Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Carson (Decided October 11, 2017, Minnesota Supreme Court) which stands for the proposition that if a dangerous substance is not listed as a "hazardous substance" in the DWI statute, a person under the influence of the substance may not be convicted of a DWI.

In Carson, the Defendant was arrested three times for DWI.  Each time she was arrested, her blood or urine was found to contain the chemical 1,1-difluoroethane (DFE).  It appears that the Defendant would purchase cans of compressed air which contain DFE as a propellant and she would get high by inhaling, or "huffing" the chemical.

In three separate cases, respondent State of Minnesota charged Carson with two counts of third-degree DWI, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. l(2)-(3), 169A.26 (2016)—one for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a hazardous substance and one for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance. Carson filed a motion to dismiss the hazardous-substance DWI charges because she claimed, in part, that there was insufficient evidence that she was under the influence of a "hazardous substance" as defined in Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 9.

During a contested omnibus hearing, a forensic scientist testified that DFE is "a propellant commonly seen in cans . . . usually found in products used to clean keyboards on computers." The scientist explained:

[DFE] is commonly seen in a product called Dust-Off It is commonly abused as an inhalant simply because it is easy to obtain and you don't need to be a particular age to acquire it or purchase it, and it will produce a pretty rapid high, as well.

The abuse comes from inhaling, whether it be through a small tube . . . or . . . a bag that is held over the nose and mouth of the person ....

It is flammable .... [T]he can is under pressure so there is a hazard. . . .

If it is inhaled ... it can [cause injury].

The district court found that the characteristics of DFE made it a hazardous substance under the DWI statutes and denied Carson's motion to dismiss.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, noting:

"In Minnesota, it is a crime to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while "the person is knowingly under the influence of a hazardous substance that affects the nervous system, brain, or muscles of the person so as to substantially impair the person's ability to drive or operate the motor vehicle." Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added). Hazardous substance, in turn, is defined as "any chemical or chemical compound that is listed as a hazardous substance in rules adopted under chapter 182 (occupational safety and health)." Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 9 (emphasis added)."

"Chapter 5206 contains a specific rule on hazardous substances, which includes a "[l]ist of hazardous substances" in alphabetical order."

***

"Carson contends that Minn. R. 5206.0400, subp. 5, is the only list of hazardous substances in the applicable rules, and that this list does not include DFE. The State argues that Minn. R. 5206.0400 acknowledges that the list of hazardous substances in subpart 5 of the rule is "illustrative" and "does not include all hazardous substances." As a result, the State contends that Minn. R. 5206.0100, subp. 7(B), contains "a list of characteristics which, if possessed, would make a chemical or substance or a mixture ... a hazardous substance." According to the State, DFE meets the definition of a hazardous substance under Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 9, because it "possesses a number of characteristics listed under Minn. R. 5206.0100, subp. 7(B)."

In rejecting the State's position, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held:

"If the Legislature had wanted to criminalize the operation of a motor vehicle while knowingly under the influence of any substance that meets the definition of a hazardous substance for purposes of the occupational safety and health rules, it knew how to do so and could have done so explicitly by using a phrase like "has the meaning given." The statutory language plainly demonstrates that the types of hazardous substances that can give rise to a driving-while-impaired conviction are limited to those substances specifically listed in Minn. R. 5206.0400, subp. 5."

"We acknowledge that based on our holding today, a driver dangerously intoxicated by DFE is not criminally liable under the plain language of the current DWI statutes. The dissent argues that the Legislature could not have intended this outcome. In other words, the dissent concludes that the Legislature could not have intended to criminalize the operation of a motor vehicle while the driver is knowingly under the influence of only those chemical compounds that are explicitly listed as hazardous substances under the occupational health and safety rules. But "[fjhis public policy concern should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state's laws as they are, not as some argue they should be."

Moral Of The Story: Everyone Is Entitled To Know Beforehand If Their Conduct Is Illegal.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota Star Tribune reports today that the woman accused of hitting and killing a Wayzata police officer with her car had cocaine in her system at the time of the accident. Beth Freeman is charged with two counts of criminal vehicular homicide as the result of the September accident which killed Wayzata P0lice Officer William Mathews.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms notes the fact that Ms. Freeman had cocaine in her blood makes the State's case substantially easier to prove.  In order to obtain a criminal vehicular homicide conviction, the State must ordinarily prove that the defendant committed "gross negligence".  "Gross negligence" is defined in Minnesota law as the "complete absence of care or acting with a wanton disregard for the lives or safety of others."  Thus for example, an accident caused by the failure to yield to another vehicle or by speeding would not constitute "gross negligence" as mere negligent conduct isn't sufficient to charge the crime of criminal vehicular homicide.

Minnesota Statute § 609.21 also provides, however, that a person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide if the person causes the death of another person as a result of operating a motor vehicle "in a negligent manner while an amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinol, is present in the person's body.

So Ms. Freeman better hope that the search warrant used to obtain her  blood or urine was deficient as otherwise, the State's case just got a lot easier to prove.

If you or a loved one has been charged with Criminal Vehicular Homicide or Criminal Vehicular Operation, or if you are facing a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms for answers to all of your legal questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Karger (Decided September 25, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a person is not under arrest even after the police can place the suspect in the back of a squad car and return the suspect to the scene of an accident. What a bunch of nonsense.

In Karger, the driver of a Pontiac Grand Prix rolled into a ditch along a highway in Swift County. A witness stopped, called police, and transported the driver—and the sole occupant—to a local bar, one mile away, where the driver waited for a ride. Approximately 20 minutes after the 911 call, police officer Justin Girard arrived at the bar. From police dispatch, Officer Girard knew that the driver was a female, appeared to be under the influence, had a cut on her hand, and was waiting for a ride. While speaking with Officer Girard, Karger denied that she was involved in the accident. The bartender explained, however, that the witness had dropped off Karger, that Karger was the only other person at the bar, and that Karger had admitted that she had been involved in a car accident. Returning to speak with Karger, Officer Girard observed that she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. She had slurred speech, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and had poor balance. She also had a cut on her hand. Girard asked Karger to accompany him to the accident site and get her car. Girard neither placed Karger in handcuffs nor said that she was under arrest.

At the scene, Officer Girard learned that the Pontiac was registered to Karger under her previous name. Karger agreed to perform field sobriety tests and failed. On a preliminary breath test, her breath sample registered an alcohol concentration of 0.19. After being placed under arrest and transported to jail, Karger agreed to a blood alcohol test, which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.263. 

Karger moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Officer Giarard unlawfully arrested her without probable cause.  Karger claimed that she was under arrest when she was placed in the back of the squad car and was transported back to the accident site.

The District Court denied the Motion to Suppress and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, noting:

"In consideration of whether an investigatory stop has exceeded its limits relative to the reasonable suspicion standard, Minnesota courts have asked whether an interpretation of the circumstances would permit a reasonable person to believe that she was under arrest and not free to leave. See id. Ultimately, the test is one of reasonableness, which requires balancing 'the nature and degree of the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against the government’s interest in crime prevention and legitimate concerns about the safety of law-enforcement officers.'"

"Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Officer Girard did not transform the investigative stop into an unlawful arrest by placing Karger in the squad car. Officer Girard knew that the driver of the rollover accident was dropped off at the bar. Karger was the only person at the bar, other than a bartender who confirmed that she was dropped off and had admitted to being involved in a car accident. Knowing that the driver had a cut on her hand, Officer Girard independently observed the cut on Karger’s hand. As Officer Girard explained at the pretrial hearing, he was still unsure whether Karger was in fact the driver but asked her to come to the accident scene, one mile away.

"The record reflects that Karger was detained for fewer than fifteen minutes. Cf. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d at 117 (upholding reasonableness of investigatory detention that lasted more than one hour). Girard did not place Karger under arrest during the investigation and he did not handcuff her. The brief detention allowed Officer Girard to continue his investigation of the rollover. In light of Karger’s denial of involvement in the rollover against corroborating evidence suggesting otherwise, Officer Girard’s investigatory detention was justified to freeze the situation."

The problem with the Court of Appeals decision is: Whether a person is under arrest is not balancing test!  The test for whether  a person is under arrest is whether a "reasonable person would believe they are free to leave", period.  As soon as you start weighing the police need to investigate a crime, the suspect is always going to lose!  Very disappointed in this decision!!

Moral Of The Story:  Always ask if you are under arrest before going anywhere with the police.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota Case of The Week is State v. Blumke (Decided October 2, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that if the law changes before an appeal is final, the Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the change.

In Blumke, the Defendant was arrested in June 2014 for Felony DWI and at the time of his arrest, Defendant was read the Minnesota Implied Consent advisory which informed him that Minnesota law required him to submit to a chemical test to determine if he was under the influence of alcohol and that refusing such a test was a crime. Appellant agreed to a blood test, which revealed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

The Defendant moved to suppress the blood test and dismiss the Complaint but the motion was denied by the district court.  In June 2016, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's test-refusal statute as it applies to breath tests but ruled that the search -incident-to-arrest exception and implied consent did not justify a warrantless blood test. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184-86 (2016).

Therefore, under Birchfield, the MInnesota Implied Consent Advisory was misleading and violated due process regarding blood tests because a person has a constitutional right to require the state to obtain a search warrant for blood.

On Appeal, Blumke argued the district court erred by declining to apply Birchfield's holding to the facts of his case and the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, noting:

"We conclude that the district court erred by declining to consider appellant's case in light of Birchfield, which was released before appellant's conviction became final. A judgment of conviction is final when direct appeals are exhausted or the time for filing a direct appeal has expired. State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn. 2006); see also Hutchinson v. State, 679 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Minn. 2004) (noting that a case is final when "a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or finally denied"). But an appeal "suspends a judgment and deprives it of its finality," which is essential in criminal cases "because to apply a new rule [of law] to the case in which it was announced but to not apply it to other cases that were then on direct appeal would be to treat similarly situated criminal defendants differently." State v. Lewis, 656 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Minn. 2003) (quotation and citation omitted). Birchfield'was announced after appellant's adjudication of guilt, but before sentencing. Appellant's case is now pending on direct review. Appellant's judgment of conviction is not yet final, Losh, 721 N.W.2d at 893-94, and he is entitled to application of the rule of law articulated in Birchfield."

Moral Of The Story: It ain't over till it's over!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Hammers (Decided September 18, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory does not have to inform an individual under arrest for DWI that the police need a warrant to obtain a blood sample.

In Hammers (unfortunate name), the Defendant was stopped for driving over the fog and center lines.  The deputy noticed that Hammers' eyes were watery and bloodshot and after the Defendant failed field-sobriety tests, Mr. Hammers was arrested and taken to the Carver County jail.

Mr. Hammers was read the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, which informed him that Minnesota law required him to take an alcohol concentration test, that refusal to test was a crime, and that he had the right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the test. Hammers stated that he understood the advisory and he declined to speak to an attorney. He took a breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.29.

Hammers filed a motion to dismiss the DWI charges arguing that the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory was misleading and, therefore, violated his right to due process.  The District Court denied the motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that: "An implied consent advisory that contains no misleading assurances would not violate federal due process"..."Hammers maintains unconvincingly that the implied-consent advisory must also inform drivers that Minnesota law allows officers to seek a search warrant to obtain a chemical test. He cites Birchfield v. North Dakota for the notion that the advisory defined by statute is inadequate because it lacks a warrant advisement. See U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). The Birchfield Court held that a breath test is a permissible search incident to a person's drunk-driving arrest and that the state may therefore criminally prosecute the person for refusing a warrantless breath test. 136 S. Ct. at 2186. We read nothing in Birchfield to require the state's implied-consent advisory to contain a warrant advisement for breath tests."
***
"Because neither the statute nor any caselaw requires a warrant advisement, the advisory was not misleading and did not violate Hammers's due process rights. The district court did not err by denying Hammers's motion to dismiss."

What is interesting about this case is that the Court also states in its opinion that, "Current Minnesota law would not have permitted police to obtain a warrant to test Hammers if he refused testing after he received the implied-consent advisory. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 1 (2016) ("If a person refuses to permit a test, then a test must not be given."); see also State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. App. 1991) (explaining that police may not compel driver to submit to test after driver refuses test)."

So this case is interesting because some counties (Isanti, Carver, come to mind) are reading the advisory and if the defendant refuses, executing a search warrant to get the blood.  This practice is now clearly illegal.

Moral Of The Story:  You should exercise your right to counsel prior to testing as it may save you from a DWI!!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Clark (Decided September 11, 2017, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that you do not have to be found inside your vehicle to be convicted of a Minnesota DWI.

In Clark, a woman was driving with her husband in the early morning hours of January 7, 2015.  They saw the Defendant, Anthony Clark, walking down the middle of the road straight at her vehicle and waving his hands in the air. They slowed down to speak with the Defendant, who appeared delusional, hurt, and in need of help. The woman called 911 to report the situation and as they continued they also noticed a vehicle in the ditch about 6 feet beyond where Defendant was walking and associated the vehicle with Defendant. It was very cold outside and had recently snowed. The woman and her husband did not see anyone else around.  They were unable to stay at the scene, but others arrived to help.

Another individual allowed the Defendant to sit in his vehicle until help arrived.  Officer Miguel Guadalajara and Officer Patrick Sloan arrived separately at the scene shortly after starting their early morning shifts. Officer Sloan saw the vehicle in the ditch and parked his squad car on the road north of the vehicle.

Officer Guadalajara also observed the vehicle in the ditch and did not see anyone by the vehicle. He parked his squad car on the road south of the vehicle in the ditch. As he approached the vehicles parked on the road ahead, he saw footprints around the vehicle in the ditch. He saw a set of footprints with the same tread outside the driver's side door of the vehicle in the ditch and leading from the driver's side up toward the vehicle occupied by the Defendant.  The officer noticed the Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of an alcoholic beverage.

Officer Guadalajara advised Defendant that they believed he drove the vehicle into the ditch and that he was intoxicated while driving. He gave Defendant a preliminary breath test, which registered an alcohol concentration of 0.183. Defendant was placed under arrest on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and read the implied-consent advisory. When asked to submit to a breath test, the Defendant refused.  The Defendant was then charged with First Degree Refusal to Submit to Testing (Felony refusal due to his prior DWI record).

At trial, Officer Sloan testified that he believed that appellant was the driver of the vehicle in the ditch. He observed footprints in the recently fallen snow around the general vicinity of the driver's side door and testified that it looked like only one person had come from the vehicle. He located the vehicle's keys inside the vehicle, but not in the ignition. He found a backpack in the backseat containing appellant's cell phone and papers and effects with appellant's name on them. He also located 5-Hour Energy drinks in the front passenger seat, the same type that he found on appellant during the pat-down. Officer Guadalajara testified that he found a 5-Hour Energy drink in the back of his squad car after appellant got out of the car at the police department.  

The jury found the Defendant guilty of felony refusal and on appeal, he claimed the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction, noting:

"In considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, this court's review is limited to a thorough analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.(citation omitted)".

"Appellant argues on appeal that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that appellant was in physical control of the vehicle in the ditch because appellant was found walking down the road; no one saw him in the vehicle or in the driver's seat; the vehicle was immobile in a snowy ditch; no one saw the vehicle go into the ditch; and the keys were found in the vehicle but not in the ignition."

"In viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the conviction, and assuming that the jury believed the state's witnesses, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that Officers Sloan and Guadalajara observed or had information that: (1) there was an immobile vehicle in a snowy ditch on the side of Barnes road in a rural location; (2) it was a very cold day and had recently snowed; (3) witnesses reported a man in need of help walking in the road in close proximity to the vehicle in the ditch; (4) no one saw the vehicle go into the ditch or saw anyone in the vehicle; (5) no one saw anyone other than appellant near the vehicle; (6) appellant exhibited signs of hypothermia and indicia of intoxication when the officers arrived; (7) there were footprints that looked like they came from the same person in front of the vehicle in the ditch and leading from its driver's side up to M.G.'s vehicle, where appellant was sitting when the officers arrived; (8) the keys were located inside the unlocked vehicle in the ditch but were not in the ignition; (9) a backpack in the backseat of the vehicle contained appellant's cell phone, as well as papers and effects with his name on them; and (10) 5-Hour Energy drinks were found in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, on appellant's person during a pat-down search, and in the back of Officer Guadalajara's squad car after appellant got out of it at the police department."

"The evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that a reasonable officer in this situation would have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that appellant had the means to initiate the vehicle's movement despite its immobility, and was in a position to exercise dominion or control over the vehicle at any time, so as to establish probable cause that appellant was in physical control. Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to reasonably conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that appellant was in physical control of the motor vehicle, as required to find appellant guilty of first-degree test refusal."

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Meeks (Decided September 4, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you are going to drive while high on drugs, it is probably not a good idea to be carrying your stash of methamphetamine and heroin in your vehicle.

In Meeks, the Defendant was stopped after driving his vehicle at varying speeds, crossing the center and fog lines, and tapping his brakes. The police officer initiated the stop after he radioed dispatch to notify the Beltrami County Sheriff's Office and the Minnesota State Patrol.

Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a strong odor of air freshener coming from the vehicle and suspected that it might be masking the smell of drugs or alcohol. The officer also observed multiple toggle switches and testified that from his training and experience he knows toggle switches are sometimes used to access hidden compartments used for drug trafficking.

The deputy had Meeks perform a field sobriety test twice, which Meeks failed both times in a manner indicating that Meeks might be under the influence of a controlled substance. While the deputy was performing the field sobriety tests, a Minnesota state trooper and another Beltrami County sheriff's deputy with a K-9 unit also responded to the stop. The deputy who had performed the field sobriety tests then instructed the K-9 unit to conduct a sniff of Meek's vehicle.

While Meeks was performing further field sobriety tests under direction of the trooper, the K-9 alerted to the presence of controlled substances behind the driver's door. Based on Meeks' driving, confused appearance, and failure to successfully perform field sobriety tests, Meeks was arrested.

After Meeks was arrested, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and searched the vehicle, finding approximately 50 grams of methamphetamine and 4 grams of heroin behind the driver's seat. Meeks was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance and third-degree test refusal. The test refusal charge was later dismissed.

Meeks moved for all evidence gathered at the stop to be suppressed. The district court denied his motion and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Meeks does not dispute that the police officer had reasonable suspicion for stopping his car when he observed Meeks' vehicle varying its speed, crossing the center and fog lines, and tapping its brakes. Meeks contends that the officers should have taken him at his word that he was having issues with his GPS and did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety testing."

"First, it must be noted that "[t]he fact that there might have been an innocent explanation for [appellant's] conduct does not demonstrate that the officers could not reasonably believe that [he] had committed a crime." State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. App. 2001). Nevertheless, "[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope." Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quotation omitted)."

"Askerooth instructs that we employ a two-part test to determine whether an unreasonable seizure has taken place. Id. First, we must determine "whether the stop was justified at its inception." Id. Second, we must determine "whether the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place." Id. In other words, "each incremental intrusion during a stop must be 'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.'" Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968) (quotation omitted))."

"Therefore, incremental intrusions during a traffic stop must be "tied to and justified by" at least one of the following: "(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness as defined in Terry." Id. at 364 (quotation omitted). Here, the original legitimate purpose of the traffic stop justifies law enforcement's decision to expand the stop to include field sobriety testing."

This resulted in a lawful arrest and the subsequent search of the Defendant's vehicle was, therefore, lawful as well.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.