Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided April 24, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a court cannot order restitution without discussing the defendant's ability to pay the ordered amount.

In Martinez, the Defendant was driving his vehicle in Blue Earth County when the police observed his vehicle did not have a red cover on one taillight. The officer attempted to make a traffic stop of Mr. Martinez, but instead of stopping, Mr. Martinez increased his speed, ran stop signs and reached a speed of 115 miles per hour. Eventually, law enforcement attempted a pursuit-intervention-technique (PIT) maneuver, causing Martinez’s vehicle to come to a stop. Martinez admitted to smoking methamphetamine and being under its influence while driving.

Mr. Martinez pled guilty and the state filed two affidavits for restitution, one from the Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust seeking $8,068.20 and one from Blue Earth County Finance seeking $1,000. The affidavits attested to the cost of repairs to the squad car that was damaged while pursuing Martinez.

Probation filed a presentence-investigation (PSI) report, which recommended a restitution award of $9,068.20 and also stated that if Martinez “chooses to execute his commitment,” restitution should “be paid out of prison earnings.” The PSI report specified that Martinez “has not maintained steady employment for the last five years” and that “his last employment was Burger King ... in January 2021,” where he worked for “three to four months until he started using drugs and left.” The report also noted that Martinez has “to pay child support but is behind on payments” and “would like the amount lowered.”

The district court “ordered [Martinez] to pay restitution in the amount of $9,068.20 that is to be paid out of any prison earnings” by April 25, 2024, and stated it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution.

The Defendant appealed the restitution order and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as the lower court failed to establish it had considered the Defendant's ability to pay the restitution amount.  Or, as stated by the Appellate Court:

"In Wigham, the supreme court reversed and remanded a restitution award because the district court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. 967 N.W.2d at 664, 666. In doing so, the supreme court held that the “district court fulfills its statutory duty to consider a defendant’s income, resources, and obligations in awarding and setting the amount of restitution when it expressly states, either orally or in writing, that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 664 (emphasis added). The district court need not “make specific findings about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to support [its] express statement that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay,” but doing so is “best practice.” Id. at 665 & n.6. Even if the district court makes specific findings, “the record must include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations to allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered.” Id. at 665."

***

"The state first argues that the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay by reviewing the PSI report, which “contained information regarding [Martinez’s] income and employment,” and by determining that Martinez “was financially unable to obtain counsel” when the district court appointed a public defender for Martinez. But this argument rests on the faulty premise that the district court need not expressly state that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay restitution. See Wigham, 967N.W.2d at 666 (holding that the district court “must expressly state” it considered the defendant’s “ability to pay—his income, resources, and obligations—when ordering restitution”). Thus, neither the district court’s review of the PSI report nor its appointment of a public defender, which occurred before the sentencing hearing, satisfied the district court’s statutory duty to expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution."

"Second, the state relies on the district court’s statement that restitution should be paid out of Martinez’s prison earnings as showing the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The state cites State v. Tenerelli, 583 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1998), affd as modified by 598 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1999), which significantly predates Wigham. In Tenerelli, we determined that the district court’s reference to the defendant’s prison earnings as the source of restitution payments showed it had considered the defendant’s ability to pay. 583 N.W.2d at 3. But the supreme court adopted a bright-line rule in Wigham, stating it sought to “avoid[] the need to scour bits and pieces of information to try to glean what the district court may have considered.” 967 N.W.2d at 664 n.5 (emphasis omitted). Wigham teaches that the district court’s reference to Martinez’s prison earnings does not fulfill its statutory duty under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045."

"For the same reason, we reject the state’s third argument, which urges us to conclude that the district court’s decision not to fine Martinez also shows the district court considered Martinez’s ability to pay restitution. The district court’s statement that it was “not imposing a fine . . . due to the large amount of restitution” does not “expressly” state it considered Martinez’s “ability to pay” restitution. See id. at 666."

"In sum, we conclude that because the district court did not expressly state it considered Martinez’s ability to pay, it failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant and abused its discretion in ordering restitution. Thus, we reverse and remand. In considering restitution on remand, the district court may in its discretion reopen the record and order an updated PSI report to include information on Martinez’s income, resources, and obligations."

Moral Of The Story: You can't get blood out of a turnip!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

 

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Taybom (Decided April 10, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the officer's failure to record in his report all of the reasons for the vehicle stop is irrelevant.   

On November 21, 2019 a police officer stopped the Defendant while she was driving her vehicle on Seventh Street in St. Paul, MN. Ms. Taybom was ultimately charged with gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI for refusing to submit to a breath test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2018), and gross-misdemeanor third-degree DWI for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2018). 

At a contested omnibus hearing, Taybom moved to suppress all evidence related to the traffic stop. She argued that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the stop based on any traffic infraction and specifically contended that the reason provided in the officer’s police report—passing another vehicle on the right—was not unlawful. The state opposed the motion, arguing that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the stop based on three separate traffic violations observed by the officer: failing to yield to oncoming traffic, crossing the centerline, and passing another vehicle on the right in an unsafe manner.

At the hearing, the officer testified that he observed the following driving conduct by Taybom prior to the stop. First, Taybom’s car failed to yield to his car at a stop sign, “causing [him] to have to hit [his] brakes to stop from hitting [Taybom’s] vehicle.” Second, he saw the wheels of Taybom’s car touch the centerline of the road as he followed the car westbound on 7th Street. Third, as he continued to follow Taybom’s car, he observed her car slow down as it approached another vehicle. That vehicle was stopped at a red light. When the light turned green, Taybom’s car veered onto the right shoulder (which was also a bus stop) and “quickly accelerated” to pass the other vehicle while driving through the intersection. After observing Taybom’s car pass the other vehicle, the officer initiated the traffic stop. During his testimony, the officer acknowledged that his police report indicated only that he stopped Taybom for passing on the right and that it “failed to document” the other two alleged violations—failing to yield and crossing the centerline. But the officer testified that he “did see those other violations.”

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order denying Tayborn’s motion to suppress. The district court determined that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based on at least two traffic violations: Tayborn’s failure to yield to oncoming traffic and the wheels of Taybom’s vehicle touching the road’s centerline. As a result, the district court concluded that it did not need to consider whether the third potential traffic violation argued by the state— passing a vehicle on the right through an intersection—also justified the stop. But the district court noted in the fact section that the officer conducted the traffic stop “based upon [Taybom] failing to properly yield to [the officer’s] car, crossing the centerline[,] and passing the stopped car on the right through the intersection.”

On appeal, Taybom argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the record does not show that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based on his observation of any traffic violation. Specifically, Taybom challenged the district court’s factual finding that the officer stopped Taybom’s car based on three separate traffic violations: failing to yield, crossing the centerline, and passing another car on the right in an intersection. Taybom argued that this factual finding is clearly erroneous because the officer’s police report identified only one reason for the stop—passing another car on the right. Taybom further claimed that the district court’s reliance on the officer’s testimony regarding the two other traffic violations was clearly erroneous because the officer did not testify that he was subjectively aware of these violations prior to the stop. Taybom also challenged the district court’s implicit determination that the officer testified credibly regarding his observation of Taybom’s driving conduct. Taybom therefore urged the appellate court to conclude that the district court erred by denying Taybom’s motion to suppress based on its determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Taybom for failing to yield and for veering onto the centerline of the road.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court stating:

"The record supports the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. First, video from the officer’s dashboard camera supports the district court’s findings that Taybom failed to yield to the officer, that the left-side tires of her car touched the road’s centerline, and that she passed another vehicle on the right at an intersection. In other words, the district court’s findings are supported by the evidence in the record. See Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 403. Second, the officer testified at the motion hearing that he “did see” all three potential violations. The district court implicitly credited that testimony, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. See Wilkes v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 111 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[Credibility determinations are the province of the district court.”). Third, both of the noted actions relied on by the district court were traffic infractions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.20, subd. 3, .18, subds. 4(4), 7(1) (2018); Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 823 (stating that an officer’s observation of any traffic violation can form the basis for a traffic stop). We therefore conclude that the record shows an objective basis for the stop."

"We are not persuaded otherwise by Taybom’s emphasis on the officer’s failure to document two of the potential traffic violations in his police report. “An officer’s failure to articulate observed violations of law as a basis for stopping a defendant is irrelevant under an objective standard.” State v. Beall, 111 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 755 n.5 (explaining that “the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is an ‘objective test’ and is not based on the subjective beliefs of the officer”). In Beall, a police officer initiated a traffic stop on the basis that the vehicle had a “brake light out.” 771 N.W.2d at 42. The officer also observed littering from the vehicle but did not record littering as a reason for the stop. Id. The driver argued that there was no basis for the stop because his vehicle, which had three brake lights, was still equipped with two working lights and littering was not the reason for the stop. Id. The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence from the stop. Id. This court reversed, explaining that the reasonable-suspicion standard is objective and concluding that both the inoperable brake light and the littering justified the traffic stop because both were unlawful. Id. at 44-45. With respect to the littering in particular, we emphasized that the officer observed the littering prior to the traffic stop. Id. at 45. “Therefore, even if [the officer’s] subjective basis for the stop was the nonfunctioning center brake light, the stop was also [objectively] justified based on [the officer’s] observation of littering.” Id. Applying that reasoning here, we conclude that the stop of Taybom was objectively justified based on the officer’s stated observation of two traffic violations—failure to yield and veering onto the centerline—even though the officer failed to document those violations in the police report."

Moral Of The Story: Writing things down is vastly overrated.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. McElree (Decided April 3, 2023, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that it is never a good idea to walk up to the police after you have been drinking and driving.  

In McElree, police officers for the city of Jordan received an harassment complaint. The complainant, J.L., alleged that his neighbor across the street, Defendant MacElree, had parked multiple vehicles in front of J.L.’s home, including two vehicles parked on either side of J.L.’s car. J.L. alleged that the vehicles on either side of his car were parked so close that he could not get into his car. J.L. also alleged that, while parking the vehicles, MacElree threatened to “tear [J.L.] apart” and knock his teeth out. J.L. showed the officers videos taken by his doorbell camera that seemed to confirm J.L.’s allegations. The videos showed the same man, later identified as MacElree, moving at least two vehicles and parking them in front of J.L. ’s home. The timestamps on the videos reflected that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles between approximately 8:55 and 9:05 p.m.

At about 9:48 p.m., while the officers were still on the scene, MacElree and a companion approached the responding officers. The officers were standing near the parked vehicles. One of the officers noticed that MacElree “smelled strongly of alcohol.” He asked MacElree if he had been drinking. MacElree responded with an expletive, claimed that his companion had driven the vehicles, and aggressively insisted that he had not driven anything. The officer did not ask MacElree to perform any field sobriety tests because of his “agitated state.” But the officer placed MacElree under arrest for suspicion of DWI. A breath test later showed that MacElree had an alcohol concentration of 0.28.

The State charged MacElree with two counts of Second Degree DWI. MacElree filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the two DWI counts for lack of probable cause to justify his arrest. In an accompanying memorandum, MacElree argued that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWI because he was not driving erratically, he did not demonstrate “other physical indicia of impairment,” the officer did not administer field sobriety or breath tests before his arrest, and he could have consumed alcohol “in the interim” between moving the vehicles and interacting with the officers some time later.

The state filed a brief opposing MacElree’s motion. The state argued that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI because the officer observed multiple signs of impairment, including a strong odor of alcohol and MacElree’s belligerent and uncooperative demeanor. In support of its position, the state filed several exhibits including: the complaint and supplemental police reports; videos taken by J.L.’s doorbell camera; and body-worn camera videos from multiple officers on the scene. The district court received these exhibits without objection from MacElree.

The district court granted MacElree’s motion and dismissed the DWI charges. The district court acknowledged that J.L. “told the officers that he saw [MacElree] drive the vehicles across the street and [the] officers identified the person in the doorbell videos as [MacElree] driving.” But the district court went on to explain that it could not “assume that [MacElree] did not consume alcohol between the time that he parked the cars and when he encountered police.” Therefore, there was “no way to prove that [MacElree] was under the influence of alcohol at the time he operated the car[s].” On that basis, the district court determined that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI and dismissed the two DWI counts against him.

The State appealed the district court's dismissal and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"The level of proof required to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest is “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). In making a probable-cause determination, courts must look to “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.” State v. Perkins, 582 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn. 1998). “The inquiry is objective, and the existence of probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual case.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly, we examine whether the district court considered all relevant facts known to the arresting officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest and whether those facts objectively establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI."

***

"The undisputed facts are sufficient to support the officer’s probable-cause determination under the applicable legal standard. The record reflects that MacElree drove at least two different vehicles near in time to when his neighbor reported being harassed, that MacElree was belligerent and generally combative with both his neighbor and police, and that the officer who arrested MacElree smelled a “strong” odor of alcohol coming from MacElree about 45 minutes after he drove the vehicles.  For the following reasons, we conclude that these facts reasonably warranted the officer’s belief that MacElree drove under the influence of alcohol. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120."

First, police observed multiple signs of MacElree’s intoxication. Only one objective indication of intoxication is required to establish probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence of alcohol. Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678. Here, police noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from MacElree and observed his belligerent and combative behavior. See Reeves, 751 N.W.2d at 120 (identifying the odor of alcohol as an indication of intoxication); Kiev, 678 N.W.2d at 678 (identifying “an uncooperative attitude” as an indication of intoxication). Significantly, MacElree also exhibited belligerent behavior— as evidenced by the neighbor’s doorbell videos—when he shouted threats at his neighbor.

Second, the record reflects that MacElree drove two vehicles and parked them near the neighbor’s car close in time to when he was belligerent to his neighbor. But, when asked by police whether he was driving, MacElree was evasive and untruthful. He asserted that his companion had driven the vehicles instead, a claim directly contradicted by the doorbell videos showing MacElree driving and parking the vehicles in front of his neighbor’s home. And, when asked if he had been drinking, MacElree did not deny consuming alcohol but insisted that he had not been driving. Taken together, the relevant facts known to the officer—the strong smell of alcohol, the belligerent behavior, the driving of vehicles, and the untruthful and evasive responses to questions about drinking and driving—are sufficient to establish probable cause for the officer to believe that MacElree drove and parked the vehicles while under the influence of alcohol. See Costillo v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 416 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1987) (considering defendant’s lying to police, belligerent behavior, and strong odor of alcohol, among other facts, as part of the totality of the circumstances supporting probable cause for DWI arrest).

***

"Here, the district court did not appear to properly consider whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest reasonably warranted the belief that MacElree was under the influence when he drove and parked the vehicles near his neighbor’s car. See id. Instead, the district court focused on the absence of evidence as to what MacElree was doing between when the neighbor observed him driving and when the officer spoke with MacElree about 45 minutes later. As a result, the district court mistakenly concluded that the state had not established probable cause for MacElree’s arrest. But, applying the proper legal standard, the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of MacElree’s arrest support a conclusion that the officer had probable cause to arrest MacElree for DWI, regardless of the time gap."

Moral Of The Story: If you are a mean drunk, stay home!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.