Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Higgins (decided October 24, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if a windshield crack is big enough, it will be presumed to interfere with the driver's vision.

In Higgins, the Defendant was stopped on Highway 169 after leaving Hibbing, MN. Mr. Higgins was subsequently charged with DWI and he challenged the validity of the initial stop.

The arresting officer testified he stopped Higgins because he observed (1) a crack in Higgins’s front windshield that “went three quarters of the way through the windshield,” and (2) a suspended object “swinging on the mirror.” The officer could not recall the exact item he saw “swinging” on the rearview mirror or the location of the crack on the windshield. But the officer recalled that the reflection of the sun on the windshield made the crack “very easy to see.”

The District Court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Regarding the scope of the windshield crack, the trooper testified that the crack he observed “went three quarters of the way through the windshield.” He described it as “very easy to see” from the sunshine’s reflection on the windshield at the time of the stop. Based upon this testimony, the district court found that the crack extended across three-quarters of the vehicle’s windshield. Because a crack of this size could lead a reasonable officer to suspect that the driver’s vision was limited, this undisputed factual finding on the size and extent of the crack provides a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Higgins drove in violation of the obstructed-vision statute. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43."

"To persuade us otherwise, Higgins references State v. Poehler, where we held that not every windshield crack justifies a traffic stop under the obstructed-vision statute. 921 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn. App. 2018), affd on other grounds, 935 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2019). Rather, there must be evidence to support a finding that a reasonable officer might suspect that the windshield was cracked to an extent that it limited the driver’s vision. Id. at 580-81. But unlike Poehler—where there was no factual finding about the crack’s size or location—evidence of the windshield crack size exists here."

***

"In sum, we conclude that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he observed the windshield crack on Higgins’s vehicle because the crack spanned “three quarters of the way through the windshield.” Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could conclude that the crack obstructed the driver’s view in violation of the traffic law."

Moral Of The Story: The bigger the crack, the better the stop.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Walter (Decided October 10, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that one can only be convicted of one DWI offense arising out of a single behavioral incident.  This case is nothing new as the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have repeatedly affirmed this principle.  But the case illustrates that some district courts are still not paying attention. 

In Walter, The Defendant was found sleeping in the front driver's seat of a car parked along side Interstate 94 near Moorhead Minnesota. The Defendant was drunk and subsequently refused to submit to testing at the police station.

Mr. Walter was charged with Felony DWI and with Felony DWI Refusal to Submit to testing. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of both charges and warrant of commitment showed convictions on both counts.  

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated the Felony Refusal conviction noting:

"Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020). The supreme court has held that “section 609.04 bars multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” State v. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985)."

"...this court applies a two-part test to determine whether any of the multiple convictions should be vacated. State v. Bonkowske, 957N.W.2d 437, 443-44 (Minn. App. 2021). First, the convictions at issue must be for offenses that arise under different sections of the same criminal statute. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d at 760. Second, the offenses must have been for acts committed during a single behavioral incident. Id".

"Walter’s convictions for count 1 and count 2 were for offenses arising under different sections of the same criminal statute—Minn. Stat. § 169A.20. Also, this court has held that DWI and test refusal “committed as part of a continuous course of conduct, as occurred here, arise out of a single behavioral incident.” Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d at 444. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by entering convictions on counts 1 and 2 on the warrant of commitment."

As explained by State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984):

"[W]hen the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act [the district court is] to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only. The remaining conviction(s) should not be formally adjudicated at this time.

If the adjudicated conviction is later vacated for a reason not relevant to the remaining unadjudicated conviction(s), one of the remaining unadjudicated convictions can then be formally adjudicated and sentence imposed, with credit, of course, given for time already served on the vacated sentence."

Moral Of The Story: One conviction is one too many but legally speaking, one is plenty!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Hower (Decided September 26, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that refusal to submit to testing can be by words or conduct.

In Hower, the Defendant was convicted of felony DWI by a jury. The facts showed that in November 2020, a law-enforcement officer responded to a call that a pickup truck had crashed in a ditch and arrived to find Hower asleep in the driver’s seat. The officer questioned Hower about what happened, and Hower—who is unable to speak—reacted by motioning to his leg, which the officer interpreted to mean that Hower’s leg was in pain. The responding officer testified at trial that he believed Hower was intoxicated based on the smell of alcoholic beverages, Hower’s inability to stand or walk, his bloodshot, watery eyes, and empty beer cans along with an opened, partially empty bottle of liquor on the floor of the truck’s passenger seat. An ambulance transported Hower to the hospital.

The police obtained a search warrant for the Defendant's blood or urine and told Hower repeatedly that he could nod or shake his head in response to the question of how he preferred to provide a sample for testing. 

At first, Hower did not respond to the officer’s questions. The officer asked Hower several more times if he would provide a blood or urine sample and continued to repeat that it was a crime to refuse. After the officer repeated his questions and tried to get Hower’s attention, Hower gestured to the officer, who gave Hower a pen and paper. Hower then wrote a few words, such as, “for watt,” which the officer interpreted to mean Hower was asking why the officer needed a blood or urine sample; “Scott driving, not me,” which the officer interpreted to mean Hower was saying someone named Scott was driving the truck when it crashed; and “hospital,” to which the officer responded by telling Hower that he was in the hospital to get his leg examined. The officer then asked again how Hower would like to complete the chemical test, and Hower wrote, “P,” which the officer took to mean Hower would provide a urine sample.

The officer left to retrieve a urine-testing kit. When the officer returned with the kit, he tried to get Hower’s attention by repeatedly saying his name. Hower did not respond and appeared to be asleep. The officer reminded Hower that if he did not respond, it would be a refusal. Hower then appeared to wake up. The officer asked Hower if he would “pee in a cup” and told Hower that if he kept “messing around,” the officer would consider it to be a test refusal. The officer again repeated Hower’s name, asked several more times if Hower was going to take the test, asked Hower to open his eyes, and told Hower to nod his head yes or no. Hower motioned to his leg. The officer told Hower that on initial review, the medical staff had not identified anything wrong with Hower’s leg. The officer yet again asked Hower whether he was going to take the test, and Hower did not respond; the officer said, “See, you stop answering me when I ask those questions.” Moments later, medical staff wheeled Hower into an exam room. The officer testified at trial that he considered Hower to have refused to test once the medical-staff member came to get him; therefore, the officer did not make any additional attempts to secure a sample after that time.

Defendant argues that the evidence supporting his conviction for test refusal was insufficient, and both parties agree that the evidence of the refusal was primarily circumstantial. Appellate courts apply greater scrutiny when assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 598 (quotation omitted). This court first identifies the circumstances proved, with the assumption that the jury rejected evidence in the record that is inconsistent with its verdict. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 622. Second, we examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt. Id. If there are no reasonable, rational inferences that are inconsistent with guilt, this court should affirm the conviction. Id."

"Based on the evidence here, the state proved the following circumstances: (1) Hower initially did not respond to the officer’s request for a chemical test; (2) Hower then appeared to agree to submit to a urine test; (3) when the officer returned with a kit to begin the process of administering the urine test, Hower appeared to be asleep; (4) after the officer reminded Hower that if he did not respond, it would be a test refusal, Hower appeared to wake up; (5) Hower then refused to communicate nonverbally as he had communicated with the officer before; and (6) Hower once again did not respond to the officer’s request to complete a urine test. These circumstances are consistent with Hower indicating an actual unwillingness to submit to the test. See Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 102 (deeming that failure to produce urine for testing after verbally agreeing to test was sufficient circumstantial evidence of actual unwillingness to submit to testing)."

"Hower, however, argues that there are other reasonable inferences based on these circumstances, including that he was not unwilling to test but simply unable to communicate because after he wrote, “P,” the pen and paper were taken away, and alternatively, that he was willing to do a urine test but did not want to do so in the public waiting area. Hower also argues that there was no requirement to consent to the test a second time after he had written, “P.” Ultimately, he argues, it is a reasonable inference that it was the officer’s failure to administer the test, not Hower’s failure to comply with the test, that frustrated the testing process."

"Hower’s proffered inferences are unreasonable based on the circumstances proved. The testimony and body-camera footage presented at trial support the inference that Hower demonstrated a clear disinterest in participating in the urine test. Hower’s argument that the removal of his pen and paper meant that he could no longer participate in testing is contradicted by the officer’s body-camera footage showing that Hower motioned with his head and his hands in response to other questions the officer asked. A driver’s refusal to submit to testing includes indicating, through words or actions, an “actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process,” even after initially consenting to a test."

***

"The record here includes evidence showing that after appearing to agree to a chemical test, Hower ignored the officer once he returned with the test kit and did not respond to questions about taking the test even as he responded nonverbally to other questions the officer asked. These circumstances support a reasonable, rational inference that Hower was indicating an actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process. We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, sufficient evidence exists in the record to support Hower’s conviction for refusal to submit to chemical testing."

Moral Of The Story:  You can still refuse even if you cannot speak.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Roth (Decided August 15, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that you can challenge a prior revocation if you can prove you were crazy during the entire 60-day challenge window.

In Roth, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI as he had two prior offenses within the past ten years.  One of the prior offenses used to make the current offense a 2nd degree was a 2018 implied consent license revocation. The Defendant had been found not guilty of the related 2018 DWI charge because at the time of the DWI offense, Ruth’s mental illness had made him unable to understand the nature or wrongfulness of his behavior.

Ruth filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing that the state’s use of the 2018 license revocation to enhance the severity of the charges violated his constitutional rights. Ruth contended that the district court’s ruling in the corresponding 2018 criminal case that he was not guilty by reason of mental illness created an inference that he was also incompetent during the 60-day judicial-review period for the revocation of his driver’s license. He further argued that, because he was unable to challenge the 2018 revocation due to his incompetence, the state’s use of the revocation to enhance the 2020 DWI charges violated his right to due process. 

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss and on appeal the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court noting:

"Under Minnesota law, the revocation of an individual’s driver’s license following an impaired-driving arrest may be used to enhance the severity of subsequent DWI charges. State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2007)

***

"Designed to protect public safety, DWI-related driver’s-license revocations are civil proceedings in which the 60-day period for requesting judicial review is strictly construed, even when a delay in pursuing judicial review is not the driver’s fault. McShane v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Minn. App. 1985)."

***

"Ruth acknowledges that he did not timely seek judicial review of his 2018 driver’s- license revocation. But, relying on the district court’s 2018 determination that he was not guilty of the corresponding criminal DWI charges by virtue of his mental illness, he contends that he was also mentally incompetent during the 60-day window for requesting judicial review and therefore could not timely initiate that process. In further support of his assertion that he was not competent to timely seek judicial review, he asks us to take judicial notice of the evaluator’s competency report in the 2018 criminal case, which concluded that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of driving while impaired at the time of the offense. According to Ruth, because there was no judicial review of the 2018 revocation, and because he was incapable of requesting judicial review, the revocation could not be used."

"Ruth contends that his case is unique, making his collateral attack on the validity of the 2018 revocation proper, because his incompetence precluded him from utilizing the available judicial review. In support of this argument, he cites to Anderson, where a driver attempted to challenge prior revocations by initiating an untimely civil implied-consent hearing—the judicial-review hearing afforded under the statutory scheme. 878 N.W.2d at 928. Like Ruth, the driver in Anderson argued that he had been incapable of timely requesting judicial review because, due to his mental incompetence, he had not understood the notice he received. Id. at 929. We rejected the driver’s use of an implied-consent hearing as a vehicle for challenging the revocations because the district court lost jurisdiction over such a proceeding when the driver failed to timely request review.  Id. at 930. But we stated that the driver could potentially challenge the revocations in a criminal proceeding if the state sought to use the revocations to enhance criminal charges. Id."

"Ruth points out that we essentially addressed his circumstances in Anderson, when we stated, “The circumstances in this case may well constitute one of the ‘unique’ cases in which a criminal defendant may collaterally attack a revocation to prevent it from serving as an enhancement.” Id. He observes that he, like the driver in Anderson, was unable to timely seek judicial review due to mental incompetence. But Ruth notes that, unlike the driver in Anderson, he used the proper vehicle for challenging his revocations—a collateral attack in the context of his criminal case."

"Ruth’s attempt to collaterally challenge the 2018 revocation is flawed, however. We reject his collateral attack on the revocation for two reasons."

"First, in Anderson, we “expressed] no opinion as to the outcome of [the] analysis.” Id. at 930. Thus, Anderson does not hold that a driver’s incompetence during the judicial- review period precludes the use of the revocation to enhance a subsequent offense."

"Second, and even more importantly, the record does not support Ruth’s claim that he was not competent to seek judicial review of the 2018 revocation. His claim relies entirely on the district court’s judicial notice of an order in his 2018 criminal case finding him not guilty of DWI by reason of mental illness. The record contains no evidence of Ruth’s competence to participate in judicial proceedings during the 60-day window for seeking judicial review. And the record does not even include the evaluation that the district court relied on in 2018 to find Ruth not guilty by reason of mental illness.  Based on the record here, we cannot infer—as Ruth asks us to do—that he was not competent to seek judicial review in 2018. Yet, this factual assertion provides the entire foundation of Ruth’s legal argument. Because the record does not support Ruth’s claim that he was not competent to seek judicial review, his legal argument fails."

"We cannot conclude that Ruth’s mental condition prevented him from requesting judicial review of his 2018 driver’s-license revocation. Because Ruth waived judicial review by failing to timely request it, the use of the revocation to enhance his current DWI offense did not violate his constitutional right to procedural due process."

Moral Of The Story: That's one crazy driver!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Johnson (Decided June 27, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Nonprecedential) which stands for the proposition that jury instructions are to be read and interpreted in their entirety. 

In Johnson, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was read the Minnesota breath test advisory at a police station in St. Louis County. Defendant was asked to provide a sample of his breath and Johnson declined.  The officer, without first obtaining a search warrant, then asked the Defendant to submit to a urine test.  Johnson again declined to submit to testing. Mr. Johnson was subsequently charged and convicted of felony refusal to submit to a breath test.

On appeal, Johnson argued that his conviction for test refusal must be reversed because the district court's instruction did not specify which chemical test the state had to prove Johnson refused when he refused both the breath test and a urine test. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction noting that since the Defendant did not object to the instructions in the district court, the appellate court would use the "plain error" standard of review: 

"When reviewing jury instructions for plain error, appellate courts review them in their entirety to determine whether the instructions fairly and adequately explain the law of the case...Appellate courts will not reverse a district court’s decision on jury instructions absent an abuse of discretion. Id. District courts abuse their discretion if the instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,” State v. Taylor, 869 N. W.2d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), or if the instructions omit an element of the charged offense, State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019)."

"Once an officer has (1) probable cause to believe that the person was driving while impaired, (2) placed the person under lawful arrest for DWI, (3) requested that the person take a breath test, and (4) read the person the breath-test advisory, Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subds. 1(b)(1), 2 (2018), “[i]t is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test. . . of the person’s breath.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1)."

"However, a person cannot be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 234 (Minn 2016)."

"Here, the district court instructed:

First, a peace officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant drove, operated, or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. . . .

Second, the peace officer placed the defendant under lawful arrest for driving while impaired. . . .

Third, the defendant was given the breath-test advisory by the peace officer.

Fourth, the defendant was requested by the peace officer to submit to a chemical test of the defendant’s breath.

Fifth, the defendant refused to submit to the test."

Johnson claimed that because the fifth element of the jury instructions failed to specify which test the state had to prove Johnson refused and instead merely said “the test,” the jury was not properly instructed that Johnson could only be convicted if he refused the breath test, not the urine test.

The Court of Appeals rejected Johnson's claim, holding:

"The jury instructions given by the district court included all elements of the offense and fairly explained the law. Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 805. When read “in their entirety,” it is clear that the fifth element was referring to a breath test. Id. The contested sentence— “Fifth, the defendant refused to submit to the test”—immediately followed two sentences that listed the “[tjhird” and “[fjourth” elements of the offense and included “breath test” and “test of the defendant’s breath.” The first sentence of the instructions also stated that “whoever refuses to submit to a chemical test of the person’s breath ... is guilty of a crime.” There was no reference to a urine test in the jury instructions. Thus, when the fifth element is read in context, the jury instructions did not “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 14-15 (quotation omitted). Consequently, under the plain-error analysis, the district court did not err in its jury instructions."

Moral Of The Story: If you refuse to submit, they will convict.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Bjerke v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided May 9, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the Court will not decide the constitutionality of the "wide turn" statute if the stop can be upheld on other grounds.

In Bjerke, the Defendant was arrested for DWI after being stopped for failing to properly stop for a stop sign and for making a wide turn in violation of Minnesota Statute § 169.19, sub. 1(a).  The criminal and license revocation hearings were combined and the Defendant moved to suppress all of the state's evidence. The Defendant argued that the sheriff's deputy did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that Statute  169.19, subs. 1(a) was unconstitutionally vague.

The arresting officer testified that at approximately 10:45 p.m. on April 1, 2021, he observed a Chrysler 300 sedan being driven in the downtown area of Mankato where there are several bars. The deputy testified that he observed the sedan stopped at the intersection of Main Street and Second Street with the front tires of the vehicle stopped “over the crosswalk” such that the vehicle was obstructing the crosswalk. The deputy testified that the driver of the vehicle then made a wide right turn, followed by another wide right turn. According to the deputy, the vehicle crossed over the center lane divider when the driver made both right turns.

Bjerke testified that he has a Class A commercial driver’s license, which allows him to drive combination tractor/trailers. According to Bjerke, he makes wide turns “[a]ll the time” in order “to avoid anything on the curb, or a door opening, going to the right.” And Bjerke acknowledged that he made wide right turns prior to being stopped by the deputy.

The district court determined that Bjerke’s “wide turn provided an independent reasonable articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of the car.” The district court also determined that Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) is not unconstitutionally vague because, although the statutory phrase ‘“as close as practicable’ is imprecise,” it is “not incomprehensible.” The district court, therefore, denied Bjerke’s motion to suppress, and sustained the revocation of his driver’s license.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

Minnesota Statute §169.19, subd. 1(a) provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. When necessary to accommodate vehicle configuration, a driver is permitted to make a right turn into the farthest lane of a roadway with two or more lanes in the same direction in order to make a U-turn at a reduced conflict intersection, if it is safe to do so."

* * *

"...in State v. Morse, the supreme court considered a challenge to a traffic stop that was made after a driver made a wide turn and subsequently drifted within a traffic lane. 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016). Although there was a question as to whether the driver in Morse violated a traffic law, the supreme court upheld the legality of the stop based on the totality of the circumstances, which included (1) the squad-car video supporting the officer’s assertion that the driver’s right turn was not as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway; (2) the squad-car video showing the driver’s vehicle drifting in its lane; (3) the fact that the events occurred close to 2:00 a.m. bar closing time; (4) the fact that the driver was leaving downtown, an area with bars; and (5) the officer’s training and experience.  Id. at 502-03.

Here, the district court found that Bjerke was stopped at approximately 10:45 p.m. “in an area of Mankato where there are many bars and heavy foot traffic.” The district court also found that the deputy “credibly testified” that he observed Bjerke’s vehicle stopped over the crosswalk such that the vehicle “was obstructing the crosswalk.” And the district court found that the deputy observed Bjerke’s vehicle make two wide right turns such that the “driver’s side tires went over the lane divider and into the oncoming lane of traffic.” Finally, the district court found that “there was no evidence the ‘vehicle configuration’ was such to make a wide right turn permissible.” The record supports the district court’s findings, including Bjerke’s admission that he made two wide right turns prior to being stopped, as well as the squad-car video that shows Bjerke make two wide right-hand turns. In fact, the squad-car video shows that when Bjerke made the second wide right-hand turn, his vehicle drifted considerably into the oncoming lane of traffic. The circumstances presented here are similar to the circumstances presented in Morse, in which the supreme court upheld the legality of the stop. See 878 N.W.2d at 502. Therefore, even if Bjerke’s wide right turns did not constitute a traffic violation, we conclude that, under Morse, the totality of the circumstances provided the deputy with the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Bjerke’s vehicle. And because the totality of the circumstances surrounding Bjerke’s driving conduct provided a reasonable basis to stop Bjerke’s vehicle, we need not address Bjerke’s contention that Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) is unconstitutionally vague."

Moral Of The Story: The Courts will not address the constitutionality of a statute if the matter can be resolved on other grounds.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Jones (Decided May 2, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that one should not pull into the parking lot of a closed business late at night.

In Jones, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and challenged the validity of the initial stop of her vehicle. The arresting officer testified that around 11:00 p.m., he was following a car traveling northbound on Highway 25 when the car turned left into the parking lot of a closed business. At the next opportunity, the trooper made a U-tum and parked along the right shoulder of southbound Highway 25 to observe the car. The trooper saw the car park in the front section of the dimly lit lot, which abutted the highway. After approximately 30 seconds, he saw the car drive further into the lot and move to a darker area between two buildings where the trooper lost sight of the car. About 30 seconds later, the trooper observed the car travel back to the front section of the lot, come to a complete stop, exit the lot, and reenter Highway 25, continuing northbound. The trooper initiated a traffic stop and arrested the car’s sole occupant, later identified as Jones, after detecting signs of intoxication.

The trooper testified that he considered Jones’s driving conduct to be suspicious. The trooper testified that he became suspicious because he knew the business was closed, the lot was not well-lit, and there were other lots along the highway with much better lighting. The trooper also testified that although he considered the driver might be custodial staff or have pulled over to look at a map, he no longer thought that was the case when he observed the vehicle travel from the dimly lit front area of the lot to a darker area of the lot hidden from his view. The trooper testified that he became particularly suspicious when the vehicle moved to the dark area of the lot out of his view because the trooper knew that buses were parked in that area, and he thought it was possible that someone could be vandalizing the building, stealing tires, or engaged in drug use. 

The district court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the MInnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, stating:

"For a stop to be supported by reasonable suspicion, there must be “specific, articulable facts” showing that the officer “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Id. at 842-43 (quotations omitted). The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.2008) (quotations omitted). This standard is satisfied when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). If a seizure is not supported by reasonable suspicion, however, all evidence obtained because of the seizure must be suppressed. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842."

***

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. Around 11:00 p.m., the trooper saw Jones drive into the front section of the lot of a closed business and, 30 seconds later, drive out of sight between two buildings. According to the trooper, there was no apparent reason for someone to enter the parking lot at that time of night because the business was closed. The trooper also concluded from his observations that Jones was not an employee because instead of entering the business, she proceeded to drive into the dimly lit area between the two buildings. The trooper articulated that he suspected Jones of vandalism, tire theft, or taking drugs when she drove from the front parking lot to the darker area of the parking lot specifically based on his knowledge that tire thefts had occurred at “dealership lots here,” and in his experience, “people do[] drugs ... in some empty lots.” Like the behaviors of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Jones’s conduct caused the trooper to form a reasonable belief that she could be engaged in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story: Don't stop at any business that is not open 24 hours!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.