The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Maas v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 20, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that "physical control" of a motor vehicle is broader than "driving" or "operating" same.
In Maas, a Faribault County deputy observed a 2007 Dodge Durango (the Durango) in a snow-filled ditch. Upon approaching the Durango, the deputy noticed it was unoccupied, locked, and turned off. Through the Durango’s window, the deputy observed a plastic cup in the center console containing an amber liquid. The deputy recognized the plastic cup as a type bars and other establishments use to sell alcohol. The deputy left the Durango and did not interact with anyone.
Approximately two hours later, the deputy passed the Durango again. This time, the deputy noticed a man, later identified as the Petitioner, next to the Durango. The deputy observed appellant on the passenger side attempting to dig the Durango’s wheels out of the snow. Maas waved to the deputy seeking assistance. The deputy activated the emergency lights and parked near the Durango. The deputy did not observe anyone other than Petitioner within or near the Durango. At this time, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Mr. Maas admitted he drove the Durango into the ditch.The deputy noticed the Petitioner exhibit indicia of intoxication and arrested Mr. Maas after he failed field tests and refused to submit to a preliminary breath test.
Mr. Maas filed a challenge to the revocation of his driver's license asserting the deputy did not have probable cause to believe Petitioner was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. The district court sustained the revocation finding probable cause, stating (1) “[appellant]’s vehicle was running, and he was in the process of trying to dig it out of the snow”; (2) “by [appellant]’s own admission, he had been consuming alcohol”; (3) appellant showed “physical symptoms of intoxication (e.g., watery and bloodshot eyes, slurring of speech and odor of alcohol)”; (4) the deputy observed a “plastic cup filled with amber liquid in the Durango’s center console”; and (5) the deputy observed “numerous empty beer cans littering the trunk of the Durango.”
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:
"We give the term “physical control . . . the broadest possible effect” to “enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes” and to “deter individuals who have been drinking from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers.” Shane, 587 N.W.2d at 641 (quotations omitted). Thus, “physical control” encompasses more than “drive” or “operate.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. 1992). But “mere presence in or about the vehicle is insufficient [to show] physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative.” Id. at 838. Courts consider several factors when determining whether a driver exercised physical control over a vehicle, including: “the person’s location in proximity to the vehicle; the location of the keys; whether the person was a passenger in the vehicle; who owned the vehicle; and the vehicle’s operability.” State v. Fleck, 111 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010)."
"Appellant asserts that he did not exercise physical control because the deputy never observed appellant seated in the Durango. But a person does not need to be seated behind the steering wheel to exercise physical control over the vehicle. For example, in State v. Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 927-28 (Minn. App. 1987), we concluded a motorist standing alone outside the rear of her vehicle was in “physical control” when the engine was running with the key in the ignition. We noted that “a person is in physical control of a vehicle if [they have] the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle and [they are] in close proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle.” Id. (quoting State v. Duemke, 352 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Minn. App. 1984))."
"Appellant also argues that he did not exercise physical control because the Durango was inoperable. But we have repeatedly held that a person may exercise “physical control” over a temporarily disabled vehicle. Flamang v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. July 27, 1994); see also Woodward, 408 N.W.2d at 927-28 (concluding appellant exercised physical control even though the vehicle had a flat tire); Abeln v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding appellant exercised physical control over a vehicle with a dead battery); Duemke, 352 N.W.2d at 429, 432 (concluding the sleeping appellant stuck in a snow-filled ditch exercised physical control over the vehicle). “Inoperability or, more precisely, the nature and duration of any inoperability, is simply a factor or circumstance to be evaluated with all the surrounding facts and circumstances ... in determining whether the situation gives rise to physical control.” Starfield, 481 N.W.2dat 839."
***
"The deputy found appellant, by himself, digging the Durango out of the snow. When the deputy arrived, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Additionally, appellant admitted the Durango belonged to him and that he drove the Durango into the snow-filled ditch. In this case, the “overall situation” supports the district court’s decision that appellant exercised physical control over the Durango. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838; Fleck, 111 N.W.2d at 236."
Moral Of The Story: If you have been drinking, don't get near any of your vehicles except as a passenger.
No comments:
Post a Comment