Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vos (Decided November 18, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition it is not a "seizure" if you are already stopped. Okay then.

In Vos, Officer Schleichert of the Lonsdale Police Department received a report of a suspicious vehicle parked on the side of the road at a rural intersection in Rice County. When he arrived at the location, Officer Schleichert pulled behind the parked car and activated his emergency lights.

The officer found Mr. Vos in the driver's seat and Vos was unresponsive.  After having Mr. Vos submit to field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest for DWI by the officer.

The Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that when the officer activated his emergency lights, he was illegally seized as the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to make the seizure.  The district court agreed and threw out the case but on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

[A] “Seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). Whether a seizure has occurred is analyzed from the objective perspective of the person alleged to have been seized. (“Under the Minnesota Constitution, a person has been seized if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was [not] free to . . . terminate the encounter.” (quotation omitted). 

(So far, so good.  But then the Court says:)

"Therefore, the question before us is whether the activation of the officer’s emergency lights transformed the interaction into a seizure."

"The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this very question in State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1993). There the court declined to hold that a police officer’s use of their emergency lights when parked behind an already stopped car is per se a seizure, and instead adopted a fact-specific approach. Id. at 220. The supreme court noted that “[i]t may be that in many fact situations the officer’s use of the flashing lights likely would signal to a reasonable person that the officer is attempting to seize the person for investigative purposes,” but declined to find so where “[i]t was dark out and the cars were on the shoulder of the highway far from any town.” Id. Under the circumstances of the encounter in Hanson, the supreme court determined that a reasonable person would know that the emergency lights were used to alert oncoming motorists to be careful due to the officer’s presence along the shoulder of a dark road at night. Id."

***

"While Vos urges this court to determine that in these circumstances a reasonable person in Vos’s shoes would not have felt free to leave, the supreme court already made that assessment to the contrary. It is not for us to second guess the Hanson court here."

ARRGH!

The problem with the Court of Appeals decision is twofold:

(1) In Hanson, the Defendant was stopped on the side of a HIGHWAY in Scott County, where officer and public safety would be a concern.  In this case, the Defendant was stopped on a rural road in the middle of nowhere. If there is no traffic to protect, what is a defendant supposed to think when the lights come on behind their vehicle?

(2) The standard to reverse the district court's factual findings is  "clearly erroneous".  And it does not appear that this district court was clearly erroneous in determining the Defendant felt "seized" at the time the emergency lights were activated. Or, as stated by the Supreme Court in Hanson, "It may be that in many fact situations the officer's use of the flashing lights likely would signal to a reasonable person that the officer is attempting to seize the person for investigative purposes. In this case, however, under all the facts, the officer's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person in these physical circumstances that the officer was attempting to seize the person. State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn. 1993).

Moral Of The Story:  Only in the Court of Appeals would a person feel free to leave when the police hit their emergency or "take-down" lights.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. McEachem (Decided November 12, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you have eight prior DWI's, you are not likely to catch a break from the courts.

In McEachem, the Defendant was arrested for First Degree (felony) DWI while still on probation for a previous felony DWI.  McEachem subsequently pled guilty to the First Degree charge and moved the district court for a downward dispositional sentencing departure claiming he was amenable to probation.

At the sentencing hearing, McEachem argued that, since his arrest nearly two years earlier, he had successfully completed treatment, maintained sobriety, obtained employment, and secured his own housing. The Defendant expressed remorse for his crime and reminded the court that he cooperated with the court throughout the case.  The district court declined to depart from the sentencing guidelines. It imposed a guidelines sentence of 62 months in prison.

On appeal, McEachem argued the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure.  But the Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, noting:

"Appellate courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A district court may depart from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines only in the presence of substantial and compelling circumstances. Id. at 308. To maintain proportionality and uniformity in sentencing, departing from the sentencing guidelines is discouraged. State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017)."

***

"When determining whether to grant a downward dispositional departure and place a defendant on probation, a district court’s primary focus should be on “the defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). There are a number of relevant factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Such factors include “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” 

"Appellant argues that he is amenable to probation and that the Trog factors weigh substantially in his favor. Appellant cites his successful completion of treatment, his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, cooperation, positive attitude in court, and support of his friends and family as reasons the court should depart from the guidelines and place him on probation and not in prison."

***

"While it need not have provided any further explanation for imposing a guidelines sentence, the district court noted appellant’s history of “using, relapsing and then driving.” The district court’s thoughtful and deliberate consideration of appellant’s departure request is reflected on the record. The district court accepted appellant’s arguments as having some merit, but also recognized that this was appellant’s “fourth felony DWI,” his eighth DWI in total, and that appellant’s “risk to public safety in [the] matter is just too significant for the court to grant [appellant’s] request for a downward dispositional departure."

"We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial and compelling reasons to depart do not exist, and that public safety would best be served by a guidelines sentence. The district court acted within its sentencing discretion."

Moral Of The Story:  Fool me once...

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Carstensen (Decided November 4, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that everyone is presumed to know the law unless you happen to be a police officer plying your trade on the streets of Minnesota.

In Carstensen, the Defendant was driving a vehicle with Iowa plates on July 2, 2018. The expiration date on the Iowa plates was June 2018.  A Beltrami County sheriff's deputy observed the vehicle and made a traffic stop, eventually arresting Mr. Carstensen for DWI.

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing the initial stop was illegal because Iowa’s registration-expiration statute provides, “[a] person shall not be considered to be driving a motor vehicle with an expired registration for a period of one month following the expiration date of the vehicle registration.”  And the Minnesota reciprocity statute provides that "a vehicle properly registered in Iowa will be treated as properly registered in Minnesota even if the Iowa requirements are different. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2018)".  The Defendant's motion to suppress was denied.

In State v. George, the Minnesota Supreme Court held "...that an officer’s mistaken belief as to Minnesota law cannot support an objective basis for an investigatory stop." So one would think that the Court of Appeals would have reversed the district court.  But no...

The Minnesota Court of Appeals instead affirmed the conviction, stating:

"We conclude that this case is distinguishable from George and Anderson. In George and Anderson, the circumstances that the officers observed could not have constituted violations of Minnesota law and were premised on the officers’ mistaken belief as to the meaning of a Minnesota statute. Here, Deputy Birt’s discovery of the registration with a June 2018 expiration could have been a violation of the general Minnesota statute. Only by way of the reciprocity statute was Carstensen’s registration valid. While the record is admittedly sparse, nothing indicates that Deputy Birt was mistaken as to the meaning of a Minnesota statute in this case."..."Because Deputy Birt was unaware that the Iowa vehicle registration was not expired for one month beyond the Minnesota requirements, it was not unreasonable for him to stop Carstensen’s vehicle for violating Minnesota Law".

Moral Of The Story: Ignorance is bliss!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Johnson (Decided October 28, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that police officers are very suspicious people.

In Johnson, the Defendant was stopped because his pickup had a non-functioning tail-light.  The deputy’s body camera recorded the events following the traffic stop. The deputy observed the Defendant exhibiting erratic behaviors and acting nervous. Specifically, the Defendant was making “weird movements” inside of his truck and looking away. The deputy characterized these nervous behaviors to be beyond those expected to occur during a routine traffic stop.

From a distance of less than five feet, the deputy saw that Defendant's pupils were abnormally constricted. The deputy directed his flashlight into the truck, but moved the light away from Defendant's face and confirmed Defendant's pupils were still constricted when the light was absent, suggesting to the deputy that Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.

After having the Defendant perform some field sobriety tests, the deputy placed Defendant under arrest and obtained a search warrant to obtain a sample of the Defendant's blood or urine.  The Defendant refused to submit to testing and was charged with DWI Refusal.

The Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the charge and suppress all of the evidence obtained after the initial stop. The Defendant argued that the officer illegally expanded the traffic stop into an investigation of DWI without sufficient cause to do so.

The District Court denied the Defendant's motions and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"...an officer may expand a traffic stop if the incremental intrusion is tied to and justified by “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires that the officer identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is satisfied when an officer observes conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” 

***

"The deputy observed that appellant exhibited signs of being under the influence of a controlled substance. Specifically, appellant exhibited erratic behaviors, acted very nervous, moved around his vehicle, did not make eye contact, and had abnormally constricted pupils. While nervousness alone is not sufficient to support the expansion of a stop, nervousness coupled with other “particularized and objective facts” may provide reasonable articulable suspicion. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). Moreover, signs of being under the influence of a controlled substance are considered and may provide a police officer with specific and articulable facts to support an expansion of the stop. See State v. Hegstrom, 543 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 1996) (considering “the observed symptoms of some type of intoxication, particularly the severely constricted pupils” as a factor in establishing probable cause to believe driver was under the influence of a controlled substance). Appellant’s nervousness coupled with his constricted pupils, a recognized sign of intoxication, formed a reasonable basis for the deputy to believe appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance, and justified his expansion of the scope of the traffic stop."

Moral Of The Story:  When you get stopped by someone with a gun, try to stay calm.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided October 21, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which, once again, stands for the proposition that if the Data Master Breath Testing machine prints a breath test result at or above the legal limit, the uncertainty of measurement inherent in said machine is not "relevant".

In Olson, the Petitioner was arrested for a Minnesota DWI and he tested at .16% BAC on the Data Master Breath testing machine.  Mr. Olson filed a challenge to the revocation of his license and notified the Commissioner of Public Safety that he intended to offer the testimony of a “breath testing expert” from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, who would “testify regarding the foundational reliability of the breath test result” and “the uncertainty of measurement values that apply to these breath test results.” The next day, the commissioner filed a motion in limine to exclude Olson’s evidence concerning uncertainty of measurement on the ground that the evidence is irrelevant.

The district court subsequently filed an order in which it granted the commissioner’s motion in limine and sustained the revocation of Olson’s driver’s license. The district court focused on the admissibility of Olson’s evidence concerning uncertainty of measurement. The district court stated that the terms “margin of error” and “uncertainty of measurement” describe the same concept and noted, “While a petitioner may challenge the actual administration of a breath test, a petitioner may not challenge the general reliability of the breath test, whether via margin of error, uncertainty of measurement, or another similar statistical method.”

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Evidence consisting of “the results of a breath test” is, as a matter of law, “admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath,” so long as the breath test was “performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument . . . pursuant to training given or approved by the commissioner of public safety or the commissioner’s acting agent.” Minn. Stat. § 634.16 (2018); see also In re Source Code, 816 N.W.2d at 528 n.3; State v. Norgaard, 899 N.W.2d 205, 207-08 (Minn App. 2017); State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Minn. App. 2012). “But section 634.16’s presumption of reliability may be challenged in a proceeding under section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b)(10), which specifically permits a driver to challenge the reliability and accuracy of his or her test results.” In re Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007); see also State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 n.4 (Minn. 2009)."

***

Olson "sought to prove that the breath-test results were not accurately evaluated on the ground that the DataMaster instrument’s measurements of the alcohol content of his breath samples was subject to a degree of uncertainty. Olson contends that his proffered evidence was relevant because it would have shed light on the 'actual true range' of the alcohol concentration of his breath samples."

The Court of Appeals rejected the proffered evidence as not "relevant" as there are a long line of cases which state that  “Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1982), does not require the Commissioner of Public Safety to prove an alcohol concentration of. 10 within an alleged margin for potential error.” Grund, 359 N.W.2d at 653. A later opinion explained the rationale for that statement:

Under Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1982), the Commissioner must revoke a person’s license when “the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of. 10 or more.” The statute clearly requires a concentration of. 10—not. 10 plus or minus an error factor. And, Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 6(3) (1982), expressly limits the issue to be raised at a hearing to whether “the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of .10 or more at the time of testing,” not whether or not the reading was . 10, coupled with some margin of error."

***

"In light of the above-described caselaw, as well as the fact that both of the Datamaster’s two measurements exceed the legal threshold, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reasoning that Olson’s proffered evidence was not relevant to the issue to be decided at the implied-consent hearing."

Moral Of The Story:  When it comes to breath testing, close enough is good enough.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Larson (Decided September 23, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a bicycle becomes a motor vehicle subject to the Minnesota DWI laws if it has a motor on it.

In Larson, the appellant argued that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor vehicle when riding his three-wheeled, motorized bicycle. The Court of Appeals rejected his contention noting that "Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2016). Section 169A.03, subd. 15 defines “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle that is self-propelled .... The term includes motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, but does not include a vehicle moved solely by human power.” The DWI definitions point to chapter 169 for the definition of a “vehicle”: “every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported . . . upon a highway.” Minn. Stat. § 169.011, sub. 92 (2016)."

"The relevant statutes are unambiguous and they are only subject to one reasonable interpretation. We therefore construe the words of the statutes according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Accordingly, chapters 169A and 169 provide that when a person under the influence of alcohol operates a device that can transport a person or property upon a highway and is self-propelled, that person commits a crime. But operation of a device that is moved solely by human power while under the influence does not result in a crime under the DWI statutes."

"The motor-vehicle definition provides two requirements for a motor vehicle: (1) self-propelling and (2) not moved solely by human power. Here, the bicycle’s motor, which allows the bicycle to travel up to 40 miles-per-hour, makes the bicycle self-propelling. The motor and gas tank are affixed to the bicycle, and a chain connects the motor to the rear wheel to propel it. Although the record does not support this, Larson argues that his motorized bicycle can also operate solely by being pedaled, without the motor running. Even taking this as true, Larson’s motorized bicycle meets the definition of “motor vehicle” because the motor makes it a self-propelling vehicle, and the bicycle is not solely moved by human power because it has a self-propelling motor."

***

"Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Larson’s motorized bicycle falls under the “motor vehicle” definition, and therefore sufficient evidence supports his conviction."

Moral of the Story: It doesn't matter if you have your motor running.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jensen v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided September 3, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that the advisory must be read before the Commissioner can conduct a pre-hearing license revocation pursuant to Minnesota Statute §171.177.

In Jensen, the arresting police officer obtained a search warrant to draw and test Pauline Jensen’s blood after she drove into and injured a child with her car and failed field sobriety tests. The blood test showed that Jensen’s alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory limit, and the commissioner of public safety revoked her license under Minnesota Statutes, section 171.177, subdivision 5.

Jensen petitioned for judicial review, arguing that her driver’s license should be reinstated because the sergeant had not warned her that test refusal is a crime, as required by Minnesota Statutes, section 171.177, subdivision 1 (2018).  The District Court sustained the license revocation but on Appeals, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"The statute requires that, “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant. . . , the person must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1. We recently concluded that the warning requirement is unambiguous, has no exceptions, and requires an officer to inform an individual of the criminal consequences of test refusal even when a warrant authorizes the blood draw. State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Minn. App. 2018), review granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 2018)."

***

"The procedures in section 171.177 largely mirror those stated in the implied-consent statutes, requiring a warning of criminal consequences at the time a test is directed or requested. Compare Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1, with Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2018). The statutes also detail the same procedure for review of a revocation. Compare Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subds. 10-12 (2012), with Minn. Stat. § 169A.53 (2018). The history of section 171.177 and its obvious relationship to the implied-consent statutes leads us to apply to section 171.177 the caselaw relied on to interpret the related implied-consent statutes."

"The supreme court’s decision in Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety is most instructive. 368 N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (Minn. 1985). Tyler compels us to hold that the deputy’s failure to provide the statutorily required warning precluded the district court from upholding Jensen’s revocation. Id. The Tyler court held that complying with the warning requirement was necessary before revoking a license under the implied-consent law: “[W]e believe that the legislature intended that a driver’s license be revoked pursuant to the implied consent law . . . only if the provisions of the law were complied with.” Id. at281 (emphasis added). And a license revocation cannot be sustained if the refusal-is-a-crime warning was not given. Id. Following this reasoning, we hold that a license can be revoked under section 171.177 only if the officer followed the warning requirement."

***

"It is true that, if Jensen had refused to submit to the test, the sergeant could have drawn and tested her blood anyway. But an officer’s authority to obtain a test despite the driver’s refusal does not eliminate his duty to give the warning “at the time a blood or urine test is directed.” Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 1. Nor does the authority render the warning irrelevant. As we have explained, the purpose of the warning is “to inform a driver of the serious consequences of refusal in an effort to compel the driver to take the test,” not to inform the driver that she has the option to refuse. Mike, 919 N.W.2d at 113. And a driver can commit the crime of test refusal even if she is ultimately forced to submit to a test. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), 171.177, subd. 13(a)-(b) (2018). Because refusing a test carries the same criminal consequences whether or not the state can force a test, and because the purpose of the warning is to inform drivers of the criminal consequences of refusal, the warning serves its purpose and is not irrelevant in these circumstances. The refusal-is-a-crime warning is required before the commissioner may secure a pre-hearing license revocation."

Moral Of The Story:  Police must warn you before your license can be revoked!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.