Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Wilson (Decided August 7, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is virtually impossible to collaterally attack a prior license revocation being used to enhance the severity of the current charge.

In Wilson, the Defendant was charged with Third Degree DWI (i.e. two DWI's within 10 years).  The charge was enhanced to a third-degree offense because Wilson’s driver’s license had been revoked two months earlier based on a November 24, 2019 DWI-related traffic stop. Wilson did not seek judicial review of the prior revocation within the statutory 60-day period. After the judicial review period to contest the driver’s-license revocation had ended, Wilson successfully moved to suppress the evidence of impairment in the prior related criminal DWI proceeding.

In the present case, Wilson moved to exclude evidence of the license revocation from being used to enhance the DWI charge. She argued that the state could not use the revocation as an aggravating factor because the evidence of impairment had been suppressed in the criminal case related to the November 24 stop. The district court denied Wilson’s motion and, in a stipulated-facts trial, found Wilson guilty of third-degree DWI.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"Use of an unreviewed license revocation as an aggravating DWI factor does not violate a defendant’s due-process rights. State v. Coleman, 661 N.W.2d 296, 301 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). A challenge to the validity of the underlying revocation used as an aggravating factor is a collateral challenge to the revocation. Anderson v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 930 (Minn. App. 2016). A collateral challenge attacks the final outcome of another proceeding which is being used as an element of a charged offense. Davis v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 391-92 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994). Because collateral challenges weaken the finality of judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988); Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 930 (citing this aspect of Warren in the implied-consent context)."

"Wilson argues that hers is a unique case because she was indigent and unable to afford counsel to help her seek review of the driver’s-license revocation. Wilson additionally argues that, had she been able to afford counsel and sought judicial review of the driver’s-license revocation, her license revocation would have been rescinded because evidence of intoxication in the related criminal proceeding was suppressed. We are not persuaded that Wilson presents a unique case."

"First, parties in civil implied-consent proceedings do not have the right to court-appointed counsel. Thole, 831 N.W.2d at 22. Thus, Wilson’s indigency and lack of counsel do not present a unique case."

"Second... Because the proceedings for license revocation and DWI are separate such that issues decided in one proceeding are not precluded from being relitigated in the other, suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the DWI charges related to the November 24 stop do not indicate that revocation of Wilson’s license would have been rescinded, had she challenged it."

"Additionally, Wilson mistakenly relies on Anderson as support for her claim. There, we concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition for judicial review of a license revocation and the petitioner’s due-process rights were not violated because he had adequate notice of the revocation despite alleged mental incompetence. Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 927-28. In dicta, we also noted that arguments about the use of prior revocation as an enhancement “should be raised at the time a person is charged with a crime,” not in an implied-consent proceeding. Id. at 930 (quotation omitted). Like in Anderson, Wilson did not timely challenge her license revocation, and, as discussed, allowing a collateral challenge is not warranted in her case."

Makes you wonder what would constitute a "unique" case.

Moral Of The Story:  Lack of haste makes waste. 

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Yemane (Decided March 16, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a change in the law does not allow for a collateral attack upon a prior DWI conviction.

In Yemane, the Defendant was charged with a First Degree (felony) DWI because he managed to rack up 4 DWIs within a 10 year period. His attorney sought to challenge the use of his 2013 conviction to enhance the current offense to a felony arguing, the "2013 offense may not be used to enhance his present offense because, in March 2013, he was advised that refusal to submit to a blood test was a crime before submitting to the blood test on which his guilty plea was based and it was later determined that such refusals could not be prosecuted criminally without a warrant. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016); State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 2016)."

The district court overruled the challenge and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"...even though advising a defendant that refusing a warrantless blood test is a crime now precludes prosecution for driving with a particular alcohol concentration, “prosecution [may] still proceed for the general offense of driving while under the influence, based on other evidence of impairment.” State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. 2006). We agree with the district court’s conclusion that here, “there was ample other evidence to sustain a prosecution and conviction for driving while impaired under a different subdivision of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, even if the district court had suppressed the unconstitutional blood draw."

"Because collateral attacks of criminal convictions undermine the finality of judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988), quoted in Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 538 n.4. A change in the law following a conviction is not a unique case. There is no basis to reverse the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to exclude the March 2013 conviction."

Moral Of The Story: Be careful that your past does not come back to haunt you.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Redday (Decided December 23, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if a prosecutor is not careful, he can turn a Felony DWI into a misdemeanor.

In Redday, the Defendant was arrested for felony DWI and was charged with four counts of DWI in the First Degree.  Ms. Redday had a South Dakota felony DWI conviction from 1997 and she also had prior dwi convictions from 2013, 2011, 2008 and 2008.

Ms. Redday was charged in Counts I and II of the current complaint with a felony for being arrested for DWI with three priors within the past ten years.  She was also charged with felony DWI in Counts II and IV of the complaint because of her prior felony South Dakota DWI. (In Minnesota, once you have a felony DWI any further DWI will also be a felony, no matter how old the prior offense).

The Defendant stipulated to her prior offenses to keep them from the jury.  The prosecutor then decided to dismiss Counts I & III and proceeded to trial only on Counts II & IV.

The Defendant was convicted and prior to sentencing, the state notified the district court and Redday that the presentence investigator had questioned whether “Redday’s prior South Dakota felony conviction qualifies as a prior felony conviction.”

The Defendant was sentenced for Felony DWI and on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, noting:

"The complaint in this case alleged that counts one and three were felonies because Redday “committed the violation within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” The complaint alleged that counts two and four were felonies because Redday “was previously convicted of felony-level Driving While Under the Influence on or about October 29, 1997 in Roberts County, South Dakota.” However, the state points out that all four counts of the complaint reference Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1), as the charging statute, which provides for felony enhancement based on the existence of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents. The state asserts that those references determine the offenses of conviction. Specifically, the state argues that “nowhere in the charging instrument was [Redday] charged with a violation of [Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2)].” For the reasons that follow, we disagree."

"The purpose of a complaint is to “apprise the defendant of the charge for which [she] is being held and tried.” State v. Clark, 134 N.W.2d 857, 866-67 (Minn. 1965). “For each count, the indictment or complaint must cite the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law the defendant allegedly violated.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.02, subd. 3. Thus, in determining what charges the state has brought against a defendant, courts should rely upon the language of a complaint rather than the actual statutory citations contained in it. See State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 847 (Minn. 1999) (discussing indictment)."

"The description of the offenses charged in counts one and three of the complaint indicate that those charges were based on Redday’ s 2008,2011, and 2013 out-of-state DWI convictions. Counts one and three therefore set forth charges under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1), the felony-enhancement provision based on three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents within ten years. But the district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss counts one and three before trial, leaving counts two and four of the complaint for trial. The description of the offenses charged in counts two and four of the complaint indicate that those charges were based on Redday’s 1997 felony-level South Dakota DWI conviction. Counts two and four therefore set forth charges under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2), the felony-enhancement provision based on a prior felony DWI conviction. Indeed, the state admits that “[a]s demonstrated by the charging language under Counts II and IV, [it] had intended to cite to [Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2)].” Consistent with that admission, the district court stated that the two counts remaining for trial were “felony counts because of a prior felony conviction.”

***

"Redday does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, the underlying DWI statute. Instead, Redday argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she had previously been convicted of a felony DWI, as required under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2). Redday stipulated that she had a “conviction on October 29, 1997 for felony DWI” and to the district court’s receipt of a certified copy of her 1997 South Dakota conviction. But Redday asserts that her 1997 South Dakota conviction does not satisfy the requirement of Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2), because she “was convicted of [a] felony driving under the influence offense under a South Dakota statute, and not under section 169A.24.” See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2) (referring to a previous felony conviction “under this section” (emphasis added)). Redday also asserts that the conduct underlying her 1997 South Dakota DWI conviction would not constitute a felony DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2). The state does not challenge either of Redday’s assertions. Based on our review of the relevant statutes, we agree that Redday’s 1997 South Dakota conviction is not a felony DWI “under [Minn. Stat. § 169A.24].” See id."

Moral Of The Story: To use a prior felony to enhance a DWI, the felony must be a prior MINNESOTA felony as set forth in Minnesota Statute §169A.24.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Anderson (Decided June 17, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that the use of a prior implied consent license revocation to enhance the severity of the current DWI charge does not violate due process provided the prior implied consent license revocation is "final" prior to the conviction for the current offense.  This case just basically follows State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 2007).

In Anderson, the defendant was arrested for DWI on October 2, 2016 and on December 18, 2016.  Anderson filed a challenge to the October DWI license revocation but in April 2017, Anderson waived his right to further judicial review of the October license revocation.

On August 7, 2017. the state charged Anderson with 2nd Degree DWI Refusal using the October license revocation to enhance the charges stemming from his December 2016 arrest.

The Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss the 2nd degree charge arguing that at the time the December offense was committed, the challenge to the October license revocation was not "final" and the revocation could not be used to enhance the present charge.  The Court of Appeals rejected the argument stating"

"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee due process of law for criminal defendants. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const, art. I, § 7. Due process requires an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” State v. Krause, 817 N.W.2d 136, 145 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)) (other quotation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that when an administrative proceeding, such as a license revocation, plays a “critical role” in imposing a subsequent criminal sanction, “there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding.” United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (1987). Accordingly, some “means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense."

***

"In Wiltgen, the supreme court applied the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at 568-70 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903). After weighing the Mathews factors, the supreme court determined that the combined private interest and risk of an erroneous deprivation outweighed the government interest. Id. The supreme court held that the potential prejudice to the defendant “from the use of an unreviewed administrative revocation to enhance a subsequent DWI rises to the level of a violation of [the defendant’s] right to procedural due process.” Id. at 570."

"In footnote seven of Wiltgen, the supreme court considered whether the state was prejudiced by its ruling and determined that it was not. Id. at 572 n.7. The supreme court reasoned that, in future cases, the state “can delay the issuance of a second-degree DWI complaint until after the implied consent hearing has been conducted and the revocation has been sustained, or can charge third-degree DWI before the implied consent hearing and amend the complaint to add a second-degree DWI charge after the hearing."

***

"Like the defendant in Heino, Anderson filed, then waived review of, his petition for judicial review of his 2016 license revocation before the state served a complaint that asserted an aggravating factor for his 2016 DWI. Although Heino involved a defendant’s property interest, and Anderson’s due-process claim involves his liberty interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is slight for Anderson. See Heino, 762 N.W.2d at 264 (concluding that “the risk of erroneous deprivation in this case was minimal”). If Anderson had proceeded with judicial review of the 2016 license revocation and successfully obtained a rescission, then the state could not have used his revocation as an aggravating factor for his 2016 DWI."

Moral Of The Story:  If you can delay and delay and delay justice, you may be able to deny it!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

This week's featured Minnesota DWI/DUI case is (drum roll please):

State v. Omwega!!!
(Decided July 21, 2009)

There is good news and bad news in this case:

The Bad News:

The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled, in this published decision, that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not require the State to prove all of the underlying facts of an implied-consent license revocation beyond the existence of the revocation itself in order to use the revocation to enhance a charge of driving while impaired.

The Good News:

Citing State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 789 (Minn.App. 2002) , the Court in Omwega reaffirmed that the defense may collaterally attack the use of a prior revocation if the prior revocation was unconstitutionally obtained. As stated by the Court:

"To properly raise the constitutionality of a prior license revocation and shift the burden of proof to the state, an appellant must (1) promptly notify the state that [his] constitutional rights were violated during a prior license revocation; and (2) produce evidence in support of that contention with respect to each challenged [revocation]."

When the State seeks to use a prior conviction to enhance the current charge, it is well established that the prior conviction can be collaterally attacked. See, State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 at 904 (Minn. 1983)(a prior conviction cannot be used to enhance where the prior conviction was the product of an uncounseled guilty plea and there was no showing of a waiver of the right to counsel); State v. Stuart, 360 N.W.2d 463 (Minn.App. 1985)(a prior conviction cannot be used to enhance where there is no factual basis on the record to support the prior plea); State v. Brown, 346 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.App. 1984)(A prior conviction cannot be used to enhance where the defendant was not informed of the penalty for the prior offense).

It would make no sense whatsoever to hold that a prior conviction, where a Defendant has appeared in Court and answered the charge, is subject to collateral attack but a license revocation, which automatically occurs upon a test failure or test refusal, is immune from collateral challenge. In State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779 (Minn.App. 2002), the Court recognized that an implied consent license revocation is subject to collateral attack and it is good to see the Court of Appeals reaffirm the Mellet holding in THIS WEEK'S FEATURED MINNESOTA DWI CASE!!

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney, Minnesota DUI Lawyer, Minneapolis DWI Attorney, Minneapolis DUI Lawyer

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney