The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Paulson V. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 2, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that while a man's home is his castle, an open garage is not.
In Paulson, the police in Blue Earth County responded to a victim’s report of a hit- and-run collision involving Susan Mary Paulson. The victim followed a maroon vehicle to a garage at Paulson's residence and provided the police with a description of the vehicle and its license-plate number. Ms. Paulson sat in her car in her open garage for approximately two minutes before the police arrived. When Officer Reinbold arrived, he could clearly see her car and the inside of her garage from the street. Officer Reinbold approached the garage, stood near the back of Paulson's vehicle, began questioning her about the hit and run with the intent “to get the information for the other driver and facilitate that exchange between the two,” and stepped into the garage during the conversation that followed.
Ms. Paulson admitted to officer Reinbold that she hit another car and drove away. During the conversation, officer Reinbold smelled alcohol and noticed her slow reactions and slurred speech. Ms. Paulson had parked too close to the vehicle next to her and could not open her door, so the officers helped her exit her vehicle. Officer Reinbold administered a field sobriety test inside the garage, which she failed. Both officers then escorted appellant to a squad car, where she requested a preliminary breath test, which resulted in a 0.261 alcohol concentration. The officers took appellant to the police station and read her the Minnesota Breath Test Advisory. Ms. Paulson waived her right to speak with an attorney and agreed to take the test, which resulted in a 0.26 alcohol concentration.
Ms. Paulson challenged the revocation of her license and the criminal charges alleging that the evidence of her intoxication resulted from an unconstitutional warrantless search of her garage because (1) she did not leave the garage impliedly open to use by the public and (2) even assuming the police had an implied license to enter the garage, they violated its purpose, time, and spatial limitations.
The District Court sustained the license revocation and held the evidence admissible. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, noting:
"The United States and Minnesota constitutions prohibit police from entering constitutionally protected areas without a warrant, with limited exceptions. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const, art. I, § 10; In re Welfare ofB.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn. 2003). This constitutional protection extends to all places where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, including the home and its curtilage. See State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn. 2018); B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d at 572. Garages adjoining the home fall within the definition of curtilage... To justify a warrantless entry into a home or its curtilage, the state must show either consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances, without which we must suppress the fruits of the search."
"If curtilage is “impliedly open” for public use, then police may enter it if they have legitimate business reasons. Crea, 233 N.W.2d at 739. In determining whether curtilage is impliedly open, courts analyze (1) whether the curtilage invites members of the public to seek and establish contact with a resident and (2) whether an objectively reasonable person would use that curtilage to do so. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 n.2, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013); Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 586. Different areas of curtilage may meet these criteria based either on customary norms or the particular circumstances. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (noting that front-door knocker provides public with implied license to use front path to approach door and knock); Tracht v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 592 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999) (implying that open garage provided public with implicit license to enter to knock on door within garage that led to home)."
"Here, appellant sat in her car in an open garage. Relying on Jardines and Tracht, we see no distinction between establishing contact by using the curtilage to knock on a door and establishing contact by approaching an open garage with appellant sitting in plain sight."
"Appellant appears to argue that sitting in her garage for two minutes did not render it impliedly open because she did not have enough time to close it before the police arrived. As an initial matter, the district court made a credibility determination that appellant had enough time to close the garage door, to which we defer. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”)."
"Moreover, curtilage does not become impliedly open when a person “briefly opens a door to enter.” Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 745, 747 (describing police following defendant into momentarily open garage and preventing door from closing by triggering sensor). In Haase, the resident revoked any implied license to enter the open garage by attempting to close the door soon after entering. Id. By contrast, from the moment police arrived, appellant sat in her open garage without making an effort to close the door and revoke the implied license. As a result, an objectively reasonable person would have believed the garage was impliedly open and continued that conversation inside the garage."
Moral Of The Story: If it's privacy you want, shut the door.
