Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Olson v. One 2009 Lexus (Decided April 2, 2018, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that the Minnesota DWI Forfeiture Statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for a prompt hearing!

The Minnesota DWI Forfeiture Statute § 169A.63, subd. 9(d) states:

"A judicial determination under this subdivision must be held at the earliest practicable date, and in any event no later than 180 days following the filing of the demand by the claimant. If a related criminal proceeding is pending, the hearing shall not be held until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The district court administrator shall schedule the hearing as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the criminal prosecution. The district court administrator shall establish procedures to ensure efficient compliance with this subdivision. The hearing is to the court without a jury."

In other words, no hearing on the DWI forfeiture of the vehicle can be scheduled until after the criminal case against the driver has been resolved.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly held that the statute violates due process, noting:

"In Fedziuk, the supreme court considered the constitutionality of the 2003 amendments to Minnesota's implied-consent law, which authorized the court to stay a prehearing suspension of a driver's license revocation if a hearing was not held in 60 days, but which removed the previous requirement that judicial review be "held at the earliest practicable date, and in any event no later than 60 days following the filing of the petition for review." 696 N.W.2d at 345-46. The supreme court noted that "[b]y eliminating the requirement for prompt postrevocation judicial review, the 2003 amendments affected the driver's private interest in continued possession and use of the license pending the outcome of a hearing, the first part of the three-part test ixom Mathews." Id. at 346."

"The Fedziuk court held that because the amended statute did not specify a time period for judicial review, it did not provide sufficiently prompt review of the prehearing deprivation of property. Id. at 347-48. It also held that the immediate administrative hardship relief contemplated by the statute, although prompt, did not provide sufficiently meaningful review to adequately protect the procedural due-process rights of deprived parties. Id. at 348. The Fedziuk court explained that "minimal due process requires that the petitioner be given the right to compel witnesses to attend the hearing and to cross-examine persons who prepared [the police reports and lab reports relied upon]" and that the immediate administrative review contemplated under the implied-consent law did not provide for such an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 347-48. It concluded that a prehearing revocation of a driver's license under the amended implied-consent law procedure offended the driver's right to constitutional due process, and reinstated the earlier version of the law. Id. at 348-49."

"Applying Fedziuk, here, the record shows that, because the resolution of the Olsons' forfeiture action was tied to the resolution of Megan's related criminal and implied-consent actions, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(d), no hearing was held on the validity of the initial or continued seizure of the Lexus for over 18 months. We agree with the district court's conclusion that this procedure unconstitutionally denied the Olsons prompt review of the prehearing seizure of the Lexus."

I have been raising this same argument in all of my Minnesota DWI forfeiture cases and it looks like all my clients will soon be sitting in the driver's seat!!

Moral Of The Story: Justice delayed is justice denied!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI or are facing the DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and forfeiture questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Kokosh v. $4657 U.S. Currency (Decided May 30, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that in any forfeiture challenge (including Minnesota DWI vehicle forfeitures) the opposing party must be personally served or acknowledge in writing that they have received the forfeiture complaint in the mail.

The Kokosh case arises from the seizure and administrative forfeiture of $4,675 and a 2000 Lincoln LS automobile by the Minnesota State Patrol.  The state patrol personally served Mr. Kokosh with a copy of the notice of seizure and intent to forfeit the property.

On August 6, 2015 Mr. Kokosh's attorney filed a complaint for judicial determination of the forfeiture in Washington County District Court and he attempted to electronically serve the County Attorney's office but encountered some technical difficulties.  Mr. Kokosh's attorney was subsequently informed that the complaint was successfully filed and that the county would be served electronically as well. Believing that he had satisfied the requirements for service of process, Kokosh mailed a copy of the complaint to the county and the state patrol, but did not include an acknowledgement of service. The county never acknowledged service of Kokosh's complaint.

On November 19, the county filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Kokosh's failure to timely serve a complaint pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05. The district court agreed and dismissed Kokosh's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, noting:

"Jurisdiction to hear a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture attaches when an owner of the affected properly makes a timely demand that meets statutory requirements. Strict compliance is required, and if the owner of the affected property fails to properly serve the demand for judicial determination, no forfeiture action is commenced, and the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to address the matter."

"The administrative forfeiture statute provides the means by which a claimant may challenge the forfeiture. Specifically, a claimant may file a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture within 60 days following service of the notice of seizure and forfeiture of properly. Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3(a). 'The demand must be in the form of a civil complaint,' and must be filed with the court administrator 'together with proof of service' on the county. Id. Service on the county is by 'any means permitted by court rules.' Id. We conclude that, because it is a complaint that must be served on the opposing party in order to commence the civil in rem action, Minn. R. Civ. P. 4 is the only rule that applies. See id., subd. 3(b) ('[A]n action for the return of property seized under this section may not be maintained ... unless [claimant] has complied with this subdivision.')"

"The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure have a bifurcated system for service with different requirements for service of documents that commence an action and service of documents after an action has already been initiated. See In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 NW.2d 472, 475-76 (Minn. 2013) (explaining difference between rule 4 and rule 5)."

"Service of a complaint when commencing an action must be completed by: (1) personal service under rule 4.03; (2) publication under rule 4.04; or (3) U.S. mail under rule 4.05. When serving a party by mail, service is complete "at the date of acknowledgment of service." Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(b). The rules of civil procedure do not allow for electronic service of a complaint 'unless consented to by the defendant either in writing or electronically.'"

"After Kokosh unsuccessfully attempted to electronically serve his complaint, he then attempted service by mail rather than by publication or personal service. As a result, service by mail under rule 4.05 is applicable here. Service by mail requires strict compliance and is not effective if the acknowledgment is not signed and returned. See Coons v. St. Paul Cos., 486 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1992). It is uncontested that Kokosh's initial mailing to the county did not include an acknowledgment of service. Therefore, Kokosh's attempted service by mail was ineffective."

"We hold that service of a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture must be completed according to specifically Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and not Rule 5, unless electronic service is consented to by the opposing party. Kokosh did not satisfy the service requirements of the rules of civil procedure, and the county did not consent to electronic service. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing this matter due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."

This case is important as it makes clear that any Minnesota forfeiture (including any Minnesota DWI vehicle forfeiture) is subject to the strict service requirements of a civil action and the failure to comply with the rules will result in the dismissal of the vehicle forfeiture challenge. 

Moral Of The Story:  If you want to succeed at the game, you have to know the rules!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Briles v. One GMC Motor Vehicle (Decided March 13, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition even if a motor vehicle is subject to a DWI forfeiture, the insurance proceeds arising from the DWI crash are not!

In Briles the Savage police arrested Russell Briles's drunk son after he crashed and totaled Briles's GMC Terrain sport utility vehicle. The police department seized the vehicle and notified Briles of its intent to forfeit it under the impaired-driver forfeiture statute, Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63. Briles had no intent to recover the totaled, seized wreck, planning instead to recover on his automobile insurance policy. But unbeknownst to Briles, the police department's attorney told his insurer to hold any insurance proceeds and implied that the department had the right to them. Briles discovered the city's representation to his insurer only after the statutory 60-day deadline for his right to file a civil complaint to challenge the forfeiture.

Briles filed a demand for judicial determination anyway, arguing that the GMC had been improperly seized and that insurance proceeds are not forfeitable under the statute. The district court rejected his filing as untimely based on its conclusion that the police department had the right to any insurance proceeds.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, stating:

"We believe this case can be resolved on the statute's plain language. Section 169A.63 nowhere specifies that money, proceeds, or anything other than the right, title, and interest in the vehicle itself is forfeitable: "All right, title, and interest in a vehicle subject to forfeiture under this section vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the conduct resulting in the designated offense or designated license revocation giving rise to the forfeiture." Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 3."

"Neither party argues that section 169A.63 is ambiguous. Rather, they dispute whether the forfeiting agency's "right, title, and interest" in a forfeited vehicle extends to the right to related insurance proceeds, which in some sense represent the wrecked vehicle. The legislature has written a broader statute, which was not invoked and does not apply here, to expressly include the targeted property and property "that represents] proceeds of a designated offense": "All personal property is subject to forfeiture if it was used or intended for use to commit or facilitate the commission of a designated offense. All money and other property, real and personal, that represent proceeds of a designated offense, and all contraband property, are subject to forfeiture, except as provided in this section." Minn. Stat. § 609.5312, subd. 1(a) (2016). And the legislature expressly urges that we treat this criminal forfeiture statute, section 609.5312, liberally rather than strictly. See Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. la (2016) (stating that sections 609.531 to 609.5318 must be liberally construed). This demonstrates that the legislature knows how to expressly include the kind of liberal and broadening language that the city asks us to incorporate inferentially into section 169A.63. Because we presume that the legislature is aware of the caselaw consistently treating the impaired-driver forfeiture statute strictly against an agency's power to take a vehicle by forfeiture, in contrast to the liberal treatment of criminal forfeiture statutes, we can infer that its choice not to add any broadening language in section 169A.63 is intentional. Nothing in the language of section 169A.63 moves us to believe that any property other than the right, title, and interest in the offender's vehicle itself is forfeitable property under that section."

The Minnesota Court of Appeals therefore correctly held, "...as to the forfeiture of any insurance proceeds resulting from an insurance policy covering Briles's vehicle, the district court incorrectly concluded that the "right, title, and interest" to a forfeited vehicle includes the right to the owner's contractual interest in the insurance proceeds.

Moral of the Story:  You can lose your car but you can still get your money!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. St. John (A Published Decision, Minnesota Court of Appeals, issued May 19, 2014) which stands for the proposition that Third Degree DWI is not a lesser included offense of Second Degree Refusal and, for sentencing and conviction purposes, the Third Degree DWI offense is more serious than the Second Degree DWI Refusal.

In St. John, the Defendant had one prior DWI within the past ten years when she was arrested for the current DWI offense.  The Defendant refused to submit to testing at the police station and was subsequently charged with Third Degree DWI (i.e. DWI with one prior offense) and Second Degree DWI Refusal (i.e. Refusal with one prior DWI).

The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to both the Second Degree DWI Refusal and the Third Degree DWI.  At sentencing, the Defendant's attorney argued that the Defendant could be convicted of only one offense but not both.  The District Court agreed and held that Third Degree DWI is a lesser included offense of Second Degree DWI and sentenced the Defendant for the Second Degree offense.

On Appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in part, finding that the District Court erred when it held that Third Degree DWI was a lesser included offense of Second Degree Refusal.  The Court of Appeals noted at in order for an offense to be a "lesser included" one, all of the elements of the "lesser" offense MUST BE contained in the elements of the "greater" offense.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that in order to be convicted of Third Degree DWI, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was under the influence at the time of driving.  But Second Degree Refusal only requires that the officer have "probable cause" to believe the Defendant was under the influence at the time of the refusal.  Because an officer could have probable cause to believe that a driver was under the influence of alcohol even though the driver was not, in fact, under the influence of alcohol, a driver could commit the second-degree test-refusal offense without committing the third-degree driving-under-the-influence offense.  Thus the District Court erred when it held that the Third Degree DWI was a lesser included offense of Second Degree Refusal.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals further held that it was error to sentence the Defendant on the Second Degree DWI count instead of the Third Degree DWI offense.  

The Court of Appeals noted that in State v. Simon, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the offenses of driving under the influence and test refusal, "arose from a single behavioral incident and therefore, under Minnesota Statute § 609.035 the driver may only be sentenced for one offense".  But which one?

Minnesota Statute § 609.035 contemplates that the defendant will be sentenced for the "most serious" of the offenses arising out of the single behavioral incident because imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all offenses.  In determining which offense is the most serious, the court should first look to the maximum sentence for each offense.  Where, as here, the maximum penalties are the same, the court must then look to the nature of the offenses to determine which is the most serious.

In this case, the Court of Appeals found that the Third Degree DWI was more serious than the Second Degree Refusal offense and held that the Defendant should have been sentenced to Third Degree DWI.  The Court reasoned that, "A person driving while under the influence of alcohol directly threatens public safety, but a driver in police custody who refuses to submit to a chemical test is not a threat to public safety".  The driving under the influence offense was the "essence" of her criminal conduct as the driver could not have committed the test refusal offense if the officer did not first believe that the Defendant was driving under the influence.  Therefore, the district court should have imposed a sentence for the driving under the influence offense rather than the second degree refusal offense.

THIS CASE IS HUGE because under Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a person must be convicted of a Second Degree DWI offense before forfeiture of a motor vehicle may occur.  A conviction does not occur until the Defendant is sentenced.  So if a prosecutor charges a Defendant with Second Degree Refusal and Third Degree DWI, the defendant is better off pleading to both counts as the conviction will only be for the Third Degree DWI and any forfeiture of the motor vehicle must be dismissed!

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is the Minnesota Supreme Court Case of  Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, (decided October 2, 2012) which stands for the proposition that in order to forfeit a vehicle pursuant to the Minnesota DWI forfeiture statute, the owner of the vehicle must first be convicted of the designated DWI criminal offense.

In Patino, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI which gave rise to the forfeiture of his vehicle.  The Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI because he had one prior DWI within ten years of the current offense and he also had a child in the vehicle at the time of the current offense.  The Defendant was allowed to plead guilty to Third Degree DWI (child endangerment) and then he sought the judicial return of his vehicle.

It was the Defendant's position that since he had not been convicted of a designated forfeiture offense (i.e. Second Degree DWI) he was entitled to the vehicle's return. The State, however, argued that although a conviction of a designated offense creates a presumption of judicial forfeiture, such a conviction is not required under the statute. Instead, the State claimed that section 169A.63, subdivision 9(f), prohibits forfeiture only if the driver is not convicted of any charge. 

The Minnesota Supreme Court (fortunately) rejected the State's position and affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling which had ordered the return of the vehicle.  The Minnesota Supreme Court in its ruling noted:

"It is undisputed that respondent made a timely demand for a judicial determination under subdivision 8(f). Thus, the administrative proceeding under subdivision 8 was converted into a judicial proceeding under subdivision 9, and subdivision 9 governs the judicial forfeiture proceeding. 

Subdivision 9(f) provides that when forfeiture is based on the commission of a designated offense and the person charged with the designated offense appears in court as required and is not convicted of the offense, the court shall order the property returned to the person legally entitled to it upon that person’s compliance with the redemption requirements of section 169A.42. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f). Under subdivision 9(f), when a person charged with a designated offense appears in court and is not convicted of the designated offense, “the court shall order the property returned to the person legally entitled to it” provided that the redemption requirements of section 169A.42 are satisfied. The word “shall” has been interpreted as mandatory."

*     *     *

"It is certainly true that the burden of proof imposed upon the State for vehicle forfeiture is higher for a judicial forfeiture than for an administrative forfeiture. But it is within the province of the Legislature to provide for different standards for vehicle forfeiture in administrative and judicial proceedings. An administrative forfeiture under subdivision 8 requires only a showing that the vehicle was “used to commit a designated offense or used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation . . . .” In contrast, judicial forfeiture under subdivision 9(f) provides that when the person charged with the designated offense “appears in court as required and is not convicted of the offense, the court shall order the property returned”.

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Patino therefore held that since the defendant had not been convicted of the designated forfeiture offense, he was entitled to the return of the vehicle.

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney, Minnesota DUI Lawyer, Minneapolis DWI Attorney, Minneapolis DUI Lawyer

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of The Week is   Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, (decided October 31, 2011) a published decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals which stands for the proposition that in order for a DWI vehicle forfeiture to be valid, the Defendant must be convicted of the underlying offense which gave rise to the forfeiture in the first place.  This case is significant as it finally overrules Mastakoski v. 2003 Dodge Durango,  738 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. App. 2007).

In Patino, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI which gave rise to the forfeiture of his vehicle.  The Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI because he had one prior DWI within ten years of the current offense and he also had a child in the vehicle at the time of the current offense.  The Defendant was allowed to plead guilty to Third Degree DWI (child endangerment) and then he sought the judicial return of his vehicle.

It was the Defendant's position that since he had not been convicted of a designated forfeiture offense (i.e. Second Degree DWI) he was entitled to the vehicle's return.  The State on the other hand relied on Mastakoski v. 2003 Dodge Durango, which had held that the driver need not be convicted of a designated forfeiture offense as long as the driving conduct constituted the commission of a designated offense.

In rejecting the state's position and overruling Mastakoski, the Patino court held, "Forfeiture is a civil in rem cause of action; because it is punitive in nature, the reviewing court strictly construes the language of a forfeiture statute and resolves any doubts in favor of the party challenging the forfeiture...." 

In Mastakoski the Court "...did not address the language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(f), which unequivocally states that if 'the forfeiture is based on the commission of a designated offense and the person charged with the designated offense appears in court as required and is not convicted of the offense, the court shall order the property returned to the person legally entitled to it."

The court in Patino therefore held that since the defendant had not been convicted of the designated forfeiture offense, he was entitled to the return of the vehicle.

Moral of the Story:  Give Them Long Enough And They Will Get It Right!

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney, Minnesota DUI Lawyer, Minneapolis DWI Attorney, Minneapolis DUI Lawyer

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota Case of the Week is the published decision of Mycka v. One 2003 GMC Envoy Automobile (decided June 15, 2010).

Mr. Mycka was arrested for driving while impaired (DWI) and due to his previous driving record, the City of Fridley sought the forfeiture of his 2003 GMC Envoy.

The city seized the vehicle after Mycka was released from jail and after he had retrieved his vehicle from a private towing company.  Mr. Mycka then challenged in district court the city's seizure on the ground that, without process issued by a court, the city was not authorized to seize the vehicle from him.  The district court denied the claim, but on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered the vehicle returned to Mr. Mycka.

If a law enforcement agency does not obtain process issued by a court, the agency may, in the alternative, seize a motor vehicle subject to forfeiture pursuant to any of the following three exceptions:

(1)   the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or a lawful search;

(2)  the vehicle subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor to the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section; or

(3)  the appropriate agency has probable cause to believe that the delay occasioned by the necessity to obtain process would result in the removal or destruction of the vehicle.

In the present case, the City of Fridley sought to justify the forfeiture seizure without court process by claiming that the vehicle was seized, "incident to a lawful arrest".

The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the City's position, stating:

"Ultimately, this case can be resolved on the simple ground that the seizure occurred so late in time.  The city did not initiate the administrative seizure of Mycka's vehicle while Mycka still was under arrest.  Mycka was released from detention, and he retrieved his vehicle from Shorty's Towing.  Not until the following day--approximately 36 hours after his arrest and approximately 24 hours after his release from the county jail--did the city's police officers seize Mycka's vehicle from his residence.  There was a clear break in time between the arrest and the seizure.  These facts compel the conclusion that the city did not seize Mycka's vehicle 'incident to' his arrest, as required by section 1679A.63, subdivision 2(b)(1).

Moral of the Story:  He Who Hesitates Is Lost!!

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney, Minnesota DUI Lawyer, Minneapolis DWI Attorney, Minneapolis DUI Lawyer

F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Lawyer

Minnesota DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is: Laase v. One 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe. In Laase, the Minnesota Supreme Court upended existing case law and held that the "innocent owner defense" of the DWI vehicle forfeiture statute does not apply in the case of a jointly held vehicle where one of the joint owners is also the defendant offender causing the forfeiture of the vehicle.

David and Jean Laase were a fine married couple who belonged to their local country club. David, after playing golf, headed home leaving his wife behind at the club with one of their jointly owned vehicles. Jean Laase remained at the club to play in a golf league event.

Mr. Laase did not observe his wife consume any alcohol and had no knowledge of her activities after he left the club. At approximately 1:00 a.m., David Laase received a call from his wife stating that she had been arrested for a DWI. The current offense and the driving record of Jean Laase qualified the jointly held vehicle for forfeiture under the Minnesota DWI forfeiture statute.

David Laase challenged the County's seizure of the vehicle by making a Demand for Judicial Determination pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169A.63. After a hearing, the District Court decided that the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture because Mr. Laase had demonstrated that he was an "innocent owner" under Minn.Stat. § 169A. 63, subd. 7(d).

The County appealed the decision but the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. So far, so good for Mr. Laase!!

The County then Petitioned for Further Review to the Minnesota Supreme Court and alas, in a decision dated 12/17/09, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.

In its opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted:

"The question presented in this case is whether the innocent owner defense provided for in Minnesota‘s vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d), applies to prevent forfeiture of the Laases‘ vehicle. Under this defense:

A motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture under this section if its owner can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the owner took reasonable steps to prevent the use of the vehicle by the offender.Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d).

Each party argues that the plain language of subdivision 7(d) supports its position. The County argues that the innocent owner defense does not apply because both owners were not innocent. Mr. Laase argues that, because he is an owner and innocent, the defense is available."

The Minnesota Supreme Court went on to note:

"The parties appear to agree that the innocent owner defense in the vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d), is unambiguous. The parties disagree, however, over whether all owners of the vehicle must be innocent in order for the defense to apply. The statute is written in the singular, providing that the defense is available if the vehicle‘s owner demonstrates innocence. But the County contends that we should rely on the canon in which the legislature has stated that the singular includes the plural. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) (2008). With owner construed as ‘owners” in subdivision 7(d), the County argues it is clear that the defense does not apply to this case because both “owners” were not innocent."

In a 4 to 3 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court bought the county's argument and held that "owner" means "owners" and since both "owners" are not "innocent" the innocent-owner defense does not apply to a jointly held vehicle where one of the owners is the defendant/offender.

Great. So in other words, a perfectly innocent individual must now suffer an economic loss; the innocent must lose their equity in the property if they hold it jointly with someone who happens to commit a crime. I respectfully submit that the Supreme Court's decision is just not fair.

I always thought that the sins of the father shall not be visited upon the son. But I guess that does not apply to a husband and wife.

Moral of the Story: Don't drink and drive or own property with anyone who does!!


F.T. Sessoms, Minnesota DWI Attorney

The following chart summarizes the cases in which the vehicle is subject to forfeiture:

Chemical Test	Prior Record (Prior means a previous DUI or alcohol related license revocation)	Vehicle Forfeiture
.20 or more	With one prior within the past 10 years	Yes
Refusal	With one prior within the past 10 years	Yes
.08 with child endangerment	With one prior within the past 10 years	Yes
Refusal with child endangerment	Without any priors	Yes
.08	With two or more priors within the past 10 years	Yes
.08 or refusal	With a "B" card or driving drunk while license has been previously cancelled as "inimical to public safety".	Yes