Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Beckman (decided April 27, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition (once again) that an inoperable vehicle does not preclude a guilty verdict for being in "physical control" while drunk.

In Beckman, the Defendant was charged with two counts of driving while impaired and two counts of carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol.  The case went to trial where Mr. Beckman represented himself.  

State Trooper Aaron Myren testified at trial that when he responded to a report of a stalled vehicle, he found a Ford Explorer with its only occupant, Beckman, slumped over in the driver’s seat. Trooper Myren knocked on the window. Beckman awoke, sat up, grasped the key in the ignition, turned the key to “initiate the power to the first stage of the ignition,” and slightly lowered his window.  The trooper “was overwhelmed with a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.” Beckman told the trooper that he had been traveling from North Dakota toward Fergus Falls but that he could not remember where he was. Trooper Myren administered field sobriety tests, during which Beckman stumbled and struggled to follow directions. The trooper told Beckman that he was under arrest, and Beckman disclosed that he had one firearm on his person and one inside the car. Trooper Myren seized a semiautomatic handgun from Beckman’s jacket and another from a vest in the Explorer’s second row of seats. Then he took Beckman to the jail, read him the implied-consent advisory, and at 9:35 a.m., administered a breath test that revealed Beckman’s alcohol concentration of 0.08.

Beckman told the jury that he was driving home to Fergus Falls and ran out of gas. Beckman claimed that after running out of gas, he took two small bottles of whiskey out of his guitar case and drank them to "stay warm" on the inside.  The jury did not buy his story and found him guilty of DWI and drunk possession of a firearm.

On appeal, Mr. Beckman claimed (among other things) that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of the DWI charge.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:

"Beckman’s physical-control argument is unavailing. “[A] person is in physical control of a vehicle if he has the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle, and he is in close proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle.” State v. Fleck, 111 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010). Prohibiting intoxicated persons from exercising “physical control” of a car curbs situations where an intoxicated person might take some action to render a parked car a dangerous instrument. State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. 1992)."

"The jury heard evidence that Beckman was seated inside his car on the highway after having driven from Fargo to where he had stopped near Fergus Falls. It also heard evidence that he sought assistance after having run out of gas both by walking to get help and by trying to flag down a passing car. Even if the jury credited his claim that he consumed whiskey while walking after the car ran out of gas (suggesting that he became intoxicated only after he was no longer actually driving), the evidence established that he was intoxicated from the time he got back into the car through the time the trooper awakened him. Given the possibility that someone might stop and help him refuel the car, he fits that category of drivers targeted by the “physical control” prohibition."

Moral Of The Story:  Never, ever enter a motor vehicle while drunk UNLESS you are a passenger.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Schwartz, (Decided April 13, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that a criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle with “any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II” in the operator’s body, does not require proof that the operator knew or had reason to know that the controlled substance was in his body. The Court is careful to point out, however, that the ruling does not cover a situation where the driver was the victim of a "spiked drink" or is making the claim the substance was involuntarily ingested.

In Schwartz, the Bloomington police responded to a call concerning an unresponsive male in a car.  The responding officers observed that the person, later identified as appellant, had difficulty balancing and standing. He smelled of alcohol. After failing a series of field sobriety tests, appellant admitted to having consumed alcohol. Officers arrested him. A search of appellant’s person incident to arrest revealed a glass pipe in appellant’s pocket. 

Mr. Schwartz submitted to a preliminary breath test, which showed a 0.04 alcohol concentration. Suspecting that appellant was under the influence of a substance other than alcohol, officers obtained a search warrant authorizing seizure of a sample of appellant’s blood. Testing of appellant’s blood later revealed the presence of 0.03 mg/L of amphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance.

The state charged appellant with operating a motor vehicle with any amount of a schedule I or II controlled substance in his body  in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). The state also charged appellant with two additional counts of driving while impaired, two counts of possessing drug paraphernalia, and one count of possessing an open bottle of beverage alcohol. As part of a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to gross-misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with any amount of a schedule I or II controlled substance in his body.

Mr. Schwartz subsequently appealed, challenging the validity of his guilty plea, alleging the plea was invalid because he did not admit in his plea testimony that he knew or had reason to know that his body contained a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II at the time he operated the motor vehicle.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the Appellant's claim, noting:  

"...if a guilty plea is not “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent,” it is invalid. Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2002). An invalid guilty plea may be withdrawn. State v. The is, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A guilty plea is not accurate if the defendant does not admit to facts showing that his conduct meets all of the elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349-50 (Minn. 2005)."

"Under Minnesota law, it is a crime for a “person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle . . . when ... the person’s body contains any amount” of a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). The charge requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the person drove, operated or was in physical control of a motor vehicle; and (2) at the time the person drove, operated, or was in physical control of the motor vehicle, the person’s body contained any amount of a schedule I or II drug or its metabolite."

"At his plea hearing and in his plea petition, appellant admitted that he had been in control of a motor vehicle, that officers found a glass pipe in his pocket, and that appellant’s blood seized by police after his arrest tested positive for amphetamine....Nevertheless, appellant contends that his guilty plea in invalid because, he argues, we should interpret the statute to require proof that the operator knew or had reason to know that a prohibited substance was in his body. Appellant’s guilty plea included no acknowledgement that he knew or had reason to know that his body contained amphetamine."

"This court has held that impaired driving is a general-intent crime, the requisite mental state being “only a general intent to do the act.” State v. Anderson, 468 N.W.2d 345, 346 (Minn. App. 1991). Although section 169A.20, subdivision 1(7), is silent concerning any mens rea element, the legislature provided an affirmative defense to drivers such as appellant in specific cases:

'If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense to a violation of section 169A.20 subdivision 1, clause (7) (presence of Schedule I or II controlled substance), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12. Minn. Stat. § 169A.46, subd. 2 (2016)'. An affirmative defense relieves the defendant of

criminal liability even though the elements of the crime are admitted or proved."

"The legislature having provided for an affirmative defense concerning schedule I or II controlled substances in limited circumstances demonstrates to our satisfaction that the absence of any specified mens rea element in section 169A.20, subdivision 1(7), concerning controlled substances was not an inadvertent omission."

***

"Section 169A.20, subdivision 1(7), is similar to the per se rule against driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2016). Appellant cites no authority for the notion that the 0.08-or-more prohibition requires the state to prove that the driver in such a case must have been subjectively aware of his own alcohol concentration in order to be guilty of the crime. That would be absurd."

"Because Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7), provides for criminal liability without proof of knowledge or intent, because the statute is a public-welfare offense, and because the legislature specifically provided for a limited affirmative defense for drivers with schedule I or II controlled substances in the driver’s body, we decline to read into the statute an element not included by the legislature in the definition of the crime. The state is not required to prove that the motor-vehicle operator knew or had reason to know that a controlled substance was in his body to prove a charge under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). Although appellant did not acknowledge in his plea testimony that he knew or had reason to know of the amphetamine in his body, that does not render his guilty plea invalid."

Moral Of The Story:  Don't plead guilty if you did not know.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Permann (Decided April 6, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that a prior conviction need only be established by competent and reliable evidence.  Permann also shows what can happen when a person can't keep their mouth shut.

In Permann, the Defendant was on probation and at a meeting with his probation officer, Mr. Permann mentioned he had used methamphetamine "two days prior".  Permann also told the agent that he had driven to her office. 

The agent told Mr. Permann that he would be taken into custody for violating his probation and Mr. Permann asked if he could make arrangements for his sport utility vehicle, parked outside.

At the jail, Mr. Permann was read his Miranda rights and the Defendant gave a recorded statement stating he drove his black Ford Bronco to the probation agent’s office for a scheduled meeting. When asked how many DWIs he had in the past ten years, the Defendant stated he had three prior  DWI offenses. 

The police obtained a search warrant and Permann gave a urine sample, which was sent to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) and tested positive for methamphetamine. The state subsequently charged Mr. Permann with Felony DWI alleging he had 3 priors within the past 10 years.  

At trial, in addition to the testimony, the state offered three exhibits to prove the existence of the prior DWI offenses:

Exhibit six was a certified “true and correct copy from the records of the Driver and Vehicle Services Division” of the Department of Public Safety (DPS) of a 2009 notice and order revoking Permann’s license for DWI (2009 notice and order of license revocation).

Exhibit seven was certified as “a true copy of the original record in [the] custody” of the Olmsted County Court Administrator of the September 28, 2012 court minutes showing Permann’s DWI conviction (2012 court minutes). Exhibit eight was a certified copy of a 2015 warrant of commitment from Dakota County showing Permann’s DWI conviction.

The Defendant was convicted of Felony DWI and on appeal he argued that the state failed to offer sufficient evidence establishing two of the three qualified prior impaired driving incidents committed within the ten years before his 2018 DWI. On appeal, Permann did not challenge the admissibility of exhibit eight, (the 2015 warrant of commitment for a DWI), but argued that exhibits six and seven were insufficient to sustain his first-degree DWI conviction.

The Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant's challenge, stating:

"First, Permann argues that exhibit six is insufficient to prove a qualified prior impaired driving incident because the 2009 notice and order of license revocation was appealable. Because the state failed to offer a “final notice of revocation,” Permann argues that the state failed to prove his license was revoked. The state responds that the prosecution can use “competent and reliable evidence” to prove a license revocation."

"Permann cites no legal authority to support his argument that the state had to prove that his 2009 license revocation was not overturned on appeal. And Permann does not even claim that he sought judicial review of his 2009 license revocation. A license revocation is effective when the commissioner of public safety, or a peace officer acting on the commissioner’s behalf, gives the notice and order of revocation to the driver. Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 6 (2016); see also State v. Goharbawang, 705 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Minn.App. 2005) (determining that license “revocation takes effect when the officer issues the notice and order of revocation”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2006). Even if we assume that Permann sought judicial review of his 2009 license revocation, a driver’s petition for judicial review “does not stay the revocation.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(c) (2016)."

"Because a notice and order of revocation is effective when the commissioner or peace officer “notifies the [driver] of the intention to revoke” his license, and a qualified prior impaired driving incident includes a “loss of license” by revocation, we conclude that exhibit six is sufficient evidence to establish that Permann had a qualified prior impaired driving incident in 2009. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 6; Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21."

"Next, Permann argues that exhibit seven, 2012 court minutes of Permann’s DWI conviction, is not “an official record of a conviction” and thus is insufficient to prove a qualified prior impaired driving incident. The state argues that the 2012 court minutes are a certified court record and thus are “competent and reliable."

"Minn. Stat. § 609.041 (2016) provides:

In a criminal prosecution in which the degree of the crime or the penalty for the crime depends, in whole or in part, on proof of the existence of a prior conviction, if the defendant contests the existence of or factual basis for a prior conviction, proof of it is established by competent and reliable evidence, including a certified court record of the conviction."

"In State v. Eller, this court held that “section 609.041 does not mandate that only a certified record may be used to prove a prior conviction. Rather, it requires only that proof of the [prior] conviction is established by competent and reliable evidence.” 780 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied {Minn. June 15,2010). Eller also clarified that “[t]he statute does not limit such proof to a certified court record” and held that a sworn statement in the probable-cause section of a complaint was competent and reliable evidence to establish the appellant’s prior conviction at a stipulated-facts trial. Id. at 380-81. We conclude that the 2012 court minutes of Permann’s DWI conviction is competent and reliable evidence and exhibit seven is sufficient to establish Permann committed a qualified prior impaired driving incident in 2012.  Thus, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Permann’s conviction for first-degree DWI."

Moral Of The Story:  Loose lips gets you shipped!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.