Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vredenburg (Decided May 13, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-court statements are admissible to establish the element of probable cause in a DWI test refusal case.

In Vredenburg, the police encountered the Defendant, apparently impaired, causing a disturbance near her former boyfriend’s home before later seeing her car driving away from the area. Police momentarily lost sight of the car, but soon saw it parked and found Vredenburg walking nearby with the key to the car in her pocket. Police arrested her on suspicion of impaired driving and the state charged her with chemical-test refusal. Vredenburg appealed from her test-refusal conviction, arguing that admitting evidence of statements provided by a bystander violated both the evidentiary rule prohibiting hearsay and Vredenburg’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.

A man reported to Rochester police that his former girlfriend, Mickela Vredenburg, was outside his house yelling and hitting his front door. Officers arrived and found Vredenburg. They noticed that she smelled of an alcoholic beverage, she slurred her speech, and her balance was unstable. An officer offered to drive Vredenburg home, but she declined. She told the officers that she had not driven there and that she had already arranged for a ride. She walked away.

Officers left but were soon dispatched to return. Vredenburg was at the house again, this time reportedly banging her head against the back door. Police did not find her at the house. But they knew she drove a black Ford Edge, and about a block away an officer saw a car of that description speeding past. The officer turned onto a different street, attempting to intercept the Ford. She soon found the Ford parked on the street, empty and situated partially in the grass, near two townhomes.

The officer stopped immediately behind the Ford and beside a bystander who was standing in the street. She got out and asked the bystander, “Did you see where that woman went?” The bystander, who lived nearby, said, “Yeah, she went right straight through there,” pointing between two townhomes. The officer walked in the indicated direction but did not immediately find Vredenburg. She returned to the bystander and questioned her further about what she had seen, asking for a description of the driver.

Meanwhile, other officers found Vredenburg walking in a direction away from where the officer had found her parked car. Vredenburg denied that she had been driving, but the officers were not persuaded. They arrested her on suspicion of drunk driving, and, searching her after the arrest, found the key to the parked Ford.

The Defendant was taken to the Olmsted County detention center where she was asked to submit to chemical testing.  Ms.Vredenburg refused testing and was subsequently charged with 3rd Degree DWI Refusal. The Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating:

"We are unconvinced by Vredenburg’s challenge to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s statements to the officer. Vredenburg is correct that hearsay statements are generally inadmissible at trial. See Minn. R. Evid. 802. She is also correct that, relatedly, testimonial out-of-court statements are generally not admissible unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764-65 (Minn. 2021). But these prohibitions are inapplicable here. An out- of-court statement repeated at trial is not hearsay unless it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). And identically, “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see also Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013). Vredenburg’s evidentiary and constitutional challenges to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s out-of-court statements therefore fails if the statements were admissible for some other reason."

"We have no difficulty concluding that the challenged statements were offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. The supreme court has explained that “[Refusing a chemical test is not a crime . . . unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had ‘probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2010)). The bystander’s statements to the officer supported the officer’s suspicion that Vredenburg had just driven the car that the officer found parked. Officers may rely on eyewitness statements to establish reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest. See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888, 891 (Minn. 1988) (holding that police had “sufficient information to reasonably suspect that the driver of the car in question was intoxicated” based on a gas-station attendant’s report to police “that he had observed an intoxicated driver leave the gas station”). The bystander’s statements about Vredenburg exiting the car and walking away from it were therefore admissible to prove a circumstance that establishes probable cause to suspect her of impaired driving. In other words, the bystander’s statement that Vredenburg was driving was not offered as substantive evidence that she was in fact driving, but to support the conclusion of police that they had probable cause to believe that she had been. Because the statements were admissible to provide the officer’s basis for probable cause, which is a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it was not subject to exclusion by either the rule prohibiting hearsay or the Confrontation Clause."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes a woman scorned feels the fury.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Street (Decided May 6, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-state convictions may not be used to calculate a defendant's criminal history score without proper documentation.

In Street, the Defendant pled guilty to Felony DWI without any agreement as to sentencing except the State did agree to dismiss the remaining charges. The district court sentenced Street to 57 months in prison, which represented a bottom-of-the-box presumptive sentence based on Street’s criminal history score of five. 

According to the PSI, the score of five included one custody-status point and four felony points. The PSI assigned three felony points for convictions that allegedly occurred in the state of Georgia. The fourth felony point was for Street’s 2019 Minnesota conviction of criminal vehicular operation with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The PSI identified each Georgia conviction by case number, date of conviction, and sentence, and included a description, date, and location for each convicted offense. The PSI did not include, and the state did not offer, any evidence to substantiate these out-of-state convictions. At sentencing, Street did not object to his criminal-history score.

On appeal, Mr. Street claimed the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him with a criminal-history score that included unsubstantiated out-of-state convictions. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case for resentencing stating:

"An offender’s criminal-history score may include out-of-state convictions if certain requirements are met. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5. The guidelines provide that an out-of-state conviction “may be counted as a felony only if [the offense] would both be defined as a felony in Minnesota, and the offender received a sentence that in Minnesota would be a felony-level sentence, which includes the equivalent of a stay of imposition.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (2020) (emphasis omitted). In assigning weight to an out-of-state offense, “[s]ection 2.B.1 governs the weight of a prior felony conviction from a jurisdiction other than Minnesota, and [the weight] must be based on the severity level of the equivalent Minnesota felony offense.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines, 2.B.5.C (2020)."

***

"Although the state need not present certified copies of out-of-state convictions for the convictions to be included in a defendant’s criminal-history score, the state must provide “persuasive evidence that sufficiently substitutes for the official, certified record of conviction.” Id. at 711-12. If the state fails to meet its burden, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand for resentencing. See id. at 715. But if the defendant fails to object to his criminal-history score at sentencing, the state may “further develop the sentencing record” on remand to allow the district court to determine whether the relevant out-of-state convictions were properly included in the defendant’s criminal-history score. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d at 356; see also State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 577 (Minn App. 2018), affd, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn 2019)."

***

"The record shows that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that the three alleged Georgia convictions were valid and would constitute felonies under Minnesota law. See Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 711. As Street correctly notes, the state did not present any evidence to support Street’s alleged Georgia convictions, nor did the PSI include any documentation to verify them. Accordingly, the state failed to present “persuasive evidence” that these convictions were properly included in Street’s criminal-history score. See id. at 710-12 (concluding that the state’s reliance on a sentencing worksheet alone was insufficient to substantiate the defendant’s out-of-state convictions); see also State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that the state met its burden of proof by providing the district court with “considerable documentation” of the defendant’s out-of-state conviction). We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing Street based on a criminal-history score that included unsubstantiated out-of-state convictions, and we reverse and remand for resentencing. See Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 711, 715. Because Street did not object to his criminal-history score at sentencing, the state may supplement the sentencing record on remand. See Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d at 356."

Moral Of The Story: You can't keep score without some paper.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Leu v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 25, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person does not lose their status as a "passenger" in a motor vehicle unless they take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves or others.

Jennifer Leu was a passenger in a pickup truck driven by her husband. A police officer stopped the pickup and suspected Leu's husband was impaired. After conducting field sobriety tests on Leu’s husband, the officer arrested him and directed Leu to remain in the truck. The truck’s engine remained running. At some point, Leu got out of the passenger compartment of the truck and moved to the driver’s seat. However, she did not close the driver’s door. Instead, Leu sat sideways on the driver’s seat, with her feet hanging out of the truck. When the officer observed Leu in that position, she was on her cell phone and explained to the officer that she was requesting a ride home from the scene. Leu exited the truck. Then, she reached inside the truck, switched off the ignition, and put the keys in her pocket. As the officer placed Leu under arrest, a third party arrived to take possession of the truck.

Jennifer Leu's drivers license was revoked for being in physical control of a motor vehicle.  Ms. Leu filed a challenge to the revocation but the district court upheld the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly reversed the district court, stating:

"The term “physical control” is more comprehensive than the terms “drive” and “operate.” State v. Harris, 202N.W.2d 878, 881 (Minn. 1972). The term “physical control” should be given “the broadest possible effect” to deter inebriated persons from getting into vehicles except as passengers. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Juncewski, 308N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). Generally, physical control is meant to cover situations in which “an inebriated person is found in a parked vehicle under circumstances where the car, without too much difficulty, might again be started and become a source of danger to the operator, to others, or to property.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn 1992)."

"However, [i]t is, of course, no crime for an intoxicated person to be in a motor vehicle as a passenger. A passenger, by definition, is someone who is merely along for the ride. When, however, only one person is found in or about a stopped car, the question arises whether that person is a passenger or a person in physical control of the motor vehicle. Mere presence in or about the vehicle is not enough for physical control; it is the overall situation that is determinative."

"Thus, the supreme court has articulated a different physical-control standard for a “known passenger” in Shane. 587 N.W.2d at 639. Under that standard: [F]or a police officer to have probable cause to believe a known passenger is in physical control of a motor vehicle, the officer must have reason to believe that the passenger has or is about to take some action that makes the motor vehicle a source of danger to themselves, to others, or to property."

***

"After the driver in Shane was removed from the vehicle, Shane asked the police officer if he could drive the vehicle home. Id. at 640. Later, Shane touched the vehicle’s gas pedal from his position in the passenger seat while the vehicle was running, causing the engine to “rev up” and the exhaust from the vehicle to increase. Id. at 642. Yet, the supreme court concluded that the officers “had no reason to believe that Shane had or was about to take some action that would make the [vehicle] a source of danger,” stating, “[t]he mere act of a known passenger leaning over and touching a vehicle’s gas pedal, without more, is not an action that makes the vehicle a source of danger.” Id. The Shane court said that the circumstances were inadequate to establish “physical control” because Shane did not put himself in a position to move the vehicle. Id. The supreme court noted that Shane did not cause the vehicle to move, did not move to the driver’s seat, did not touch the steering wheel, and did not put the vehicle into gear. Id. Nor was there any evidence that Shane attempted to do those things. Id. Thus, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Shane was in physical control of the vehicle. Id."

"When compared to the circumstances in Shane, the circumstances here provide even less reason to believe that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property. Like Shane, Leu did not put herself in a position to move the truck, and she did not cause the truck to move. Although Leu moved to the driver’s seat, she did not sit in a position conducive to driving. Instead, she sat facing out the driver’s door with her feet outside of the truck, where they were not in contact with the truck’s gas and brake pedals. Unlike Shane, Leu did not manipulate the gas pedal. Leu operated only the truck’s ignition switch, and she did so only to turn off the truck’s engine. Next, she removed the keys from the truck. Those acts are inconsistent with an attempt to move the truck. Finally, unlike Shane, Leu did not ask for permission to drive the truck. Instead, she attempted to make arrangements for a ride home, and a third party arrived and took custody of the truck before the police officer cleared the scene. When considered in their totality, these circumstances do not suggest that Leu had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a danger to herself, others, or property."

***

"Because Leu was a known passenger and the totality of the circumstances do not indicate that she had taken or was about to take some action to make the truck a source of danger, there was no probable cause to believe that she was in physical control of the truck. We therefore reverse the commissioner’s revocation of Leu’s license to drive."

Moral Of The Story: Don't ride with a drunk driver.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Alleman v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 4, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that a partially covered license plate is a constitutionally sufficient reason for the police to stop a motor vehicle. 

In Alleman, a Crow Wing County police officer was following the Petitioner's motorcycle when the officer noticed Mr. Alleman's backpack was obstructing the rear license plate of the motorcycle.  The officer initiated a traffic stop and ultimately arrested Mr. Alleman for DWI and revoked his driver's license.

Mr. Alleman filed a challenge to the license revocation arguing the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to justify the initial stop.  The district court denied the challenge and upheld the license revocation.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"...an officer does not violate the prohibition if [the officer] stops a vehicle to conduct an investigation based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 463-64 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see Magnuson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. App. 2005). “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

***

"Under Minnesota Statutes section 169.79, subdivision 7 (2022), “[t]he person driving the motor vehicle shall keep the [license] plate legible and unobstructed ... so that the lettering is plainly visible at all times.” See Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 44 (2022) (defining “motorcycle” as a “motor vehicle”). Based on the squad-car video, the district court found that it was “very clear that the backpack obstruct[ed] at least three quarters of the license plate.” Alleman disputes the district court’s finding that his license plate was obstructed by the backpack."

"Alleman contends that two screenshots from the squad-car video show that his license plate was not covered by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped his motorcycle. But a review of the squad-car video plainly shows that the license plate was partially obstructed by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped Alleman’s motorcycle. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that Alleman’s license plate was obstructed by the backpack, the district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had reasonable suspicion to stop Alleman’s motorcycle."

Moral Of The Story: Be careful of what you are packing.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Obowa v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (Decided February 5, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands, once again, for the proposition that any vehicle equipment violation justifies the stop of the motor vehicle.

In Obowa, a law-enforcement officer with the Lino Lakes Public Safety Department was driving northbound on Lake Drive. A passenger vehicle was driving directly in front of the officer’s squad car. When the driver of the vehicle braked to stop for a red light, the officer observed that one of the vehicle’s brake lights was not working. The officer then initiated a traffic stop by pulling over the vehicle.

The officer spoke to the driver, James Obowa, and the officer could smelled the odor of alcohol, and observed Mr. Obowa exhibited bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Further testing resulted in the arrest of Mr. Obowa for DWI and in the revocation of his driver's license.

Mr. Obowa challenged the license revocation but the district court sustained the revocation. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, stating:

"A law enforcement officer may, however, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard, the officer “must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted)."

"In the traffic-stop context, the bar for reasonable suspicion is relatively low. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752, 757. “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

***

"Obowa challenges the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop. More specifically, Obowa contends that the district court’s decision is based on a mistake of law and a mistake of fact because the record does not reflect that the officer had an objective basis to suspect that Obowa was operating his vehicle in violation of a traffic law. Based on our review of the applicable traffic laws and the record in this case, we are not persuaded."

"Minnesota law requires that a vehicle’s stop lamps and signal lamps “must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2022). In State v. Beall, we clarified that the statute “unambiguously applies to all lamps with which a vehicle is equipped.” 771 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009) (emphasis added). We concluded that “[a] vehicle with an inoperable [] brake light is operated unlawfully in violation of [section 169.57, subdivision 3(a)].” Id. And we held that an officer’s observation of a violation of that statutory provision “gives rise to objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.” Id.

"Beall instructs that an officer’s mere observation of an inoperable brake light is sufficient to justify a traffic stop. See id. That is exactly what the officer testified to in this case. At the implied-consent hearing, he stated that “when the vehicle applied its brakes, the driver’s-side brake light was inoperable.” This testimony is sufficient to support the traffic stop based on a violation of section 169.57, subdivision 3(a). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Obowa."

Moral Of The Story: An ill equipped car is like living with a snitch.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waldron (Decided December 26, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to talk to the police.

In Waldron, the defendant approached a house in Hibbing Minnesota looking for held after a single-car crash.  Waldron was injured and smelled of alcohol, and the homeowners summoned emergency assistance. A state trooper was the first emergency worker to arrive. The trooper located the car, which was in a ditch about 40 yards away from the road, and he confirmed that it was unoccupied. Then, the trooper went to the house to meet with Ms. Waldron.

Waldron was lying on the entryway floor, bloodied, and crying, and the homeowners were nearby. The trooper called for an ambulance. When the trooper asked Waldron for her name, she did not respond and moaned in pain. The homeowners told the trooper that Waldron had told them her name and had said her boyfriend was the driver. When the trooper asked Waldron what she had been doing at the time of the crash and whether she had been wearing a seatbelt, Waldron said she was not driving and asked about her boyfriend’s whereabouts. The trooper radioed for assistance in locating the missing boyfriend.

Another officer arrived at the home, and asked Waldron for the name of the boyfriend they should be looking for. This officer asked Waldron whether the boyfriend had been driving. Waldron responded that her boyfriend was not the driver.

Ms. Waldron was taken to a local hospital and her blood was drawn pursuant to a search warrant.  The blood test result revealed an alcohol concentration level of .188%.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and moved to suppress the statements she had made to law enforcement arguing the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"To determine whether an individual was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda requirement, a court should consider the surrounding circumstances. State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012). Factors suggesting that a person was in custody include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station;

(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And factors suggesting that an individual was not in custody include brief questioning, a nonthreatening environment, an explicit statement by police that the person is not under arrest, and police allowing the person to make phone calls or leave after they gave their statement. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

"Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted). A custodial interrogation occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 10-11 (quotation omitted); see also Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637."

***

"Based on the district court’s undisputed factual findings, we determine, based on our independent review, that there was no custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, considering the surrounding circumstances, Waldron was not in custody when she was questioned. At the outset of Waldron’s encounter with law enforcement—and, indeed, for the majority of that encounter—there was just one law enforcement officer present. The homeowners were also present during the encounter, and they were also interacting with law enforcement. Waldron was not in a police station, jail, or a squad car. She was lying on the floor of a house that she entered on her own initiative. And the responding trooper made clear that medical help had been summoned for Waldron. The questions posed by law enforcement were not accusatory. Rather, they were open-ended attempts to figure out what had happened and whether there was another injured person outside in the cold. The totality of these circumstances indicates that Waldron was not in custody when she made the statements at issue. See Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11 (instructing district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an individual is in custody for the purpose of a Miranda warning).

Second, there was no interrogation. Police are not required to give a Miranda warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. This includes “on-the-scene questioning” of individuals suspected of driving while under the influence. See Steinberg v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”). Here, law enforcement officers asked Waldron general on-the-scene questions after responding to a serious car accident. These questions did not amount to an interrogation."

"Because there was no custodial interrogation, no Miranda warning was required."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Ness v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the failure to read verbatim the Minnesota DWI Search Warrant Advisory is not fatal as long as the advisory given is not inaccurate, misleading or confusing.

In Ness, the Petitioner was arrested for driving while impaired and was taken to jail.  The arresting officer asked the Petitioner if he preferred to take a blood or a urine test. The Petitioner responded that the officer was not going to obtain either test from him.

The officer obtained a search warrant authorizing him to procure either a blood or urine sample from appellant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer approached Petitioner's holding cell, stated Petitioner's name, and asked Petitioner to come talk to him. Petitioner was lying down on the cell bed, was wrapped in a blanket with his eyes closed, and did not get up or respond to the officer. The officer informed Petitioner, “as I told you before, I was drafting a search warrant for your blood or urine because of the DWI, and I have a signed search warrant in my hand, and refusing to submit to that search warrant is a crime.” The officer asked Petitioner if he understood. The officer testified that appellant did not respond and was ignoring him, but that at one point Petitioner opened his eyes and looked at him while adjusting his blanket before continuing to ignore him.  The officer asked Petitioner if he was refusing to give the officer a test, to which Petitioner did not reply.

The officer then told Petitioner that he was taking his silence as a refusal, and asked if Petitioner understood. Petitioner again did not reply. The officer informed Petitioner that he was leaving Petitioner a copy of the search warrant but Petitioner's noncompliance with the warrant would be considered a refusal and he would be charged with an additional crime. The officer then issued a Notice and Order Of Revocation of the Petitioner's driver's license.

The Petitioner challenged the revocation of his license asserting that his refusal to submit to testing was not properly obtained.  Petitioner claimed that since the officer failed to read the search warrant advisory statutory language verbatim, and failed to offer both a blood or urine test, the revocation of his license must be rescinded.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4. “At the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Id., subd. 1. 

"Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 2, provides, in part, that:

The peace officer who directs a test pursuant to a search warrant shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant. If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test,     the officer may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine.

Action may only be taken against a person who is offered and refuses both a urine test and a blood test. Id., subd. 2."

"This court has determined that the warning requirement under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, is unambiguous and law enforcement is required to inform a defendant that refusal to submit to a warranted blood or urine test is a crime. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103,110 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20,2019)."

***

"In Nash, this court considered whether law enforcement provided the search-warrant advisory required under Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, when a state trooper told Nash, “I applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, and refusal to take a test is a crime.” 989 N.W.2d at 706. Even though the warrant also permitted a urine test, the trooper did not mention the possibility of a urine test, and Nash did not have an opportunity to read the warrant before agreeing to the blood test. Id. at 710. We concluded that “the advisory informed Nash that he could be charged with a crime if he refused the blood test, even though the trooper had not offered Nash an alternative urine test. That was an inaccurate statement of law and misleading,” and could not be a basis for Nash’s license revocation. Id. at 710-11. We held that if a search-warrant advisory deviates from the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, it “is insufficient to sustain the revocation of a person’s driving privileges if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing when considered in its context as a whole.” 

"Although here the officer’s search-warrant advisory did not comply with the exact wording of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, Nash supports that a deviation is only problematic if it is an inaccurate statement of law, misleading, or confusing in its context. 989 N.W.2d at 711. Here, the officer’s advisory was legally accurate and properly advised appellant of the consequences of his refusal. The officer testified that at the jail and prior to applying for a search warrant, he asked appellant whether he preferred a blood or urine test, to which appellant responded that he would provide neither. After applying for and receiving a search warrant, the officer told appellant that he had obtained a signed search warrant for appellant’s blood or urine, and that refusing to submit to the search warrant was a crime."

"The plain language of subdivision 2 does not require law enforcement to separately direct the tests. A peace officer who directs a test “shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant,” and if the warrant authorizes both, the peace officer “may direct whether the test is ofblood or urine.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2 (emphasis added). If a person objects to one test, the peace officer shall offer the other test. Id. The statute does not prohibit a peace officer from simultaneously offering a urine or a blood test. “Action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered.” Id. Here, the officer testified to offering both types of tests to appellant before the officer obtained a search warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the officer again indicated to appellant that both tests were authorized by the search warrant before informing appellant that refusal to comply with the search warrant was a crime. The officer therefore complied with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2."

Moral Of The Story: Close enough for government work. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.