Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Mike (Decided August 27, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that even if the police disobey the law in obtaining a blood or urine test the test results will still not be suppressed in the criminal case.  This is a terrible decision and will lead to absurd results.

In State v. Mike, the Defendant was arrested for a Minnesota DWI and the police obtained a search warrant authorizing the collection of sample of his blood for chemical testing.  The arrested officer never informed Mr. Mike that refusal to submit to a warranted blood test was a crime.  The test result of the blood sample revealed an alcohol concentration level of .23%.

Mike moved to suppress the test result arguing that Minnesota Statute §171.77 requires a person be informed that refusal to submit to a warranted blood test is a crime.  The District Court agreed with the Defendant and suppressed the test.  But on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, stating:

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"Having concluded that compliance with the advisory requirement in section 171.177, subdivision 1, was necessary, we must next determine whether suppression of Mike’s test results is an appropriate remedy for noncompliance."

"The purpose of suppression is not to vindicate a defendant’s rights nor to affirm the integrity of the courts, but to deter police from engaging in illegal searches.” State v. Cook, 498 N. W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. 1993). “In other words, the risk of having seized evidence suppressed is intended to persuade police officers to follow the rules and to act lawfully when searching and seizing private property.” Id. The supreme court “[has] indicated in a number of cases . . . that [it] will not require suppression of all evidence seized in searches constituting, or resulting from, a violation of a statute.”

"...suppression based on a statutory violation is justified only if the violation subverts the purpose of the statute. We therefore consider the purpose of section 171.177, subdivision 1. Two cases inform our consideration. The first is Tyler v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985). In Tyler, the supreme court considered, in the context of a license-revocation proceeding, the appropriate remedy for the state’s failure to provide a standard implied-consent advisory before obtaining a driver’s consent to testing. 368 N.W.2d at 278, 280-81. The supreme court stated that “[i]t would be improper and unfair to revoke a driver’s license for refusing to take a test if an advisory were not given,” but that “failure to give an advisory should not make any difference in a case where the revocation is based on test results showing that the driver had an [illegal] blood alcohol concentration.” Id. at 280. The supreme court reasoned, “The advisory is not designed to persuade a driver not to take a test; rather it is aimed at letting a driver know the serious consequences of his refusal to take a test.”

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"Because the purpose of the advisory in section 171.177, subdivision 1, is to encourage submission to testing, and not refusal, that purpose is not subverted if a driver submits to a test without being read the advisory. And because the statutory purpose is not subverted in such circumstances, failure to provide the advisory does not justify suppression of ensuing test results. We therefore hold that failure to comply with the advisory requirement in Minnesota Statutes section 171.177, subdivision 1, does not justify suppression of the test results in a criminal prosecution for DWI.  The district court therefore erred by suppressing Mike’s blood-test results on the ground that the state failed to inform Mike that refusal to take a warranted blood test is a crime."

The Court of Appeals reasoning appears to be flawed for two reasons:

(1) The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.  The exclusionary rule is not limited to police search misconduct.  When the police disobey the law, by not informing an individual of the consequences of refusal, they have engaged in misconduct and the evidence should be suppressed.

(2) According to the logic of the Court of Appeals, anyone who is subjected to a warranted search of their blood and who is not advised of the consequences of refusal pursuant to § 171.77, should ALWAYS refuse to submit to testing as they could not be prosecuted for the refusal crime.

Moral Of The Story:  Just say no!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is State v. Yaeger (Decided August 20, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule only applies where the police are relying on established court precedent.

In Yaeger, the Defendant was stopped as one of the headlights on his vehicle was out.  The trooper noticed Yaeger's pupils were dilated "way above average" and asked Yaeger to submit to standardized field-sobriety tests, which he failed.  Yaeger admitted that he had taken Cymbalta, an antidepressant, about two hours before the traffic stop.  As the troopers were placing Yaeger under arrest, they told Yaeger that he was "not gonna get charged tonight."

Trooper Elzen read Yaeger the implied-consent advisory. Yaeger decided to consult with an attorney, but before speaking with an attorney asked the troopers, "So is it ultimately, is this, you guys are trying to get it into like a DWI?" Trooper Elzen replied that Yaeger had been arrested for "DWI, a controlled substance." Yaeger said that "the medication that I'm on[,] I was told I can drive on those medications." Trooper Bormann replied, "Yeah there's ... a prescription defense to that, however we don't know tonight how much you took, if you took other things." Yaeger then consulted an attorney and agreed to take a urine test. The urine test came back positive for alpha-hydroxyalprazolam, also known as Xanax, as well as Zolpidem.

On November 18, 2015, Yaeger was charged with one count of DWI—operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance. Yaeger moved to suppress "any evidence acquired as a result of the unlawful search . . . ." The district court held a hearing on Yaeger's motion to dismiss, at which he argued that he did not consent to the search, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, and that his due-process rights had been violated as a result of an incorrect implied-consent advisory.

Ruling from the bench, the district court "d[id] not find that consent was voluntary." The district court, "[considering the totality of the circumstances[,]" noted first that the implied-consent advisory read to Yaeger was not accurate. The district court stated that the incorrect advisory "is one thing that [it] can consider." In addition, the district court considered "other things that occurred," including that troopers told Yaeger he was not going to be charged that night, they were "just getting the test to see what comes back on the test, and . . . if there's things in there that are impairing, then you could get charged with a DWI." The district court stated that it was "inclined to look at that statement as one that's not supporting consent, that [Yaeger] [wa]s being told, more or less, that his acquiescence to the test [wa]s one thing that they'll consider in releasing him tonight and ultimately whether or not he's going to be charged." The district court then considered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court found that the troopers "acted appropriately" and that "[t]here isn't anything in the record that suggests that there was police misconduct." The district court also found that the implied-consent advisory was correct at the time it was read to Yaeger. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and that the urine-test results were admissible.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, correctly finding that:

"Here, the district court found that Yaeger did not voluntarily consent to the urine test. The district court's finding was not based solely on the inaccurate statement of law contained in the implied-consent advisory. The district court also considered the statements made by the troopers suggesting that"[Yaeger's] acquiescence to the test is one thing that they'll consider in releasing him tonight and ultimately whether or not he's going to be charged." The troopers also downplayed the consequences of taking the urine test. Additionally, Trooper Bormann mistakenly informed Yaeger that there was a "prescription defense" to DWI.1 The state does not argue that the district court erred by finding that Yaeger's consent was invalid. Accordingly, the district court's finding is presumed to be correct."

"Yaeger challenges the district court's application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The supreme court stated in Lindquist that "[t]he exclusionary rule does not apply . . . when law enforcement acts in good-faith, objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent."   869 N.W.2d at 864.   The supreme court reiterated that "deterrence of police misconduct" is the "central purpose of the exclusionary rule" and concluded that "applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent would have no deterrent value on police misconduct." Id. at 871."

"The district court erred by applying the good-faith exception. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply only if the incorrect advisory was the sole factor that rendered Yaeger's consent involuntary...Here, in addition to the incorrect advisory, the troopers told Yaeger that he would be released without being charged after he took the urine test, downplayed the consequences of the test, and misled him to believe that there was a prescription defense to DWI. The state cites no binding appellate precedent that authorizes such conduct.  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by reversing its direction and ultimately admitting the urine-test results under the good-faith exception."

Moral Of The Story:  In order for the police to act "in good faith" they must follow ALL of the rules!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Grey v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided August 6, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that a constitutional challenge to the application of the Minnesota Implied Consent Statute can be raised even though the statute limits the types of challenges that can be raised in the revocation hearing.  

In Grey, the Appellant was an out-of-towner from Iowa, who received a notice and order of revocation following a failed breath test at the sheriffs office. But in the midst of being transported to detox, the notice was left behind. A few days later, the notice and order of revocation was mailed to him. Gray requested an implied-consent hearing at which he contended that his license revocation should be rescinded because his due-process right was violated in light of not receiving the revocation notice and because of an ambiguity in the notice stemming from his driver's license being issued by Iowa, not Minnesota. The district court disagreed, determining that Gray properly received the notice, and due to his own conduct, left the document behind.  The district court also found that the Appellant could not raise a procedural due process challenge as it is not a challenge listed as permissible for hearing in a license revocation case.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on other grounds but it significantly found that:

"Individuals are entitled to seek administrative or judicial review after receiving a notice and order of revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 1-2 (2016). For a judicial-review hearing, also known as an implied-consent hearing, the statute explicitly limits the issues that can be addressed. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2016) (stating that the "scope of the hearing is limited to the issues" listed). Arguments concerning procedural due process are not among the listed issues."

"Whether an argument not listed in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b), can be raised at an implied-consent hearing was addressed in Axelberg, where the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with a petitioner who attempted to raise a necessity defense at an implied-consent hearing. 848 N.W.2d at 207-08. Through a statutory-interpretation analysis, the supreme court determined that because the necessity defense was not one of the delineated issues in the statute, the individual could not raise the defense.6 Id. at 208, 212. It reasoned that the language in the statute, "[t]he scope of the hearing is limited to the issues" listed, meant exactly that—the legislature limited the issues that can be raised. Id. at 208-09."

"Before us is a similar situation as that faced by the Axelberg court, but with a distinct difference. Here, as in Axelberg, Gray attempted to raise an issue outside the scope of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b), at the implied-consent hearing. But Gray's argument concerned his constitutional right to procedural due process, unlike the issue from Axelberg, which considered the common-law defense of necessity. 848 N.W.2d at 206 (noting that the defense of necessity is a common-law defense). We discern that this distinction—between a common-law affirmative defense and the constitutional right to due process—is significant, and conclude that Gray can raise a due-process argument at his implied-consent hearing."

"It is the critical nature of the constitutional right to due process, and its guarantee of fundamental fairness, that drives our determination. The importance of due process in judicial proceedings cannot be overstated, as it "is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom." Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1, 20, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1439-40 (1967) (describing due process as "the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise"). The hallmark of the procedural protections afforded by the due process clause is "fundamental fairness." Ford v. Wainwright, All U.S. 399, 424, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2609 (1986). And while difficult to define exactly what procedural due process requires, courts have explained that it is this "fundamental fairness" that must be ascertained for a given situation. Lassiter v. Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2158 (1981). And proper notice is engrained in the concept of due process. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S. Ct. 240, 243 (1957). Simply put, as Justice Marshall explained, "it is procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2715 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because of the importance of due process, it would be improper to determine that an individual cannot raise procedural due-process concerns at an implied-consent hearing."

"Furthermore, while the Minnesota Legislature may limit what arguments can be raised at an implied-consent hearing, it cannot legislate away constitutional rights."

Moral Of The Story:  The constitution trumps legislation every time!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI or are facing the DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and forfeiture questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Schwartz (Decided July 23, 2018, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that even a very minor traffic offense will justify the stop of a motor vehicle.  

In Schwartz, St. Cloud police officer Darin Vessel was on routine patrol in downtown St. Cloud. He observed a vehicle exit a parking ramp, followed the vehicle, and observed two suspected traffic violations. First, Officer Vossen observed the vehicle cross over the centerline during a right turn. Next, Officer Vossen observed the vehicle travel on the centerline. Officer Vossen stopped the vehicle and identified its driver as appellant Ashley Amy Schwartz. Based on his subsequent observations of Schwartz's appearance, Officer Vossen arrested her for DWI.

After the Defendant was convicted, she appealed arguing that the stop of her vehicle was illegal. Schwartz acknowledged that she violated traffic laws, but she argue dthat the violations did not justify the stop of her vehicle because they were "brief and minimal." She further argued that the violations "did not interrupt traffic or pose a risk to public safety." 

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, rejected her contention stating:

"These arguments are unavailing because 'no matter how insignificant the traffic law,' a violation provides the requisite particularized and objective basis for a traffic stop. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 823; see also State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 304,232 N.W.2d 906, 911 (1975) ("All that is required is that the stop not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity)." 

The Court of Appeals noted that her driving conduct violated Minnesota Statute § 169.18 ("Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway") and, therefore, affirmed her conviction.

Moral Of The Story: There is no such thing as being just a little bit pregnant.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Abduljabbar (Decided July 16, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you do not object to the foundation for the admission of a Minnesota DWI breath test result, you have waived the right to object on appeal. 

In Abduljabbar, the defendant was pulled over for having a loud muffler. After the officer who pulled over Abduljabbar smelled alcohol and noticed that Abduljabbar's eyes were watery and bloodshot, she arrested Abduljabbar and took him to the Osseo police department for breath testing. That test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.12.

A jury trial was held on and the state called one witness—the police officer who arrested Abduljabbar and performed the breath test. She testified that she was certified to operate the breath-test machine and that she knew how to recognize if the machine was not functioning properly. Although the officer testified that the machine was a "DataMaster transportable gas spectrometer with infrared option," she did not testify as to the specific model number, nor does that model number appear anywhere in the record. After describing how she went about operating the machine when testing Abduljabbar's breath, the officer testified, without objection, that machine measured a 0.12 alcohol concentration.

The Defendant was found guilty and on appeal, he argued that that the district court erred in admitting the results of the breath test without the state first (1) laying foundation that the machine used was one of the models approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety or (2) if it was not one of those models, laying foundation that the machine used provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in breath.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the Defendant's argument finding that any objection to the test result was waived at the trial.  The Appellate Court noted:

"Generally, when a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, the defendant forfeits review of that admission on appeal. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 276 (Minn. 2017). However, "the plain-error rule provides a limited power to correct certain errors that a defendant has forfeited." Id. at 277 (quotation omitted).

The plain-error rule requires a defendant to establish (1) an error, (2) that is plain in that it violates or contradicts case law or a rule, and (3) that the error affects the defendant's substantial rights. If all three requirements are met, we then determine whether relief is required to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings."

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"Although there is no on-the-record foundation that makes Abduljabbar's breath-test result admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 702 (or that exempts it from the rule's foundation requirement under Minn. Stat. § 634.16), this foundation is lacking because Abduljabbar did not object and force the state to lay it. Had Abduljabbar done so, the state could have asked the arresting officer what model of breath-test machine was used or else called an expert to testify as to the reliability of the device. Indeed, Abduljabbar is unable to cite any case where a Minnesota appellate court has, on plain-error review, reversed a conviction on the basis that otherwise admissible testimony was improperly admitted because the requisite foundation was not presented to the district court."

Moral Of The Story:  Only the squeaky wheel gets the grease!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Deno (Decided July 2, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that defense questions must be relevant to the issue of intoxication in order to be admissible.

In Deno, a police dispatcher sent Trooper Scott Barstad to a parking lot in Rochester on a report of a suspected impaired driver with a bloody face sitting in a pickup truck. The trooper found and stopped Jerry Deno's truck after he saw it exceed the speed limit and drift over the centerline. After the stop, the trooper saw that Deno's face was bloody and bruised. The trooper also saw signs of Deno's intoxication: Deno smelled of a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage; his eyes were bloodshot; and he slurred his speech. The trooper administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which supported his suspicion that Deno was impaired. Deno refused to perform any other field sobriety tests, including a preliminary breath test.

Trooper Barstad took Deno to the detention center and read him the implied-consent advisory. The trooper asked Deno at least three times if he would submit to a breath test, but Deno refused. The state charged Deno with second-degree gross-misdemeanor test refusal, third-degree gross-misdemeanor   driving   while   impaired,   and   open-bottle possession.

Deno's trial strategy was to argue that his visible facial wounds implied that he had suffered a head injury that caused him merely to appear to be impaired. The district court treated this as a valid defense theory but prohibited Deno from arguing "to th[e] jury that [the arresting trooper's] decision not to contact emergency medical care or seek out medical care somehow negates probable cause." During Deno's cross examination of Trooper Barstad, the district court sustained relevancy objections to the following questions: "[H]ow far would you say [the traffic stop] was from the closest hospital?" "Well, in any event, you did not take him to the hospital. Correct?" "Knowing now that [many of the circumstances that led you to believe Deno was impaired could have also been explained by his head injuries,] . . . if you had to do it again . . . ?"

The Defendant was convicted and on appeal argued that the district court denied him his constitutional right to present a defense to the test-refusal charge.  Deno argued that by prohibiting him from asking questions that sought to undermine the existence of probable cause (by casting doubt on the trooper's decision not to take Deno for medical treatment), the district court abused its discretion.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Deno's conviction stating:

"A defendant must exercise his right to present a complete defense within the bounds of the rules of evidence. State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 698 (Minn. 2001). Deno's challenged questions were irrelevant under the rules. "Evidence is relevant when it logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, or tends to make such a fact more or less probable, or affords a basis for or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact." State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 749 (Minn. 1997)."

"Questioning the trooper about the proximity to the nearest hospital would not elicit any evidence relevant to whether probable cause existed. The location of a hospital has no bearing on whether a reasonable officer would suspect that impaired driving was caused by alcohol consumption. Deno's other two challenged questions—"[I]f you had to do it again" and "You did not take him to the hospital"—likewise would not draw any testimony about whether probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. See id. The district court appropriately sustained the state's relevancy objections."

Moral Of The Story:  If you have had too much to drink, don't drive or get into a fight!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Meyer (Decided June 25, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if a Data Master breath test result appears to be reliable, it is incumbent upon the driver to show why the test is not trustworthy.

In Meyer, the Defendant was arrested for a DWI and he tested at .14% alcohol concentration on the Data Master Breath testing machine (DMT).  The case went to trial and the sole witness was the sheriff's deputy, who testified that he properly administered the DMT and that the DMT was working properly. The printed DMT result was admitted into evidence and published for the jury without objection. The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree DWI.

On Appeal, the Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence claiming that the DMT test was not reliable.  The Defendant, however, did not produce any evidence as to why the test was not reliable.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"The test result of a DMT, which is an 'approved breath-testing instrument,' is admissible without expert testimony that the result is trustworthy or reliable if the test is performed by a fully trained person. Minn. Stat. § 634.16 (2016)".

"The proponent of the test must show that "the necessary steps have been taken to ensure reliability," and thereafter, "it is incumbent on the driver to suggest a reason why the [breath] test was untrustworthy." State v. Nelson, 399 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. App. 1987).

In this case, the sheriff's deputy testified that he did not observe any malfunction or interference with the DMT machine, and appellant concedes that the DMT was functioning properly on November 9, 2015. The record also supports that the deputy was certified to operate the DMT as of September 15, 2015, and that he had training and field practice in operating a DMT. The deputy testified that he followed the procedure and protocol consistent with his DMT training in administering appellant's DMT test.

"To rebut the state's prima facie showing of admissibility and presumed reliability, appellant must show a reason why the DMT test result is untrustworthy. Nelson, 399 N.W.2d at 632. To do so requires more than '"speculation that something might have occurred to invalidate th[e] results."

"On this record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the DMT methodology, operation, and test result were accurate, valid, and reliable, and thus, for the jury to rely on the DMT result in reaching its verdict.   The record shows that appellant's DMT test result was 0.14 AC within two hours of driving.   Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the state proved that appellant was guilty of second-degree DWI beyond a reasonable doubt."

Moral Of The Story:  Saying something is true does not make it so.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI or are facing the DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and forfeiture questions.