Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case If The Week is State v. Klatt (Decided September 8, 2025, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it doesn't take much to justify the expansion of a traffic stop.

In Klatt, the Defendant was stopped for driving a vehicle with an inoperable taillight.  The officer making the stop testified he had met Mr. Klatt on two previous occasions.  The officer testified that at their first meeting, Klatt’s “eyes were clear and his manners were calm, and [the deputy] did not observe any signs of impairment."

The officer testified that at their second meeting, he “observed a change in behavior from the first time that [he] saw [Klatt].” He testified that Klatt’s “eyes were bloodshot and watery” and that Klatt was “kind of in an excited state.” During the conversation, Klatt admitted that he uses alcohol and cannabis and “stated that he would not stop.”

The officer testified that during the taillight stop, he he did not immediately observe any alcohol containers or drug paraphernalia, did not detect the smell of alcohol or marijuana, and did not observe any visible smoke. But he testified that, upon speaking with Klatt, the deputy “immediately recognized that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and that his pupils were dilated.” The deputy explained that, in response to the light from his flashlight, Klatt’s pupils did not restrict and remained instead “more dilated than [he] would expect normally.” The deputy testified that he suspected Klatt was impaired based on his dilated pupils, his bloodshot and watery eyes, and his prior knowledge that Klatt used drugs and alcohol.

The deputy asked Klatt to step out of the vehicle and observed that Klatt’s “balance and coordination seemed fine.” Klatt submitted to field sobriety testing during which the deputy observed additional signs of impairment. The deputy placed Klatt under arrest and searched his vehicle. Inside Klatt’s vehicle, the deputy found several open alcohol containers.

Mr. Klatt was subsequently charged with underage drinking and driving and violating the open bottle law.  

The district court, however, suppressed all of the evidence, ruling that the officer unlawfully expanded the traffic stop into a driving while impaired (DWI) investigation because “the [deputy’s observation of [Klatt] with bloodshot and watery eyes, and dilated pupils, [was] insufficient to provide reasonable [articulable] suspicion of intoxication,” and that the deputy’s prior interactions with Klatt did not support such a suspicion.

The State appealed the District Court's ruling and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, noting:

"“An officer seeking to expand the duration or scope of the traffic stop beyond its original justification may only do so if he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion . . . [must be] tied to and justified by one of the following: (l)the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonable suspicion as defined by Terry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn 2004)."

*    *    *

"The state argues that the deputy justifiably expanded the traffic stop because Klatt’s dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes constituted two indicia of impairment, and two indicia of impairment are sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.  We agree."

"In Klamar, a trooper pulled behind a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the freeway. Id. at 690. After asking the driver to step out of the vehicle, the trooper “noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from [the driver] and that [the driver]’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.” Id. The trooper expanded the scope of the stop and conducted a DWI investigation. Id. The investigation indicated that the driver was intoxicated, and she was charged with DWI. Id. The district court determined that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the stop and dismissed the charge. Id. We reversed, concluding that “[t]he trooper’s observation of two indicia of intoxication specific to [the driver] reasonably justified further intrusions in the form of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing.” Id. at 696.

Here, as in Klamar, the deputy observed two indicia of impairment specific to Klatt: dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. But the district court noted that, although the deputy observed those two indicia, he observed “no others” and pointed out that the deputy did not observe Klatt slurring his speech or exhibiting an unsteady gait, and did not observe an odor of alcohol or marijuana. The district court concluded that, in the totality of the circumstances, the indicia that did indicate that Klatt was impaired were “rather weak” because “the majority of the circumstances . . . did not indicate [that Klatt] was impaired.” (Emphasis added.)"

"The district court’s analysis was incorrect. Reasonable suspicion does not require that an officer observe a driver exhibiting a majority of the known indicia of impairment. In this case, the deputy observed Klatt with dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. Consistent with our decision in Klamar, his observations provided an “independent basis” of suspicion that justified expansion of the traffic stop. Moreover, in the context of the more-demanding probable-cause standard, we have said that the absence of certain indicia does not invalidate or negate the existence of other indica. See, e.g.. State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding that driver “perform[ing] well” on field sobriety tests did not negate other indicia of impairment supporting probable cause), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); State v. Grohoski, 390 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that district court “improperly focused on the absence of other indicia of intoxication” because a “DWI suspect need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication in order to support a determination of probable cause”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986)."

"Because the deputy observed Klatt exhibiting two indicia of impairment, we conclude that the district court erred in determining that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion justifying the expansion of the traffic stop."

Moral Of The Story:  Where is Visine when you need it?

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Lang (Decided October 21, 2025, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police may expand a traffic stop to investigate a possible DWI if the police action is reasonably related to the circumstances arising from the stop. 

In Lang, the Defendant was stopped by the police for failing to signal a lane change. The officer who stopped the Defendant recognized her and knew that Ms. Lang had a history of drug-related criminal activity. The officer directed Lang out of her vehicle and then questioned her about where she was traveling and her plans for the day. While speaking with Lang, the officer observed her to have “excited” behavior, facial twitching, dilated pupils, and dry lips. Based on his training and experience, the officer recognized these as indicia of recent methamphetamine use. The officer questioned Lang about her drug use. Lang responded that she had not used methamphetamine since March 2022. She agreed to perform field sobriety tests, after which the officer informed Lang that he believed that she had used methamphetamine more recently. After she admitted to smoking methamphetamine four days earlier, the officer arrested Lang.

The State of Minnesota charged Lang with one count of fourth-degree DWI (body contains any amount of schedule I/II drugs) and one count of fourth-degree DWI (under the influence of a controlled substance), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2), (7). Lang moved to suppress all the evidence obtained from the traffic stop arguing (among other things) the expansion of the stop was unlawful because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that Lang was driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. The District Court denied the defense motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court stating:

"First, Lang argues that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by ordering her out of her vehicle without articulating safety concerns. We are not persuaded. An “officer may order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). This is so because such an additional intrusion is de minimis. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111. Accordingly, the officer did not expand the traffic stop by asking Lang to step out of her vehicle."

"Second, Lang contends that the officer expanded the scope of the stop by asking her and her passenger “general investigative” questions and extended the duration of the stop by questioning her passenger. An officer expands the scope of a stop if they engage in investigative questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop and without reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding no reasonable suspicion to expand a traffic stop for speeding and a cracked windshield to include questions about drugs and weapons); Sargent, 968 N. W.2d at 40-42 (holding that questions about pretrial release conditions were questions about noncriminal activity unrelated to a traffic stop). But an officer may “ask the driver about [their] destination and the reason for the trip” during a routine traffic stop. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003). That is the situation here. Once the officer had ordered Lang out of the car, he proceeded to ask her questions about how she knew her passenger and where they were heading for the day. The officer then asked the passenger the same questions. We conclude that the officer’s initial questioning of Lang and her passenger falls within the scope of the “reason for the trip,” and did not expand the scope of the stop. Id."

"To the extent that Lang argues that the officer’s questioning of her passenger extended the duration of the stop, as we discuss below, the record demonstrates that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Lang was under the influence of methamphetamine before speaking to the passenger. In other words, the officer had a valid basis to continue to detain Lang during the passenger’s brief questioning. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (“Law enforcement may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains provided they act diligently and reasonably.” (quotation omitted))."

"Third, Lang argues that the officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by continuing to question her about drug use after returning her license and registration and by administering field sobriety tests. This argument is unavailing. The officer testified that he observed “possible signs of impairment” early on, while speaking with Lang about what she was doing for the day. He described Lang as exhibiting “excited” behavior, very dry lips, dilated pupils, and facial tremors. Based on his experience and training, the officer recognized these as signs of possible drug use. The district court expressly found this testimony reliable. One “objective indicator of intoxication” can constitute reasonable suspicion that a person is under the influence. Otto v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted). This record persuades us that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop by asking Lang about drug use and requesting field sobriety testing."

"In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings that Lang (1) violated a traffic statute by failing to signal when changing lanes, and (2) exhibited multiple indicia of controlled-substance use. Because the traffic stop was valid and the officer permissibly expanded it based on reasonable suspicion that Lang was impaired, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Lang’s suppression motion."

Moral Of The Story: Loose lips sink ships.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Majors (Decided September 11, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a district court judge is not required to find that something is true just because a state trooper claims that it is true!

In Majors, the defendant was stopped late Saturday night by a state trooper for driving the wrong way on a one-way street in downtown Minneapolis.  When the trooper approached the vehicle, Ms. Majors explained that she was on her way to work nearby and turned onto Second Avenue, despite knowing it is a one-way, because her usual path to her parking location was blocked. 

The trooper requested her driver’s license and insurance card, which she provided “without delay or difficulty” while reiterating that she was on her way to work. He then asked, one minute into their interaction, “What time was your last drink?” She said it was at midnight and, upon further questioning, acknowledged having two drinks. The trooper directed her to get out of the vehicle for field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT), which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.15. He arrested Majors, and she was charged with two DWI offenses.

Majors moved to suppress evidence of her intoxication obtained after the trooper asked her about drinking, arguing that the inquiry impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. In support of the motion, Majors submitted the video recording from the trooper’s body-worn camera. During the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that he asked Majors about alcohol consumption because she turned the wrong way on a one-way street, there was an “overwhelming” odor of alcohol coming from the car, and Majors had bloodshot, watery eyes and “heavily slurred” speech. He explained that slurring meant running words together, slow speech, garbled words, or “drawing words out louder.” He also testified that the timing of the stop was “meaningful” because there tend to be more impaired drivers on the road at night and Saturday night is when “most people” go out drinking.

On cross-examination, the trooper acknowledged that the brief wrong-way driving was Majors’s only concerning driving conduct; he did not observe swerving, speeding, or other traffic violations. When asked to identify where, in the recording, Majors’s speech was heavily slurred, he pointed to several moments before and after he asked about alcohol consumption. He maintained that her speech was heavily slurred “[throughout the entire time” he interacted with her but agreed that he had no difficulty understanding her. He also acknowledged that Majors’s eyes did not look bloodshot in the recording. Regarding the accuracy of the recorded image, he testified that the body-worn camera captures “only a small snippet of what’s actually happening” because it does not capture his full field of vision. But he agreed that the recording captures what was directly in front of him, including Majors’s eyes. He also clarified that the fact Majors was driving shortly after midnight was “[n]ot at all” an indication of impairment.

The district court found that the trooper’s testimony that Majors had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech was not credible because the recording showed neither. And because he was not credible on those points, the district court declined to “rely on” his testimony about smelling an odor of alcohol. The district court also found that the time of day did not create reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, pointing to Majors’s work-related reason for being out at that time and the trooper’s testimony that, while Saturday is a common time for people to drink, he did not consider the timing suspicious or indicative of impairment in this case. After concluding that there is no credible evidence to support expansion of the traffic stop, the district court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges.

The State appealed the dismissal but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"In assessing credibility, a district court may weigh conflicting testimony and determine which witness to believe. State v. Kramer, 668 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). It may accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony. Id. And it may determine the weight of any corroborating evidence. See State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1987). When there is video evidence of a traffic stop, the district court may make factual findings from its independent review of the video, including discrediting contrary testimony from the officer who conducted the stop. State v. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Minn. App. 1999)."

"The district court found that the trooper was not credible in testifying that Majors’s eyes were bloodshot because the body-worn recording “did not support” the testimony. Review of the recording confirms that, during the one-minute interaction before the trooper asked about alcohol, Majors exhibited no redness in her eyes. Indeed, the trooper acknowledged in his testimony that her eyes do not appear red in the video. This evidence supports the district court’s credibility determination."

"The state ... faults the district court for not explaining its determination that the trooper was not credible, such as findings addressing his experience or his demeanor while testifying. But it identifies no authority requiring a district court to do so. To the contrary, a finding that testimony conflicts with video evidence is sufficient justification for discrediting the testimony. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d at 186.  Because the district court made such a finding here, and the body-worn recording supports it, the state has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by discrediting the trooper’s testimony regarding bloodshot eyes."

"The district court also discredited the trooper’s testimony that Majors had “heavily slurred” speech because the recording “did not support” the testimony. The court found that Majors spoke rapidly but “did not slur her speech.” Again, review of the recording supports the district court’s findings: During their one minute of contact before the trooper inquired about alcohol consumption, Majors spoke quickly but intelligibly and did not slur her words."

"The state argues that the district court should have credited the trooper’s testimony because he described Majors’s speech as heavily slurred and discerned slurred speech at several points in the recording. But the district court was not bound to accept the trooper’s description of the recording. See id. The state’s contention that the court should have deferred to the trooper’s training and experience is similarly unpersuasive. The trooper explained that his training and experience led him to look for a person running words together, using slow or garbled speech, or drawing words out louder. The recording reveals none of these indicators, just normal, if rapid, speech. And while courts defer to law- enforcement officers’ training and experience because it enables them to make inferences and deductions that may “elude an untrained person,” Mesenburg v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 969 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022), officers are not uniquely expert in assessing whether a person’s speech suggests impairment, see State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that an officer’s opinion as to impairment is not “expert” testimony). On this record, we discern no clear error by the district court in finding the trooper’s testimony that Majors had heavily slurred speech not credible."

"The district court acknowledged that, unlike with the other physical indicia the trooper described, the recording does not provide an independent basis for assessing whether Majors smelled of alcohol. But the court reasoned that, “given the [trooper’s] lack of credibility” in testifying that Majors had bloodshot eyes and “heavily slurred” speech, it would “not rely on any alleged odor of alcohol in making its ruling.”

"The state contends that this implicit credibility finding is clearly erroneous because the record contains evidence that corroborates his testimony about smelling alcohol—Majors’s admission that she drank alcohol recently, her poor performance on field sobriety tests, his comment at a later point in the recording that she smelled strongly of alcohol, and her 0.15 PBT result. This argument is unavailing. The district court was clearly aware of this evidence and its potential corroborative value, as its comments during the suppression hearing reflect. But the court was not required to accept the trooper’s testimony as to odor of alcohol, even with corroborating evidence, particularly in light of its supported finding that the trooper’s testimony regarding other physical indicia of impairment was not credible. See Harris, 405 N.W.2d at 229. Moreover, the district court disagreed that Majors’s performance on field sobriety tests provided corroboration, finding “little support” in the recording for a finding “that [she] was impaired.”

"Given the district court’s supported credibility determinations regarding other indicia of impairment, and its express consideration of potential corroborating evidence, the state has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by implicitly finding that the trooper was also not credible in testifying that Majors emitted an odor of alcohol."

Moral Of The Story: The Court is not bound to accept the testimony of someone "lying like a cop in court".

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Kapus (Decided March 23, 2020, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the "totality of the circumstances" govern whether testing with a preliminary breath test is warranted.

In Kapus, Minnesota State Trooper Samuel Catlin found Jeffrey Lee Kapus sitting in his car in the ditch on the wrong side of a county road in Morrison County. It was -15 degrees Fahrenheit and windy that night, but the road was “clear,” “dry,” and “not difficult to travel.” Catlin noticed that Kapus’s speech was slurred, his left eye was watery,  and he began “swaying” on his feet in a “circular motion” as soon as he stepped out of his car. Catlin also noticed that Kapus had several unusual responses to his situation: he was very “laid back” about his car being in the ditch, which in Catlin’s experience is contrary to the typical driver responses of being either “upset” or “apologetic,” and he gave a slow and seemingly untruthful answer to Catlin’s question about where he was coming from that night—answering that he had gone to purchase gasoline for his car. From these circumstances, Catlin formed the belief that Kapus had been driving while under the influence of alcohol.

Because of the extreme weather, Catlin did not ask Kapus to perform any field sobriety tests, but he did ask Kapus to take a preliminary breath test (PBT), making the request less than a minute after he first approached Kapus.  Kapus agreed to testing and blew a .194 on the PBT.

Kapus was subsequently charged with 3rd Degree DWI and he moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that there was insufficient evidence to justify the request for the preliminary breath test that formed the basis for the arrest. 

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, stating:

"...a law enforcement officer may seize a stopped driver and “request a PBT if the officer possesses ‘specific and articulable facts’ that form a basis to believe that a person has been driving a motor vehicle while impaired.” Vondrachek v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262, 268 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting Dep’t. of Pub. Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1981)), review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018)."

"“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate . . . that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, and law enforcement officers may draw inferences that are based on the totality of circumstances, including those “that might well elude an untrained person."

"Kapus argues that Trooper Catlin did not observe any odor of alcohol on him before asking him to take a PBT and that other circumstances were insufficient to suggest that he had been drinking and driving. We disagree. Caselaw mandates that we consider the totality of all circumstances suggestive of Kapus’s alcohol consumption. See, e.g., Costillo v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987)"

"Here, the particular circumstances supporting Catlin’s suspicion that Kapus was driving under the influence of alcohol include that he was involved in a one-car accident where he crossed over an oncoming traffic lane to drive into the ditch on the opposite side of the road when the roadway was clear and dry; he swayed in a circular pattern that was unrelated to the wind when he left his vehicle; his speech was slurred and his eye was watery; and he behaved abnormally when talking about the accident and gave a pretextual reason for driving late at night when the weather was very cold. In addition, Catlin noted that there were several bars in the immediate vicinity."

"These circumstances were sufficiently suspicious to provide Catlin proper grounds for asking Kapus to perform a PBT. While Kapus suggests that Catlin should have asked him to complete field sobriety tests before asking him to take a PBT, the extreme weather was not conducive to doing so, and Kapus, on his own initiative, demonstrated some of the physical conduct that could have been established through field sobriety testing. Because Trooper Catlin reasonably suspected Kapus of criminal activity, he could ask Kapus to take a PBT. See Vondrachek, 906 N.W.2d at 268. We conclude that the district court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence recovered by Catlin."

Moral Of The Story: It's the vibe of the thing that counts.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Johnson (Decided October 28, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that police officers are very suspicious people.

In Johnson, the Defendant was stopped because his pickup had a non-functioning tail-light.  The deputy’s body camera recorded the events following the traffic stop. The deputy observed the Defendant exhibiting erratic behaviors and acting nervous. Specifically, the Defendant was making “weird movements” inside of his truck and looking away. The deputy characterized these nervous behaviors to be beyond those expected to occur during a routine traffic stop.

From a distance of less than five feet, the deputy saw that Defendant's pupils were abnormally constricted. The deputy directed his flashlight into the truck, but moved the light away from Defendant's face and confirmed Defendant's pupils were still constricted when the light was absent, suggesting to the deputy that Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance.

After having the Defendant perform some field sobriety tests, the deputy placed Defendant under arrest and obtained a search warrant to obtain a sample of the Defendant's blood or urine.  The Defendant refused to submit to testing and was charged with DWI Refusal.

The Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the charge and suppress all of the evidence obtained after the initial stop. The Defendant argued that the officer illegally expanded the traffic stop into an investigation of DWI without sufficient cause to do so.

The District Court denied the Defendant's motions and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"...an officer may expand a traffic stop if the incremental intrusion is tied to and justified by “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires that the officer identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is satisfied when an officer observes conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” 

***

"The deputy observed that appellant exhibited signs of being under the influence of a controlled substance. Specifically, appellant exhibited erratic behaviors, acted very nervous, moved around his vehicle, did not make eye contact, and had abnormally constricted pupils. While nervousness alone is not sufficient to support the expansion of a stop, nervousness coupled with other “particularized and objective facts” may provide reasonable articulable suspicion. State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). Moreover, signs of being under the influence of a controlled substance are considered and may provide a police officer with specific and articulable facts to support an expansion of the stop. See State v. Hegstrom, 543 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 1996) (considering “the observed symptoms of some type of intoxication, particularly the severely constricted pupils” as a factor in establishing probable cause to believe driver was under the influence of a controlled substance). Appellant’s nervousness coupled with his constricted pupils, a recognized sign of intoxication, formed a reasonable basis for the deputy to believe appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance, and justified his expansion of the scope of the traffic stop."

Moral Of The Story:  When you get stopped by someone with a gun, try to stay calm.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Rusthoven which stands for the proposition that if you act like you have something to hide, you are going to get searched by the police.

In Rusthoven, the Defendant was stopped for speeding in Swift County, Minnesota. When Deputy Hoffman approached the Defendant's truck, he noticed Mr. Rusthoven was, "very fidgety and very agitated".  When Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven if he was under the influence of a controlled substance, Rusthoven became “even more agitated.”

The deputy returned to his squad car to look up Rusthoven’s driver’s license. The search revealed that Rusthoven’s license was restricted, requiring that, if any drugs were found in his system, his license would be invalidated. The deputy returned to speak with Rusthoven and observed that, "his arms were constantly moving, just back and forth, up and down. He would take his hat over [sic] very quickly and put it on very quickly and he was always, you know, it appeared that he was always digging around inside the vehicle or moving his arms inside the vehicle."

Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit the vehicle, but Rusthoven refused. This made the deputy “fairly nervous.” The deputy waited to take further action until a second deputy arrived.

When a second deputy arrived, Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit his vehicle again. After several requests from both deputies, Rusthoven did so. Deputy Hoffman performed a pat-down search for weapons and thought that he felt a methamphetamine pipe in Rusthoven’s front pocket. Deputy Hoffman told Rusthoven that he was under arrest.

A search warrant was obtained to get a sample of Rusthoven's blood. The blood tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mr. Rusthoven was charged with felony DWI and he moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing the deputy did not have a reason suspicion to expand the stop and conduct a pat-down for weapons.  The district court denied Rusthoven’s motions, finding that each expansion of the stop was justified.  

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"To be constitutional, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). The supreme court has summarized Terry as follows: “[E]ven in the absence of probable cause, the police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted); accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)."

***

"Based on the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. The deputy observed indicia of drug use and found that Rusthoven’s license was restricted from prior drug use. In addition, Rusthoven was unwilling to cooperate with the deputies’ requests to exit the vehicle. Based on those facts, combined with Rusthoven’s “erratic and agitated” movements, including “digging around inside the vehicle,” “moving his arms inside the vehicle,” and “fidgeting with everything,” the deputy reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. At that point, given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman possessed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous, justifying a pat-down frisk for weapons."

Moral Of The Story:  If you get fidgety, the cops will get frisky!


If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Fernandez, (Decided January 7, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it does not take much to allow the police to expand a traffic stop to investigate intoxication for a DWI arrest.

In Fernandez, Officer William Hullopeter stopped a vehicle when he discovered that the registered owner, a 48-year-old woman, had a cancelled driver’s license. As he exited his squad car and approached the vehicle, Officer Hullopeter observed that the driver, who was not a female, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and that his breath had a “strong minty odor” emanating from the gum he was chewing. Officer Hullopeter also observed “beer cans directly behind the driver’s seat,” and that the driver was wearing two paper wristbands that are the type commonly issued at events where alcohol is served. Officer Hullopeter identified the driver as appellant Christian Fernandez and asked him to perform several field sobriety tests, the results of which indicated impairment. The officer arrested Fernandez, transported him to the Blue Earth County Jail, and read him the Implied Consent Advisory. Fernandez agreed to provide a breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.10.

Fernandez moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that the stop was unlawfully expanded because Officer Hullopeter should not have further approached the driver as soon as he shined his spotlight into the vehicle and determined that the driver was not a female and therefore was not the registered owner of the vehicle with the canceled driver’s license. 

The district court found that “the officer’s suspicions about the identity of the driver were not dispelled until he exited the squad vehicle and approached [Fernandez’s] vehicle.” The court also found that when Officer Hullopeter “approached the vehicle and spoke with [Fernandez], he immediately” observed signs that Fernandez had been drinking, and that “these new observations were made at the same time that Hullopeter determined that the driver was not the registered owner.” 

The district court's findings of fact meant that the Defendant had no hope for winning on appeal. Or, as noted by the Appellate Court:

"Fernandez acknowledges that under Pike, the initial stop of the vehicle was valid because the vehicle was registered to an owner with an expired driver’s license. But Fernandez argues that because “Officer Hullopeter’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was based entirely upon his assumption that the registered owner... was the person driving the vehicle,” the reasonable suspicion justifying the stop was dispelled as soon as the officer “shined his squad spotlight on the car” and recognized that Fernandez was not a middle-aged woman. Fernandez argues that because Officer Hullopeter observed that the driver of the vehicle was not a middle-aged woman, his detention of Fernandez for the purpose of asking to see his driver’s license was unconstitutional."

***

"Officer Hullopeter’s suspicions that criminal activity was afoot were not dispelled until he “was in close proximity to the vehicle,” close enough to observe that the registered owner of the vehicle was not the driver, but also close enough to “immediately” observe that the driver had “bloodshot, watery eyes,” and “‘minty’ breath.” (Emphasis added.). Officer Hullopeter also observed “alcoholic beverage containers in plain view in the vehicle,” and that Fernandez was wearing wristbands of the type worn by “younger people at events or locations where alcohol is served.” These new observations occurred prior to Officer Hullopeter asking for Fernandez’s driver’s license and provided him with reasonable suspicion that Fernandez was driving under the influence of alcohok See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that an officer’s observation of the odor of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes justified the expansion of a traffic stop to investigate a suspicion of impaired driving)."

Moral Of The Story:  If you have been drinking do not drive someone else's car as they may not be as responsible as you.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Horn (Decided June 11, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police cannot ask for consent to search your vehicle if the search is unrelated to the traffic stop. 

In Horn, Minnesota State Patrol Sergeant Thostenson observed Mr. Horn driving an automobile and stopped him because he was not wearing a seatbelt. Sergeant Thostenson asked Horn for proof of insurance. Horn gave Sergeant Thostenson an expired insurance card and did not look for any other proof of insurance in his vehicle. Sergeant Thostenson thought this behavior was odd and testified that some people avoid opening areas where insurance cards are normally kept because they have contraband or weapons in those areas. Sergeant Thostenson observed that Horn avoided eye contact, appeared excessively nervous, talked very fast and was slow to respond to some questions. Sergeant Thostenson also smelled a faint odor of marijuana coming from Horn's vehicle.

Sergeant Thostenson returned to his squad car, printed a ticket for the seatbelt violation, returned to Horn's car, and asked Horn to step out of his vehicle. Sergeant Thostenson noticed that Horn's front teeth were discolored and decaying. He testified that such conditions indicated drug use. Sergeant Thostenson explained the seatbelt citation to Horn, handed Horn the ticket, and asked Horn if he had any questions before the sergeant let him go. Horn responded, "No." Sergeant Thostenson then asked Horn if he could take a quick look in Horn's vehicle. Horn agreed to the ensuing vehicle search.

During the search of Horn's vehicle, Sergeant Thostenson found a zippered container, which he recognized as the type of container commonly used for drugs and paraphernalia. He opened the container and found a pipe and methamphetamine inside. Horn admitted that he had used methamphetamine earlier that morning. Horn agreed to perform field sobriety tests and performed poorly on the tests. Sergeant Thostenson arrested Horn, obtained a search warrant to test his blood, and the blood sample was positive for methamphetamine.

Mr. Horn was charged with DWI and possession of a controlled substance.  The defense moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that Sergeant Thostenson's incremental intrusion of asking to search Horn's vehicle was unrelated to the purpose of the stop for failure to wear a seatbelt and that the circumstances did not otherwise justify the request to search the vehicle. Horn therefore argued that the evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed.

At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Thostenson admitted that after he handed Horn the seatbelt-violation ticket, Horn was free to go, but that he nonetheless asked to search Horn's car after he gave Horn the ticket.  

The district court denied Horn's motion to suppress, concluding that "the odor of marijuana along with the other factors was sufficient to justify" the trooper's request to search the vehicle.  On appeal, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court  noting:

"When a search is conducted pursuant to consent . . . , neither probable cause nor a warrant is required." State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Minn. 1999). However, a "suspect's consent, taken alone, is insufficient to permit expansion of a routine traffic stop; the police officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of further criminal activity in order to request to expand the stop.   State v. Volkman, 675 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. App. 2004)."

"Horn contends that any suspicions that might have justified the request to search his vehicle were dispelled prior to the request. He notes that Sergeant Thostenson "had completed the initial stop and immediately before asking to search the car, he had admittedly concluded that Horn was 'free to go.' Horn therefore argues that 'regardless of anything [Sergeant Thostenson] may have observed prior to handing [him] the ticket, when he asked to search the car, no reasonable suspicion remained.' Horn concludes that "because the search of [his] car was invalid, the fruits of the search and all related evidence must be suppressed."

The Minnesota Court of Appeals justifiably ruled in favor of the Defendant, stating:

"We would have a difficult time concluding that Sergeant Thostenson articulated constitutionally adequate support for his request to search Horn's vehicle given his testimony that Horn was free to go before the request. Sergeant Thostenson's agreement that Horn was no longer seized when he asked to search Horn's vehicle significantly undercuts the state's argument that the trooper articulated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the request to search. In our view, this record does not support a conclusion that Sergeant Thostenson articulated reasonable suspicion justifying his request to search Horn's vehicle. We therefore hold that the search was unconstitutional and reverse the district court's order denying Horn's motion to suppress."

Moral Of The Story:  Never, ever, ever consent to a search! Ever!!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Torfin v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided November 20, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it does not take much for the police to turn a speeding ticket into a DWI Arrest. 

In Torfin, the Petitioner accelerated quickly from a stop sign and was subsequently stopped by a Victoria Minnesota Police officer after the officer clocked the Petitioner going 57 mph in a 45 miles per hour zone.  After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the car and asked the Petitioner for his license and insurance.  The Petitioner was cooperative throughout the process. 

The officer could smell the odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. The Petitioner "admitted to having a couple of beers." Petitioner  looked straight ahead and did not maintain eye contact with the officer as the two conversed. The officer moved closer to the car and "took a . . . deep breath from inside the vehicle and detected ... the odor of consumed alcohol." Petitioner again admitted to consuming alcohol before driving that night, and refused to take a preliminary breath test because he did not want to "find himself in trouble."

The officer had Petitioner step from the car to perform four field sobriety tests. Appellant's performance on the tests suggested impairment. The officer then arrested appellant for driving while impaired. A later breath test, not challenged on appeal, revealed excessive alcohol in appellant's system, and his driving privileges were revoked.

The Petitioner filed a challenge to the license revocation arguing that the officer did not have a sufficient basis to expand the stop from the speeding ticket to the performance of field sobriety tests.  The District disagreed and upheld the license revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the district court noting:

"A traffic stop initially supported by reasonable suspicion may be expanded, so long as the expansion is "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible." State v. Asherooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted). Justification comes from "(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry v. Ohio." State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (discussing the scope of a traffic stop under Minn. Const, art. I, § 10). Reasonable suspicion for the expanded stop must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion."

"Minnesota courts have articulated several bases on which an officer may permissibly expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate a driver's possible intoxication. Some indicators of intoxication include the odor of alcohol, slurred speech, glassy eyes, and poor balance."

"We apply the rule of law identified in State v. Wiegand to the evidence here, that is:

"the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to limit the scope of a Terry investigation to that which occasioned the stop, . . . and to the investigation of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense."

"Here, the officer initially stopped appellant's car for speeding but, given the hour and the driver's aggressive acceleration, the officer suspected from the outset that this might be a drunk driver. Upon approaching the car, the officer could smell consumed alcohol, appellant admitted to drinking alcohol before driving, and appellant stared straight ahead while the two talked. The officer expanded the stop to determine whether the driver was impaired only after having developed a reasonable suspicion of impairment. The officer expanded the stop based on a number of factors including driving conduct, odor of alcohol, admitted consumption of alcohol, and appellant's somewhat unusual behavior in avoiding eye contact. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence in the record supports the district court's determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of impaired driving when he expanded the traffic stop to include field sobriety tests."

MORAL OF THE STORY: If you are going to drink and drive you should abide by the remaning traffic laws!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Meeks (Decided September 4, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you are going to drive while high on drugs, it is probably not a good idea to be carrying your stash of methamphetamine and heroin in your vehicle.

In Meeks, the Defendant was stopped after driving his vehicle at varying speeds, crossing the center and fog lines, and tapping his brakes. The police officer initiated the stop after he radioed dispatch to notify the Beltrami County Sheriff's Office and the Minnesota State Patrol.

Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a strong odor of air freshener coming from the vehicle and suspected that it might be masking the smell of drugs or alcohol. The officer also observed multiple toggle switches and testified that from his training and experience he knows toggle switches are sometimes used to access hidden compartments used for drug trafficking.

The deputy had Meeks perform a field sobriety test twice, which Meeks failed both times in a manner indicating that Meeks might be under the influence of a controlled substance. While the deputy was performing the field sobriety tests, a Minnesota state trooper and another Beltrami County sheriff's deputy with a K-9 unit also responded to the stop. The deputy who had performed the field sobriety tests then instructed the K-9 unit to conduct a sniff of Meek's vehicle.

While Meeks was performing further field sobriety tests under direction of the trooper, the K-9 alerted to the presence of controlled substances behind the driver's door. Based on Meeks' driving, confused appearance, and failure to successfully perform field sobriety tests, Meeks was arrested.

After Meeks was arrested, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and searched the vehicle, finding approximately 50 grams of methamphetamine and 4 grams of heroin behind the driver's seat. Meeks was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance and third-degree test refusal. The test refusal charge was later dismissed.

Meeks moved for all evidence gathered at the stop to be suppressed. The district court denied his motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Meeks does not dispute that the police officer had reasonable suspicion for stopping his car when he observed Meeks' vehicle varying its speed, crossing the center and fog lines, and tapping its brakes. Meeks contends that the officers should have taken him at his word that he was having issues with his GPS and did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety testing."

"First, it must be noted that "[t]he fact that there might have been an innocent explanation for [appellant's] conduct does not demonstrate that the officers could not reasonably believe that [he] had committed a crime." State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. App. 2001). Nevertheless, "[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope." Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quotation omitted)."

"Askerooth instructs that we employ a two-part test to determine whether an unreasonable seizure has taken place. Id. First, we must determine "whether the stop was justified at its inception." Id. Second, we must determine "whether the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place." Id. In other words, "each incremental intrusion during a stop must be 'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.'" Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968) (quotation omitted))."

"Therefore, incremental intrusions during a traffic stop must be "tied to and justified by" at least one of the following: "(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness as defined in Terry." Id. at 364 (quotation omitted). Here, the original legitimate purpose of the traffic stop justifies law enforcement's decision to expand the stop to include field sobriety testing."

This resulted in a lawful arrest and the subsequent search of the Defendant's vehicle was, therefore, lawful as well.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.