Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

 The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Urratia, (Decided March 1, 2021, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that some appeals are just a big waste of time.

In Urratia, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of DWI. On appeal, he argued the district court committed reversible error when it failed to suppress the evidence of his crime as the arresting officer used excessive force in making the arrest.

In February 2019, a Beltrami County Deputy Sheriff was patrolling a rural area late at one night when he observed a car with a loud exhaust passing him in the opposite direction. The deputy turned his squad car around, intending to initiate a traffic stop. But the loud car stopped in the middle of the road, backed up, and pulled into a driveway. The deputy positioned his squad car in the driveway behind it.

The deputy began approaching on foot and the driver then suddenly left the car. The deputy—alone and surprised—drew his handgun and ordered the driver to the ground. He holstered his gun when he was satisfied that the driver, Jesse Urrutia, was unarmed.

During oral argument on appeal, "his counsel explained that Urrutia is challenging the level of force the sergeant used, but he does not assert that the deputy’s conduct constituted a de facto, unconstitutional arrest." 

(Why Not?)

The Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant's claim noting that the exclusionary rule applies to 4th Amendment violations not excessive force claims:

"As one federal court accurately put it, “[T]here has been no appellate decision holding that the exclusionary rule can serve as a remedy for excessive force collateral to a search or seizure.” United States v. Collins, 714 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 2013). Urrutia has cited no Minnesota or federal case holding that a seizure that is unconstitutionally excessive in force precipitates the suppression of evidence collected during the seizure and unrelated to the force. It is unlikely that such a case exists, since the exclusionary rule generally justifies suppression of evidence discovered or collected because of a Fourth Amendment violation, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619 (1974), not evidence that is collected with no causal relation to an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. We doubt that the sergeant’s conduct here was excessive under the circumstances of Urrutia’s suspicious behavior in the secluded driveway, but because the appeal would fail anyway, we need not consider the assertion."

I do not understand why appellate counsel did not raise the claim of an unconstitutional arrest.  In State v. Carver, 577 N.W.2d 245 (Minn.App. 1998) the Minnesota Court of Appeals held the Defendant was illegally arrested for DWI where he was ordered to the ground and handcuffed before the police developed probable cause.  

At least the Defendant in this case would have had an argument.

Moral Of The Story:  The exclusionary rule does not apply to everything.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Noel (Decided February 1, 2021, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you exercise too much right to counsel, they may hold it against you in a DWI Refusal trial.

In Noel, the Defendant was arrested for DWI in Minneapolis after driving the wrong way down a one-way street.  Mr. Noel was taken the the Minneapolis Chem test station and during the 15-minute observation period, the Defendant appeared to be trying to burp. Because forced burping may cause vomiting, which would delay the test, the police told Noel to stop.

The police officer next read Noel the breath-test advisory. Noel said he did not understand the part about speaking to an attorney, requiring the officer to re-read that portion of the advisory. Noel again indicated he did not understand. The officer then gave Noel a phone to contact an attorney. After speaking with an attorney for approximately 45 minutes, Noel told the officer that he would take the test.

The officer handed Noel the mouthpiece to begin the first of two required breath samples. He immediately noted that Noel “was not keeping [the] minimum flow rate” of air into the machine necessary to record a sample. The officer advised Noel “several times” that he needed to provide a “strong, steady breath.” But Noel failed to do so, and did not provide a sufficient sample by the end of the three-minute testing period. The officer determined Noel’s conduct amounted to test refusal.

At trial, the officer testified that Noel’s behavior during the testing process and several other factors led him to conclude that Noel refused the breath test. The other factors include the length of time Noel talked to an attorney,  his stated inability to understand the advisory “even after multiple readings,” and his attempts “to force himself to burp.” These factors also prompted the officer’s decision not to attempt a second test—even though he had the discretion to do so.

The Defendant was convicted of test refusal and on appeal, asserted that the District Court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that Noel consulted with counsel for 45 minutes.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, affirmed his conviction noting:

"Because at trial Noel only objected to one instance of the officer’s testimony regarding Noel consulting with an attorney—while leaving prior testimony on the point unchallenged—we must consider both whether the district court abused its discretion by permitting the challenged testimony and whether the district court committed plain error by permitting the unchallenged testimony."

"Noel asserts his choice to avail himself of the right to counsel cannot be held against him at trial, citing State v. Roberts, 208 N. W.2d 744 (Minn. 1973). But the right described in Roberts is derived from the Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination. See 208 N.W.2d at 746 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 n.37 (1966)); see generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-66, 86 S. Ct. at 1623 (discussing U.S. Const, amend V). The limited right to counsel following a DWI arrest does not fall under the umbrella of protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 835, 837 (citing Minn. Const, art I, § 6). Accordingly, “[c]hemical testing in a DWI proceeding, pursuant to the implied consent law, is not self-incrimination and does not trigger Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.” Busch v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. App. 2000)."

"Second, conduct that unreasonably delays or otherwise frustrates the testing process—even conduct involving the limited right to counsel—may constitute test refusal. See Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 658 (driver’s belligerent speech and behavior, during which she invoked her limited right to counsel, frustrated the testing process and amounted to test refusal); Busch, 614 N.W.2d at 259-60 (driver’s silence during reading of breath-test advisory and conduct constituted retraction of his request for counsel and test refusal). Thus, evidence of the manner in which a person exercised his limited right to counsel may be relevant to whether he frustrated the testing process to such an extent that he refused the test."

"That is the situation here. Noel’s conduct before and during the administration of the breath test are relevant to whether his conduct frustrated the testing process. The fact that he spoke to an attorney for 45 minutes is one of several circumstances that tended to show he sought to unreasonably delay or otherwise obstruct the testing process. He initially attempted to burp up stomach contents, which could delay the process; he made the officer re-read portions of the breath-test advisory; and he did not follow repeated instructions to provide sufficient airflow, causing the test to restart several times over the course of three minutes, and resulting in a deficient sample."

"In sum, this record persuades us that the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err by admitting the officer’s testimony that Noel spoke with an attorney for 45 minutes before the officer administered the breath test."

Moral Of The Story: When it comes to your rights, we don't have all day.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Nichols (Decided January 4, 2021, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that an inadmissible comment made by a state's witness will not usually lead to a reversal of the conviction. 

In Nichols, the Defendant was stopped by the police after receiving cell phone call from a citizen complaining about the Defendant's driving conduct. The Defendant was ultimately arrested for DWI and taken to the Yellow Medicine County Jail.

Nichols was read the breath-test advisory at the jail, which informed her that refusal to take a test is a crime and that if she wished to contact an attorney she would have the opportunity to do so. Nichols indicated that she wanted to contact an attorney and she was provided with a telephone and phone books, including phone directories with contact information for DWI attorneys in the area. Nichols was very argumentative for the first ten minutes and did not make any attempt to contact an attorney. She then stated that she had her own attorney and asked to search her purse for the attorney’s business card. The officers checked her purse for her but were unable to locate the business card. Nichols attempted to contact one attorney over the course of the next 35 minutes, but only reached an answering service. The officers then asked Nichols numerous times if she would consent to a test; she stated that she was not refusing to take a test but never consented to one. Nichols also repeatedly claimed that she was not driving that morning. After approximately 45 minutes, Nichols’s actions were deemed a refusal to consent to testing.

The State of Minnesota charged Nichols with one count of second-degree test refusal and gross misdemeanor DWI. The case was tried to a jury, and the jury found Nichols guilty on both counts.

On Appeal, Nichols argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to adequately prepare the officer to testily and that this misconduct requires reversal of her convictions and a new trial. She cites to two specific statements, the officer made that she asserts impermissibly referenced her prior criminal convictions and contacts with law enforcement. The first statement, which Nichols objected to at trial, relates to her “not being new to the system.” Nichols has two prior convictions for DWI-related offenses— one for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher and one for test refusal, which the state sought to admit into evidence. The district court initially reserved ruling on the issue but, during trial, determined that the evidence of Nichols’s prior convictions was inadmissible due to the “tremendous opportunity for prejudice” and comparatively little probative value.

The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction noting:

"For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, there are two harmless-error standards of review taken from State v. Caron. 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn 1974). The harmless- error test for “unusually serious” misconduct requires an analysis of whether the misconduct was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 105 (Minn 2011) (quotation omitted). An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “only if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. at 105-06 (quotation omitted). The harmless-error test for less serious misconduct requires an analysis of “whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” Id. at 105 (quotation omitted)."

"For allegations of prosecutorial misconduct that were not objected to during trial, we utilize a modified plain-error standard of review. Stale w Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn 2006). The defendant bears the burden of establishing an error that is plain, but upon doing so the burden shifts to the state to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id."

***

"The state concedes that the officer’s statement that Nichols was “not new to the system” was inadmissible testimony and we agree. As such, this could be construed as a failure on the part of the prosecution to adequately prepare the officer. Thus, we will next consider whether the inadmissible statement deprived her of a fair trial. In doing so we must determine “whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d at 105 (quotation omitted).  We conclude that it did not."

"The inadmissible statement that Nichols was “not new to the system” was brief, general, and the district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement. See State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 596 (Minn. 2009) (noting that references to appellant’s previous arrests were not unfairly prejudicial where the references were “fleeting” and “nonspecific”); see also State v. Budreau, 641 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Minn. 2002) (stating that there is a presumption that the jury follows the district court’s instructions). Moreover, the prosecutor did not emphasize or repeat the statement, which lessens the chance of unfair prejudice. State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d 837, 842-43 (Minn. 2009). Finally, the jury heard testimony about Nichols’s driving and subsequent conduct from S.M. and the three officers involved, and viewed the video that was recorded during the breath-test advisory process. This provided the jury with ample evidence on which to base its convictions. On this record, we conclude that the state satisfied its burden of demonstrating that it is not likely that the inadmissible statement played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict. Consequently, Nichols is not entitled to a new trial with regard to the first statement."

The second statement, which was not objected to at trial, relates to the officer's testimony that he had observed the Defendant drive her vehicle earlier in the day. The officer testified"

"We’re going into towards the casino and we saw a female driving a Honda SUV. She is sitting next to [defense counsel]. Her name is Olga Nichols and then we shortly after we were pulling into the casino, we had a driving complaint dispatched from Yellow Medicine County.

Q. All right. When you say that you saw Ms. Nichols driving, you’re referring to the individual sitting next to [defense counsel]?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. At the time you saw her, did anything at that time strike you as noteworthy or unusual or anything?

A. Not at that time. I mean there was a brief passing and we turned in and she was going west."

"Because defense counsel did not object to this testimony, Nichols bears the burden of establishing that it constitutes plain error that affected her substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. 'An error is plain if it was clear or obvious.' Id. (quotation omitted). Nichols argues that the statement suggests that the officer recognized her from prior contacts with law enforcement. But the officer did not testify that he recognized her from such contacts, he merely stated that he observed her driving earlier in the day on the date of the offense. This statement does not clearly or obviously refer to her prior contacts with law enforcement. And as the state points out, this was potentially relevant to rebut Nichols’s previous assertions that she was not driving on the date in question. Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the officer’s testimony that he saw Nichols driving on the date of the offense and conclude that neither of the two challenged statements deprived Nichols of her right to a fair trial."

 Moral Of The Story: A person is entitled to a fair trial; not a perfect one.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Berger (Decided December 14, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that field sobriety tests are not, in themselves, sufficient to justify a conviction for DWI.

In Berger, the Defendant was stopped by the police for leaving a public park after closing.  The officer spoke with Berger and noticed he had bloodshot eyes and smelled faintly of alcohol and marijuana.  A preliminary breath test of Mr. Berger revealed zero alcohol in his system.  The officer did not suspect Mr. Berger of being under the influence and he was released. The officer did arrest one of Berger's passengers as there was a warrant for the passenger's arrest.

When the officer arrived at the jail, Mr. Berger was already there to pick up the passenger after posting bond.  At that point, the officer was notified that Mr. Berger had a previous arrest in Iowa for possession of LSD and pills. The officer then decided to further investigate Mr. Berger.

The officer again talked to Mr. Berger and noticed his skin was flushed and his eyes appeared bloodshot and dilated.  The officer then administered three standard field sobriety tests: the modified Romberg test,  the walk-and-tum, and the one-leg stand. The officer also checked Berger’s pulse and pupil dilation.  After observing Berger’s performance on the field sobriety tests, the officer concluded that Berger failed each one and placed Berger under arrest.  A blood sample was then taken from Berger. The results of the test indicated the presence of THC, a controlled substance in Minnesota. 

Berger was charged with fourth-degree driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2018). Instead of proceeding to trial, Berger agreed to a stipulated-facts trial and was convicted of the offense.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, noting:

"When, as in this case, a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, this court conducts a two-step analysis to determine whether the evidence supports a guilty verdict. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, this court identifies the circumstances proved by viewing any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Then we determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with the verdict of guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion except that of guilt. Id. at 599. It is not enough that circumstances or inferences pointing to guilt are reasonable. Id. Guilt must be the only rational hypothesis this court can reach based on the proved circumstances. Id."

"Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and taking into account the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties, we conclude that the following circumstances were proved. Officer Beck conducted a stop when he saw Berger’s car leaving a closed park. Officer Beck did not observe any traffic violations or poor driving prior to stopping Berger. During the stop, Officer Beck observed that Berger had bloodshot eyes and smelled faintly of alcohol and marijuana. Officer Beck also administered a preliminary breath test, which resulted in an alcohol concentration of 0.00. Because Officer Beck did not believe Berger was under the influence at that time, he released Berger. Later, while talking to Berger at the jail, Officer Beck observed that Berger had flushed skin, bloodshot eyes, and dilated pupils. After administering the field sobriety tests, Officer Beck determined that Berger failed each one. Finally, Berger’s blood test confirmed the presence of THC on the day of his arrest."

"Moving to the second step in our analysis, we must determine whether the circumstances proved above are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis except guilt."

"In instances where courts have found sufficient evidence of driving while under the influence, stops were typically triggered by a vehicle collision or traffic violation, which demonstrated that the driver lacked that “clearness of intellect and control.”

***

"Erratic or aggressive driving has also often led to individuals being stopped on suspicion of driving while under the influence..."

***

"In sum, in cases where convictions for driving under the influence have been upheld, observable traffic violations or aggressive, poor driving generally preceded the stop and provided evidence that the driver was, indeed, driving under the influence."

"In contrast, in State v. Elmourabit, where the state relied primarily on outward manifestations of intoxication observed after the stop, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the proof fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 373 N.W.2d 290, 291 (Minn. 1985). In Elmourabit, the respondent was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id. The district court relied on evidence that the respondent had been speeding, smelled of alcohol when stopped by police, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, was difficult to understand, and became aggressive multiple times during his interaction with police to support its guilty verdict. Id. at 291. But the supreme court concluded that “[t]he inferences to be draw from this evidence, however, are in somewhat uneasy equilibrium,” and led the court to decide that this proof fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 293-94."

"Guided by this case law, we conclude that the circumstances proved here are inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of guilt. Silvemail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. Nothing in Officer Beck’s report suggests that Berger was driving poorly, violated any traffic laws, or acted out of the norm in any other substantive way."

"In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court’s decision in State v. Elmourabit is particularly instructive. 373 N.W.2d at 290. The circumstances in Berger’s case are less compelling than in Elmourabit. He was not stopped by Officer Beck because of poor driving, but because he was leaving a park at a time that it would normally be closed. Berger did not exhibit any aggressive behavior. Officer Beck did not suspect that Berger was under the influence during the stop and released him. Nor was Berger’s condition at the jail different from what Officer Beck had encountered shortly before when he decided to release Berger. Finally, although Berger was determined to have failed three of the field sobriety tests, we are mindful to avoid placing “too much significance” on field sobriety tests."

Moral Of The Story: If you have been released by the police, do not give them a second bite at the apple!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. French (Decided November 23, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the use of machine or computer generated data.

In French, the Defendant was arrested for DWI in Becker County, Minnesota and the police obtained a search warrant for his blood.  The results of the blood test revealed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine. 

Mr. French was subsequently charged with felony DWI.  The defense subsequently learned that, "D.Z.", the scientist who analyzed French's blood, had retired and was not available to testify at trial.  The defense then moved to exclude the results of D.Z.'s lab report as D.Z. was unavailable to testify.

The district court concluded that “the BCA lab report prepared by [D.Z.] is inadmissible unless [D.Z.] herself testifies at trial.” But the court “reserved ruling as to whether another BCA scientist may testify as an expert witness at trial".

Over French’s objection, the district court allowed BCA scientist J.S. testify that French’s blood had been tested for the presence of controlled substances, but that she was not the analyst who conducted the testing. Although D.Z.’s report was not admitted into evidence, J.S. testified that she independently reviewed the raw data in the file associated with French’s case and concluded that French’s blood sample showed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine.

The Defendant was convicted of Felony DWI and on appeal, he argued the admission of J.S.’s opinion testimony, that French’s blood tested positive for a controlled substance, violated his Confrontation-Clause rights because, “the BCA scientist who actually performed the test did not testify".

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's conviction noting:

"As the state points out, French does not address this court’s decision in State v. Ziegler, 855 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. App. 2014). In that case, the defendant was charged with criminal vehicular operation (CVO) and reckless driving. Ziegler, 855 N.W.2d at 552. In preparing for trial, a state trooper used computer software to extract data from the defendant’s vehicle, such as the vehicle’s speed and brake activation prior to the accident at issue. Id. The software generated a report containing the data from the defendant’s vehicle. Id. At trial, however, the prosecution called a different state trooper who provided accident-reconstruction testimony based on his review of the machine¬generated report. Id. at 552-53. The testifying trooper admitted that he was not present when the software extracted the data from the defendant’s vehicle, or when the report was generated. Id. at 553. He also admitted that he did not know whether the software was working properly when the vehicle data was extracted, or whether all proper procedures were followed. Id."

"A jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting the data collected from her vehicle through the testimony of a trooper who was not present when the data was collected. Id. at 554. This court disagreed, concluding that “machine-generated data that do not contain the statements of human witnesses are not testimonial statements within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 558. In reaching its decision, the court recognized that “Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, Caulfield, and Weaver do not determine the issue presented in this case because in those cases, the objectionable evidence was not limited to machine generated data; it included out-of-court statements made by people regarding the data.” Id. at 555. But the court stated that “several federal circuit courts have addressed the issue and concluded that such data are not testimonial statements within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. The court then referred to a Seventh Circuit Court case, which “noted that a chemist’s report admitted into evidence had ‘two kinds of information: the readings taken from the instruments, and the chemist’s conclusion that these readings mean that the tested substance was cocaine’ and that only ‘the latter is testimonial as the Supreme Court used that word in Crawford.’” Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361-62 (7th Cir. 2008)). The court also referenced a Fourth Circuit Court case, which concluded that “‘printed data’ generated from chromatograph machines operated by lab technicians were not ‘statements of the lab technicians who operated the machines’ and thus ‘not out- of-court statements made by declarants that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2007))."

"This case is akin to Ziegler. As in Ziegler, a machine generated the raw data related to French’s blood sample. Under Ziegler, the raw data is not testimonial. See id. at 558. Although the conclusions in D.Z.’s report are testimonial, the report was not admitted into evidence. Instead, J.S. testified regarding her independent review of the machine¬generated data. As in Ziegler, the admission of machine-generated data through J.S.’s testimony did not trigger French’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. See id. And as the court noted in Ziegler, any question regarding the foundation for J.S.’s opinion is not relevant to French’s Confrontation-Clause argument. See id. at 558 (stating that the defendant’s “concerns regarding the reliability of the data and the data-retrieval process are not resolved under the Confrontation Clause”). Accordingly, J.S.’s testimony about the presence of controlled substances in French’s blood did not violate French’s right to confrontation."

Moral Of The Story: Machine's don't lie. Only people do.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

 

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jante v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided November 16, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you will lose if your attorney does not raise the correct issue.

In Jante, a Douglas County Sheriff's deputy was on routine patrol when he saw a pickup truck stopped in a turn lane with its emergency lights on. The deputy stopped and approached the vehicle on the passenger side. Petitioner was standing outside of the vehicle next to the front passenger door. The door was open. At the Petitioner's feet were empty beer bottles and the truck’s ignition keys.

Seated in the backseat of the vehicle was a passenger.  Both the Petitioner and the backseat passenger claimed the other person was driving.  The Petitioner was arrested for DWI and his license was revoked.

The Petitioner filed a challenge to the license revocation challenging, "whether there was probable cause that the Petitioner was in physical control of the vehicle".   The Petitioner testified he was not the driver. The passenger also testified that she had lied to the police (because she was already on probation) and was in-fact the driver of the vehicle.

In addition, other witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf that they saw the Petitioner leave in his truck with the alleged passenger driving his vehicle.  

The district court sustained the revocation finding that the police had probable cause to believe the Petitioner was driving or in physical control of the motor vehicle.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, confining its analysis to whether there was "probable cause" to believe the Petitioner drove or was in physical control of the motor vehicle.

There are a number of cases [Eg. Liona v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 389 N.W.2d 210 (MN.App. 1986); Winder v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 392 N.W.2d 21 (MN.App. 1986); Rademacher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, _ N.W.2d _ (MN App. 2007, Unpublished)] which hold that when the Petitioner alleges (in his revocation petition )that he or she was not, in fact, the driver or operator or in physical control of the motor vehicle, the Commissioner then has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the  evidence, that Petitioner was, in fact, the driver.

In the present case, it appears the Petitioner only alleged the police did not have "probable cause" to believe he was in physical control, which is a much easier standard for the Commissioner to meet.

Moral Of The Story: If you have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, hire an experienced lawyer who will not snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

 The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is LaClair v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 27, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the police cannot enter the curtilage of a home in the early morning hours based upon a whim or idle curiosity.

In LaClair, a Lino Lakes police officer noticed a car, with its lights on, sitting in the driveway of a residence.  When the officer drove by the residence an hour later, the vehicle lights were still illuminated.  

The officer got out of his squad and walked up the driveway to the vehicle.  The officer walked up to the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed Mr. LaClair passed out in the driver's seat.

The officer walked over the the driver's side and opened the door without knocking.  Mr. LaClair woke up and admitted to drinking and driving.  LaClair was subsequently placed under arrest and his license was revoked.  

Mr. LaClair challenged the license revocation but the district court upheld the loss of his license.  On appeal, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court noting:

"Police must have a warrant to enter a constitutionally protected area, subject to limited exceptions. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10; Haase v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 679 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. App. 2004). “If police enter a constitutionally protected area without a warrant, that entry is presumed to be unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed” if no exception applies. Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 747."

"These protections extend to the “curtilage,” or the area adjacent to a home. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). The path to the front door, however, invites visitors to approach and knock, and an officer may use this implied license just as any other citizen. Id. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The relevant question is whether an officer’s behavior falls within the scope of the implied license that extends to any member of the public. See id. (“Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). The scope of an implied license is limited in time and purpose as determined by social norms. See State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 586-88 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that officer violated social norms by taking a circuitous route and by lingering too long). 

***

"A late-night approach does not fall within the purview of an implied license absent an emergency or some evidence that the homeowner accepts visitors during those hours. United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2016); People v. Frederick, 895 N.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Mich. 2017) (discussing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415); see also United States v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the time of day is a relevant circumstance when analyzing whether a consent to search is voluntary)."

"The record shows, and the commissioner concedes, that there was no sign of emergency when Officer Cree entered LaClair’s driveway or approached the residence. LaClair was not visible in his vehicle. Officer Cree did not testify that anyone else was present. He did not observe any indication of imminent danger to anyone. There is no evidence that the lights in the home were illuminated or of any other sign that the occupants of the home would welcome visitors during sleeping hours. And the circumstances observed by Officer Cree before his entry onto the property did not give rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Instead, Officer Cree testified that he entered the property only to alert the homeowner of the potential for a dead car battery, which the commissioner concedes is a non-emergency. These are not the circumstances where an ordinary citizen would approach a home in the middle of the night. Accordingly, Officer Cree entered a constitutionally protected area without a warrant or an implied license, and evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed."

Moral Of The Story:  Don't entice the police with shiny objects.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.