Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Baas (Decided December 12, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that an officer only needs a "reasonable" basis to believe someone is speeding in order to make a traffic stop. 

In Baas, the Defendant was observed accelerate rapidly from a stop sign by a Blue Earth County Sheriff's deputy.  The deputy was a block away when he made the observation.  

The deputy turned onto Front Street in Mankato in the direction that the Defendant was headed while the Defendant travelled parallel to him on Second Street. Based on the time in which it took for the Defendant to reach the intersections ahead of them, the deputy believed that the Defendant was traveling faster than normal traffic in this area and too fast for the road conditions. While catching up to the Defendant's vehicle, the deputy travelled at a speed up to 54 miles per hour in a 30 mph zone. 

The Deputy initiated a traffic stop and inevitably, placed the Defendant under arrest for DWI.  At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, arguing that reasonable, articulable suspicion did not support the traffic stop. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the traffic stop and denied the motion to dismiss the complaint.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"A police officer may conduct a “brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). It “requires more than a mere hunch but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752."

***

“When an officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.” See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004)."

"Failure to drive with due care and driving above posted speed limits are both violations of traffic laws. Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subds. 1, 2 (2018). Subdivision 1 of the statute provides that “[n]o person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 169.14 subd.l. In other words, an individual may violate subdivision 1 without exceeding any posted or statutory speed limit. See id. Recently, we interpreted section 169.14 in a nonprecedential opinion in State v. Konjaric, No. A18-0724 2019, WL 1320600, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 25, 2019), and concluded that the standard for subdivision 1 is that of a reasonable and prudent person, “given the driving conditions and hazards.” Although Konjari is not precedential, we find its reasoning persuasive and adopt it here. Whereas subdivision 1 focuses on the reasonableness of the speed, subdivision 2 makes driving above speed limits prima facie evidence that the speed is unreasonable."

"Appellant claims it was impossible for the deputy to estimate accurately the speed at which appellant was driving, because the streets were dark, there were houses obstructing the view, and the deputy initially only observed appellant’s vehicle from a block away. Appellant further notes that the deputy did not use markers, radar, or the pacing method to estimate appellant’s speed. Lastly, appellant questions the reliability of the speed estimation because the deputy testified that he believed it should take about a minute to drive the one-half mile to where he stopped appellant, yet his squad video showed that it took him about one minute and twenty seconds."

"Appellant conflates the burden of proof required for a traffic stop with the burden required for a speeding conviction. The reasonable-suspicion standard required for a traffic stop is “not high” and “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of evidence.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). A traffic stop meets the standard when an “officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). In contrast, to sustain a conviction for speeding, the evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. App. 2004)."

***

"Based on the road conditions, the time of day, and the deputy’s first-hand observations, we conclude that the deputy had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant violated Minnesota Statute § 169.14, subdivision 1, for failing to drive with due care, and subdivision 2 for driving above the posted speed limit."

Moral Of The Story: Don't drink and drive fast.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Higgins (decided October 24, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if a windshield crack is big enough, it will be presumed to interfere with the driver's vision.

In Higgins, the Defendant was stopped on Highway 169 after leaving Hibbing, MN. Mr. Higgins was subsequently charged with DWI and he challenged the validity of the initial stop.

The arresting officer testified he stopped Higgins because he observed (1) a crack in Higgins’s front windshield that “went three quarters of the way through the windshield,” and (2) a suspended object “swinging on the mirror.” The officer could not recall the exact item he saw “swinging” on the rearview mirror or the location of the crack on the windshield. But the officer recalled that the reflection of the sun on the windshield made the crack “very easy to see.”

The District Court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the lower court, stating:

"Regarding the scope of the windshield crack, the trooper testified that the crack he observed “went three quarters of the way through the windshield.” He described it as “very easy to see” from the sunshine’s reflection on the windshield at the time of the stop. Based upon this testimony, the district court found that the crack extended across three-quarters of the vehicle’s windshield. Because a crack of this size could lead a reasonable officer to suspect that the driver’s vision was limited, this undisputed factual finding on the size and extent of the crack provides a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Higgins drove in violation of the obstructed-vision statute. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43."

"To persuade us otherwise, Higgins references State v. Poehler, where we held that not every windshield crack justifies a traffic stop under the obstructed-vision statute. 921 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn. App. 2018), affd on other grounds, 935 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2019). Rather, there must be evidence to support a finding that a reasonable officer might suspect that the windshield was cracked to an extent that it limited the driver’s vision. Id. at 580-81. But unlike Poehler—where there was no factual finding about the crack’s size or location—evidence of the windshield crack size exists here."

***

"In sum, we conclude that the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he observed the windshield crack on Higgins’s vehicle because the crack spanned “three quarters of the way through the windshield.” Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could conclude that the crack obstructed the driver’s view in violation of the traffic law."

Moral Of The Story: The bigger the crack, the better the stop.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Walter (Decided October 10, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that one can only be convicted of one DWI offense arising out of a single behavioral incident.  This case is nothing new as the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have repeatedly affirmed this principle.  But the case illustrates that some district courts are still not paying attention. 

In Walter, The Defendant was found sleeping in the front driver's seat of a car parked along side Interstate 94 near Moorhead Minnesota. The Defendant was drunk and subsequently refused to submit to testing at the police station.

Mr. Walter was charged with Felony DWI and with Felony DWI Refusal to Submit to testing. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of both charges and warrant of commitment showed convictions on both counts.  

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated the Felony Refusal conviction noting:

"Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020). The supreme court has held that “section 609.04 bars multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” State v. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985)."

"...this court applies a two-part test to determine whether any of the multiple convictions should be vacated. State v. Bonkowske, 957N.W.2d 437, 443-44 (Minn. App. 2021). First, the convictions at issue must be for offenses that arise under different sections of the same criminal statute. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d at 760. Second, the offenses must have been for acts committed during a single behavioral incident. Id".

"Walter’s convictions for count 1 and count 2 were for offenses arising under different sections of the same criminal statute—Minn. Stat. § 169A.20. Also, this court has held that DWI and test refusal “committed as part of a continuous course of conduct, as occurred here, arise out of a single behavioral incident.” Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d at 444. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by entering convictions on counts 1 and 2 on the warrant of commitment."

As explained by State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984):

"[W]hen the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for the same act [the district court is] to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only. The remaining conviction(s) should not be formally adjudicated at this time.

If the adjudicated conviction is later vacated for a reason not relevant to the remaining unadjudicated conviction(s), one of the remaining unadjudicated convictions can then be formally adjudicated and sentence imposed, with credit, of course, given for time already served on the vacated sentence."

Moral Of The Story: One conviction is one too many but legally speaking, one is plenty!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Hower (Decided September 26, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that refusal to submit to testing can be by words or conduct.

In Hower, the Defendant was convicted of felony DWI by a jury. The facts showed that in November 2020, a law-enforcement officer responded to a call that a pickup truck had crashed in a ditch and arrived to find Hower asleep in the driver’s seat. The officer questioned Hower about what happened, and Hower—who is unable to speak—reacted by motioning to his leg, which the officer interpreted to mean that Hower’s leg was in pain. The responding officer testified at trial that he believed Hower was intoxicated based on the smell of alcoholic beverages, Hower’s inability to stand or walk, his bloodshot, watery eyes, and empty beer cans along with an opened, partially empty bottle of liquor on the floor of the truck’s passenger seat. An ambulance transported Hower to the hospital.

The police obtained a search warrant for the Defendant's blood or urine and told Hower repeatedly that he could nod or shake his head in response to the question of how he preferred to provide a sample for testing. 

At first, Hower did not respond to the officer’s questions. The officer asked Hower several more times if he would provide a blood or urine sample and continued to repeat that it was a crime to refuse. After the officer repeated his questions and tried to get Hower’s attention, Hower gestured to the officer, who gave Hower a pen and paper. Hower then wrote a few words, such as, “for watt,” which the officer interpreted to mean Hower was asking why the officer needed a blood or urine sample; “Scott driving, not me,” which the officer interpreted to mean Hower was saying someone named Scott was driving the truck when it crashed; and “hospital,” to which the officer responded by telling Hower that he was in the hospital to get his leg examined. The officer then asked again how Hower would like to complete the chemical test, and Hower wrote, “P,” which the officer took to mean Hower would provide a urine sample.

The officer left to retrieve a urine-testing kit. When the officer returned with the kit, he tried to get Hower’s attention by repeatedly saying his name. Hower did not respond and appeared to be asleep. The officer reminded Hower that if he did not respond, it would be a refusal. Hower then appeared to wake up. The officer asked Hower if he would “pee in a cup” and told Hower that if he kept “messing around,” the officer would consider it to be a test refusal. The officer again repeated Hower’s name, asked several more times if Hower was going to take the test, asked Hower to open his eyes, and told Hower to nod his head yes or no. Hower motioned to his leg. The officer told Hower that on initial review, the medical staff had not identified anything wrong with Hower’s leg. The officer yet again asked Hower whether he was going to take the test, and Hower did not respond; the officer said, “See, you stop answering me when I ask those questions.” Moments later, medical staff wheeled Hower into an exam room. The officer testified at trial that he considered Hower to have refused to test once the medical-staff member came to get him; therefore, the officer did not make any additional attempts to secure a sample after that time.

Defendant argues that the evidence supporting his conviction for test refusal was insufficient, and both parties agree that the evidence of the refusal was primarily circumstantial. Appellate courts apply greater scrutiny when assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting:

"To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 598 (quotation omitted). This court first identifies the circumstances proved, with the assumption that the jury rejected evidence in the record that is inconsistent with its verdict. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 622. Second, we examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt. Id. If there are no reasonable, rational inferences that are inconsistent with guilt, this court should affirm the conviction. Id."

"Based on the evidence here, the state proved the following circumstances: (1) Hower initially did not respond to the officer’s request for a chemical test; (2) Hower then appeared to agree to submit to a urine test; (3) when the officer returned with a kit to begin the process of administering the urine test, Hower appeared to be asleep; (4) after the officer reminded Hower that if he did not respond, it would be a test refusal, Hower appeared to wake up; (5) Hower then refused to communicate nonverbally as he had communicated with the officer before; and (6) Hower once again did not respond to the officer’s request to complete a urine test. These circumstances are consistent with Hower indicating an actual unwillingness to submit to the test. See Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 102 (deeming that failure to produce urine for testing after verbally agreeing to test was sufficient circumstantial evidence of actual unwillingness to submit to testing)."

"Hower, however, argues that there are other reasonable inferences based on these circumstances, including that he was not unwilling to test but simply unable to communicate because after he wrote, “P,” the pen and paper were taken away, and alternatively, that he was willing to do a urine test but did not want to do so in the public waiting area. Hower also argues that there was no requirement to consent to the test a second time after he had written, “P.” Ultimately, he argues, it is a reasonable inference that it was the officer’s failure to administer the test, not Hower’s failure to comply with the test, that frustrated the testing process."

"Hower’s proffered inferences are unreasonable based on the circumstances proved. The testimony and body-camera footage presented at trial support the inference that Hower demonstrated a clear disinterest in participating in the urine test. Hower’s argument that the removal of his pen and paper meant that he could no longer participate in testing is contradicted by the officer’s body-camera footage showing that Hower motioned with his head and his hands in response to other questions the officer asked. A driver’s refusal to submit to testing includes indicating, through words or actions, an “actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process,” even after initially consenting to a test."

***

"The record here includes evidence showing that after appearing to agree to a chemical test, Hower ignored the officer once he returned with the test kit and did not respond to questions about taking the test even as he responded nonverbally to other questions the officer asked. These circumstances support a reasonable, rational inference that Hower was indicating an actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process. We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, sufficient evidence exists in the record to support Hower’s conviction for refusal to submit to chemical testing."

Moral Of The Story:  You can still refuse even if you cannot speak.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Roth (Decided August 15, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that you can challenge a prior revocation if you can prove you were crazy during the entire 60-day challenge window.

In Roth, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI as he had two prior offenses within the past ten years.  One of the prior offenses used to make the current offense a 2nd degree was a 2018 implied consent license revocation. The Defendant had been found not guilty of the related 2018 DWI charge because at the time of the DWI offense, Ruth’s mental illness had made him unable to understand the nature or wrongfulness of his behavior.

Ruth filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing that the state’s use of the 2018 license revocation to enhance the severity of the charges violated his constitutional rights. Ruth contended that the district court’s ruling in the corresponding 2018 criminal case that he was not guilty by reason of mental illness created an inference that he was also incompetent during the 60-day judicial-review period for the revocation of his driver’s license. He further argued that, because he was unable to challenge the 2018 revocation due to his incompetence, the state’s use of the revocation to enhance the 2020 DWI charges violated his right to due process. 

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss and on appeal the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court noting:

"Under Minnesota law, the revocation of an individual’s driver’s license following an impaired-driving arrest may be used to enhance the severity of subsequent DWI charges. State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2007)

***

"Designed to protect public safety, DWI-related driver’s-license revocations are civil proceedings in which the 60-day period for requesting judicial review is strictly construed, even when a delay in pursuing judicial review is not the driver’s fault. McShane v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Minn. App. 1985)."

***

"Ruth acknowledges that he did not timely seek judicial review of his 2018 driver’s- license revocation. But, relying on the district court’s 2018 determination that he was not guilty of the corresponding criminal DWI charges by virtue of his mental illness, he contends that he was also mentally incompetent during the 60-day window for requesting judicial review and therefore could not timely initiate that process. In further support of his assertion that he was not competent to timely seek judicial review, he asks us to take judicial notice of the evaluator’s competency report in the 2018 criminal case, which concluded that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of driving while impaired at the time of the offense. According to Ruth, because there was no judicial review of the 2018 revocation, and because he was incapable of requesting judicial review, the revocation could not be used."

"Ruth contends that his case is unique, making his collateral attack on the validity of the 2018 revocation proper, because his incompetence precluded him from utilizing the available judicial review. In support of this argument, he cites to Anderson, where a driver attempted to challenge prior revocations by initiating an untimely civil implied-consent hearing—the judicial-review hearing afforded under the statutory scheme. 878 N.W.2d at 928. Like Ruth, the driver in Anderson argued that he had been incapable of timely requesting judicial review because, due to his mental incompetence, he had not understood the notice he received. Id. at 929. We rejected the driver’s use of an implied-consent hearing as a vehicle for challenging the revocations because the district court lost jurisdiction over such a proceeding when the driver failed to timely request review.  Id. at 930. But we stated that the driver could potentially challenge the revocations in a criminal proceeding if the state sought to use the revocations to enhance criminal charges. Id."

"Ruth points out that we essentially addressed his circumstances in Anderson, when we stated, “The circumstances in this case may well constitute one of the ‘unique’ cases in which a criminal defendant may collaterally attack a revocation to prevent it from serving as an enhancement.” Id. He observes that he, like the driver in Anderson, was unable to timely seek judicial review due to mental incompetence. But Ruth notes that, unlike the driver in Anderson, he used the proper vehicle for challenging his revocations—a collateral attack in the context of his criminal case."

"Ruth’s attempt to collaterally challenge the 2018 revocation is flawed, however. We reject his collateral attack on the revocation for two reasons."

"First, in Anderson, we “expressed] no opinion as to the outcome of [the] analysis.” Id. at 930. Thus, Anderson does not hold that a driver’s incompetence during the judicial- review period precludes the use of the revocation to enhance a subsequent offense."

"Second, and even more importantly, the record does not support Ruth’s claim that he was not competent to seek judicial review of the 2018 revocation. His claim relies entirely on the district court’s judicial notice of an order in his 2018 criminal case finding him not guilty of DWI by reason of mental illness. The record contains no evidence of Ruth’s competence to participate in judicial proceedings during the 60-day window for seeking judicial review. And the record does not even include the evaluation that the district court relied on in 2018 to find Ruth not guilty by reason of mental illness.  Based on the record here, we cannot infer—as Ruth asks us to do—that he was not competent to seek judicial review in 2018. Yet, this factual assertion provides the entire foundation of Ruth’s legal argument. Because the record does not support Ruth’s claim that he was not competent to seek judicial review, his legal argument fails."

"We cannot conclude that Ruth’s mental condition prevented him from requesting judicial review of his 2018 driver’s-license revocation. Because Ruth waived judicial review by failing to timely request it, the use of the revocation to enhance his current DWI offense did not violate his constitutional right to procedural due process."

Moral Of The Story: That's one crazy driver!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Johnson (Decided June 27, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Nonprecedential) which stands for the proposition that jury instructions are to be read and interpreted in their entirety. 

In Johnson, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was read the Minnesota breath test advisory at a police station in St. Louis County. Defendant was asked to provide a sample of his breath and Johnson declined.  The officer, without first obtaining a search warrant, then asked the Defendant to submit to a urine test.  Johnson again declined to submit to testing. Mr. Johnson was subsequently charged and convicted of felony refusal to submit to a breath test.

On appeal, Johnson argued that his conviction for test refusal must be reversed because the district court's instruction did not specify which chemical test the state had to prove Johnson refused when he refused both the breath test and a urine test. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction noting that since the Defendant did not object to the instructions in the district court, the appellate court would use the "plain error" standard of review: 

"When reviewing jury instructions for plain error, appellate courts review them in their entirety to determine whether the instructions fairly and adequately explain the law of the case...Appellate courts will not reverse a district court’s decision on jury instructions absent an abuse of discretion. Id. District courts abuse their discretion if the instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,” State v. Taylor, 869 N. W.2d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), or if the instructions omit an element of the charged offense, State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019)."

"Once an officer has (1) probable cause to believe that the person was driving while impaired, (2) placed the person under lawful arrest for DWI, (3) requested that the person take a breath test, and (4) read the person the breath-test advisory, Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subds. 1(b)(1), 2 (2018), “[i]t is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test. . . of the person’s breath.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1)."

"However, a person cannot be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 234 (Minn 2016)."

"Here, the district court instructed:

First, a peace officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant drove, operated, or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. . . .

Second, the peace officer placed the defendant under lawful arrest for driving while impaired. . . .

Third, the defendant was given the breath-test advisory by the peace officer.

Fourth, the defendant was requested by the peace officer to submit to a chemical test of the defendant’s breath.

Fifth, the defendant refused to submit to the test."

Johnson claimed that because the fifth element of the jury instructions failed to specify which test the state had to prove Johnson refused and instead merely said “the test,” the jury was not properly instructed that Johnson could only be convicted if he refused the breath test, not the urine test.

The Court of Appeals rejected Johnson's claim, holding:

"The jury instructions given by the district court included all elements of the offense and fairly explained the law. Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 805. When read “in their entirety,” it is clear that the fifth element was referring to a breath test. Id. The contested sentence— “Fifth, the defendant refused to submit to the test”—immediately followed two sentences that listed the “[tjhird” and “[fjourth” elements of the offense and included “breath test” and “test of the defendant’s breath.” The first sentence of the instructions also stated that “whoever refuses to submit to a chemical test of the person’s breath ... is guilty of a crime.” There was no reference to a urine test in the jury instructions. Thus, when the fifth element is read in context, the jury instructions did not “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 14-15 (quotation omitted). Consequently, under the plain-error analysis, the district court did not err in its jury instructions."

Moral Of The Story: If you refuse to submit, they will convict.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Bjerke v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided May 9, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the Court will not decide the constitutionality of the "wide turn" statute if the stop can be upheld on other grounds.

In Bjerke, the Defendant was arrested for DWI after being stopped for failing to properly stop for a stop sign and for making a wide turn in violation of Minnesota Statute § 169.19, sub. 1(a).  The criminal and license revocation hearings were combined and the Defendant moved to suppress all of the state's evidence. The Defendant argued that the sheriff's deputy did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that Statute  169.19, subs. 1(a) was unconstitutionally vague.

The arresting officer testified that at approximately 10:45 p.m. on April 1, 2021, he observed a Chrysler 300 sedan being driven in the downtown area of Mankato where there are several bars. The deputy testified that he observed the sedan stopped at the intersection of Main Street and Second Street with the front tires of the vehicle stopped “over the crosswalk” such that the vehicle was obstructing the crosswalk. The deputy testified that the driver of the vehicle then made a wide right turn, followed by another wide right turn. According to the deputy, the vehicle crossed over the center lane divider when the driver made both right turns.

Bjerke testified that he has a Class A commercial driver’s license, which allows him to drive combination tractor/trailers. According to Bjerke, he makes wide turns “[a]ll the time” in order “to avoid anything on the curb, or a door opening, going to the right.” And Bjerke acknowledged that he made wide right turns prior to being stopped by the deputy.

The district court determined that Bjerke’s “wide turn provided an independent reasonable articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of the car.” The district court also determined that Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) is not unconstitutionally vague because, although the statutory phrase ‘“as close as practicable’ is imprecise,” it is “not incomprehensible.” The district court, therefore, denied Bjerke’s motion to suppress, and sustained the revocation of his driver’s license.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

Minnesota Statute §169.19, subd. 1(a) provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. When necessary to accommodate vehicle configuration, a driver is permitted to make a right turn into the farthest lane of a roadway with two or more lanes in the same direction in order to make a U-turn at a reduced conflict intersection, if it is safe to do so."

* * *

"...in State v. Morse, the supreme court considered a challenge to a traffic stop that was made after a driver made a wide turn and subsequently drifted within a traffic lane. 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016). Although there was a question as to whether the driver in Morse violated a traffic law, the supreme court upheld the legality of the stop based on the totality of the circumstances, which included (1) the squad-car video supporting the officer’s assertion that the driver’s right turn was not as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway; (2) the squad-car video showing the driver’s vehicle drifting in its lane; (3) the fact that the events occurred close to 2:00 a.m. bar closing time; (4) the fact that the driver was leaving downtown, an area with bars; and (5) the officer’s training and experience.  Id. at 502-03.

Here, the district court found that Bjerke was stopped at approximately 10:45 p.m. “in an area of Mankato where there are many bars and heavy foot traffic.” The district court also found that the deputy “credibly testified” that he observed Bjerke’s vehicle stopped over the crosswalk such that the vehicle “was obstructing the crosswalk.” And the district court found that the deputy observed Bjerke’s vehicle make two wide right turns such that the “driver’s side tires went over the lane divider and into the oncoming lane of traffic.” Finally, the district court found that “there was no evidence the ‘vehicle configuration’ was such to make a wide right turn permissible.” The record supports the district court’s findings, including Bjerke’s admission that he made two wide right turns prior to being stopped, as well as the squad-car video that shows Bjerke make two wide right-hand turns. In fact, the squad-car video shows that when Bjerke made the second wide right-hand turn, his vehicle drifted considerably into the oncoming lane of traffic. The circumstances presented here are similar to the circumstances presented in Morse, in which the supreme court upheld the legality of the stop. See 878 N.W.2d at 502. Therefore, even if Bjerke’s wide right turns did not constitute a traffic violation, we conclude that, under Morse, the totality of the circumstances provided the deputy with the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Bjerke’s vehicle. And because the totality of the circumstances surrounding Bjerke’s driving conduct provided a reasonable basis to stop Bjerke’s vehicle, we need not address Bjerke’s contention that Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(a) is unconstitutionally vague."

Moral Of The Story: The Courts will not address the constitutionality of a statute if the matter can be resolved on other grounds.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Jones (Decided May 2, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that one should not pull into the parking lot of a closed business late at night.

In Jones, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and challenged the validity of the initial stop of her vehicle. The arresting officer testified that around 11:00 p.m., he was following a car traveling northbound on Highway 25 when the car turned left into the parking lot of a closed business. At the next opportunity, the trooper made a U-tum and parked along the right shoulder of southbound Highway 25 to observe the car. The trooper saw the car park in the front section of the dimly lit lot, which abutted the highway. After approximately 30 seconds, he saw the car drive further into the lot and move to a darker area between two buildings where the trooper lost sight of the car. About 30 seconds later, the trooper observed the car travel back to the front section of the lot, come to a complete stop, exit the lot, and reenter Highway 25, continuing northbound. The trooper initiated a traffic stop and arrested the car’s sole occupant, later identified as Jones, after detecting signs of intoxication.

The trooper testified that he considered Jones’s driving conduct to be suspicious. The trooper testified that he became suspicious because he knew the business was closed, the lot was not well-lit, and there were other lots along the highway with much better lighting. The trooper also testified that although he considered the driver might be custodial staff or have pulled over to look at a map, he no longer thought that was the case when he observed the vehicle travel from the dimly lit front area of the lot to a darker area of the lot hidden from his view. The trooper testified that he became particularly suspicious when the vehicle moved to the dark area of the lot out of his view because the trooper knew that buses were parked in that area, and he thought it was possible that someone could be vandalizing the building, stealing tires, or engaged in drug use. 

The district court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the MInnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, stating:

"For a stop to be supported by reasonable suspicion, there must be “specific, articulable facts” showing that the officer “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Id. at 842-43 (quotations omitted). The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.2008) (quotations omitted). This standard is satisfied when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (quotation omitted). If a seizure is not supported by reasonable suspicion, however, all evidence obtained because of the seizure must be suppressed. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842."

***

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. Around 11:00 p.m., the trooper saw Jones drive into the front section of the lot of a closed business and, 30 seconds later, drive out of sight between two buildings. According to the trooper, there was no apparent reason for someone to enter the parking lot at that time of night because the business was closed. The trooper also concluded from his observations that Jones was not an employee because instead of entering the business, she proceeded to drive into the dimly lit area between the two buildings. The trooper articulated that he suspected Jones of vandalism, tire theft, or taking drugs when she drove from the front parking lot to the darker area of the parking lot specifically based on his knowledge that tire thefts had occurred at “dealership lots here,” and in his experience, “people do[] drugs ... in some empty lots.” Like the behaviors of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Jones’s conduct caused the trooper to form a reasonable belief that she could be engaged in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story: Don't stop at any business that is not open 24 hours!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Halicki v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided April 25, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you have to make a sufficient showing of a particular need in order to obtain the source code of the breath testing equipment.

In Halicki, the petitioner was arrested for dwi and tested at a .08% on the DataMaster breath testing equipment.  Petitioner challenged the license revocation and sought to obtain the DMT's computer source code.  

Halicki argued that the source code is relevant to whether his test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 and whether the DMT testing method is valid and reliable. In support of his motion, he submitted the testimony of Dr. Andreas Stolz and exhibits purporting to show how an error in the source code could result in an erroneous DMT test result. In opposition to the motion, the commissioner submitted his own exhibits, including Halicki’s test results and an affidavit from forensic scientists in the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension supporting the veracity and reliability of DMT breath testing.

The district court denied the discovery request, "concluding that nothing suggested that the particular DMT device used to test Halicki’s breath malfunctioned or was improperly used; “Dr. Stolz is not a qualified expert on breath testing or source code analysis”; and the commissioner did not possess the source code as it “is under the exclusive control of Intoximeters, Inc.” 

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, stating:

"The DMT source code is not subject to mandatory discovery. Accordingly, the focus of our analysis is whether the district court abused its discretion by concluding the source code is not relevant to Halicki’s claims or defenses. Halicki contends it is relevant to determine whether the testing method was “valid and reliable” and whether the test results were “accurately evaluated,” as set out in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(10). The commissioner asserts that Halicki did not make the requisite showing of relevance because he did not provide evidence of potential error specific to his test."

*    *    *

"Halicki cites State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009) (Underdahl II), for the proposition that the DMT source code is relevant to the validity and reliability of his breath-test results. In Underdahl II, the supreme court considered two consolidated criminal cases in which the district court ordered the State of Minnesota to produce the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000. 767 N.W.2d at 679. As to defendant Underdahl, the supreme court concluded that the district court abused its discretion because Underdahl “made no threshold evidentiary showing whatsoever” that the source code was relevant to his guilt or innocence. Id. at 685. As to defendant Brunner, the supreme court discerned no abuse of discretion because Brunner “submitted source code definitions, written testimony of a computer science professor that explained issues surrounding the source codes and their disclosure, and an example of a breath-test machine analysis and its potential defects.” Id. at 686. Halicki asserts that he, like Brunner, sufficiently demonstrated the relevance of the DMT source code to warrant discovery. We are not persuaded for three reasons."

"First, Halicki overlooks the significant distinction between the discovery afforded in criminal and civil cases. In a criminal case, district courts may order discovery of any information that “may relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3). In contrast, in an implied-consent case, the party seeking nonmandatory discovery must show how the information sought bears on the validity and reliability of the testing method used and the test results in the case at hand. Minn. Stat. § 169.53, subd. 3(b)(10); Abbott, 760 N.W.2d at 925-26 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02). Underdahl II provides helpful context regarding the type of evidence courts consider in determining the relevance of a breath-testing device’s source code. But it does not alter Halicki’s burden to show that the source code is relevant to his claims and defenses regarding his breath test or compel a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion."

"Second, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that Dr. Stolz is not a qualified expert on the topic of breath testing or the DMT source code. Halicki did not expressly challenge this finding in his briefing. Generally, “issues not argued in briefs are deemed waived on appeal.” State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 n.8 (Minn. 1997). But even if Halicki did not waive this challenge, the record supports the district court’s finding regarding Dr. Stolz’s qualifications. Dr. Stolz is an associate professor at the National Superconducting Cyclotron Laboratory at Michigan State University. He studies rare isotopes and programs computer software to analyze measurements of these isotopes. He testified about his general familiarity with source codes but acknowledged that his work does not involve breath testing, source codes for breath-testing equipment, or the DMT. In short, the record supports the district court’s finding that Dr. Stolz lacks expertise to support Halicki’s request for discovery of the source code."

"Third, the district court did not misapply the law or otherwise abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence Halicki offered does not establish that the source code is relevant to Halicki’s claims and defenses. Halicki emphasizes that he submitted a law- review article, two newspaper articles, an article from an academic journal, and the expert report generated in State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008), which Brunner submitted in support of his discovery motion in Underdahl II. None of these submissions shed light on how the DMT source code is relevant to Halicki’s claims or defenses. The law-review article does not discuss the DMT source code or any potential problems with it, instead stating that “[m]any times, the greatest challenge is convincing the court that the source code is relevant and material” before directing the reader to other secondary sources. The newspaper articles chronicle experiences working with and assessing the reliability of breath-testing devices nationwide; neither mentions the DMT’s source code or anything specific to Halicki’s test results. And while the academic article concludes the DMT is not reliable at detecting the presence of mouth alcohol, Halicki does not contend that mouth alcohol affected his test results. Finally, the Chun report concerned the source code for the Alcotest 7110 Mk III, not the DMT."

Moral Of The Story: You probably have a better chance of getting the source code in the related criminal case.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Waltz (Decided March 21, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police get to search the car and arrest the driver when the occupied vehicle reeks of marijuana.

In Waltz, the Montevideo police received a report that a female was passed out in a running car in a convenience store parking lot.  The first officer to arrive approached the car and after some effort, awoke the unconscious driver, Ms Waltz.  The officer had to knock on the window and shine his flashlight in her eyes to awaken Ms. Waltz. 

While standing next to the car, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana and when the defendant rolled down her window, the odor was even more intense.

Two other officers arrived together in a second patrol car. They approached the car and confirmed that there was a strong marijuana smell.

The Defendant was asked to exit the car and the vehicle was searched. The police found a plastic grocery bag containing approximately ten grams of marijuana.  

The police asked Waltz whether she had been using marijuana, and she admitted to smoking a blunt  a few hours before. Suspecting that Waltz was under the influence of marijuana or a controlled substance, the sergeant asked Waltz to perform some field sobriety tests and conducted a preliminary breath test, which revealed a zero alcohol concentration. The sergeant arrested Waltz based on suspicion that she had been driving while impaired and provided her with a Miranda warning.

The Defendant was charged with DWI and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Walz moved to suppress the evidence of marijuana that police seized from her car and her admissions to the police that she had smoked marijuana.

Waltz claimed that the police had no basis to detain her for a criminal investigation or to search her car once they determined that she was not in distress. And she asserted that the police unlawfully interrogated her about her marijuana use without providing a Miranda warning. Waltz argued that these constitutional violations require suppression of the drug evidence found in her car and on her person, the evidence of her impairment, her statements to the police, and any evidence obtained as a result of her statements. 

The district court denied her motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed stating:

"In some circumstances, the police may seize an individual without a search warrant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). One exception to the warrant requirement permits limited investigatory seizures. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004)."

"Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744N.W.2d 390,393 (Minn. 2008) (quotingIllinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,123 (2000)) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). But an investigatory detention “may become invalid if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18). Thus, each subsequent intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). And to expand the scope of an investigatory seizure, the police must have independent probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the subsequent intrusion. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21)."

"Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified a limited investigatory detention. Waltz was sleeping in a running car in a public place at 11:00 p.m. When the sergeant approached the car, he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana. Waltz was difficult to rouse; the sergeant was required to bang on the car window and shine his flashlight in her eyes. The marijuana smell became more intense when Waltz finally rolled her window down. And the two other officers who arrived to assist with the investigation confirmed that they could smell marijuana even while standing three feet away from Waltz’s car. Given these facts, the officers had reason to suspect that Waltz was driving while impaired and that she possessed marijuana in a motor vehicle. Either of these suspicions provided a basis for an investigatory detention. See State v. Doren, 654 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. App.2002) (stating that a car passenger’s “extraordinary nervousness,” the smell of burned marijuana emanating from the passenger’s location, and the passenger’s appearance of being under the influence together provide a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).

"Waltz argues that even if the initial seizure was valid, the officers unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop by searching her car. The state responds that the officers’ actions were permissible under another exception to the warrant requirement—the automobile exception."

"The automobile exception allows police to search a vehicle, including closed containers, when “there are facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Determining whether there is probable cause requires an objective inquiry that evaluates the totality of the circumstances in a particular case. Id. These circumstances include the reasonable inferences that law enforcement officers may make based on their training and experience. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011)."

"The state points out that “[t]he detection of odors alone, which trained police officers can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further evidence of crime.” State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1973). And the state notes that undercurrent Minnesota law, the smell of marijuana provides probable cause for a vehicle search. See State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (stating that the automobile exception applies when an officer smells marijuana emanating from a car)."

"While we do not disagree with the state’s summary of the law, we note that the factual circumstances here included more than an odor of marijuana. Again, Waltz was found soundly sleeping in a running car near midnight. The car was parked in a convenience store parking lot. When finally awakened, Waltz said that she was meeting someone. Three trained police officers smelled a strong odor of marijuana—including fresh marijuana—coming from the car. And Waltz admitted to smoking marijuana in the car earlier. Based on all of these facts, the officers reasonably believed that the car would contain contraband. Because the officers had probable cause to search, their search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement."

Moral Of The Story: You snooze. You lose.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jackson v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 14, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the burden is on the petitioner to establish physical inability to provide an adequate breath sample.

In Jackson, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and he agreed to take a breath test on the DataMaster machine at the police station. During the first attempt, Jackson started and then stopped blowing into the machine, broke a mouthpiece, coughed into the mouthpiece, removed the mouthpiece from his mouth and stared at the officers, dropped the mouthpiece, and chatted with the officers. On the second attempt, Jackson stopped the breath sample to talk, coughed, ignored instructions, puffed his cheeks, and started and stopped blowing. And during the third attempt, Jackson repeated his earlier behaviors. Despite three attempts, Jackson did not provide a sufficient breath sample for testing.

According to the DMT operator, Jackson was “deliberately attempting to beat the test” by “doing as little as he possib[ly could] to try and do the test without actually doing the test.” The second officer present did not believe that Jackson was “deliberately trying to not take the test,” but he saw no indication that Jackson was having difficulty breathing into the machine. Both officers recalled that Jackson remarked about smoking cigars. But Jackson never claimed to the officers that he was physically unable to complete the tests.

Jackson filed a petition challenging the revocation of his driver's license and during the district court hearing, Jackson provided numerous explanations for his failure to provide a sufficient breath sample, including seasonal allergies, nervousness and anxiety around law enforcement, cigar smoking, and inadequate instructions from the officers.

The district court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, noting:

"Failure to provide two adequate breath samples constitutes a refusal under Minnesota’s implied-consent law. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 5(a), (c) (2020). But a driver may prove as an affirmative defense that the refusal to submit to a chemical test “was based on reasonable grounds.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c) (2020). A driver’s inability to provide a breath sample is one such ground that may be raised at an implied- consent hearing. Wolle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. App. 1987). To rely on this affirmative defense, a driver must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was unable to provide adequate breath samples due to physical inability. Bale v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 385 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. App. 1986). Whether a person is physically unable to provide a breath sample is a question of fact for the district court that we review for clear error. Burke v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 381 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Minn. App. 1986)."

"Jackson contends that he satisfied his burden of proof by presenting sufficient evidence of his physical inability to test. Because the district court did not clearly err in finding otherwise, we disagree."

"Although Jackson testified that he was unable to provide a sufficient breath sample for various reasons—including allergies, anxiety, and cigar smoking—the district court found that his testimony was not credible. Moreover, the district court noted that Jackson failed to introduce any independent evidence to support his claim that he was unable to take the DMT breath test. These findings are not clearly erroneous. Jackson’s testimony was the sole evidence provided in support of his affirmative defense. And we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations."

Moral Of The Story:  It is good to be a blowhard when you are taking a breath test!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Nolden (Decided January 31, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that you are still "equipped" even if your bulbs are gone.

In Nolden, the defendant's jeep liberty was stopped by a Beltrami County Sheriff's deputy because the center brake light on the jeep did not illuminate when the vehicle's brakes were activated. When the deputy approached the Defendant's vehicle, he noticed that there wasn't a brake light cover over the center light cavity and he could see the wiring inside the cavity which appeared to have previously housed the brake light.

The Defendant was subsequently arrested for a DWI and he filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence arguing that the initial stop was illegal. 

Minnesota law requires that “[w]hen a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps or signal lamps, the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2020). The Defendant's argument was that his vehicle was not “equipped” with a center brake light pursuant to the “plain reading” of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) “because the entire [brake light] fixture was absent from the vehicle at the time in question.” In short, defendant argues, his “vehicle did not have a faulty or malfunctioning third brake light” because “it simply had no light at all.”

The district court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"Although “equipped” is not defined in the statute or elsewhere, its dictionary definition is “[t]o supply with necessities such as tools or provisions.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 602 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 422 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “equip” to include “to furnish for service or action by appropriate provisioning”); see American Heritage, supra, at 712 (defining “furnish” and other synonyms of “equip” as “to provide with what is necessary for an activity or purpose” and providing examples of “furnished the team with new uniforms” and “equip a car with snow tires” ); see also Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 508 (providing “furnish” as a synonym for “equip” and defining it as “to provide with what is needed”). Therefore, based on these dictionary definitions of “equipped,” its plain meaning is to supply or provide the necessities for a particular purpose."

*    *    *

"Appellant argues that “equipped” should be read to mean “if that component is presently attached to the vehicle,” such as a brake light, then that vehicle is “equipped” with that component. According to appellant, this definition is an “everyday life” and “natural use” of the word “equipped.” We disagree. This definition requires us to add the words to the statute. This we may not do."

"Accordingly, the deputy possessed a particularized and objective basis for suspecting appellant had committed a traffic violation based on his observation of appellant’s inoperable center brake light, thereby justifying the stop."

Moral Of The Story: It's lights out for the defendant!

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Brown (Decided January 24, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the police are very suspicious people.

In Brown, the Defendant was driving in the early morning hours of May 6, 2019 when a Hennepin County Sheriff's Deputy noticed her vehicle pull in front of him. Ms. Brown turned immediately right at the next available opportunity in between a couple of buildings that appeared closed for the day. The deputy then observed the car turn left into an area behind a warehouse. The deputy knew that there were not many connecting streets behind the warehouse and there were no normal businesses open at that time of night. 

After seeing the car go behind the warehouse, the deputy turned right at the next available street and waited to see if the car would keep driving and reappear on the other side of the warehouse. When the car did not reappear, the deputy drove behind the warehouse and spotted the car there. The car was parked behind the warehouse “in an odd manner”—“in the middle of an open area by a loading dock and not lined up with anything else.” The warehouse was closed, and the area was dark; the deputy did not see any apparent “legitimate business needs” there. The deputy saw Brown sitting in the car and looking at her phone. At that point, the deputy activated his emergency lights and approached the car.

Things went downhill from there and ultimately Ms. Brown was arrested for a DWI.  She filed a Motion to Suppress all of the evidence asserting that the officer did not have a constitutionally sufficient basis to make the initial seizure of her vehicle.  The District Court denied the motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"We conclude that these circumstances provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the deputy to seize Brown for purposes of an investigatory stop. Brown’s behavior in driving off the main road, going behind a closed warehouse, and remaining parked there in the middle of the night, with no apparent legitimate purpose for being there, reasonably gave rise to the inference that she may have been involved in some sort of criminal activity."

"Two cases from this court shed light on this issue. In Thomeczek v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer observed the defendant parked in an empty lot after 11:00 p.m., with the car running and the headlights on, “in an area undergoing construction, where a burglary, vandalism or theft might occur.” 364 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. App. 1985). This court determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant may have been involved in unlawful activity and that the stop was therefore legal. Id. Similarly, in Olmscheid v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the officer stopped the defendant, who was driving along a dead-end road at 1:30 a.m., behind a car dealership that had a history of property theft. 412 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn. App. 1987)."

"The facts here are like those in Thomeczek and Olmscheid. It was the middle of the night, and the deputy saw Brown drive behind a warehouse to an empty area where all lights were off and no businesses were open. The deputy did not start the traffic stop when Brown turned behind the warehouse but investigated further only after she did not reappear within a few minutes. Based on the time of night, the lack of any open businesses, and the unusual manner in which Brown was parked, the deputy had an objective basis to reasonably believe that Brown had no legitimate purpose for being there. Like the behavior of the drivers in Thomeczek and Olmscheid, Brown’s parking behind a closed business in the middle of the night reasonably caused the deputy to believe that she could be there to engage in criminal activity."

Moral Of The Story:  If you want to stop to look at your phone, do it in front of a 24-hour shop.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Dodds (Decided January 18, 2022, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you never want to give the police a second chance to make a first impression!

In Dodds, a Carver County Sheriff's Deputy noticed an occupied vehicle in the Domino's parking lot in Waconia.  The deputy approached the vehicle and spoke with the occupants. The deputy checked Dodds’s registration and discovered that his driving privileges had been revoked. But because Dodds was in a nonmoving vehicle in a private parking lot, the deputy believed that no law had been broken.

An hour later, the deputy observed the same car roll through a stop sign. The car also crossed the center line by roughly two feet. The deputy pulled the car over and noticed the occupants attempt to conceal something within the car. After he identified Dodds (who had been driving) and his passenger, the deputy noted a strong odor of alcohol. The passenger appeared to be “extremely intoxicated” and during the conversation produced two open containers of alcohol. The deputy asked Dodds and the passenger to exit the vehicle and conducted a search for additional contraband. Dodds warned the deputy that there were approximately three grams of marijuana inside the vehicle, which the deputy eventually located. The deputy issued Dodds a citation for possession of marijuana, failure to provide insurance, and driving after revocation. The deputy then told Dodds he was released from the traffic stop and warned him to keep his voice down because they were in a residential area in the middle of the night.

The deputy returned to his squad car to take pictures of the open containers found in Dodds’s vehicle when Dodds started to yell to the deputy. The deputy again cautioned Dodds about yelling in the neighborhood. But Dodds continued to yell. The deputy reapproached Dodds and this time noticed that Dodds’s speech was slurred, his eyes were watery and glassy, and his breath smelled of alcohol, which the deputy had not noticed in the previous encounters that night. The deputy then administered field sobriety testing and eventually arrested Dodds for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI).

The state charged Dodds with felony test refusal and felony DWI.  Dodds filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop and to dismiss, in part, due to an impermissible expansion of the scope of the stop.

The District Court denied the motion to suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Minn. 1992). But police may conduct “[a] limited investigative stop ... if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). The reasonable-suspicion standard is met when a deputy observes conduct that leads the deputy to reasonably conclude that “criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The standard is not high, but it requires more than an unparticularized hunch. Id. When determining whether a deputy reasonably suspected criminal activity, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson, 581N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998)."

"Here, while the deputy and Dodds had multiple contacts throughout the night, we narrowly focus on whether the deputy improperly seized Dodds when he re-approached him following the written citation. After Dodds got the deputy’s attention by yelling, the deputy re-approached and noticed that Dodds’s breath smelled of alcohol. The smell of alcohol is all that is required for reasonable suspicion to suspect that Dodds had been driving while intoxicated and to justify a seizure. See Hager v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a driver’s odor of alcohol provided reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired and a legal basis for a preliminary breath test)."

"In sum, because the deputy had reasonable suspicion to seize Dodds after smelling alcohol on his breath, the district court did not err when denying Dodds’s motion to suppress."

Moral Of The Story: Next time, take the ticket and run (quietly)!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.