Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Halicki v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided April 25, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you have to make a sufficient showing of a particular need in order to obtain the source code of the breath testing equipment.

In Halicki, the petitioner was arrested for dwi and tested at a .08% on the DataMaster breath testing equipment.  Petitioner challenged the license revocation and sought to obtain the DMT's computer source code.  

Halicki argued that the source code is relevant to whether his test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 and whether the DMT testing method is valid and reliable. In support of his motion, he submitted the testimony of Dr. Andreas Stolz and exhibits purporting to show how an error in the source code could result in an erroneous DMT test result. In opposition to the motion, the commissioner submitted his own exhibits, including Halicki’s test results and an affidavit from forensic scientists in the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension supporting the veracity and reliability of DMT breath testing.

The district court denied the discovery request, "concluding that nothing suggested that the particular DMT device used to test Halicki’s breath malfunctioned or was improperly used; “Dr. Stolz is not a qualified expert on breath testing or source code analysis”; and the commissioner did not possess the source code as it “is under the exclusive control of Intoximeters, Inc.” 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, stating:

"The DMT source code is not subject to mandatory discovery. Accordingly, the focus of our analysis is whether the district court abused its discretion by concluding the source code is not relevant to Halicki’s claims or defenses. Halicki contends it is relevant to determine whether the testing method was “valid and reliable” and whether the test results were “accurately evaluated,” as set out in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(10). The commissioner asserts that Halicki did not make the requisite showing of relevance because he did not provide evidence of potential error specific to his test."

*    *    *

"Halicki cites State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009) (Underdahl II), for the proposition that the DMT source code is relevant to the validity and reliability of his breath-test results. In Underdahl II, the supreme court considered two consolidated criminal cases in which the district court ordered the State of Minnesota to produce the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000. 767 N.W.2d at 679. As to defendant Underdahl, the supreme court concluded that the district court abused its discretion because Underdahl “made no threshold evidentiary showing whatsoever” that the source code was relevant to his guilt or innocence. Id. at 685. As to defendant Brunner, the supreme court discerned no abuse of discretion because Brunner “submitted source code definitions, written testimony of a computer science professor that explained issues surrounding the source codes and their disclosure, and an example of a breath-test machine analysis and its potential defects.” Id. at 686. Halicki asserts that he, like Brunner, sufficiently demonstrated the relevance of the DMT source code to warrant discovery. We are not persuaded for three reasons."

"First, Halicki overlooks the significant distinction between the discovery afforded in criminal and civil cases. In a criminal case, district courts may order discovery of any information that “may relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3). In contrast, in an implied-consent case, the party seeking nonmandatory discovery must show how the information sought bears on the validity and reliability of the testing method used and the test results in the case at hand. Minn. Stat. § 169.53, subd. 3(b)(10); Abbott, 760 N.W.2d at 925-26 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02). Underdahl II provides helpful context regarding the type of evidence courts consider in determining the relevance of a breath-testing device’s source code. But it does not alter Halicki’s burden to show that the source code is relevant to his claims and defenses regarding his breath test or compel a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion."

"Second, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that Dr. Stolz is not a qualified expert on the topic of breath testing or the DMT source code. Halicki did not expressly challenge this finding in his briefing. Generally, “issues not argued in briefs are deemed waived on appeal.” State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 n.8 (Minn. 1997). But even if Halicki did not waive this challenge, the record supports the district court’s finding regarding Dr. Stolz’s qualifications. Dr. Stolz is an associate professor at the National Superconducting Cyclotron Laboratory at Michigan State University. He studies rare isotopes and programs computer software to analyze measurements of these isotopes. He testified about his general familiarity with source codes but acknowledged that his work does not involve breath testing, source codes for breath-testing equipment, or the DMT. In short, the record supports the district court’s finding that Dr. Stolz lacks expertise to support Halicki’s request for discovery of the source code."

"Third, the district court did not misapply the law or otherwise abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence Halicki offered does not establish that the source code is relevant to Halicki’s claims and defenses. Halicki emphasizes that he submitted a law- review article, two newspaper articles, an article from an academic journal, and the expert report generated in State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008), which Brunner submitted in support of his discovery motion in Underdahl II. None of these submissions shed light on how the DMT source code is relevant to Halicki’s claims or defenses. The law-review article does not discuss the DMT source code or any potential problems with it, instead stating that “[m]any times, the greatest challenge is convincing the court that the source code is relevant and material” before directing the reader to other secondary sources. The newspaper articles chronicle experiences working with and assessing the reliability of breath-testing devices nationwide; neither mentions the DMT’s source code or anything specific to Halicki’s test results. And while the academic article concludes the DMT is not reliable at detecting the presence of mouth alcohol, Halicki does not contend that mouth alcohol affected his test results. Finally, the Chun report concerned the source code for the Alcotest 7110 Mk III, not the DMT."

Moral Of The Story: You probably have a better chance of getting the source code in the related criminal case.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waltz (Decided March 21, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police get to search the car and arrest the driver when the occupied vehicle reeks of marijuana.

In Waltz, the Montevideo police received a report that a female was passed out in a running car in a convenience store parking lot.  The first officer to arrive approached the car and after some effort, awoke the unconscious driver, Ms Waltz.  The officer had to knock on the window and shine his flashlight in her eyes to awaken Ms. Waltz. 

While standing next to the car, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana and when the defendant rolled down her window, the odor was even more intense.

Two other officers arrived together in a second patrol car. They approached the car and confirmed that there was a strong marijuana smell.

The Defendant was asked to exit the car and the vehicle was searched. The police found a plastic grocery bag containing approximately ten grams of marijuana.  

The police asked Waltz whether she had been using marijuana, and she admitted to smoking a blunt  a few hours before. Suspecting that Waltz was under the influence of marijuana or a controlled substance, the sergeant asked Waltz to perform some field sobriety tests and conducted a preliminary breath test, which revealed a zero alcohol concentration. The sergeant arrested Waltz based on suspicion that she had been driving while impaired and provided her with a Miranda warning.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Walz moved to suppress the evidence of marijuana that police seized from her car and her admissions to the police that she had smoked marijuana.

Waltz claimed that the police had no basis to detain her for a criminal investigation or to search her car once they determined that she was not in distress. And she asserted that the police unlawfully interrogated her about her marijuana use without providing a Miranda warning. Waltz argued that these constitutional violations require suppression of the drug evidence found in her car and on her person, the evidence of her impairment, her statements to the police, and any evidence obtained as a result of her statements. 

The district court denied her motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed stating:

"In some circumstances, the police may seize an individual without a search warrant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). One exception to the warrant requirement permits limited investigatory seizures. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004)."

"Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744N.W.2d 390,393 (Minn. 2008) (quotingIllinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,123 (2000)) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). But an investigatory detention “may become invalid if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18). Thus, each subsequent intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). And to expand the scope of an investigatory seizure, the police must have independent probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the subsequent intrusion. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21)."

"Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified a limited investigatory detention. Waltz was sleeping in a running car in a public place at 11:00 p.m. When the sergeant approached the car, he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana. Waltz was difficult to rouse; the sergeant was required to bang on the car window and shine his flashlight in her eyes. The marijuana smell became more intense when Waltz finally rolled her window down. And the two other officers who arrived to assist with the investigation confirmed that they could smell marijuana even while standing three feet away from Waltz’s car. Given these facts, the officers had reason to suspect that Waltz was driving while impaired and that she possessed marijuana in a motor vehicle. Either of these suspicions provided a basis for an investigatory detention. See State v. Doren, 654 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. App.2002) (stating that a car passenger’s “extraordinary nervousness,” the smell of burned marijuana emanating from the passenger’s location, and the passenger’s appearance of being under the influence together provide a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).

"Waltz argues that even if the initial seizure was valid, the officers unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop by searching her car. The state responds that the officers’ actions were permissible under another exception to the warrant requirement—the automobile exception."

"The automobile exception allows police to search a vehicle, including closed containers, when “there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Determining whether there is probable cause requires an objective inquiry that evaluates the totality of the circumstances in a particular case. Id. These circumstances include the reasonable inferences that law enforcement officers may make based on their training and experience. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011)."

"The state points out that “[t]he detection of odors alone, which trained police officers can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further evidence of crime.” State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1973). And the state notes that undercurrent Minnesota law, the smell of marijuana provides probable cause for a vehicle search. See State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (stating that the automobile exception applies when an officer smells marijuana emanating from a car)."

"While we do not disagree with the state’s summary of the law, we note that the factual circumstances here included more than an odor of marijuana. Again, Waltz was found soundly sleeping in a running car near midnight. The car was parked in a convenience store parking lot. When finally awakened, Waltz said that she was meeting someone. Three trained police officers smelled a strong odor of marijuana—including fresh marijuana—coming from the car. And Waltz admitted to smoking marijuana in the car earlier. Based on all of these facts, the officers reasonably believed that the car would contain contraband. Because the officers had probable cause to search, their search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement."

Moral Of The Story: You snooze. You lose.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jackson v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 14, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the burden is on the petitioner to establish physical inability to provide an adequate breath sample.

In Jackson, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and he agreed to take a breath test on the DataMaster machine at the police station. During the first attempt, Jackson started and then stopped blowing into the machine, broke a mouthpiece, coughed into the mouthpiece, removed the mouthpiece from his mouth and stared at the officers, dropped the mouthpiece, and chatted with the officers. On the second attempt, Jackson stopped the breath sample to talk, coughed, ignored instructions, puffed his cheeks, and started and stopped blowing. And during the third attempt, Jackson repeated his earlier behaviors. Despite three attempts, Jackson did not provide a sufficient breath sample for testing.

According to the DMT operator, Jackson was “deliberately attempting to beat the test” by “doing as little as he possib[ly could] to try and do the test without actually doing the test.” The second officer present did not believe that Jackson was “deliberately trying to not take the test,” but he saw no indication that Jackson was having difficulty breathing into the machine. Both officers recalled that Jackson remarked about smoking cigars. But Jackson never claimed to the officers that he was physically unable to complete the tests.

Jackson filed a petition challenging the revocation of his driver's license and during the district court hearing, Jackson provided numerous explanations for his failure to provide a sufficient breath sample, including seasonal allergies, nervousness and anxiety around law enforcement, cigar smoking, and inadequate instructions from the officers.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"Failure to provide two adequate breath samples constitutes a refusal under Minnesota’s implied-consent law. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 5(a), (c) (2020). But a driver may prove as an affirmative defense that the refusal to submit to a chemical test “was based on reasonable grounds.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c) (2020). A driver’s inability to provide a breath sample is one such ground that may be raised at an implied- consent hearing. Wolle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. App. 1987). To rely on this affirmative defense, a driver must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was unable to provide adequate breath samples due to physical inability. Bale v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 385 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. App. 1986). Whether a person is physically unable to provide a breath sample is a question of fact for the district court that we review for clear error. Burke v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 381 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Minn. App. 1986)."

"Jackson contends that he satisfied his burden of proof by presenting sufficient evidence of his physical inability to test. Because the district court did not clearly err in finding otherwise, we disagree."

"Although Jackson testified that he was unable to provide a sufficient breath sample for various reasons—including allergies, anxiety, and cigar smoking—the district court found that his testimony was not credible. Moreover, the district court noted that Jackson failed to introduce any independent evidence to support his claim that he was unable to take the DMT breath test. These findings are not clearly erroneous. Jackson’s testimony was the sole evidence provided in support of his affirmative defense. And we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations."

Moral Of The Story:  It is good to be a blowhard when you are taking a breath test!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Nolden (Decided January 31, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that you are still "equipped" even if your bulbs are gone.

In Nolden, the defendant's jeep liberty was stopped by a Beltrami County Sheriff's deputy because the center brake light on the jeep did not illuminate when the vehicle's brakes were activated. When the deputy approached the Defendant's vehicle, he noticed that there wasn't a brake light cover over the center light cavity and he could see the wiring inside the cavity which appeared to have previously housed the brake light.

The Defendant was subsequently arrested for a DWI and he filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence arguing that the initial stop was illegal. 

Minnesota law requires that “[w]hen a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps or signal lamps, the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2020). The Defendant's argument was that his vehicle was not “equipped” with a center brake light pursuant to the “plain reading” of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) “because the entire [brake light] fixture was absent from the vehicle at the time in question.” In short, defendant argues, his “vehicle did not have a faulty or malfunctioning third brake light” because “it simply had no light at all.”

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"Although “equipped” is not defined in the statute or elsewhere, its dictionary definition is “[t]o supply with necessities such as tools or provisions.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 602 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 422 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “equip” to include “to furnish for service or action by appropriate provisioning”); see American Heritage, supra, at 712 (defining “furnish” and other synonyms of “equip” as “to provide with what is necessary for an activity or purpose” and providing examples of “furnished the team with new uniforms” and “equip a car with snow tires” ); see also Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 508 (providing “furnish” as a synonym for “equip” and defining it as “to provide with what is needed”). Therefore, based on these dictionary definitions of “equipped,” its plain meaning is to supply or provide the necessities for a particular purpose."

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"Appellant argues that “equipped” should be read to mean “if that component is presently attached to the vehicle,” such as a brake light, then that vehicle is “equipped” with that component. According to appellant, this definition is an “everyday life” and “natural use” of the word “equipped.” We disagree. This definition requires us to add the words to the statute. This we may not do."

"Accordingly, the deputy possessed a particularized and objective basis for suspecting appellant had committed a traffic violation based on his observation of appellant’s inoperable center brake light, thereby justifying the stop."

Moral Of The Story: It's lights out for the defendant!

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Brown (Decided January 24, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police are very suspicious people.

In Brown, the Defendant was driving in the early morning hours of May 6, 2019 when a Hennepin County Sheriff's Deputy noticed her vehicle pull in front of him. Ms. Brown turned immediately right at the next available opportunity in between a couple of buildings that appeared closed for the day. The deputy then observed the car turn left into an area behind a warehouse. The deputy knew that there were not many connecting streets behind the warehouse and there were no normal businesses open at that time of night. 

After seeing the car go behind the warehouse, the deputy turned right at the next available street and waited to see if the car would keep driving and reappear on the other side of the warehouse. When the car did not reappear, the deputy drove behind the warehouse and spotted the car there. The car was parked behind the warehouse “in an odd manner”—“in the middle of an open area by a loading dock and not lined up with anything else.” The warehouse was closed, and the area was dark; the deputy did not see any apparent “legitimate business needs” there. The deputy saw Brown sitting in the car and looking at her phone. At that point, the deputy activated his emergency lights and approached the car.

Things went downhill from there and ultimately Ms. Brown was arrested for a DWI.  She filed a Motion to Suppress all of the evidence asserting that the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to make the initial seizure of her vehicle.  The District Court denied the motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"We conclude that these circumstances provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the deputy to seize Brown for purposes of an investigatory stop. Brown’s behavior in driving off the main road, going behind a closed warehouse, and remaining parked there in the middle of the night, with no apparent legitimate purpose for being there, reasonably gave rise to the inference that she may have been involved in some sort of criminal activity."

"Two cases from this court shed light on this issue. In Thomeczek v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer observed the defendant parked in an empty lot after 11:00 p.m., with the car running and the headlights on, “in an area undergoing construction, where a burglary, vandalism or theft might occur.” 364 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. App. 1985). This court determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been involved in unlawful activity and that the stop was therefore legal. Id. Similarly, in Olmscheid v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer stopped the defendant, who was driving along a dead-end road at 1:30 a.m., behind a car dealership that had a history of property theft. 412 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. App. 1987)."

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. It was the middle of the night, and the deputy saw Brown drive behind a warehouse to an empty area where all lights were off and no businesses were open. The deputy did not start the traffic stop when Brown turned behind the warehouse but investigated further only after she did not reappear within a few minutes. Based on the time of night, the lack of any open businesses, and the unusual manner in which Brown was parked, the deputy had an objective basis to reasonably believe that Brown had no legitimate purpose for being there. Like the behavior of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Brown’s parking behind a closed business in the middle of the night reasonably caused the deputy to believe that she could be there to engage in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story:  If you want to stop to look at your phone, do it in front of a 24-hour shop.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Dodds (Decided January 18, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you never want to give the police a second chance to make a first impression!

In Dodds, a Carver County Sheriff's Deputy noticed an occupied vehicle in the Domino's parking lot in Waconia.  The deputy approached the vehicle and spoke with the occupants. The deputy checked Dodds’s registration and discovered that his driving privileges had been revoked. But because Dodds was in a nonmoving vehicle in a private parking lot, the deputy believed that no law had been broken.

An hour later, the deputy observed the same car roll through a stop sign. The car also crossed the center line by roughly two feet. The deputy pulled the car over and noticed the occupants attempt to conceal something within the car. After he identified Dodds (who had been driving) and his passenger, the deputy noted a strong odor of alcohol. The passenger appeared to be “extremely intoxicated” and during the conversation produced two open containers of alcohol. The deputy asked Dodds and the passenger to exit the vehicle and conducted a search for additional contraband. Dodds warned the deputy that there were approximately three grams of marijuana inside the vehicle, which the deputy eventually located. The deputy issued Dodds a citation for possession of marijuana, failure to provide insurance, and driving after revocation. The deputy then told Dodds he was released from the traffic stop and warned him to keep his voice down because they were in a residential area in the middle of the night.

The deputy returned to his squad car to take pictures of the open containers found in Dodds’s vehicle when Dodds started to yell to the deputy. The deputy again cautioned Dodds about yelling in the neighborhood. But Dodds continued to yell. The deputy reapproached Dodds and this time noticed that Dodds’s speech was slurred, his eyes were watery and glassy, and his breath smelled of alcohol, which the deputy had not noticed in the previous encounters that night. The deputy then administered field sobriety testing and eventually arrested Dodds for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI).

The state charged Dodds with felony test refusal and felony DWI.  Dodds filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop and to dismiss, in part, due to an impermissible expansion of the scope of the stop.

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Minn. 1992). But police may conduct “[a] limited investigative stop ... if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). The reasonable-suspicion standard is met when a deputy observes conduct that leads the deputy to reasonably conclude that “criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The standard is not high, but it requires more than an unparticularized hunch. Id. When determining whether a deputy reasonably suspected criminal activity, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson, 581N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998)."

"Here, while the deputy and Dodds had multiple contacts throughout the night, we narrowly focus on whether the deputy improperly seized Dodds when he re-approached him following the written citation. After Dodds got the deputy’s attention by yelling, the deputy re-approached and noticed that Dodds’s breath smelled of alcohol. The smell of alcohol is all that is required for reasonable suspicion to suspect that Dodds had been driving while intoxicated and to justify a seizure. See Hager v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a driver’s odor of alcohol provided reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired and a legal basis for a preliminary breath test)."

"In sum, because the deputy had reasonable suspicion to seize Dodds after smelling alcohol on his breath, the district court did not err when denying Dodds’s motion to suppress."

Moral Of The Story: Next time, take the ticket and run (quietly)!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Wadekamper v. Commissioner of Public Safety which stands for the proposition that a DWI license revocation is never to old to effect your license.

In Wadekamper, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI on June 3, 2020. Mr. Wadekamper had five prior impaired-driving incidents from 1974, 1977, 1983, 1986, and 1994. Pursuant to statute, the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license for six years.

The Petitioner filed a challenge to the license revocation seeking a judicial review hearing.  The hearing was held, at which time the Petitioner conceded that there were no factual disputes but that he wanted to challenge the length of the six-year license revocation. Petitioner told the district court he only wanted to submit written briefs as testimony or oral argument was not required.

Petitioner submitted a written argument in the form of a letter to the district court, again challenging only the lawfulness of the six-year license-revocation period. He acknowledged that, under the license-revocation statute, the revocation period is not less than six years for a person with four or more prior impaired-driving offenses and conceded that he had more than four prior DWIs. Petitioner nevertheless argued that his prior DWIs should not be considered in determining the length of his license revocation because the prior impaired-driving incidents were “stale.” Petitioner also argued that the license-revocation statute requiring the district court to consider all prior DWIs, without requiring a prior enhancement warning, violated due process. Petitioner cited no legal authority in support of his due-process argument.

The district court rejected Petitioner's arguments and sustained the commissioner’s license revocation. The district court first determined that, because the length-of- revocation issue is outside of the exclusive list of issues that the district court is authorized to review at an implied-consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), appellant could not raise it. See Axelberg v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Minn. 2014) (holding that issues a driver may raise at an implied-consent hearing are limited to those falling within topics listed in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)). The district court then stated that the revocation period is mandated by the license-revocation statute and the commissioner had no discretion to ignore any qualifying prior impaired-driving offenses. The district court noted that Petitioner cited no legal authority for his claim that the lack of an enhancement-warning requirement in the license-revocation statute violated his due- process rights and declined to consider it. 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Appellant appears to argue that the district court denied him procedural due process by denying him a meaningful hearing. Whether the government violated a person’s procedural due-process rights is a question of law that we review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the state from depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. The suspension of a driver’s license implicates a property interest that triggers due-process protections. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Due process generally requires “adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N. W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976))."

"Here, appellant received a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The district court granted his request for an implied-consent hearing after the commissioner revoked his license. Appellant had an opportunity to argue his case before the district court. At the hearing, appellant stated that “the only issue was the length of his license revocation” and told the district court that he just wanted to submit briefs. The district court allowed appellant to submit a written argument after the hearing, which he did in the form of a letter. Appellant therefore had every opportunity to argue his case before the district court in both oral and written form. He received a meaningful hearing and all the procedural due process to which he was entitled."

"To the extent that appellant’s argument on appeal could be construed as a challenge to the district court’s denial of his constitutional claim that the lack of an enhancement warning violated his due-process rights, appellant’s argument still fails. In his letter to the district court, appellant’s only explicit reference to his due-process claim is a single line stating that “The legislation . . . permitting the use of incidents over twenty years ago to be used, without an enhancement warning, as a lifelong stepping stone for six years of ignition interlock is a violation of due process.”  The district court declined to address appellant’s due-process challenge because he cited no legal authority in support of his position. Courts do not consider claims that are unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, 614 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). We therefore discern no error in the district court’s rejection of appellant’s undeveloped constitutional challenge."

Moral Of The Story: A License Revocation Never Forgets!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.