Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided June 17, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that prior DWI's cannot be proven by a written summary of existing conviction records.

In Martinez, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI and the complaint alleged Mr. Martinez had two previous DWI convictions, making the current charge a gross misdemeanor.

Martinez had a jury trial. At the beginning of the trial, and outside of the jury’s presence, the prosecutor informed defense counsel and the district court that he intended to introduce a “summary” of Martinez’s prior convictions under rule 1006 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. During the trial, the prosecutor called a paralegal as a witness. The paralegal testified that she had requested information about Martinez’s prior convictions and received “[approximately 50 to 60 pages” of material. She identified exhibit 5 as “a summary of the criminal convictions that [she] requested for this case.”  The prosecutor then asked the paralegal, “Would you mind reading for the jury Number 1 and Number 2 on that document?” But defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The prosecutor offered exhibit 5 into evidence. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted the exhibit which stated: "1. On July 10, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-837. 2. On September 28, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-1670".

The Defendant was convicted of Second Degree DWI and on appeal he argued that exhibit 5 constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his constitutional right of confrontation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the Defendant and reversed the conviction, stating:

" Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” the defendant. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Minn. Const, art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (noting that confrontation claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions). These provisions are often referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from being offered for the truth of the matter asserted when the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant. Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). An appellant alleging a violation of the Confrontation Clause must show that “the statement in question was testimonial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the [appellant] was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” Id.

"Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor ... is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”)). If a document is prepared “for authentication purposes” and not “for providing evidence in litigation,” it is nontestimonial. State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018)."

"Martinez argues that exhibit 5 is a testimonial statement because it was prepared for litigation. We agree. The record shows that the state prepared the summary of Martinez’s prior convictions to be used at trial as substantive evidence of those convictions. The paralegal for the prosecutor’s office testified that she obtained records concerning Martinez’s prior convictions. The summary—which includes a case caption—purports to be the state’s summary of those convictions. At trial, the state introduced the summary in evidence to prove the prior-conviction element of its case. Indeed, the summary was the only evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions."

"The state contends that the summary is a nontestimonial record “that authenticates other kinds of certified copies of public records,” as was the document at issue in our Noor decision. But we are not persuaded. In Noor, the state introduced a “certificate of order sent” into evidence—a document that certified the authenticity of a Department of Public Safety order revoking Noor’s driver’s license and confirming that the order had been mailed to Noor. Noor argued on appeal that the “certificate of order sent” was a testimonial document for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 650. We rejected that argument, determining that the document was nontestimonial because “(1) United States Supreme Court precedent suggests documents introduced for authentication purposes, instead of to prove a fact, are nontestimonial; (2) an examination of Minnesota caselaw reaches the same result; and (3) the certificate is duplicative of nontestimonial documents.” Id. at 654."

"Our rationale in Noor or does not apply here. The summary was not introduced to authenticate other evidence. It was introduced to prove a fact—that Martinez had prior qualifying convictions. Moreover, the summary was not duplicative of nontestimonial documents. The summary was the sole evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions presented at trial. Given these circumstances, the summary was testimonial. Accord Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (determining that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial because their “sole purpose . . . was to provide prima facie evidence of’ an element of the offense); State v. Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that a firearm trace report introduced to prove firearm ownership was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 2009); State v. Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. App. 2007) (determining that a lab report introduced to prove the cause of death in a murder trial was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007); Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307, 309 (determining that a lab report introduced to prove that a substance was cocaine in a drug-sale trial was testimonial)."

"The parties do not dispute that the remaining two elements of a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in this case—that the summary was offered as proof of Martinez’s prior convictions and that Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross- examine the declarant.  Because the summary was a testimonial document offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the admission of the summary in evidence violated Martinez’s constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, there was plain error."

"There is also no dispute that the erroneous admission of the summary affected Martinez’s substantial rights. To convict Martinez of second-degree DWI test refusal, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had “a qualified impaired driving incident” within ten years of his refusal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (“A person who violates section 169A.20, subdivision 2 . . ., is guilty of second- degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed.”) .03, subd. 3(1) (‘“Aggravating factor’ includes . . . a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.”) (2020). And the only trial evidence that Martinez had a qualified impaired driving incident was exhibit 5—the summary. There is a reasonable likelihood that the admission of the summary into evidence substantially affected the verdict. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634."

"Because the admission of the summary into evidence was plain error that affected Martinez’s substantial rights, Martinez has satisfied the first three elements of our plain- error standard of review. But before we address the error, we must determine whether doing so will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted)."

“‘[W]hen there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the . . . error,’ the result would be different,” affirming a conviction would “adversely affect the public’s confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 256 (quoting State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2014)). Here, without the summary of Martinez’s convictions, the state would not have been able to satisfy an element of second-degree DWI test refusal. But for the error, the result of Martinez’s trial would have been different. We therefore conclude that reversing Martinez’s conviction and remanding for a new trial will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 255."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes its best not to summarize.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Moore (Decided May 28, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a jury instruction is not improper unless it materially misstates the law.

In Moore, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and the police applied for a search warrant for the Defendant's blood or urine.  As the deputy worked to submit the warrant, Defendant asked to go to the bathroom. The deputy advised Mr. Moore to wait so he could give a urine sample. Moore became increasingly agitated, continuing to ask to use the bathroom and threatening to urinate in the back of the squad car. After appellant’s repeated threats to urinate on the floor of the squad car, the deputy allowed him to use the bathroom in the emergency room at about 3:40 a.m.

At 3:49 a.m., minutes after they returned to the squad car, the deputy received the signed warrant from the judge, and the Defendant orally refused to submit a blood sample.

The deputy then transported appellant to the law-enforcement center for the Defendant to provide a urine sample. There, the deputy offered the Defendant a bottle of water, which Moore refused. The Defendant bought a can of pop from a vending machine and drank some of it. The deputy suggested to the Defendant several times that he try to urinate, but Moore responded that he did not have to because he had urinated so recently. The Defendant went into the bathroom twice but did not provide a urine sample. The deputy deemed the Defendant to have refused to consent to a urine test at 4:49 a.m.

The Defendant was charged with DWI Refusal to submit to testing and was convicted of same by a jury. On appeal, the Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion because the jury instructions “told the jury the State had prove[d] the refusal element” by instructing them, over counsel’s objection, that a “failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.” 

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction noting:

"The state charged appellant under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2020), which states, “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test... of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant.” In State v. Ferrier, this court considered whether a person could refuse to submit to a chemical test without orally stating their refusal. 792 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding sufficient circumstantial evidence supported determination appellant refused to submit to a test by conduct when she had been given between six and fifteen glasses of water and made three attempts to produce urine sample over three hours), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). We noted that the statute requires a volitional act; “the statute does not criminalize inability to perform the steps necessary for testing.” Id. Nevertheless, we held that “[a] driver may refuse to submit to chemical testing by words or conduct. We highlighted that “actual unwillingness to submit to testing must be proved.” Id. at 101. “Depending on the total circumstances, failure to perform the necessary steps for testing may be circumstantial evidence of refusal by conduct.” Id. at 102.

"Here, the district court instructed the jury on the fourth element of the crime as follows:

Fourth, [appellant] refused to submit to a blood and urine sample. A failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.

A refusal to submit to chemical testing includes any indication of actual unwillingness to complete the testing process as determined from the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances. Actual unwillingness to submit to testing must be proved."

"Appellant challenges the statement, “A failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.” However, “[i]f the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly state the law in language that can be understood by the jury, there is no reversible error.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). When the jury instruction for the fourth element is read “as a whole,” the jury had to determine whether the state had proved “[a]ctual unwillingness to submit to testing.” Because the jury instructions “as a whole” accurately stated the law, the district court did not abuse its discretion."

Moral Of The Story: Mostly right is good enough.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vredenburg (Decided May 13, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-court statements are admissible to establish the element of probable cause in a DWI test refusal case.

In Vredenburg, the police encountered the Defendant, apparently impaired, causing a disturbance near her former boyfriend’s home before later seeing her car driving away from the area. Police momentarily lost sight of the car, but soon saw it parked and found Vredenburg walking nearby with the key to the car in her pocket. Police arrested her on suspicion of impaired driving and the state charged her with chemical-test refusal. Vredenburg appealed from her test-refusal conviction, arguing that admitting evidence of statements provided by a bystander violated both the evidentiary rule prohibiting hearsay and Vredenburg’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.

A man reported to Rochester police that his former girlfriend, Mickela Vredenburg, was outside his house yelling and hitting his front door. Officers arrived and found Vredenburg. They noticed that she smelled of an alcoholic beverage, she slurred her speech, and her balance was unstable. An officer offered to drive Vredenburg home, but she declined. She told the officers that she had not driven there and that she had already arranged for a ride. She walked away.

Officers left but were soon dispatched to return. Vredenburg was at the house again, this time reportedly banging her head against the back door. Police did not find her at the house. But they knew she drove a black Ford Edge, and about a block away an officer saw a car of that description speeding past. The officer turned onto a different street, attempting to intercept the Ford. She soon found the Ford parked on the street, empty and situated partially in the grass, near two townhomes.

The officer stopped immediately behind the Ford and beside a bystander who was standing in the street. She got out and asked the bystander, “Did you see where that woman went?” The bystander, who lived nearby, said, “Yeah, she went right straight through there,” pointing between two townhomes. The officer walked in the indicated direction but did not immediately find Vredenburg. She returned to the bystander and questioned her further about what she had seen, asking for a description of the driver.

Meanwhile, other officers found Vredenburg walking in a direction away from where the officer had found her parked car. Vredenburg denied that she had been driving, but the officers were not persuaded. They arrested her on suspicion of drunk driving, and, searching her after the arrest, found the key to the parked Ford.

The Defendant was taken to the Olmsted County detention center where she was asked to submit to chemical testing.  Ms.Vredenburg refused testing and was subsequently charged with 3rd Degree DWI Refusal. The Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating:

"We are unconvinced by Vredenburg’s challenge to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s statements to the officer. Vredenburg is correct that hearsay statements are generally inadmissible at trial. See Minn. R. Evid. 802. She is also correct that, relatedly, testimonial out-of-court statements are generally not admissible unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764-65 (Minn. 2021). But these prohibitions are inapplicable here. An out- of-court statement repeated at trial is not hearsay unless it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). And identically, “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see also Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013). Vredenburg’s evidentiary and constitutional challenges to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s out-of-court statements therefore fails if the statements were admissible for some other reason."

"We have no difficulty concluding that the challenged statements were offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. The supreme court has explained that “[Refusing a chemical test is not a crime . . . unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had ‘probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2010)). The bystander’s statements to the officer supported the officer’s suspicion that Vredenburg had just driven the car that the officer found parked. Officers may rely on eyewitness statements to establish reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest. See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888, 891 (Minn. 1988) (holding that police had “sufficient information to reasonably suspect that the driver of the car in question was intoxicated” based on a gas-station attendant’s report to police “that he had observed an intoxicated driver leave the gas station”). The bystander’s statements about Vredenburg exiting the car and walking away from it were therefore admissible to prove a circumstance that establishes probable cause to suspect her of impaired driving. In other words, the bystander’s statement that Vredenburg was driving was not offered as substantive evidence that she was in fact driving, but to support the conclusion of police that they had probable cause to believe that she had been. Because the statements were admissible to provide the officer’s basis for probable cause, which is a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it was not subject to exclusion by either the rule prohibiting hearsay or the Confrontation Clause."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes a woman scorned feels the fury.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Street (Decided May 6, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-state convictions may not be used to calculate a defendant's criminal history score without proper documentation.

In Street, the Defendant pled guilty to Felony DWI without any agreement as to sentencing except the State did agree to dismiss the remaining charges. The district court sentenced Street to 57 months in prison, which represented a bottom-of-the-box presumptive sentence based on Street’s criminal history score of five. 

According to the PSI, the score of five included one custody-status point and four felony points. The PSI assigned three felony points for convictions that allegedly occurred in the state of Georgia. The fourth felony point was for Street’s 2019 Minnesota conviction of criminal vehicular operation with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The PSI identified each Georgia conviction by case number, date of conviction, and sentence, and included a description, date, and location for each convicted offense. The PSI did not include, and the state did not offer, any evidence to substantiate these out-of-state convictions. At sentencing, Street did not object to his criminal-history score.

On appeal, Mr. Street claimed the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him with a criminal-history score that included unsubstantiated out-of-state convictions. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case for resentencing stating:

"An offender’s criminal-history score may include out-of-state convictions if certain requirements are met. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5. The guidelines provide that an out-of-state conviction “may be counted as a felony only if [the offense] would both be defined as a felony in Minnesota, and the offender received a sentence that in Minnesota would be a felony-level sentence, which includes the equivalent of a stay of imposition.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (2020) (emphasis omitted). In assigning weight to an out-of-state offense, “[s]ection 2.B.1 governs the weight of a prior felony conviction from a jurisdiction other than Minnesota, and [the weight] must be based on the severity level of the equivalent Minnesota felony offense.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines, 2.B.5.C (2020)."

***

"Although the state need not present certified copies of out-of-state convictions for the convictions to be included in a defendant’s criminal-history score, the state must provide “persuasive evidence that sufficiently substitutes for the official, certified record of conviction.” Id. at 711-12. If the state fails to meet its burden, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand for resentencing. See id. at 715. But if the defendant fails to object to his criminal-history score at sentencing, the state may “further develop the sentencing record” on remand to allow the district court to determine whether the relevant out-of-state convictions were properly included in the defendant’s criminal-history score. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d at 356; see also State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 577 (Minn App. 2018), affd, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn 2019)."

***

"The record shows that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that the three alleged Georgia convictions were valid and would constitute felonies under Minnesota law. See Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 711. As Street correctly notes, the state did not present any evidence to support Street’s alleged Georgia convictions, nor did the PSI include any documentation to verify them. Accordingly, the state failed to present “persuasive evidence” that these convictions were properly included in Street’s criminal-history score. See id. at 710-12 (concluding that the state’s reliance on a sentencing worksheet alone was insufficient to substantiate the defendant’s out-of-state convictions); see also State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that the state met its burden of proof by providing the district court with “considerable documentation” of the defendant’s out-of-state conviction). We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing Street based on a criminal-history score that included unsubstantiated out-of-state convictions, and we reverse and remand for resentencing. See Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 711, 715. Because Street did not object to his criminal-history score at sentencing, the state may supplement the sentencing record on remand. See Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d at 356."

Moral Of The Story: You can't keep score without some paper.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Leu v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 25, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person does not lose their status as a "passenger" in a motor vehicle unless they take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves or others.

Jennifer Leu was a passenger in a pickup truck driven by her husband. A police officer stopped the pickup and suspected Leu's husband was impaired. After conducting field sobriety tests on Leu’s husband, the officer arrested him and directed Leu to remain in the truck. The truck’s engine remained running. At some point, Leu got out of the passenger compartment of the truck and moved to the driver’s seat. However, she did not close the driver’s door. Instead, Leu sat sideways on the driver’s seat, with her feet hanging out of the truck. When the officer observed Leu in that position, she was on her cell phone and explained to the officer that she was requesting a ride home from the scene. Leu exited the truck. Then, she reached inside the truck, switched off the ignition, and put the keys in her pocket. As the officer placed Leu under arrest, a third party arrived to take possession of the truck.

Jennifer Leu's drivers license was revoked for being in physical control of a motor vehicle.  Ms. Leu filed a challenge to the revocation but the district court upheld the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly reversed the district court, stating:

"The term “physical control” is more comprehensive than the terms “drive” and “operate.” State v. Harris, 202N.W.2d 878, 881 (Minn. 1972). The term “physical control” should be given “the broadest possible effect” to deter inebriated persons from getting into vehicles except as passengers. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Juncewski, 308N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). Generally, physical control is meant to cover situations in which “an inebriated person is found in a parked vehicle under circumstances where the car, without too much difficulty, might again be started and become a source of danger to the operator, to others, or to property.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn 1992)."

"However, [i]t is, of course, no crime for an intoxicated person to be in a motor vehicle as a passenger. A passenger, by definition, is someone who is merely along for the ride. When, however, only one person is found in or about a stopped car, the question arises whether that person is a passenger or a person in physical control of the motor vehicle. Mere presence in or about the vehicle is not enough for physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative."

"Thus, the supreme court has articulated a different physical-control standard for a “known passenger” in Shane. 587 N.W.2d at 639. Under that standard: [F]or a police officer to have probable cause to believe a known passenger is in physical control of a motor vehicle, the officer must have reason to believe that the passenger has or is about to take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves, to others, or to property."

***

"After the driver in Shane was removed from the vehicle, Shane asked the police officer if he could drive the vehicle home. Id. at 640. Later, Shane touched the vehicle’s gas pedal from his position in the passenger seat while the vehicle was running, causing the engine to “rev up” and the exhaust from the vehicle to increase. Id. at 642. Yet, the supreme court concluded that the officers “had no reason to believe that Shane had or was about to take some action that would make the [vehicle] a source of danger,” stating, “[t]he mere act of a known passenger leaning over and touching a vehicle’s gas pedal, without more, is not an action that makes the vehicle a source of danger.” Id. The Shane court said that the circumstances were inadequate to establish “physical control” because Shane did not put himself in a position to move the vehicle. Id. The supreme court noted that Shane did not cause the vehicle to move, did not move to the driver’s seat, did not touch the steering wheel, and did not put the vehicle into gear. Id. Nor was there any evidence that Shane attempted to do those things. Id. Thus, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Shane was in physical control of the vehicle. Id."

"When compared to the circumstances in Shane, the circumstances here provide even less reason to believe that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property. Like Shane, Leu did not put herself in a position to move the truck, and she did not cause the truck to move. Although Leu moved to the driver’s seat, she did not sit in a position conducive to driving. Instead, she sat facing out the driver’s door with her feet outside of the truck, where they were not in contact with the truck’s gas and brake pedals. Unlike Shane, Leu did not manipulate the gas pedal. Leu operated only the truck’s ignition switch, and she did so only to turn off the truck’s engine. Next, she removed the keys from the truck. Those acts are inconsistent with an attempt to move the truck. Finally, unlike Shane, Leu did not ask for permission to drive the truck. Instead, she attempted to make arrangements for a ride home, and a third party arrived and took custody of the truck before the police officer cleared the scene. When considered in their totality, these circumstances do not suggest that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property."

***

"Because Leu was a known passenger and the totality of the circumstances do not indicate that she had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a source of danger, there was no probable cause to believe that she was in physical control of the truck. We therefore reverse the commissioner’s revocation of Leu’s license to drive."

Moral Of The Story: Don't ride with a drunk driver.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Alleman v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 4, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that a partially covered license plate is a constitutionally sufficient reason for the police to stop a motor vehicle. 

In Alleman, a Crow Wing County police officer was following the Petitioner's motorcycle when the officer noticed Mr. Alleman's backpack was obstructing the rear license plate of the motorcycle.  The officer initiated a traffic stop and ultimately arrested Mr. Alleman for DWI and revoked his driver's license.

Mr. Alleman filed a challenge to the license revocation arguing the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to justify the initial stop.  The district court denied the challenge and upheld the license revocation.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"...an officer does not violate the prohibition if [the officer] stops a vehicle to conduct an investigation based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 463-64 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see Magnuson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. App. 2005). “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

***

"Under Minnesota Statutes section 169.79, subdivision 7 (2022), “[t]he person driving the motor vehicle shall keep the [license] plate legible and unobstructed ... so that the lettering is plainly visible at all times.” See Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 44 (2022) (defining “motorcycle” as a “motor vehicle”). Based on the squad-car video, the district court found that it was “very clear that the backpack obstruct[ed] at least three quarters of the license plate.” Alleman disputes the district court’s finding that his license plate was obstructed by the backpack."

"Alleman contends that two screenshots from the squad-car video show that his license plate was not covered by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped his motorcycle. But a review of the squad-car video plainly shows that the license plate was partially obstructed by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped Alleman’s motorcycle. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that Alleman’s license plate was obstructed by the backpack, the district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had reasonable suspicion to stop Alleman’s motorcycle."

Moral Of The Story: Be careful of what you are packing.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Obowa v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (Decided February 5, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands, once again, for the proposition that any vehicle equipment violation justifies the stop of the motor vehicle.

In Obowa, a law-enforcement officer with the Lino Lakes Public Safety Department was driving northbound on Lake Drive. A passenger vehicle was driving directly in front of the officer’s squad car. When the driver of the vehicle braked to stop for a red light, the officer observed that one of the vehicle’s brake lights was not working. The officer then initiated a traffic stop by pulling over the vehicle.

The officer spoke to the driver, James Obowa, and the officer could smelled the odor of alcohol, and observed Mr. Obowa exhibited bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Further testing resulted in the arrest of Mr. Obowa for DWI and in the revocation of his driver's license.

Mr. Obowa challenged the license revocation but the district court sustained the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, stating:

"A law enforcement officer may, however, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer “must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted)."

"In the traffic-stop context, the bar for reasonable suspicion is relatively low. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752, 757. “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

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"Obowa challenges the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop. More specifically, Obowa contends that the district court’s decision is based on a mistake of law and a mistake of fact because the record does not reflect that the officer had an objective basis to suspect that Obowa was operating his vehicle in violation of a traffic law. Based on our review of the applicable traffic laws and the record in this case, we are not persuaded."

"Minnesota law requires that a vehicle’s stop lamps and signal lamps “must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2022). In State v. Beall, we clarified that the statute “unambiguously applies to all lamps with which a vehicle is equipped.” 771 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009) (emphasis added). We concluded that “[a] vehicle with an inoperable [] brake light is operated unlawfully in violation of [section 169.57, subdivision 3(a)].” Id. And we held that an officer’s observation of a violation of that statutory provision “gives rise to objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.” Id.

"Beall instructs that an officer’s mere observation of an inoperable brake light is sufficient to justify a traffic stop. See id. That is exactly what the officer testified to in this case. At the implied-consent hearing, he stated that “when the vehicle applied its brakes, the driver’s-side brake light was inoperable.” This testimony is sufficient to support the traffic stop based on a violation of section 169.57, subdivision 3(a). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Obowa."

Moral Of The Story: An ill equipped car is like living with a snitch.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.