Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Anderson (decided March 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a sentence within the sentencing guidelines is not going to be disturbed on appeal.

In Anderson, the Defendant was charged with felony DWI as his alcohol concentration level was over the legal limit and he had a prior felony DWI from 2006. (Once a felony, always a felony unless the felony DWI is from another state). Mr. Anderson subsequently pled guilty and the district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI). The probation officer who authored the PSI report recommended that the district court impose a prison sentence of 54 months (the fixed sentence duration within the applicable sentencing range of 46 to 64 months), stay execution of the sentence, place Anderson on probation, and order him to serve one year in jail. 

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in June 2022. The state requested that the district court impose an executed prison sentence of 48 months. The prosecutor noted that Anderson has five prior DWI convictions and two prior felony convictions, that Anderson’s alcohol concentration was more than twice the 0.08 threshold at the time of the offense, that he was driving in heavy traffic, and that his offense occurred only six months after he was charged with another felony DWI offense in Washington County. The prosecutor acknowledged that Anderson had remained sober while charges were pending but attributed his sobriety to the fact that he was subject to random testing.

Anderson’s attorney requested a downward dispositional departure on the ground that Anderson is particularly amenable to probation. Based on the information in the PSI report, Anderson’s attorney argued that Anderson had been sober for many years between his 2006 DWI conviction and his mid-2020 arrest for DWI in Washington County and had maintained sobriety again since being charged there. The attorney explained that, at the time of the offense in this case, Anderson was unemployed and had lost his home but that he since had regained employment and housing and was attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings three times per week. The attorney introduced four letters of support written by persons who have attended AA meetings with Anderson.

The district court stated that it had read the letters of support and had “spent a lot of time looking at this and thinking about it.” The district court commended Anderson for doing well on probation for the Washington County offense. But the district court emphasized the fact that this is Anderson’s third felony DWI conviction. The district court noted its concern for public safety and stated that, in committing the current offense, Anderson had endangered others. The district court concluded by finding that Anderson is not particularly amenable to probation and that there are no substantial and compelling mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the district court denied Anderson’s request for a downward dispositional departure and imposed an executed sentence of 48 months of imprisonment.

On Appeal, the Defendant argued that the district court erred by not exercising discretion in denying his request for a downward dispositional departure. He asserted that the district court did not consider the mitigating facts contained in the PSI report and, instead, focused on the fact that this offense is Anderson’s third felony DWI conviction. He relies on this court’s opinion in State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App. 1984), in which the court remanded for reconsideration after concluding that the district court had not considered all relevant mitigating factors. 

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines generally provide for presumptive sentences for felony offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (2020). For any particular offense, the presumptive sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2020). Accordingly, a district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable [presumptive] range . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D. 1 (2020)."

"The sentencing guidelines provide non-exclusive lists of mitigating and aggravating factors that may justify a departure. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3 (2020). One of the listed mitigating factors is “particular amenability to probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7). In determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, a district court may consider, among other factors, “the defendant’s . . . prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d28, 31 (Minn. 1982)."

"This case is meaningfully different from Curtiss. In that case, the district court stated that there was “no justifiable reason” to depart from the presumptive sentence. Id. at 263. We determined that the district court had “abandoned” the possibility of a downward dispositional departure without “comparing reasons for and against.” Id. In this case, in contrast, the district court expressly mentioned the facts that Anderson’s attorney had cited in his argument for a departure, such as Anderson’s renewed sobriety, his success on probation in the Washington County case, and the letters of support submitted on his behalf. The record shows that the district court did consider the mitigating factors that might support a departure but determined that they did not outweigh other factors and did not allow a finding of substantial and compelling reasons for a departure. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so."

Moral Of The Story:  If you do the crime, you are presumed to do the time.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Maas v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 20, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that "physical control" of a motor vehicle is broader than "driving" or "operating" same.

In Maas, a Faribault County deputy observed a 2007 Dodge Durango (the Durango) in a snow-filled ditch. Upon approaching the Durango, the deputy noticed it was unoccupied, locked, and turned off. Through the Durango’s window, the deputy observed a plastic cup in the center console containing an amber liquid. The deputy recognized the plastic cup as a type bars and other establishments use to sell alcohol. The deputy left the Durango and did not interact with anyone.

Approximately two hours later, the deputy passed the Durango again. This time, the deputy noticed a man, later identified as the Petitioner, next to the Durango. The deputy observed appellant on the passenger side attempting to dig the Durango’s wheels out of the snow. Maas waved to the deputy seeking assistance. The deputy activated the emergency lights and parked near the Durango. The deputy did not observe anyone other than Petitioner within or near the Durango. At this time, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Mr. Maas admitted he drove the Durango into the ditch.The deputy noticed the Petitioner exhibit indicia of intoxication and arrested Mr. Maas after he failed field tests and refused to submit to a preliminary breath test.

Mr. Maas filed a challenge to the revocation of his driver's license asserting the deputy did not have probable cause to believe Petitioner was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol. The district court sustained the revocation finding probable cause, stating (1) “[appellant]’s vehicle was running, and he was in the process of trying to dig it out of the snow”; (2) “by [appellant]’s own admission, he had been consuming alcohol”; (3) appellant showed “physical symptoms of intoxication (e.g., watery and bloodshot eyes, slurring of speech and odor of alcohol)”; (4) the deputy observed a “plastic cup filled with amber liquid in the Durango’s center console”; and (5) the deputy observed “numerous empty beer cans littering the trunk of the Durango.” 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"We give the term “physical control . . . the broadest possible effect” to “enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes” and to “deter individuals who have been drinking from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers.” Shane, 587 N.W.2d at 641 (quotations omitted). Thus, “physical control” encompasses more than “drive” or “operate.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. 1992). But “mere presence in or about the vehicle is insufficient [to show] physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative.” Id. at 838. Courts consider several factors when determining whether a driver exercised physical control over a vehicle, including: “the person’s location in proximity to the vehicle; the location of the keys; whether the person was a passenger in the vehicle; who owned the vehicle; and the vehicle’s operability.” State v. Fleck, 111 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010)."

"Appellant asserts that he did not exercise physical control because the deputy never observed appellant seated in the Durango. But a person does not need to be seated behind the steering wheel to exercise physical control over the vehicle. For example, in State v. Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 927-28 (Minn. App. 1987), we concluded a motorist standing alone outside the rear of her vehicle was in “physical control” when the engine was running with the key in the ignition. We noted that “a person is in physical control of a vehicle if [they have] the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle and [they are] in close proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle.” Id. (quoting State v. Duemke, 352 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Minn. App. 1984))."

"Appellant also argues that he did not exercise physical control because the Durango was inoperable. But we have repeatedly held that a person may exercise “physical control” over a temporarily disabled vehicle. Flamang v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. July 27, 1994); see also Woodward, 408 N.W.2d at 927-28 (concluding appellant exercised physical control even though the vehicle had a flat tire); Abeln v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding appellant exercised physical control over a vehicle with a dead battery); Duemke, 352 N.W.2d at 429, 432 (concluding the sleeping appellant stuck in a snow-filled ditch exercised physical control over the vehicle). “Inoperability or, more precisely, the nature and duration of any inoperability, is simply a factor or circumstance to be evaluated with all the surrounding facts and circumstances ... in determining whether the situation gives rise to physical control.” Starfield, 481 N.W.2dat 839."

***

"The deputy found appellant, by himself, digging the Durango out of the snow. When the deputy arrived, the Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Additionally, appellant admitted the Durango belonged to him and that he drove the Durango into the snow-filled ditch. In this case, the “overall situation” supports the district court’s decision that appellant exercised physical control over the Durango. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838; Fleck, 111 N.W.2d at 236."

Moral Of The Story:    If you have been drinking, don't get near any of your vehicles except as a passenger.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Dolby (Decided March 6, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person can commit the crime of DWI refusal to submit to testing if their conduct tends to frustrate the process.

In Dolby, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was subsequently charged with Second Degree Refusal to submit to testing. The Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and had the matter decided by a district court judge.  The district court found the Defendant guilty of DWI refusal. On appeal, the Defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"The officer then read Doby the breath-test advisory form. Doby stated that he did not understand and needed an interpreter. But at trial, Doby testified that he grew up in St. Paul and spoke English as his native language. He explained that when he asked for an interpreter, he “felt like [he] needed a mediator” to help him understand what was happening. The breath-test advisory began at 1:36 a.m. and finished at 1:41 a.m., when the officer decided to treat Doby’s actions as a refusal to test. The officer testified that Doby never said he would take the test, while Doby testified that he never refused to cooperate with the test."

***

"The implied-consent statute provides that a driver may be obligated to submit to a chemical test of their blood, breath, or urine when an officer has probable cause to believe the driver has been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and the driver has been lawfully placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(a), (b)(1) (2018). It is a crime to refuse to submit to this chemical test. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2018). When the officer requests that the driver perform the test, the driver must be informed of specific information set out in the implied-consent statute. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2018). The statute does not state that verbal refusal is required. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1). Rather, circumstantial evidence, such as the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances, can establish refusal without a direct statement of unwillingness. Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 102. An individual’s actions that completely frustrate the implied-consent procedure constitute test refusal. State v. Collins, 655 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. App. 2003)."

"Here, the district court found that the state proved that Doby constantly interrupted the officer during the reading of the implied-consent advisory, asked for an interpreter three times but had no need for an interpreter, and refused to respond three times when the officer asked if Doby wanted an attorney. Further, the district court found that when the officer asked Doby if he would take a breath test, Doby indicated that he needed an interpreter and that he did not understand, but never said yes or no. Doby argues that these circumstances support the alternative rational hypothesis that he did not refuse the test because he was not given enough time to consider his options and the officer did not sufficiently explain the test requirement. We disagree."

"Doby’s actions were inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than that he intended to frustrate the implied-consent procedure. There is no evidence in the record other than Doby’s testimony that he ever affirmatively indicated a willingness to take the test. The officer read the required advisory to Doby and gave him time to decide before treating Doby’s behavior as a refusal, and the body-camera footage does not show Doby asking for additional time. These actions demonstrate nothing other than an actual unwillingness to submit to chemical testing."

"Still, Doby argues that the officer did not give him enough time to process the implied-consent advisory and make an informed decision, and that he was not refusing. Rather, he asserts that he was asking for more time to make his decision. But the statute includes no minimum time period for giving the advisory; it only includes the information that an officer must convey to a person at the time of the breath test. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2. And an “officer is not required to wait for the driver to decide at his convenience whether or not he will submit to testing.” Gabrick v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a reasonably prompt decision whether the driver will take the test aligns with the purpose of the statute to protect the public from the hazards of intoxicated drivers). Furthermore, the officer asked Doby three times if he would submit to a test, and we have held that refusing to reply after three implied-consent advisories frustrates the testing process. Busch v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 257, 260 (Minn. App. 2000)."

"Finally, Doby posits that because his conduct was not persistent, extreme, offensive, and abusive from beginning to end, his conduct did not frustrate the testing process. But we have held that a simple refusal to answer the question “will you take the breath test” after it is asked once is enough to constitute a refusal to test. Gabrick, 393 N.W.2d at 25. Doby’s attempt to move the bar so that his conduct clears it is unavailing."

Moral Of The Story: Actions speak louder than words.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The week is State v. Peterson (Decided February 27, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that a stop of a motor vehicle is valid if the stop is based upon a reasonable mistake of fact.

In Peterson, the Defendant was stopped because the police officer ran a license plate inquiry on the Defendant's vehicle and the inquiry revealed the Defendant's license was cancelled. The Defendant was eventually arrested for Felony DWI and a search of his vehicle revealed drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine.

Peterson moved the suppress the evidence arguing the stop was unconstitutional.  The deputy testified that the DVS system indicated that Peterson’s driving status was canceled-IPS. That testimony was supported by the district court’s receipt of a certified copy of Peterson’s driving record, which indicated that his license was canceled-IPS when the stop occurred. The district court concluded that the information from the DVS provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop and denied the motion to suppress.

Peterson appealed arguing that his convictions must be reversed because the state failed to prove that his driving privileges were “actually canceled” at the time of the traffic stop.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.” State v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019). But the “actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be detectable.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996). The police need only “show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” 

***

"Traffic stops are routinely based on DVS record checks conducted from police squad cars. See, e.g.. Pike, 551 N.W.2d at 921-22 (upholding traffic stop based on officer’s license-plate check, which revealed the registered owner’s license was revoked). And the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is constitutional for an officer to make a brief, investigatory, [traffic] stop of a vehicle if the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a revoked license,” as long as the officer is “unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.” Id. at 920. Under the reasoning of Pike, we similarly conclude that it is constitutional for an officer to make a traffic stop based on current DVS records, so long as the officer is unaware of any facts that would make an assumption that the records are accurate unreasonable. The record does not reveal any basis to conclude that the deputy in this case was aware of such facts."

"We note that even if the DVS records in this case were incorrect, it does not necessarily follow that the resulting stop was invalid because “honest, reasonable mistakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003). So long as the deputy was unaware of any facts reasonably suggesting that the DVS records regarding Peterson’s license status were inaccurate, his reliance on incorrect DVS records would constitute an unobjectionable mistake of fact...absent a showing that the officer’s reliance on the accuracy of the DVS records was unreasonable, the records provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop, regardless of their accuracy."

Moral Of The Story: Close enough for government work!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Mattingly (Decided February 6, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands, once again, for the proposition that a vehicle must travel within its lane.

In Mattingly, the Defendant was driving a pickup truck that was towing a trailer containing an ATV.  Carlton County Deputy Sheriff David Radzak was following the vehicle when the deputy saw the truck signal a right turn, slow down, and cross the fog line separating the lane of travel and the right shoulder. He watched the truck continue slowly down the shoulder for about 20 seconds. Deputy Radzak activated his squad car’s flashing red and blue overhead lights and pulled onto the shoulder behind the truck.

Mr. Mattingly was subsequently arrested and charged with drunk driving. His attorney challenged the stop arguing the deputy did not have the constitutional authority to stop the vehicle.  

The District Court denied the defense motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"We are unpersuaded by Mattingly’s contention that Deputy Radzak lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him...An officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop if he sees a driver commit a traffic violation. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)...we are satisfied that Deputy Radzak had reasonable suspicion to stop Mattingly’s truck.

"Minnesota motorists may drive only on the roadway and may not cross the fog line marking the lane of travel. Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). They may not drive on the shoulder except in circumstances not relevant here: “Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway ...” Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1 (2020). A “roadway” includes only “that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk or shoulder.” Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 68 (2020). The legislature has carved out exceptions to the prohibition against driving on the shoulder, such as to perform a U-tum or to operate certain buses. Minn. Stat. §§ 169.19, subd. 2, .306 (2020). By leaving the roadway and operating on the shoulder in a manner that meets no statutory exception, Mattingly engaged in driving conduct for which a police officer could temporarily seize him by stopping his truck."

"We are not persuaded otherwise by Mattingly’s assertion at oral argument that an emergency exception applies. He relies on Minnesota Statutes section 169.18, subdivision 7(1) (2020), but his reliance is misplaced. That subdivision applies to roadways that have “been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic” and prohibits a driver from leaving his lane until he “first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety." Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7. This lane-change statute does not expressly or implicitly authorize a motorist to operate his vehicle on the shoulder for safety reasons. Although we need not address the district court’s motorist-assistance rationale to justify the deputy’s encounter with Mattingly, we observe that, if an emergency exception does exist and apply here because Mattingly was experiencing a safety issue, the deputy had a reason to activate his emergency lights wholly apart from reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense."

Moral Of The Story: Stay in your lane!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Helget v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 23, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the Court of Appeals continues to erode the distinction between reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest.

In Helget, a caller notified law enforcement that a white pickup truck was “all over the road” in New Ulm. The caller provided his name, the pickup’s license-plate number, and updates regarding the pickup’s location as he followed it. Officer Patrick Fay received word of the caller’s report from police dispatch and suspected that the pickup’s driver might be impaired.

Fay drove his marked squad car to the area described by the caller and saw a pickup matching the description of the suspect vehicle. While passing the pickup, Fay saw its driver and its license-plate number, which matched the plate number provided by the caller. As Fay passed the pickup, the caller in some way indicated to him that this pickup was the vehicle that the caller had observed “all over the road.”

Fay located the pickup parked on the apron to a garage behind 810 North Payne Street in New Ulm. He parked his squad car behind the pickup and turned on his white “takedown” lights, but not his emergency lights.  While doing so, he saw the driver of the pickup, later identified as appellant Jesse Lee Helget, get out of the pickup and walk to the comer of the garage. Fay got out of his marked squad car and yelled at Helget to stop. Helget, who was about 25 feet away, looked back over his shoulder in Fay’s direction, but he kept walking. Helget turned at the comer of the garage and walked toward the house located beyond the garage.

For a brief period, the garage blocked Fay’s view of Helget. After Fay walked past the garage, he saw Helget standing in the back yard of the residence at 806 North Payne Street, which was next door to the residence where Helget had parked. Fay observed that a three-foot-high chain-link fence ran between the two properties and surmised that Helget had climbed over the fence.

Upon seeing Helget, Fay again yelled at Helget to stop; this time, Helget complied. Fay, who was still on the 810 North Payne side of the fence, asked Helget to walk toward him so the two could talk. Helget did not comply. He remained standing on the far side of the adjoining lot.

The police eventually got close to Mr. Helget and one of the officers could smell alcohol on Helmet's breath.

One of the officer's then grabbed Helget’s left wrist, and told him to put his hands behind his back. Helget minimally resisted but was quickly subdued by the officers. The officers handcuffed Helget and escorted him to Fay’s squad car, where they asked him to take a seat in the back.

At the squad car, Helget repeatedly refused commands to sit in the squad car and stated, “I’m not being detained.” Helget did not comply until an officer threatened to tase him. He then refused to slide his feet into the squad car, despite repeated commands to do so.

Helget repeatedly asked why he was being detained, and Gramentz replied, “You’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” In response, Helget noted that he had not fled and that he had stopped. Later, again in response to Helget’s inquiries, Gramentz told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations.”

The State of Minnesota charged Helget with third-degree test refusal, fourth-degree DWI, obstruction of legal process or arrest, and public urination. Helget moved the district court to suppress the evidence against him and to dismiss the criminal charges, again asserting that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. 

The district court denied the motion to suppress  and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, noting:

"Helget does not dispute that reasonable articulable suspicion justified a temporary warrantless seizure to investigate whether he had been driving while impaired. Instead, he asserts that the police converted his lawful seizure into an illegal arrest and argues that the circumstances did not satisfy the higher probable-cause standard necessary for a warrantless arrest.

"To determine whether there was probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI, we must first determine the point at which Helget was arrested. “The ultimate test to be used in determining whether a suspect was under arrest is whether a reasonable person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under arrest and not free to go.” State v. Beckman, 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984). There is no bright-line test separating a legitimate investigative stop from an unlawful arrest. Instead, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” State v. Balenger, 667 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003)."

"The supreme court has held that “briefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the back of a squad car while the investigation proceeds.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999). Here, the police handcuffed Helget, escorted him to a squad car, and threatened to tase him if he did not enter the back seat of the squad car. Those circumstances alone might lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. See State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Minn. 1993) (“[Defendant] was under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and put in the squad car.”). But in this case there is one additional circumstance that makes that conclusion unavoidable. As the officers placed Helget in the squad car, Gramentz told him, “Tow ’re under arrest for fleeing right now, so that’s what you’re under arrest for.” (Emphasis added.) Although Gramentz subsequently told Helget that he was being detained “for investigations,” under the circumstances, Gramentz’s statement that Helget was “under arrest. . . right now” would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go. We therefore consider whether at that point, the objective facts were such that a person of ordinary care and prudence would have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that Helget had committed the crime of DWI."

"The relevant facts were as follows. A known citizen called the police around 1:00 a.m. to report that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” Time of day is a relevant consideration when assessing suspicion of DWI because DWI offenses are common in the early morning hours. See Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (considering 1:20 a.m. on a Saturday morning to be a “time of day when drinking is often found to be involved”). Fay located the pickup and observed Helget driving it. Although Fay did not observe Helget commit any moving offenses, the citizen caller generally alleged that Helget’s truck was “all over the road.” That comment reasonably suggested that Helget’s pickup was being driven all over the road and likely in violation of traffic laws. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2018) (“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”)."

"After Helget parked and exited his pickup, he was evasive. As Helget walked away from his pickup, Fay yelled at Helget to “stop.” Helget looked back over his shoulder toward Fay and kept walking away from the officer. Fay pursued Helget and observed him in the adjacent yard. Fay also observed a three-foot-high fence that Helget had to cross to get there. Although Helget stopped in response to Fay’s second command to do so, he did not comply with Fay’s subsequent command to approach."

"When Gramentz arrived and got within two feet of Helget, he noticed that Helget emitted an odor of alcohol, a common indication of intoxication. See State v. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Common indicia of intoxication include an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an uncooperative attitude.”), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2004). Helget told Gramentz that he was in his own back yard, even though he was standing in another person’s yard and had to cross over a fence to get there. Helget’s statement reasonably suggested either further evasive behavior or confusion stemming from intoxication. Lastly, Helget displayed an uncooperative attitude, which is another recognized indication of intoxication. See id. His refusal to cooperate progressed from verbal to physical resistance as the police tried to secure him in the squad car while they pursued their lawful investigation."

"Admittedly, some might view the existence of probable cause to arrest Helget for DWI in this case as a close call. On one hand, the assertion of impaired driving conduct is limited to the citizen caller’s general allegation that Helget’s pickup was “all over the road.” And the record indicates that the police wanted to do more to confirm their suspicion of DWI. Indeed, the record supports a conclusion that the officers did not subjectively believe that there was sufficient probable cause for a DWI arrest. But our probable-cause determination is based on an objective standard; it is not limited to the beliefs or motives of the arresting officers. “[T]he issue is not whether the officers subjectively felt that they had probable cause but whether they had objective probable cause.” Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (noting that it was “not clear from the record that the arresting officers subjectively believed that they had probable cause to believe Costillo was under the influence”). Moreover, the possibility of innocent explanations for Helget’s otherwise suspicious behavior does not preclude a finding of probable cause to arrest."

But, as noted by Judge Ross in his dissenting opinion:

"If all it takes to be arrested for and charged with drunk driving is a caller asserting generally that a car was “all over the road” and an officer noticing that the driver smells like he consumed any amount of alcohol, then the Fourth Amendment doesn’t do much in Minnesota to prevent unreasonable seizures. I respectfully dissent".

***

"The majority does not address the district court’s primary conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing on foot. A person who is not in a vehicle commits the misdemeanor offense of fleeing if, “for the purpose of avoiding arrest, detention, or investigation” by “running, hiding, or by any other means” he “attempts to evade or elude a peace officer” who is discharging an official duty. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2018). Officer Fay’s uncontradicted testimony and the video footage reveal that, contrary to the district court’s findings, the officer never activated his emergency lights and Helget likely did not know a police officer had ordered him to stop. And the record likewise also uncontradictably establishes that Helget stopped immediately once Officer Fay identified himself. Helget could not have walked away and entered his neighbor’s yard “for the purpose of’ evading a police officer because, according to the officer who testified about it, Helget was unaware he was walking away from police. The circumstances did not establish probable cause to arrest Helget for fleeing.

I am convinced that the same is so regarding the district court’s alternative conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Helget for drunk driving. In numerous cases, we have considered whether circumstances like those the officers faced here (an imprecise nighttime complaint about bad driving and the odor of an alcoholic beverage) support an officer’s reasonable suspicion to investigate the driver for drunk  driving. But we have never suggested what the majority holds today, which is that these circumstances justify leapfrogging reasonable suspicion and landing all the way at probable cause to arrest the driver for drunk driving with no further inquiry necessary—no need to closely observe the driver, no need to question the driver, no need to look for clear characteristics of impairment, and no need to administer field sobriety tests."

***

"Lacking more information, we simply cannot say that Helget’s driving even began to establish probable cause of alcohol-based impairment. When considering whether a caller’s report meets even the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, “If the police chose to stop on the basis of the tip alone, the anonymous caller must provide at least some specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegation of criminal activity.” Olson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985). I believe that the imprecise report and odor of alcohol here support no more than reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate. The officers chose instead to arrest first and investigate later. In doing so, they did not honor the Fourth Amendment with proper, constitutional policing."

Moral Of The Story: If you have been drinking, try to say out to the neighbors yard.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Baas (Decided December 12, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that an officer only needs a "reasonable" basis to believe someone is speeding in order to make a traffic stop. 

In Baas, the Defendant was observed accelerate rapidly from a stop sign by a Blue Earth County Sheriff's deputy.  The deputy was a block away when he made the observation.  

The deputy turned onto Front Street in Mankato in the direction that the Defendant was headed while the Defendant travelled parallel to him on Second Street. Based on the time in which it took for the Defendant to reach the intersections ahead of them, the deputy believed that the Defendant was traveling faster than normal traffic in this area and too fast for the road conditions. While catching up to the Defendant's vehicle, the deputy travelled at a speed up to 54 miles per hour in a 30 mph zone. 

The Deputy initiated a traffic stop and inevitably, placed the Defendant under arrest for DWI.  At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, arguing that reasonable, articulable suspicion did not support the traffic stop. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the traffic stop and denied the motion to dismiss the complaint.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"A police officer may conduct a “brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). It “requires more than a mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752."

***

“When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.” See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

"Failure to drive with due care and driving above posted speed limits are both violations of traffic laws. Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subds. 1, 2 (2018). Subdivision 1 of the statute provides that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subd.l. In other words, an individual may violate subdivision 1 without exceeding any posted or statutory speed limit. See id. Recently, we interpreted section 169.14 in a nonprecedential opinion in State v. Konjaric, No. A18-0724 2019, WL 1320600, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 25, 2019), and concluded that the standard for subdivision 1 is that of a reasonable and prudent person, “given the driving conditions and hazards.” Although Konjari is not precedential, we find its reasoning persuasive and adopt it here. Whereas subdivision 1 focuses on the reasonableness of the speed, subdivision 2 makes driving above speed limits prima facie evidence that the speed is unreasonable."

"Appellant claims it was impossible for the deputy to estimate accurately the speed at which appellant was driving, because the streets were dark, there were houses obstructing the view, and the deputy initially only observed appellant’s vehicle from a block away. Appellant further notes that the deputy did not use markers, radar, or the pacing method to estimate appellant’s speed. Lastly, appellant questions the reliability of the speed estimation because the deputy testified that he believed it should take about a minute to drive the one-half mile to where he stopped appellant, yet his squad video showed that it took him about one minute and twenty seconds."

"Appellant conflates the burden of proof required for a traffic stop with the burden required for a speeding conviction. The reasonable-suspicion standard required for a traffic stop is “not high” and “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of evidence.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). A traffic stop meets the standard when an “officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). In contrast, to sustain a conviction for speeding, the evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. App. 2004)."

***

"Based on the road conditions, the time of day, and the deputy’s first-hand observations, we conclude that the deputy had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant violated Minnesota Statute § 169.14, subdivision 1, for failing to drive with due care, and subdivision 2 for driving above the posted speed limit."

Moral Of The Story: Don't drink and drive fast.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.