Friday, November 13, 2026

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Knapp V. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided November 12, 2026 Minn.),wherein the Minnesota Supreme Court was asked to decide whether or not a deficient observation period automatically excludes the data master breath test result. And the short answer from the Supreme Court was: No. "The district court must consider all record evidence bearing on whether the breath sample was contaminated and must admit the test result if a preponderance of the evidence shows that the breath sample was not contaminated".

In Knapp, the appellant was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and consented to a breath test that showed his alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit. Knapp challenged the revocation on the sole ground that the arresting officer conducted an inadequate pre-test observation period.

The district court found that the observation period was inadequate and that Knapp’s test result was inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in ruling the test result was inadmissible based solely on evidence of an imperfect observation period. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and sent the case back down to the district court for further findings.

Knapp argued that a test result can be admitted without antecedent expert testimony establishing that the breath testing instrument provided a trustworthy and reliable measure of alcohol concentration in the breath sample only if all protocols necessary to establish reliability were properly performed in the particular case. Knapp asserted that an adequate observation period is one of the protocols required for admissibility. It was Knapp's claim that without an adequate observation period, the breath test result must automatically be excluded.

The Commissioner of Public Safety Agreed that test result admissibility requires considering whether the breath test was properly administered in the particular case. The Commissioner, however, argued that this consideration is limited to the administration or use of the instrument.

The Commissioner asserted that the observation period is not a protocol related to the use of the instrument. Consequently, if the record shows that a trained operator properly followed all steps needed to operate an approved instrument, the breath test results that the instrument generates are admissible.

The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with both Knapp and the Commissioner of Public Safety, finding that an inadequate observation period does not per se result in the exclusion of the breath test. Rather, the Supreme Court held that the district court must look at all the evidence to determine whether or not the breath test result is reliable. Or, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court:

"In summary, based on our analysis of the relevant cases and Minn. Stat. §634.16, we conclude that the risk that a breath sample was contaminated could support a district court determination that the breath test result reached with that sample is inadmissible, but that such a determination must be based on all record evidence bearing on whether the sample was contaminated, with the proponent of admissibility bearing the burden under a preponderance of the evidence standard. An imperfect observation is not a per se reason to exclude the breath test result."

***

"For admissibility purposes, the proponent may establish foundation that the breath-test instrument accurately and reliably analyzed a breath sample and reported an alcohol-concentration measurement from that sample without expert testimony if two conditions are met: (1) the instrument has been approved by the Commissioner, and (2) the person operating the instrument was fully trained pursuant to Commissioner-approved training.17 Minn. Stat. § 634.16; Quinn, 182 N.W.2d at 845.

The proponent of admitting a breath test must also establish foundation that the breath test was properly administered in the particular case, including that the breath test provided a reliable measure of the alcohol content of the driver’s deep lung breath. Dille, 258 N.W.2d at 567. Under our alcohol-content-test-result-admissibility precedent, flaws in administering a breath test do not decisively establish that the breath-test result is inadmissible because it lacks foundational reliability. Id. at 567–68; Habisch, 313 N.W.2d at 16. Rather, the test result may be admissible if sufficient record evidence shows that the reliability purposes that the allegedly flawed protocol serves—here, preventing test results that are not a measure of the alcohol concentration in the driver’s deep lung breath—were met. Dille, 258 N.W.2d at 568.

In assessing whether a breath-test result is admissible, and specifically whether the breath sample tested was not contaminated so as to provide a reliable measure of the alcohol content of the driver’s deep lung breath, a district court should consider all the evidence bearing on that question. Ultimately, when a defendant challenges a test sample on the ground that it may have been contaminated, the district court should assess admissibility under a preponderance of evidence standard, asking whether it is more likely than not that the test results reflect a reliable measure of the alcohol concentration of a driver’s deep lung breath."

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"The purpose of an observation period, like the sterilization of a needle and bottle in Dille, is to prevent sample contamination. Thus, the question in this case is whether all pertinent evidence shows, by a preponderance of evidence, that Knapp’s breath sample accurately tested deep lung air—i.e., it was not contaminated. If the answer is “Yes,” then the district court should admit the test-result evidence.

In answering this question here, we decline to adopt the court of appeals’ position that Knapp’s failure to introduce direct affirmative evidence of mouth alcohol means the breath test is admissible. As discussed above, the burden is on the Commissioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Knapp’s breath sample was not contaminated. Under our precedent on the admissibility of test results for alcohol concentration, we also reject Knapp’s position that an inadequate observation period, standing alone, is dispositive of admissibility. Inadequacies in an observation period are one factor to consider in assessing, under the preponderance of the evidence standard, whether it is more likely than not that a breath sample was not contaminated."

***

"...we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that Knapp’s test result was unreliable because the court did not apply the appropriate analysis in assessing the test result’s foundational reliability and, consequently, based its decision on an erroneous view of the law. The district court remains, however, in the best position to make that determination under the proper standard articulated in this opinion. Therefore, we remand to the district court to determine whether Knapp’s breath-test results are admissible under the standard we articulate today."

Moral Of The Story: Law enforcement is on notice that they need to pay attention!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.



 


 

Wednesday, August 5, 2026

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Wirkus v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided August 3, 2026, Unpublished, Minnesota Court of Appeals) which stands for the proposition that if you have been drinking and driving and make it safely home, KEEP YOUR DOOR SHUT!

In Wirkus, the Petitioner caused a disturbance at her former place of employment and then left the scene.  The former employer called the police complaining Ms. Wirkus was drunk and provided a description of her vehicle and license plate.

The police drove to the Petitioner's residence to investigate and to serve her with a "Trespass Notice" from the former employer. The police went to the front door of her home, which had a screen door attached that opened outwards from the home's solid front door.  

The officer rang the bell but no one answered.  The officer then opened the screen door and knocked on the solid door.  A man identified as Wirkus’s fiance opened the front door. At that moment, a dog slipped out of the house and into the yard. The fiance stepped out of the house and closed the front door and told the officers to “hang on” while he went into the yard to collect the dog. The officer remained at the front entrance, holding the screen door open with her body. After a short time, the officer again knocked on the front door and waited. Getting no response, she knocked again.

Ms. Wirkus opened the front door. She stepped one foot outside, reached out and grabbed the screen door with her left hand, and said, “I’m going to shut this door.” At the same time, Wirkus reached her right hand out and pushed against Olstad’s utility belt, which was equipped with a service weapon, a taser, ammunition, and a baton. The police immediately grabbed Wirkus’s right arm, pulled her fully outside, and tried to put her arms behind her back to place her in handcuffs. 

The police brought the Petitioner to the station where she agreed to submit to a Data Master breath test with a result of .14% BAC.

The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked the Petitioner's license and she filed a challenge to the revocation arguing (among other things) that the police unlawfully intruded on her residence without a warrant.

The District Court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation noting:

"Wirkus argues that the district court misapplied Hasse in concluding that Olstad did not intrude on her residence by preventing the front door from closing. In Hasse, we held that an officer committed a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area by “kicking his leg out to trip the auto-reverse sensor” of a garage-door opener to prevent a garage door from closing when Hasse was inside his garage and trying to close the door. 679 N.W.2d at 745. We reasoned that, while a garage can be entered by officers if left “impliedly open,” Hasse’s garage was not impliedly open because he was trying to close the door. Id. at 746-47. As a result, the officer had entered an area in which Hasse had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 747. The district court here distinguished Hasse, explaining the officers “did not prevent the closing of any door that was in the process of being closed” and, instead, were reacting for their own safety to Wirkus’s “aggressive conduct” of taking a step out of the door and pushing on Officer Olstad’s utility belt."

"Wirkus argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Olstad did not prevent a door from being closed because Olstad admitted that she was blocking the screen door from being closed. At the hearing, Olstad agreed that she was “holding the screen door open with [her] body.” But the issue here, as in Hasse, is whether Olstad, by holding the screen door open, was intruding on a place in which Wirkus had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 746. There are two main differences between this case and Hasse that establish that Olstad was not intruding in a protected place."

"First, the screen door here opened outward such that Olstad did not have to enter the house to open it or hold it open. This situation is different from Hasse, in which the officer had to move his foot into the garage (a constitutionally protected space) to keep the door open. See id. at 745. The officers here only intruded on the area outside the front entrance, which is a constitutionally unprotected space. See Crea, 233 N.W.2d at 739; see also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 40-42 (1976) (concluding that the appellant had no expectation of privacy when standing in her doorway). And, as the district court noted, Wirkus opened the front door—the officers neither opened it nor blocked any attempt to close it."

"Second, neither Wirkus’s nor her fiance’s conduct supported a reasonable expectation of privacy in the screen door area before the seizure. The fiance made no attempt to close it when he answered the door and stepped outside to chase the dog. And when Wirkus finally answered the door, the screen door had been open for over a minute. In these circumstances, Olstad had no reason to believe that the screen door area was not impliedly open. This differs from Hasse, in which the officer saw the garage door being closed and then intruded to keep it open. See Haase, 679 N.W.2d at 745. It is true that Wirkus likely established an expectation of privacy when she opened the front door, took a step outside, said that she was going to close the screen door, and tried to close it. But Wirkus simultaneously pushed Olstad’s utility belt, which triggered the officers’ seizure of Wirkus, and Olstad had no time to react to Wirkus’s newly expressed intent to close the screen door. Therefore, Olstad’s opening of the screen door and holding it open until the seizure did not intrude on an area with a reasonable expectation of privacy."

***

"And unlike in Hulne, Wirkus actually stepped out of her home before the seizure. 'A search occurs whenever governmental agents intrude upon an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.' In re Welfare ofB.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn. 2003). The officers here did not enter Wirkus’s home and thus did not intrude upon a protected area."

Moral Of The Story: Curiosity can also catch a cat.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.