the officer testified that he would have found the pipe “regardless” of any of Brehmer’s statements during the encounter."

"Similarly, the district court found that “a routine records check inevitably would have been performed” and would have revealed that Brehmer’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety and that the vehicle was subject to whiskey plates. Brehmer does not assert that this finding was clearly erroneous. One officer agreed during his testimony that it was “standard operating procedure to identify an individual” during a traffic stop, that the officer would have learned that Brehmer’s license was canceled, and that the officer would have discovered that the vehicle should have been displaying whiskey plates when stopped. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846-47."

"Based on these inevitabilities, the officers would have had probable cause to arrest Brehmer for operating a vehicle while his license was canceled as inimical to public safety—a gross misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. §§ 171.04, subd. 1(10), .24, subd. 5(1) (2020). And given that probable cause to arrest, officers would have inevitably discovered the drug pipe with residue on Brehmer in a search incident to arrest. Brehmer’s erratic driving, drug pipe with residue, and his canceled license and vehicle-registration status, taken together, formed sufficient probable cause to support a warrant for chemical testing for DWI."

Moral Of The Story: If someone continues to drive and act the wrong way, they will inevitably get into trouble.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota WI Case Of The Week is Reihs v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 20, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that an extension of a revocation or cancellation of a driver's license is not subject to judicial review. I always thought procedural due process required that any government action concerning the "property interest" of a driver's license is subject to judicial review, but live and learn, in this case, to one's detriment.

In Reihs, the Petitioner's license had been revoked due to a drunk driving arrest.  Reihs enrolled in the Minnesota's Ignition Interlock program which enabled him to regain driving privileges subject to the requirements laid out in the interlock-program guidelines. 

The interlock-program guidelines require participants to submit to two types of alcohol-detecting breath tests via a device installed in their vehicle: an initial test and rolling tests. The participant must pass the initial test to legally start their vehicle. The device then periodically requests rolling tests at intervals of five to 45 minutes while the vehicle is running. 

Reihs he failed to complete multiple rolling tests. Because of this, in July 2023, the commissioner sent him a warning letter stating that he had violated the interlock-program guidelines and that further violations would result in an extension of his program enrollment. In September, after Reihs again missed rolling tests, the commissioner informed him that his license-revocation period was extended for 180 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a). And when Reihs thereafter continued to miss rolling tests, the commissioner advised him that his revocation period was extended for an additional year. Both extension notices included language informing Reihs that he had “the right to judicial review” as “outlined in Minnesota Statutes, section 171.19.”

Reihs filed a challenge in district court to the extension of the license revocation period but the lower court held that it lacked "subject matter" jurisdiction because extension of a revocation is not one of the five challenges enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 171.19. 

In a published decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.19 provides, in pertinent part:

Any person whose driver’s license has been refused, revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified by the commissioner, except where the license is revoked or disqualified under section 169A. 52, 171.177, or 171.186, may file a petition for a hearing in the matter in the district court."

"First, Reihs asserts that extending a license-revocation period constitutes a 'revocation' under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 because there is “no material difference” between   a revocation and an extension of revocation. He suggests that an extension of a revocation period is, effectively, a 're-revocation.' We disagree."

The appellate court reviewed various definitions of revocation and found, "...'revocation' plainly means the initial act or instance of withdrawing a person’s driver’s license. Because an extension of a revocation period is not an initial instance of license withdrawal but a continuation of a withdrawal that has already occurred, it is a distinct and separate action from the revocation itself. Simply put, a revocation extension does not alter the license status of the revoked person. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of the term “revocation,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not include an extension of a driver’s license revocation issued pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a)."

"Second, Reihs argues that, if an extension of revocation is not a “revocation” under Minn. Stat. § 171.19, it is a “de facto refusal to restore [his] license.” This argument is no more convincing."

"Like “revocation,” the term “refusal” is not statutorily defined. See Minn. Stat. § 171.01. Dictionaries define it as “[t]he act or an instance of refusing,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1478, and “a denial or rejection of something demanded or offered,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 494. To “refuse” means to “indicate unwillingness to do, accept, give, or allow,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1478, and to “decline to take or accept (something offered or presented); to reject [an] offer,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 495."

"The ordinary meaning of the term “refusal” clearly contemplates an action taken in response to a preceding request, application, or demand. Indeed, “indicating] unwillingness” and “declining] to accept” are both affirmative, responsive actions. Similarly, both definitional phrases imply discretion on the part of the refuser. It follows that an extension of revocation issued due to a violation of the interlock-program guidelines cannot be a “refusal.” This is so because an extension does not arise from any sort of request or application and it does not depend on the exercise of the commissioner’s discretion. Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a) (stating “[i]f a program participant. . . violates the program guidelines . . ., the commissioner shall extend the person’s revocation period” (emphasis added)). We conclude that the plain meaning of the term “refusal,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not encompass an extension of a driver’s license revocation issued under Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a). 

"A district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 to review the extension of a driver’s license-revocation period. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Reihs’s petition."

Moral Of The Story: Once you are in the program, the Courts are not going to help you get out of it.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Lorsung v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 30, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if an officer's suspicion of intoxication has been dispelled, he may not subsequently administer a preliminary breath test and the arrest of the petitioner is illegal.

In Lorsung, Officer Sonterre of the New Brighton police responded to a reported automobile collision in a bar parking lot. Officer Sonterre learned that Melissa Lorsung had been backing out of her parking spot when her car bumped an apparently intoxicated pedestrian. The officer also learned that Lorsung had been drinking inside the bar and had left the bar around closing time. Lorsung was smoking a cigarette when Officer Sonterre first approached her. He did not smell alcohol on her breath or observe any of the typical tell-tale signs of alcohol impairment, like bloodshot and watery eyes, unstable balance, or slurred speech.

Officer Sonterre directed Lorsung to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer Sonterre noticed no indication of impairment during the test.

Officer Paul Yang then spoke with Lorsung. Officer Yang, who waited with Lorsung and spent more time near her than Officer Sonterre, also did not observe bloodshot or watery eyes, slurred speech, or the odor of alcoholic beverages. Lorsung said, “[W]e’re free to leave, I guess.” He watched Lorsung move her car about three feet out of the way and into a parking spot, which he later said he would not have allowed had he believed she was impaired. Officer Yang told Lorsung that he didn’t want to keep her and asked if she had any questions before she left.

Officer Sonterre spoke with his supervising sergeant. Officer Sonterre told the sergeant that Lorsung was not drunk, and he agreed that it appeared that an impaired pedestrian had walked into the car of a sober driver. But the pedestrian and her family were still present, and Officer Sonterre said that he would administer another sobriety test before allowing Lorsung to leave, reasoning, “[S]o they can’t say I didn’t do my job.”

The preliminary breath test revealed an alcohol concentration level of .145 and Ms. Lorsung was placed under arrest.  A subsequent Data Master breath test revealed Ms. Lorsung was over the legal limit and her driver's license was subsequently revoked.

Ms. Lorsung challenged the revocation in district court arguing the officer lacked a "reasonable suspicion" to administer the preliminary breath test. The District Court upheld the revocation but on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court stating:

"[B]efore an officer may ask a driver to submit to a PBT, he must have a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is impaired. Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (Supp. 2023); see Sarberv. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 819N.W.2d465 (Minn. App. 2012) (reversing an implied-consent license revocation where the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the investigation). Because the exclusionary rule requires the district court to suppress the results of a PBT administered without reasonable suspicion, see State v. Diede, 795 N. W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011), we must consider whether the district court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to ask Lorsung to perform the PBT."

"Our review leads us to disagree with the district court’s determination. We review “a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo” and “accept[] the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Kruse v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. App. 2018). Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis to suspect a driver of criminal activity considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn. 2004); State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). We understand that, after Officer Sonterre began his investigation, he had reason to suspect that Lorsung had been driving while impaired. He knew that she had been drinking and that she had backed into a pedestrian in the parking lot of a bar at closing time. Even with no other indicia of impairment, a reasonable officer would suspect—as the officer here initially suspected—that Lorsung was impaired. But Officer Sonterre did not ask Lorsung to perform a PBT when he first suspected her impairment. He used other means to test his suspicion. He looked for signs of impairment in her balance, in the condition of her eyes, and in her speech. He testified at the implied- consent hearing that none of his observations of those things supported the idea that she was impaired. He then directed Lorsung to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. And his observation of her performance on that test combined with the accident investigation and his ongoing observations of Lorsung led him to believe, contrary to his initial suspicion, that he had apparently encountered a case of a drunk pedestrian walking into the car of a sober driver. Corroborating Officer Sonterre’s belief, Officer Yang, who observed Lorsung the longest, also thought that she was not impaired."

"The commissioner emphasizes the circumstances preceding the officer’s no longer reasonably suspecting Lorsung’s impairment. But the totality of circumstances includes an officer’s consideration of new information that tends to dispel previous reasonable suspicion. This is because police intrusions after their reasonable suspicion has been dispelled are unconstitutional. State v. Pleas, 329 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. 1983); State v. Hickman, 491 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992). The commissioner does not identify, and the district court did not find, any indicia of Lorsung’s intoxication that any officer observed between the time of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the time Officer Sonterre reapproached to ask her to perform the PBT. We have no difficulty concluding that a reasonable officer in Officer Sonterre’s shoes would have reasonably suspected, just as the officers here reasonably suspected, that Lorsung was not impaired when Officer Sonterre asked her to perform the PBT. Because the information available to the officers in the developing investigation would have dispelled (and did dispel) their objective reasonable suspicion that Lorsung was impaired, Officer Sonterre lacked reasonable suspicion to request the test."

"We are also unpersuaded by the commissioner’s argument that Officer Sonterre’s decision not to dismiss Lorsung shows that his reasonable suspicion had not been dispelled. The argument glosses over three important facts. The first is that Officer Sonterre is trained to notice signs of intoxication. The second is that he was satisfied that Lorsung was not impaired. And the third and most important is that the reason he did not dismiss Lorsung before he requested the PBT was not because he suspected that she was impaired but because he sought to confirm his contrary suspicion for the sake of demonstrating a thorough review for the struck pedestrian and her family."

***

"Officer Sonterre ended his impaired-driving investigation after Lorsung successfully completed the nystagmus test, and his reason for asking for the PBT was not based on his reasonable suspicion of her impairment but instead on his reasoned suspicion of her nonimpairment. The officer had no basis to request a subsequent chemical test. We reverse the commissioner’s decision to revoke Lorsung’s driving privileges."

MORAL OF THE STORY: You can't be tested if you are above suspicion.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Lang (Decided October 21, 2025, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police may expand a traffic stop to investigate a possible DWI if the police action is reasonably related to the circumstances arising from the stop. 

In Lang, the Defendant was stopped by the police for failing to signal a lane change. The officer who stopped the Defendant recognized her and knew that Ms. Lang had a history of drug-related criminal activity. The officer directed Lang out of her vehicle and then questioned her about where she was traveling and her plans for the day. While speaking with Lang, the officer observed her to have “excited” behavior, facial twitching, dilated pupils, and dry lips. Based on his training and experience, the officer recognized these as indicia of recent methamphetamine use. The officer questioned Lang about her drug use. Lang responded that she had not used methamphetamine since March 2022. She agreed to perform field sobriety tests, after which the officer informed Lang that he believed that she had used methamphetamine more recently. After she admitted to smoking methamphetamine four days earlier, the officer arrested Lang.

The State of Minnesota charged Lang with one count of fourth-degree DWI (body contains any amount of schedule I/II drugs) and one count of fourth-degree DWI (under the influence of a controlled substance), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2), (7). Lang moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the traffic stop arguing (among other things) the expansion of the stop was unlawful because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that Lang was driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. The District Court denied the defense motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"First, Lang argues that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by ordering her out of her vehicle without articulating safety concerns. We are not persuaded. An “officer may order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). This is so because such an additional intrusion is de minimis. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. Accordingly, the officer did not expand the traffic stop by asking Lang to step out of her vehicle."

"Second, Lang contends that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by asking her and her passenger “general investigative” questions and extended the duration of the stop by questioning her passenger. An officer expands the scope of a stop if they engage in investigative questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop and without reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding no reasonable suspicion to expand a traffic stop for speeding and a cracked windshield to include questions about drugs and weapons); Sargent, 968 N. W.2d at 40-42 (holding that questions about pretrial release conditions were questions about noncriminal activity unrelated to a traffic stop). But an officer may “ask the driver about [their] destination and the reason for the trip” during a routine traffic stop. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003). That is the situation here. Once the officer had ordered Lang out of the car, he proceeded to ask her questions about how she knew her passenger and where they were heading for the day. The officer then asked the passenger the same questions. We conclude that the officer’s initial questioning of Lang and her passenger falls within the scope of the “reason for the trip,” and did not expand the scope of the stop. Id."

"To the extent that Lang argues that the officer’s questioning of her passenger extended the duration of the stop, as we discuss below, the record demonstrates that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Lang was under the influence of methamphetamine before speaking to the passenger. In other words, the officer had a valid basis to continue to detain Lang during the passenger’s brief questioning. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (“Law enforcement may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains provided they act diligently and reasonably.” (quotation omitted))."

"Third, Lang argues that the officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by continuing to question her about drug use after returning her license and registration and by administering field sobriety tests. This argument is unavailing. The officer testified that he observed “possible signs of impairment” early on, while speaking with Lang about what she was doing for the day. He described Lang as exhibiting “excited” behavior, very dry lips, dilated pupils, and facial tremors. Based on his experience and training, the officer recognized these as signs of possible drug use. The district court expressly found this testimony reliable. One “objective indicator of intoxication” can constitute reasonable suspicion that a person is under the influence. Otto v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted). This record persuades us that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop by asking Lang about drug use and requesting field sobriety testing."

"In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings that Lang (1) violated a traffic statute by failing to signal when changing lanes, and (2) exhibited multiple indicia of controlled-substance use. Because the traffic stop was valid and the officer permissibly expanded it based on reasonable suspicion that Lang was impaired, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Lang’s suppression motion."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Smith (Decided September 30, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that in a DWI test-refusal case, the State does not have to prove that the officer requesting the breath test is properly certified to operate the testing equipment (i.e. the Data Master breath testing machine).

In Smith, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Ava Thadette Smith with one count of refusal to submit to a breath test, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1) (2020), for refusing to submit to an evidentiary breath test after Smith was lawfully arrested based on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

The deputy testified at trial that after placing Ms. Smith under arrest for DWI and bringing here to the Chisago County Jail, she informed Ms. Smith that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime by reading her the statutorily required breath-test advisory.  After providing Smith an opportunity to contact an attorney, the deputy asked her if she would take a breath test. Smith refused, stating that she did not believe the breath-test machine would be accurate.

The deputy testified about her training in DWI enforcement, including field sobriety testing and roadside DWI investigation. The deputy stated that she received “all the standard training for DWI.” But the deputy did not specifically testify that she was trained to administer breath tests, nor did the deputy say that she was trained to operate the breath¬testing machine.

The Defendant was convicted by the jury of DWI Test Refusal and on appeal, she argued that the evidence was insufficient because the state did not prove that the deputy who requested that she submit to a breath test was fully trained to administer the test per Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51 (2020) (the implied-consent statute).

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating:

"On appeal, Smith relies on subdivision 7(c) of the implied-consent statute, which provides that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(c). We are not persuaded that the state must prove a would-be test administrator’s training as an element of refusal to submit to a breath test."

"By its plain language, the training requirement in subdivision 7(c) governs a person who is “administering a breath test”—not a person requesting a breath test. That language makes clear that a breath-test administrator’s training comes into play only if a breath test is administered. Moreover, the rest of subdivision 7(c)—which limits liability for persons “drawing blood” at the direction of an officer—likewise applies only if a blood test occurs. Id. (providing that certain “qualified person[s] drawing blood at the request of a peace officer for the purpose of determining the concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating substance [are] in no manner liable in any civil or criminal action except for negligence in drawing the blood”). And when subdivision 7 is read as a whole, the other subparts govern circumstances in which a test takes place, not scenarios in which a test is requested and refused. See id., subd. 7(a) (defining who may draw blood), (b) (providing that “[t]he person tested has the right to have someone of the person’s own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any tests administered”). Thus, whether read in isolation or in the context of the statute as a whole, the plain language of the breath-test training requirement set forth in subdivision 7(c) controls how a test must be performed—and therefore applies only if a test is, in fact, administered. See Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d at 287; Robinson, 921 N.W.2d at 758. We are therefore unconvinced that this requirement is relevant if a breath test is refused."

***

"In sum, we hold that the requirement set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51, subdivision 7(c), that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety[,]” is not an element of the crime of refusal to submit to a breath test under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1). As a result, the state was not required to prove that the deputy who would have administered Smith’s test, if Smith had not refused that test, was properly trained in the administration of breath tests. Smith’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim therefore fails."

Moral Of The Story: Just say 'yes" to the test!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Peach v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided September 23, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you are not valid to obtain a driver's license in the State where the DWI was committed, you are not valid to obtain a driver's license in Minnesota.

Mr. Peach had three prior DWI's from Minnesota when he committed a fourth DWI in Wisconsin in 2021.  The Wisconsin conviction resulted in a "lifetime revocation" of his Wisconsin privilege to drive a motor vehicle.

In 2023, Mr. Peach applied for a Minnesota driver's license and sought to enroll in the Interlock program which would allow him to have an interlock-limited license. The application was denied because his driving privilege was still revoked in Wisconsin.

Mr. Peach filed a challenge in district court to the denial of his Minnesota license request but the district court sustained the application denial.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Because appellant had three prior DWI offenses, under Wisconsin law he received a “lifetime” revocation of his driving privileges, and because appellant’s driving privileges have been revoked in Wisconsin, he may not apply for a driver’s license in Minnesota. See Minn. R. 7410.5500, subp 2 (“If an applicant’s driving privileges are withdrawn in any other state and the applicant applies for a driver’s license in Minnesota, then the applicant’s driving privileges must be reinstated in all other states before the applicant is eligible for driving privileges in Minnesota . . . .”)."

"Appellant argues that this is an “absurd” result because, if he had committed his fourth offense in Minnesota instead of in Wisconsin, he could enroll in IID. That may be true; persons who are convicted of a fourth Minnesota DWI offense are not necessarily convicted of violating Minn Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9), and, if the statute they did violate is among those specified in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d) (listing those eligible for the IID program), they are eligible to enroll."

"But it is also true that courts may presume the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2022). The legislature’s determination that persons with outstanding license revocations in other states should not be allowed to obtain a Minnesota license through the IID program is not absurd. “[C]onvictions of another state should generally be recognized in the forum state . . . [unless] strong public policy interests of the forum state provide sufficient reason to override the general rule of recognition.” State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 537, 539 (Minn. 2006)".

***

"It is equally true that this court “cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Martinco v. Hastings, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 1963). Thus, whether appellant would be entitled to enroll in IID if his fourth offense had been committed in Minnesota is irrelevant; his offense was committed in Wisconsin, is not included in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d), and this court cannot sua sponte include it."

Moral Of The Story:  If you are going to drink, stay home.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided June 17, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that prior DWI's cannot be proven by a written summary of existing conviction records.

In Martinez, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI and the complaint alleged Mr. Martinez had two previous DWI convictions, making the current charge a gross misdemeanor.

Martinez had a jury trial. At the beginning of the trial, and outside of the jury’s presence, the prosecutor informed defense counsel and the district court that he intended to introduce a “summary” of Martinez’s prior convictions under rule 1006 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. During the trial, the prosecutor called a paralegal as a witness. The paralegal testified that she had requested information about Martinez’s prior convictions and received “[approximately 50 to 60 pages” of material. She identified exhibit 5 as “a summary of the criminal convictions that [she] requested for this case.”  The prosecutor then asked the paralegal, “Would you mind reading for the jury Number 1 and Number 2 on that document?” But defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The prosecutor offered exhibit 5 into evidence. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted the exhibit which stated: "1. On July 10, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-837. 2. On September 28, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-1670".

The Defendant was convicted of Second Degree DWI and on appeal he argued that exhibit 5 constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his constitutional right of confrontation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the Defendant and reversed the conviction, stating:

" Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” the defendant. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Minn. Const, art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (noting that confrontation claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions). These provisions are often referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from being offered for the truth of the matter asserted when the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant. Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). An appellant alleging a violation of the Confrontation Clause must show that “the statement in question was testimonial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the [appellant] was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” Id.

"Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor ... is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”)). If a document is prepared “for authentication purposes” and not “for providing evidence in litigation,” it is nontestimonial. State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018)."

"Martinez argues that exhibit 5 is a testimonial statement because it was prepared for litigation. We agree. The record shows that the state prepared the summary of Martinez’s prior convictions to be used at trial as substantive evidence of those convictions. The paralegal for the prosecutor’s office testified that she obtained records concerning Martinez’s prior convictions. The summary—which includes a case caption—purports to be the state’s summary of those convictions. At trial, the state introduced the summary in evidence to prove the prior-conviction element of its case. Indeed, the summary was the only evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions."

"The state contends that the summary is a nontestimonial record “that authenticates other kinds of certified copies of public records,” as was the document at issue in our Noor decision. But we are not persuaded. In Noor, the state introduced a “certificate of order sent” into evidence—a document that certified the authenticity of a Department of Public Safety order revoking Noor’s driver’s license and confirming that the order had been mailed to Noor. Noor argued on appeal that the “certificate of order sent” was a testimonial document for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 650. We rejected that argument, determining that the document was nontestimonial because “(1) United States Supreme Court precedent suggests documents introduced for authentication purposes, instead of to prove a fact, are nontestimonial; (2) an examination of Minnesota caselaw reaches the same result; and (3) the certificate is duplicative of nontestimonial documents.” Id. at 654."

"Our rationale in Noor or does not apply here. The summary was not introduced to authenticate other evidence. It was introduced to prove a fact—that Martinez had prior qualifying convictions. Moreover, the summary was not duplicative of nontestimonial documents. The summary was the sole evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions presented at trial. Given these circumstances, the summary was testimonial. Accord Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (determining that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial because their “sole purpose . . . was to provide prima facie evidence of’ an element of the offense); State v. Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that a firearm trace report introduced to prove firearm ownership was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 2009); State v. Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. App. 2007) (determining that a lab report introduced to prove the cause of death in a murder trial was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007); Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307, 309 (determining that a lab report introduced to prove that a substance was cocaine in a drug-sale trial was testimonial)."

"The parties do not dispute that the remaining two elements of a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in this case—that the summary was offered as proof of Martinez’s prior convictions and that Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross- examine the declarant.  Because the summary was a testimonial document offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the admission of the summary in evidence violated Martinez’s constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, there was plain error."

"There is also no dispute that the erroneous admission of the summary affected Martinez’s substantial rights. To convict Martinez of second-degree DWI test refusal, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had “a qualified impaired driving incident” within ten years of his refusal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (“A person who violates section 169A.20, subdivision 2 . . ., is guilty of second- degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed.”) .03, subd. 3(1) (‘“Aggravating factor’ includes . . . a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.”) (2020). And the only trial evidence that Martinez had a qualified impaired driving incident was exhibit 5—the summary. There is a reasonable likelihood that the admission of the summary into evidence substantially affected the verdict. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634."

"Because the admission of the summary into evidence was plain error that affected Martinez’s substantial rights, Martinez has satisfied the first three elements of our plain- error standard of review. But before we address the error, we must determine whether doing so will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted)."

“‘[W]hen there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the . . . error,’ the result would be different,” affirming a conviction would “adversely affect the public’s confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 256 (quoting State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2014)). Here, without the summary of Martinez’s convictions, the state would not have been able to satisfy an element of second-degree DWI test refusal. But for the error, the result of Martinez’s trial would have been different. We therefore conclude that reversing Martinez’s conviction and remanding for a new trial will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 255."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes its best not to summarize.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vredenburg (Decided May 13, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-court statements are admissible to establish the element of probable cause in a DWI test refusal case.

In Vredenburg, the police encountered the Defendant, apparently impaired, causing a disturbance near her former boyfriend’s home before later seeing her car driving away from the area. Police momentarily lost sight of the car, but soon saw it parked and found Vredenburg walking nearby with the key to the car in her pocket. Police arrested her on suspicion of impaired driving and the state charged her with chemical-test refusal. Vredenburg appealed from her test-refusal conviction, arguing that admitting evidence of statements provided by a bystander violated both the evidentiary rule prohibiting hearsay and Vredenburg’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.

A man reported to Rochester police that his former girlfriend, Mickela Vredenburg, was outside his house yelling and hitting his front door. Officers arrived and found Vredenburg. They noticed that she smelled of an alcoholic beverage, she slurred her speech, and her balance was unstable. An officer offered to drive Vredenburg home, but she declined. She told the officers that she had not driven there and that she had already arranged for a ride. She walked away.

Officers left but were soon dispatched to return. Vredenburg was at the house again, this time reportedly banging her head against the back door. Police did not find her at the house. But they knew she drove a black Ford Edge, and about a block away an officer saw a car of that description speeding past. The officer turned onto a different street, attempting to intercept the Ford. She soon found the Ford parked on the street, empty and situated partially in the grass, near two townhomes.

The officer stopped immediately behind the Ford and beside a bystander who was standing in the street. She got out and asked the bystander, “Did you see where that woman went?” The bystander, who lived nearby, said, “Yeah, she went right straight through there,” pointing between two townhomes. The officer walked in the indicated direction but did not immediately find Vredenburg. She returned to the bystander and questioned her further about what she had seen, asking for a description of the driver.

Meanwhile, other officers found Vredenburg walking in a direction away from where the officer had found her parked car. Vredenburg denied that she had been driving, but the officers were not persuaded. They arrested her on suspicion of drunk driving, and, searching her after the arrest, found the key to the parked Ford.

The Defendant was taken to the Olmsted County detention center where she was asked to submit to chemical testing.  Ms.Vredenburg refused testing and was subsequently charged with 3rd Degree DWI Refusal. The Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating:

"We are unconvinced by Vredenburg’s challenge to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s statements to the officer. Vredenburg is correct that hearsay statements are generally inadmissible at trial. See Minn. R. Evid. 802. She is also correct that, relatedly, testimonial out-of-court statements are generally not admissible unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764-65 (Minn. 2021). But these prohibitions are inapplicable here. An out- of-court statement repeated at trial is not hearsay unless it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). And identically, “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see also Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013). Vredenburg’s evidentiary and constitutional challenges to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s out-of-court statements therefore fails if the statements were admissible for some other reason."

"We have no difficulty concluding that the challenged statements were offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. The supreme court has explained that “[Refusing a chemical test is not a crime . . . unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had ‘probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2010)). The bystander’s statements to the officer supported the officer’s suspicion that Vredenburg had just driven the car that the officer found parked. Officers may rely on eyewitness statements to establish reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest. See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888, 891 (Minn. 1988) (holding that police had “sufficient information to reasonably suspect that the driver of the car in question was intoxicated” based on a gas-station attendant’s report to police “that he had observed an intoxicated driver leave the gas station”). The bystander’s statements about Vredenburg exiting the car and walking away from it were therefore admissible to prove a circumstance that establishes probable cause to suspect her of impaired driving. In other words, the bystander’s statement that Vredenburg was driving was not offered as substantive evidence that she was in fact driving, but to support the conclusion of police that they had probable cause to believe that she had been. Because the statements were admissible to provide the officer’s basis for probable cause, which is a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it was not subject to exclusion by either the rule prohibiting hearsay or the Confrontation Clause."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes a woman scorned feels the fury.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waldron (Decided December 26, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to talk to the police.

In Waldron, the defendant approached a house in Hibbing Minnesota looking for held after a single-car crash.  Waldron was injured and smelled of alcohol, and the homeowners summoned emergency assistance. A state trooper was the first emergency worker to arrive. The trooper located the car, which was in a ditch about 40 yards away from the road, and he confirmed that it was unoccupied. Then, the trooper went to the house to meet with Ms. Waldron.

Waldron was lying on the entryway floor, bloodied, and crying, and the homeowners were nearby. The trooper called for an ambulance. When the trooper asked Waldron for her name, she did not respond and moaned in pain. The homeowners told the trooper that Waldron had told them her name and had said her boyfriend was the driver. When the trooper asked Waldron what she had been doing at the time of the crash and whether she had been wearing a seatbelt, Waldron said she was not driving and asked about her boyfriend’s whereabouts. The trooper radioed for assistance in locating the missing boyfriend.

Another officer arrived at the home, and asked Waldron for the name of the boyfriend they should be looking for. This officer asked Waldron whether the boyfriend had been driving. Waldron responded that her boyfriend was not the driver.

Ms. Waldron was taken to a local hospital and her blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant.  The blood test result revealed an alcohol concentration level of .188%.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and moved to suppress the statements she had made to law enforcement arguing the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"To determine whether an individual was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda requirement, a court should consider the surrounding circumstances. State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012). Factors suggesting that a person was in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;

(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And factors suggesting that an individual was not in custody include brief questioning, a nonthreatening environment, an explicit statement by police that the person is not under arrest, and police allowing the person to make phone calls or leave after they gave their statement. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

"Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 10-11 (quotation omitted); see also Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

***

"Based on the district court’s undisputed factual findings, we determine, based on our independent review, that there was no custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, considering the surrounding circumstances, Waldron was not in custody when she was questioned. At the outset of Waldron’s encounter with law enforcement—and, indeed, for the majority of that encounter—there was just one law enforcement officer present. The homeowners were also present during the encounter, and they were also interacting with law enforcement. Waldron was not in a police station, jail, or a squad car. She was lying on the floor of a house that she entered on her own initiative. And the responding trooper made clear that medical help had been summoned for Waldron. The questions posed by law enforcement were not accusatory. Rather, they were open-ended attempts to figure out what had happened and whether there was another injured person outside in the cold. The totality of these circumstances indicates that Waldron was not in custody when she made the statements at issue. See Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11 (instructing district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual is in custody for the purpose of a Miranda warning).

Second, there was no interrogation. Police are not required to give a Miranda warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. This includes “on-the-scene questioning” of individuals suspected of driving while under the influence. See Steinberg v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”). Here, law enforcement officers asked Waldron general on-the-scene questions after responding to a serious car accident. These questions did not amount to an interrogation."

"Because there was no custodial interrogation, no Miranda warning was required."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Ness v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the failure to read verbatim the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory is not fatal as long as the advisory given is not inaccurate, misleading or confusing.

In Ness, the Petitioner was arrested for driving while impaired and was taken to jail.  The arresting officer asked the Petitioner if he preferred to take a blood or a urine test. The Petitioner responded that the officer was not going to obtain either test from him.

The officer obtained a search warrant authorizing him to procure either a blood or urine sample from appellant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer approached Petitioner's holding cell, stated Petitioner's name, and asked Petitioner to come talk to him. Petitioner was lying down on the cell bed, was wrapped in a blanket with his eyes closed, and did not get up or respond to the officer. The officer informed Petitioner, “as I told you before, I was drafting a search warrant for your blood or urine because of the DWI, and I have a signed search warrant in my hand, and refusing to submit to that search warrant is a crime.” The officer asked Petitioner if he understood. The officer testified that appellant did not respond and was ignoring him, but that at one point Petitioner opened his eyes and looked at him while adjusting his blanket before continuing to ignore him.  The officer asked Petitioner if he was refusing to give the officer a test, to which Petitioner did not reply.

The officer then told Petitioner that he was taking his silence as a refusal, and asked if Petitioner understood. Petitioner again did not reply. The officer informed Petitioner that he was leaving Petitioner a copy of the search warrant but Petitioner's noncompliance with the warrant would be considered a refusal and he would be charged with an additional crime. The officer then issued a Notice and Order Of Revocation of the Petitioner's driver's license.

The Petitioner challenged the revocation of his license asserting that his refusal to submit to testing was not properly obtained.  Petitioner claimed that since the officer failed to read the search warrant advisory statutory language verbatim, and failed to offer both a blood or urine test, the revocation of his license must be rescinded.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4. “At the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Id., subd. 1. 

"Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 2, provides, in part, that:

The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test,     the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine.

Action may only be taken against a person who is offered and refuses both a urine test and a blood test. Id., subd. 2."

"This court has determined that the warning requirement under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous and law enforcement is required to inform a defendant that refusal to submit to a warranted blood or urine test is a crime. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103,110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20,2019)."

***

"In Nash, this court considered whether law enforcement provided the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, when a state trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” 989 N.W.2d at 706. Even though the warrant also permitted a urine test, the trooper did not mention the possibility of a urine test, and Nash did not have an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to the blood test. Id. at 710. We concluded that “the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading,” and could not be a basis for Nash’s license revocation. Id. at 710-11. We held that if a search-warrant advisory deviates from the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, it “is insufficient to sustain the revocation of a person’s driving privileges if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing when considered in its context as a whole.” 

"Although here the officer’s search-warrant advisory did not comply with the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, Nash supports that a deviation is only problematic if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing in its context. 989 N.W.2d at 711. Here, the officer’s advisory was legally accurate and properly advised appellant of the consequences of his refusal. The officer testified that at the jail and prior to applying for a search warrant, he asked appellant whether he preferred a blood or urine test, to which appellant responded that he would provide neither. After applying for and receiving a search warrant, the officer told appellant that he had obtained a signed search warrant for appellant’s blood or urine, and that refusing to submit to the search warrant was a crime."

"The plain language of subdivision 2 does not require law enforcement to separately direct the tests. A peace officer who directs a test “shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant,” and if the warrant authorizes both, the peace officer “may direct whether the test is ofblood or urine.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If a person objects to one test, the peace officer shall offer the other test. Id. The statute does not prohibit a peace officer from simultaneously offering a urine or a blood test. “Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.” Id. Here, the officer testified to offering both types of tests to appellant before the officer obtained a search warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer again indicated to appellant that both tests were authorized by the search warrant before informing appellant that refusal to comply with the search warrant was a crime. The officer therefore complied with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2."

Moral Of The Story: Close enough for government work. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Graham (Decided November 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the unintentional destruction of the squad video does not violate Due Process.

Mr. Graham was charged with second-degree DWI and he challenged the stop and arrest.  The arresting officer testified that he observed Mr. Graham drive his vehicle over the fog line and make a "sloppy right turn, and cross into oncoming traffic before correcting into the proper lane. The arresting officer testified that his squad car’s video system automatically activates when an officer turns on the vehicle’s emergency lights, and the captured footage will often include a few minutes of video prior to the activation of the lights. He further testified he believed Graham’s driving conduct was automatically recorded by the squad camera.

Defense counsel was then given leave by the Court to obtain a copy of the squad video. The state later informed the district court that the squad video did not exist and requested that the record be closed.  Graham moved the district court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the loss or destruction of the squad video constituted a due-process violation. The district court held a second omnibus hearing and received testimony from the arresting officer and his chief of police.

The police chief testified testified that he oversees the sergeants assigned to managing, transferring, and storing videos; that he searched for and could not locate the video recording of Graham’s traffic stop; and that all recordings labeled as medical calls were “deleted for 2019 to free up some space on our server.” He testified that “it’s to the point where test recordings, traffic warnings and medicals take up a lot of space on our internal storage, and it’s my belief that after a year or two if there haven’t been any complaints” then “we just delete them,” and that “[t]he only person in our department that has the password to remove the files [is] myself.” He testified, “I might have deleted it if it was labeled as a test recording, as a medical or as a traffic warning.”

The district court denied Graham’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that there was “an equal likelihood the squad video could have inculpated [Graham] as it could have exculpated him.” The district court determined that the squad video was not destroyed in bad faith, that the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent "at the time of destruction".

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court stating:

"In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Thus, “[u]nder Brady, the suppression by the [s]tate, whether intentional or not, of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Walen v. State, 111 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010)."

"The three elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Id. If evidence that is only potentially useful to a defendant is destroyed, then the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the state to establish a due-process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 (1988)."

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"The district court reasoned that the video was not material because there was an equal likelihood that the video was inculpatory, and not exculpatory...The district court’s reasoning is sound, and we agree that the video was not “material.” There must be something beyond mere “hope” that the destroyed evidence could be exculpatory before it will be protected as the type of “material exculpatory evidence addressed in Brady”.

"Because the video was not material and was only “potentially useful,” Graham must show bad faith on the part of the state to succeed on his due-process claim. The United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have identified two indices of bad faith: (1) the state’s purposeful destruction of evidence favorable to a defendant so as to conceal it; and (2) the state’s failure to follow standard procedures when destroying evidence. Hawkinson, 829 N.W.2d at 373."

"The record does not support a conclusion that the state purposely destroyed the video.  The district court expressly found that “while the video may have been destroyed due to mistake or gross negligence, the [c]ourt does not find the video was intentionally destroyed.” And the circumstances do not suggest that the state was attempting to conceal the video. In fact, but for Officer Etshokin’s testimony at the initial omnibus hearing, which revealed the existence of the video, Graham would not have known about the video. Nor does the record support a conclusion that the state failed to follow standard procedures when it destroyed the video."

"In sum, because the video was not “material” and the record does not show that the video was destroyed in bad faith, the district court did not err by denying Graham’s motion to dismiss for a due-process violation."

Moral Of The Story: Counsel should have immediately obtained the squad video as reference thereto is always contained in the police reports.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.