Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota WI Case Of The Week is Reihs v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 20, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that an extension of a revocation or cancellation of a driver's license is not subject to judicial review. I always thought procedural due process required that any government action concerning the "property interest" of a driver's license is subject to judicial review, but live and learn, in this case, to one's detriment.

In Reihs, the Petitioner's license had been revoked due to a drunk driving arrest.  Reihs enrolled in the Minnesota's Ignition Interlock program which enabled him to regain driving privileges subject to the requirements laid out in the interlock-program guidelines. 

The interlock-program guidelines require participants to submit to two types of alcohol-detecting breath tests via a device installed in their vehicle: an initial test and rolling tests. The participant must pass the initial test to legally start their vehicle. The device then periodically requests rolling tests at intervals of five to 45 minutes while the vehicle is running. 

Reihs he failed to complete multiple rolling tests. Because of this, in July 2023, the commissioner sent him a warning letter stating that he had violated the interlock-program guidelines and that further violations would result in an extension of his program enrollment. In September, after Reihs again missed rolling tests, the commissioner informed him that his license-revocation period was extended for 180 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a). And when Reihs thereafter continued to miss rolling tests, the commissioner advised him that his revocation period was extended for an additional year. Both extension notices included language informing Reihs that he had “the right to judicial review” as “outlined in Minnesota Statutes, section 171.19.”

Reihs filed a challenge in district court to the extension of the license revocation period but the lower court held that it lacked "subject matter" jurisdiction because extension of a revocation is not one of the five challenges enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 171.19. 

In a published decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"Minn. Stat. § 171.19 provides, in pertinent part:

Any person whose driver’s license has been refused, revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified by the commissioner, except where the license is revoked or disqualified under section 169A. 52, 171.177, or 171.186, may file a petition for a hearing in the matter in the district court."

"First, Reihs asserts that extending a license-revocation period constitutes a 'revocation' under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 because there is “no material difference” between   a revocation and an extension of revocation. He suggests that an extension of a revocation period is, effectively, a 're-revocation.' We disagree."

The appellate court reviewed various definitions of revocation and found, "...'revocation' plainly means the initial act or instance of withdrawing a person’s driver’s license. Because an extension of a revocation period is not an initial instance of license withdrawal but a continuation of a withdrawal that has already occurred, it is a distinct and separate action from the revocation itself. Simply put, a revocation extension does not alter the license status of the revoked person. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of the term “revocation,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not include an extension of a driver’s license revocation issued pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a)."

"Second, Reihs argues that, if an extension of revocation is not a “revocation” under Minn. Stat. § 171.19, it is a “de facto refusal to restore [his] license.” This argument is no more convincing."

"Like “revocation,” the term “refusal” is not statutorily defined. See Minn. Stat. § 171.01. Dictionaries define it as “[t]he act or an instance of refusing,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1478, and “a denial or rejection of something demanded or offered,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 494. To “refuse” means to “indicate unwillingness to do, accept, give, or allow,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1478, and to “decline to take or accept (something offered or presented); to reject [an] offer,” 13 The Oxford English Dictionary 495."

"The ordinary meaning of the term “refusal” clearly contemplates an action taken in response to a preceding request, application, or demand. Indeed, “indicating] unwillingness” and “declining] to accept” are both affirmative, responsive actions. Similarly, both definitional phrases imply discretion on the part of the refuser. It follows that an extension of revocation issued due to a violation of the interlock-program guidelines cannot be a “refusal.” This is so because an extension does not arise from any sort of request or application and it does not depend on the exercise of the commissioner’s discretion. Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a) (stating “[i]f a program participant. . . violates the program guidelines . . ., the commissioner shall extend the person’s revocation period” (emphasis added)). We conclude that the plain meaning of the term “refusal,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 171.19, does not encompass an extension of a driver’s license revocation issued under Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 5(a). 

"A district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 to review the extension of a driver’s license-revocation period. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Reihs’s petition."

Moral Of The Story: Once you are in the program, the Courts are not going to help you get out of it.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Lorsung v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided December 30, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if an officer's suspicion of intoxication has been dispelled, he may not subsequently administer a preliminary breath test and the arrest of the petitioner is illegal.

In Lorsung, Officer Sonterre of the New Brighton police responded to a reported automobile collision in a bar parking lot. Officer Sonterre learned that Melissa Lorsung had been backing out of her parking spot when her car bumped an apparently intoxicated pedestrian. The officer also learned that Lorsung had been drinking inside the bar and had left the bar around closing time. Lorsung was smoking a cigarette when Officer Sonterre first approached her. He did not smell alcohol on her breath or observe any of the typical tell-tale signs of alcohol impairment, like bloodshot and watery eyes, unstable balance, or slurred speech.

Officer Sonterre directed Lorsung to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer Sonterre noticed no indication of impairment during the test.

Officer Paul Yang then spoke with Lorsung. Officer Yang, who waited with Lorsung and spent more time near her than Officer Sonterre, also did not observe bloodshot or watery eyes, slurred speech, or the odor of alcoholic beverages. Lorsung said, “[W]e’re free to leave, I guess.” He watched Lorsung move her car about three feet out of the way and into a parking spot, which he later said he would not have allowed had he believed she was impaired. Officer Yang told Lorsung that he didn’t want to keep her and asked if she had any questions before she left.

Officer Sonterre spoke with his supervising sergeant. Officer Sonterre told the sergeant that Lorsung was not drunk, and he agreed that it appeared that an impaired pedestrian had walked into the car of a sober driver. But the pedestrian and her family were still present, and Officer Sonterre said that he would administer another sobriety test before allowing Lorsung to leave, reasoning, “[S]o they can’t say I didn’t do my job.”

The preliminary breath test revealed an alcohol concentration level of .145 and Ms. Lorsung was placed under arrest.  A subsequent Data Master breath test revealed Ms. Lorsung was over the legal limit and her driver's license was subsequently revoked.

Ms. Lorsung challenged the revocation in district court arguing the officer lacked a "reasonable suspicion" to administer the preliminary breath test. The District Court upheld the revocation but on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court stating:

"[B]efore an officer may ask a driver to submit to a PBT, he must have a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver is impaired. Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (Supp. 2023); see Sarberv. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 819N.W.2d465 (Minn. App. 2012) (reversing an implied-consent license revocation where the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the investigation). Because the exclusionary rule requires the district court to suppress the results of a PBT administered without reasonable suspicion, see State v. Diede, 795 N. W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011), we must consider whether the district court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to ask Lorsung to perform the PBT."

"Our review leads us to disagree with the district court’s determination. We review “a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo” and “accept[] the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Kruse v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. App. 2018). Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis to suspect a driver of criminal activity considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn. 2004); State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). We understand that, after Officer Sonterre began his investigation, he had reason to suspect that Lorsung had been driving while impaired. He knew that she had been drinking and that she had backed into a pedestrian in the parking lot of a bar at closing time. Even with no other indicia of impairment, a reasonable officer would suspect—as the officer here initially suspected—that Lorsung was impaired. But Officer Sonterre did not ask Lorsung to perform a PBT when he first suspected her impairment. He used other means to test his suspicion. He looked for signs of impairment in her balance, in the condition of her eyes, and in her speech. He testified at the implied- consent hearing that none of his observations of those things supported the idea that she was impaired. He then directed Lorsung to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. And his observation of her performance on that test combined with the accident investigation and his ongoing observations of Lorsung led him to believe, contrary to his initial suspicion, that he had apparently encountered a case of a drunk pedestrian walking into the car of a sober driver. Corroborating Officer Sonterre’s belief, Officer Yang, who observed Lorsung the longest, also thought that she was not impaired."

"The commissioner emphasizes the circumstances preceding the officer’s no longer reasonably suspecting Lorsung’s impairment. But the totality of circumstances includes an officer’s consideration of new information that tends to dispel previous reasonable suspicion. This is because police intrusions after their reasonable suspicion has been dispelled are unconstitutional. State v. Pleas, 329 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. 1983); State v. Hickman, 491 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992). The commissioner does not identify, and the district court did not find, any indicia of Lorsung’s intoxication that any officer observed between the time of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the time Officer Sonterre reapproached to ask her to perform the PBT. We have no difficulty concluding that a reasonable officer in Officer Sonterre’s shoes would have reasonably suspected, just as the officers here reasonably suspected, that Lorsung was not impaired when Officer Sonterre asked her to perform the PBT. Because the information available to the officers in the developing investigation would have dispelled (and did dispel) their objective reasonable suspicion that Lorsung was impaired, Officer Sonterre lacked reasonable suspicion to request the test."

"We are also unpersuaded by the commissioner’s argument that Officer Sonterre’s decision not to dismiss Lorsung shows that his reasonable suspicion had not been dispelled. The argument glosses over three important facts. The first is that Officer Sonterre is trained to notice signs of intoxication. The second is that he was satisfied that Lorsung was not impaired. And the third and most important is that the reason he did not dismiss Lorsung before he requested the PBT was not because he suspected that she was impaired but because he sought to confirm his contrary suspicion for the sake of demonstrating a thorough review for the struck pedestrian and her family."

***

"Officer Sonterre ended his impaired-driving investigation after Lorsung successfully completed the nystagmus test, and his reason for asking for the PBT was not based on his reasonable suspicion of her impairment but instead on his reasoned suspicion of her nonimpairment. The officer had no basis to request a subsequent chemical test. We reverse the commissioner’s decision to revoke Lorsung’s driving privileges."

MORAL OF THE STORY: You can't be tested if you are above suspicion.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Payton (Decided November 18, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police will be believed without definitive proof to the contrary.

In Payton, the Defendant was arrested and charged with Third Degree DWI - Refusal to submit to testing. Mr. Peyton challenged the legality of the initial stop but the district court ruled that the stop was valid. On appeal, Mr. Peyton alleged the district court "clearly erred" when it ruled his vehicle crossed a white-dashed centerline without signaling, thereby giving the police officer reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle.   

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling stating:

"When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a pre-trial suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We 'will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)."

***

"Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he observed Payton swerve 6-12 inches over the white-dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet before recentering the vehicle in the appropriate lane. The officer indicated his belief that this conduct violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), which states, “When any roadway has been divided into two [lanes] ... a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” The officer testified that he “clear[ly]” observed the violation and indicated exactly when the violation occurred in the dash-camera video. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.  See State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555- 56 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). Based on this evidence, the district court found that Payton’s vehicle “swerve[d] and cross[ed] the dashed white line separating the two lanes without signaling.” We conclude that the evidence amply supports the district court’s finding that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling."

"Payton disagrees, arguing the district court clearly erred when it found he crossed the white-dashed centerline. Payton relies on his assertion that the dash-camera video does not support the officer’s testimony. But contrary to Payton’s argument, though dark and poor quality, the dash-camera video does not contradict the officer’s testimony. While the white-dashed centerline does not appear in the dash-camera video, the dash-camera video plainly captures Payton’s vehicle veering slightly to the right at the time the officer testified that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline. Although not dispositive, the dash-camera video bolsters the officer’s testimony that a traffic violation occurred."

"For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not clearly err when it found Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling and, thereby, violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). As such, the district court correctly determined the officer had the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting the traffic stop and, therefore, the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion."

Moral Of The Story: It's too bad that police cameras are far inferior to those used in viewing football. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Chrismen (Decided November 4, 2024, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the Court of Appeals will rarely reverse the lower court if it refused to grant a downward departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.

In Chrismen, the Defendant plea guilty to a felony DWI and was facing a 42-month presumptive prison sentence. The Defendant moved for a downward dispositional departure arguing he was particularly amenable to probation given his remorse and the positive steps he had taken since the offense occurred. Chrismen emphasized that the pre-sentence investigation report noted he “would be a good candidate for sobriety in the community” and that he had only two speeding tickets and no criminal offenses in over 20 years.

The state opposed Chrismen’s motion (of course), arguing that this was not Chrismen’s first felony DWI offense, Chrismen’s claimed participation in treatment was unverified, and there was no support for Chrismen’s assertion that he is amenable to probation.

The District Court, at sentencing, noted it had reviewed all the materials and acknowledged the struggles Chrismen has overcome, but noted concerns about the violent act towards the deputy and the possibility that similar violence could occur if Chrismen was intoxicated. The district court found that Chrismen was not particularly amenable to probation and sentenced him to serve the presumptive term of 42 months in prison with five years of conditional release.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"A mitigating factor that may provide a substantial and compelling reason for departure is a defendant’s particular amenability to probation. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2022); State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn 2006). Whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation depends on various factors, including the defendant’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the support of family and friends. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). But even if some of these factors exist, a district court need not grant a downward dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009). "

***

"We will only reverse a district court’s refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence in the 'rare' case. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)."

***

"The record demonstrates that the district court carefully considered the arguments both for and against a downward dispositional departure, as well as other information in the record like the presentence investigation report and materials that addressed Chrismen’s record on probation, motivation to change, and remorse. And while we recognize the positive steps Chrismen has taken since his DWI conviction, this is not the 'rare' case that requires us to reverse the district court’s decision to impose a presumptive sentence. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. The abuse-of-discretion standard gives the district court broad discretion in its sentencing decisions and we will 'not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination.' State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted)."

Moral Of The Story: If you don't win at the district court, the Court of Appeals is not going to help you.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Lang (Decided October 21, 2025, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police may expand a traffic stop to investigate a possible DWI if the police action is reasonably related to the circumstances arising from the stop. 

In Lang, the Defendant was stopped by the police for failing to signal a lane change. The officer who stopped the Defendant recognized her and knew that Ms. Lang had a history of drug-related criminal activity. The officer directed Lang out of her vehicle and then questioned her about where she was traveling and her plans for the day. While speaking with Lang, the officer observed her to have “excited” behavior, facial twitching, dilated pupils, and dry lips. Based on his training and experience, the officer recognized these as indicia of recent methamphetamine use. The officer questioned Lang about her drug use. Lang responded that she had not used methamphetamine since March 2022. She agreed to perform field sobriety tests, after which the officer informed Lang that he believed that she had used methamphetamine more recently. After she admitted to smoking methamphetamine four days earlier, the officer arrested Lang.

The State of Minnesota charged Lang with one count of fourth-degree DWI (body contains any amount of schedule I/II drugs) and one count of fourth-degree DWI (under the influence of a controlled substance), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2), (7). Lang moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the traffic stop arguing (among other things) the expansion of the stop was unlawful because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that Lang was driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. The District Court denied the defense motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"First, Lang argues that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by ordering her out of her vehicle without articulating safety concerns. We are not persuaded. An “officer may order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). This is so because such an additional intrusion is de minimis. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. Accordingly, the officer did not expand the traffic stop by asking Lang to step out of her vehicle."

"Second, Lang contends that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by asking her and her passenger “general investigative” questions and extended the duration of the stop by questioning her passenger. An officer expands the scope of a stop if they engage in investigative questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop and without reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding no reasonable suspicion to expand a traffic stop for speeding and a cracked windshield to include questions about drugs and weapons); Sargent, 968 N. W.2d at 40-42 (holding that questions about pretrial release conditions were questions about noncriminal activity unrelated to a traffic stop). But an officer may “ask the driver about [their] destination and the reason for the trip” during a routine traffic stop. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003). That is the situation here. Once the officer had ordered Lang out of the car, he proceeded to ask her questions about how she knew her passenger and where they were heading for the day. The officer then asked the passenger the same questions. We conclude that the officer’s initial questioning of Lang and her passenger falls within the scope of the “reason for the trip,” and did not expand the scope of the stop. Id."

"To the extent that Lang argues that the officer’s questioning of her passenger extended the duration of the stop, as we discuss below, the record demonstrates that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Lang was under the influence of methamphetamine before speaking to the passenger. In other words, the officer had a valid basis to continue to detain Lang during the passenger’s brief questioning. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (“Law enforcement may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains provided they act diligently and reasonably.” (quotation omitted))."

"Third, Lang argues that the officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by continuing to question her about drug use after returning her license and registration and by administering field sobriety tests. This argument is unavailing. The officer testified that he observed “possible signs of impairment” early on, while speaking with Lang about what she was doing for the day. He described Lang as exhibiting “excited” behavior, very dry lips, dilated pupils, and facial tremors. Based on his experience and training, the officer recognized these as signs of possible drug use. The district court expressly found this testimony reliable. One “objective indicator of intoxication” can constitute reasonable suspicion that a person is under the influence. Otto v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted). This record persuades us that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop by asking Lang about drug use and requesting field sobriety testing."

"In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings that Lang (1) violated a traffic statute by failing to signal when changing lanes, and (2) exhibited multiple indicia of controlled-substance use. Because the traffic stop was valid and the officer permissibly expanded it based on reasonable suspicion that Lang was impaired, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Lang’s suppression motion."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Sanchez (Decided October 14, 2024 Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that amenability to treatment is also a basis for the District to depart downward from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.

In Sanchez, the Defendant was found guilty by a jury of Felony DWI.The Defendant moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that she was particularly amenable to probation if she received chemical-dependency treatment.

A pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) noted that Sanchez has a lengthy criminal history, including four previous felony DWI convictions. Sanchez was also on probation when she committed the current offense. The PSI did not support a probationary sentence based on Sanchez’s continued use of drugs and alcohol and public-safety concerns. The probation agent recommended the presumptive 75-month prison sentence.

The district court granted Sanchez’s motion, finding that with Sanchez’s participation in DWI court comes a “high degree of monitoring” and “a higher probability” that Sanchez will successfully abstain from drugs and alcohol. Instead, the district court stayed the execution of the sentence for five years.

On appeal, the State argued the district court abused its discretion when it granted the dispositional departure. But the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court stating:

"A district court may depart from the presumptive sentence only when “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D. 1 (2022). This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant a motion for a dispositional departure for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). This court will rarely reverse the district court’s decision because of the district court’s considerable discretion in sentencing. Id. at 305, 307-08. We will affirm a district court’s decision “as long as the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a [sentencing] determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985)."

"I am going to grant the motion, because in this situation ... I don’t know about particular amenability. ... I don’t know that she’s going to be successful at treatment and stop, but I think there are substantial and compelling reasons and that one of those is she’s going to be monitored very, very, very, very, very closely from DWI Court and any kind of slip¬up, she’s probably going to be back in front of me for a probation violation."

"[T]hings will really be scrutinized if you come back with a probation violation, because you belong in prison, according to the guidelines. And you, just by yourself, are not a person that there should be a departure."

"But you with DWI Court provides a situation where you’ll have exceptional monitoring, potentially monitoring for a longer period than you would if you were in prison, because the probationary period will be for a full five years. And so there’s a much higher probability that you are going to be successful with probation, with the longer supervision and the accountability."

***

"The state argues that the district court should not have granted the departure because it did not find Sanchez particularly amenable to probation. But the district court noted that Sanchez would be very closely monitored and monitored longer than if she went to prison. See State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. App. 1994) (stating that district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing impact of shorter prison sentence with no guarantee of treatment against treatment program and longer, highly structured probation), rev. denied (Minn Apr. 21, 1994). The district court is afforded great discretion, and it carefully considered the sentence."

Moral Of The Story: If a person does not stop driving drunk, they will end up dead or in prison.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Smith (Decided September 30, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that in a DWI test-refusal case, the State does not have to prove that the officer requesting the breath test is properly certified to operate the testing equipment (i.e. the Data Master breath testing machine).

In Smith, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Ava Thadette Smith with one count of refusal to submit to a breath test, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1) (2020), for refusing to submit to an evidentiary breath test after Smith was lawfully arrested based on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

The deputy testified at trial that after placing Ms. Smith under arrest for DWI and bringing here to the Chisago County Jail, she informed Ms. Smith that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime by reading her the statutorily required breath-test advisory.  After providing Smith an opportunity to contact an attorney, the deputy asked her if she would take a breath test. Smith refused, stating that she did not believe the breath-test machine would be accurate.

The deputy testified about her training in DWI enforcement, including field sobriety testing and roadside DWI investigation. The deputy stated that she received “all the standard training for DWI.” But the deputy did not specifically testify that she was trained to administer breath tests, nor did the deputy say that she was trained to operate the breath¬testing machine.

The Defendant was convicted by the jury of DWI Test Refusal and on appeal, she argued that the evidence was insufficient because the state did not prove that the deputy who requested that she submit to a breath test was fully trained to administer the test per Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51 (2020) (the implied-consent statute).

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating:

"On appeal, Smith relies on subdivision 7(c) of the implied-consent statute, which provides that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(c). We are not persuaded that the state must prove a would-be test administrator’s training as an element of refusal to submit to a breath test."

"By its plain language, the training requirement in subdivision 7(c) governs a person who is “administering a breath test”—not a person requesting a breath test. That language makes clear that a breath-test administrator’s training comes into play only if a breath test is administered. Moreover, the rest of subdivision 7(c)—which limits liability for persons “drawing blood” at the direction of an officer—likewise applies only if a blood test occurs. Id. (providing that certain “qualified person[s] drawing blood at the request of a peace officer for the purpose of determining the concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating substance [are] in no manner liable in any civil or criminal action except for negligence in drawing the blood”). And when subdivision 7 is read as a whole, the other subparts govern circumstances in which a test takes place, not scenarios in which a test is requested and refused. See id., subd. 7(a) (defining who may draw blood), (b) (providing that “[t]he person tested has the right to have someone of the person’s own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any tests administered”). Thus, whether read in isolation or in the context of the statute as a whole, the plain language of the breath-test training requirement set forth in subdivision 7(c) controls how a test must be performed—and therefore applies only if a test is, in fact, administered. See Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d at 287; Robinson, 921 N.W.2d at 758. We are therefore unconvinced that this requirement is relevant if a breath test is refused."

***

"In sum, we hold that the requirement set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51, subdivision 7(c), that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety[,]” is not an element of the crime of refusal to submit to a breath test under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1). As a result, the state was not required to prove that the deputy who would have administered Smith’s test, if Smith had not refused that test, was properly trained in the administration of breath tests. Smith’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim therefore fails."

Moral Of The Story: Just say 'yes" to the test!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.