Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Nolden (Decided January 31, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that you are still "equipped" even if your bulbs are gone.

In Nolden, the defendant's jeep liberty was stopped by a Beltrami County Sheriff's deputy because the center brake light on the jeep did not illuminate when the vehicle's brakes were activated. When the deputy approached the Defendant's vehicle, he noticed that there wasn't a brake light cover over the center light cavity and he could see the wiring inside the cavity which appeared to have previously housed the brake light.

The Defendant was subsequently arrested for a DWI and he filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence arguing that the initial stop was illegal. 

Minnesota law requires that “[w]hen a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps or signal lamps, the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2020). The Defendant's argument was that his vehicle was not “equipped” with a center brake light pursuant to the “plain reading” of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) “because the entire [brake light] fixture was absent from the vehicle at the time in question.” In short, defendant argues, his “vehicle did not have a faulty or malfunctioning third brake light” because “it simply had no light at all.”

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"Although “equipped” is not defined in the statute or elsewhere, its dictionary definition is “[t]o supply with necessities such as tools or provisions.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 602 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 422 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “equip” to include “to furnish for service or action by appropriate provisioning”); see American Heritage, supra, at 712 (defining “furnish” and other synonyms of “equip” as “to provide with what is necessary for an activity or purpose” and providing examples of “furnished the team with new uniforms” and “equip a car with snow tires” ); see also Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 508 (providing “furnish” as a synonym for “equip” and defining it as “to provide with what is needed”). Therefore, based on these dictionary definitions of “equipped,” its plain meaning is to supply or provide the necessities for a particular purpose."

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"Appellant argues that “equipped” should be read to mean “if that component is presently attached to the vehicle,” such as a brake light, then that vehicle is “equipped” with that component. According to appellant, this definition is an “everyday life” and “natural use” of the word “equipped.” We disagree. This definition requires us to add the words to the statute. This we may not do."

"Accordingly, the deputy possessed a particularized and objective basis for suspecting appellant had committed a traffic violation based on his observation of appellant’s inoperable center brake light, thereby justifying the stop."

Moral Of The Story: It's lights out for the defendant!

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Brown (Decided January 24, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police are very suspicious people.

In Brown, the Defendant was driving in the early morning hours of May 6, 2019 when a Hennepin County Sheriff's Deputy noticed her vehicle pull in front of him. Ms. Brown turned immediately right at the next available opportunity in between a couple of buildings that appeared closed for the day. The deputy then observed the car turn left into an area behind a warehouse. The deputy knew that there were not many connecting streets behind the warehouse and there were no normal businesses open at that time of night. 

After seeing the car go behind the warehouse, the deputy turned right at the next available street and waited to see if the car would keep driving and reappear on the other side of the warehouse. When the car did not reappear, the deputy drove behind the warehouse and spotted the car there. The car was parked behind the warehouse “in an odd manner”—“in the middle of an open area by a loading dock and not lined up with anything else.” The warehouse was closed, and the area was dark; the deputy did not see any apparent “legitimate business needs” there. The deputy saw Brown sitting in the car and looking at her phone. At that point, the deputy activated his emergency lights and approached the car.

Things went downhill from there and ultimately Ms. Brown was arrested for a DWI.  She filed a Motion to Suppress all of the evidence asserting that the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to make the initial seizure of her vehicle.  The District Court denied the motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"We conclude that these circumstances provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the deputy to seize Brown for purposes of an investigatory stop. Brown’s behavior in driving off the main road, going behind a closed warehouse, and remaining parked there in the middle of the night, with no apparent legitimate purpose for being there, reasonably gave rise to the inference that she may have been involved in some sort of criminal activity."

"Two cases from this court shed light on this issue. In Thomeczek v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer observed the defendant parked in an empty lot after 11:00 p.m., with the car running and the headlights on, “in an area undergoing construction, where a burglary, vandalism or theft might occur.” 364 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. App. 1985). This court determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been involved in unlawful activity and that the stop was therefore legal. Id. Similarly, in Olmscheid v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer stopped the defendant, who was driving along a dead-end road at 1:30 a.m., behind a car dealership that had a history of property theft. 412 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. App. 1987)."

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. It was the middle of the night, and the deputy saw Brown drive behind a warehouse to an empty area where all lights were off and no businesses were open. The deputy did not start the traffic stop when Brown turned behind the warehouse but investigated further only after she did not reappear within a few minutes. Based on the time of night, the lack of any open businesses, and the unusual manner in which Brown was parked, the deputy had an objective basis to reasonably believe that Brown had no legitimate purpose for being there. Like the behavior of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Brown’s parking behind a closed business in the middle of the night reasonably caused the deputy to believe that she could be there to engage in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story:  If you want to stop to look at your phone, do it in front of a 24-hour shop.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Dodds (Decided January 18, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you never want to give the police a second chance to make a first impression!

In Dodds, a Carver County Sheriff's Deputy noticed an occupied vehicle in the Domino's parking lot in Waconia.  The deputy approached the vehicle and spoke with the occupants. The deputy checked Dodds’s registration and discovered that his driving privileges had been revoked. But because Dodds was in a nonmoving vehicle in a private parking lot, the deputy believed that no law had been broken.

An hour later, the deputy observed the same car roll through a stop sign. The car also crossed the center line by roughly two feet. The deputy pulled the car over and noticed the occupants attempt to conceal something within the car. After he identified Dodds (who had been driving) and his passenger, the deputy noted a strong odor of alcohol. The passenger appeared to be “extremely intoxicated” and during the conversation produced two open containers of alcohol. The deputy asked Dodds and the passenger to exit the vehicle and conducted a search for additional contraband. Dodds warned the deputy that there were approximately three grams of marijuana inside the vehicle, which the deputy eventually located. The deputy issued Dodds a citation for possession of marijuana, failure to provide insurance, and driving after revocation. The deputy then told Dodds he was released from the traffic stop and warned him to keep his voice down because they were in a residential area in the middle of the night.

The deputy returned to his squad car to take pictures of the open containers found in Dodds’s vehicle when Dodds started to yell to the deputy. The deputy again cautioned Dodds about yelling in the neighborhood. But Dodds continued to yell. The deputy reapproached Dodds and this time noticed that Dodds’s speech was slurred, his eyes were watery and glassy, and his breath smelled of alcohol, which the deputy had not noticed in the previous encounters that night. The deputy then administered field sobriety testing and eventually arrested Dodds for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI).

The state charged Dodds with felony test refusal and felony DWI.  Dodds filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop and to dismiss, in part, due to an impermissible expansion of the scope of the stop.

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Minn. 1992). But police may conduct “[a] limited investigative stop ... if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). The reasonable-suspicion standard is met when a deputy observes conduct that leads the deputy to reasonably conclude that “criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The standard is not high, but it requires more than an unparticularized hunch. Id. When determining whether a deputy reasonably suspected criminal activity, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson, 581N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998)."

"Here, while the deputy and Dodds had multiple contacts throughout the night, we narrowly focus on whether the deputy improperly seized Dodds when he re-approached him following the written citation. After Dodds got the deputy’s attention by yelling, the deputy re-approached and noticed that Dodds’s breath smelled of alcohol. The smell of alcohol is all that is required for reasonable suspicion to suspect that Dodds had been driving while intoxicated and to justify a seizure. See Hager v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a driver’s odor of alcohol provided reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired and a legal basis for a preliminary breath test)."

"In sum, because the deputy had reasonable suspicion to seize Dodds after smelling alcohol on his breath, the district court did not err when denying Dodds’s motion to suppress."

Moral Of The Story: Next time, take the ticket and run (quietly)!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.