Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Donarski (Decided August 21, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished), which stands for the proposition that the basis for an initial stop is an objective test and not what the officer subjectively believes. Duh! Otherwise, the police could stop anyone whenever they have a subjective feeling that they should.

In Donarski, the facts are great:  On July 1, 2015, at approximately 12:32 a.m., Officer Kenneth Dionne received a call from dispatch reporting a "suspicious vehicle" that had been "parked in or near the complainant's driveway" for approximately 15 minutes. The vehicle's headlights and taillights were on, but the complainant did not see anybody in the vehicle. The complainant provided a license-plate number, which the dispatcher ran and found that the vehicle was registered to appellant Melissa Ann Donarski.

Officer Dionne knew the complainant's name and the address. As the officer approached the area, a rural and lightly traveled region, he observed the vehicle moving southbound and then turn eastbound onto County Road 23, which goes through Tabor Township. Officer Dionne observed the vehicle moving very slowly, ten or twenty miles an hour. Officer Dionne also saw the vehicle's brake lights come on several times; the vehicle appeared to "slow[] down randomly," and its reverse lights came on one time.

When Officer Dionne reached Tabor, Donarski's vehicle was no longer on the county road; rather, the vehicle was traveling on a dike, a grass-covered area that is 3 or 4 feet high and approximately 15 feet wide. The dike is not for public use, it is not paved, it has no street lights, and it is not marked with any signage.   The dike has some vehicle tracks from moving farming machinery. The purpose of the dike is to keep water out of Tabor, which is on the north end of the dike, a "large ditch that is filled with water during the flooding season" is to the south. Officer Dionne has patrolled through Tabor approximately 500 times and has never seen anyone drive on the dike.

Officer Dionne then stopped Ms. Donarski and subsequently placed her under arrest for DWI. Ms. Donarski moved to suppress the test results and dismiss the charges in the district court, arguing that Officer Dionne lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop her. Following a hearing, the district court denied Donarski's motion, concluding that, while no single factor provided reasonable suspicion, Officer Dionne had reasonable suspicion to stop Donarski based on all of the circumstances.

On appeal, Donarski argued that her seizure was unconstitutional because Officer Dionne failed to state a subjective reasonable suspicion for the seizure.  but the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly rejected her argument noting:

"Contrary to Donarski's assertion, an officer's suspicion must satisfy an objective test, rather than a subjective test. See State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 351 (Minn. 2012) ("To be reasonable, the basis of the officer's suspicion must satisfy an objective, totality -of-the-circumstances test."). This objective test requires consideration of whether '"the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.' State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1880)."

***

"The district court determined that no single factor provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. But an officer may have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on a combination of factors even when no single factor alone would justify a stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81. The district court here correctly assessed the totality of the circumstances in concluding that, when combined, the facts sufficiently supported an objective determination of reasonable suspicion."

Moral Of The Story:  If you are going to drive drunk, it might be a good idea to stay on the road.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is McIntyre v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided July 14, 2017, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that "close is good enough for government work"!

In McIntyre, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI and taken to the Savage police department for breath testing.  Ms. McIntyre provided two breath samples that were accepted by the testing machine. The first sample reported 0.087 alcohol concentration, and the second sample reported 0.080.   Because under the testing procedure, the lower of the two samples, rounded down, is the final reported value, Mclntyre's testing showed a final result of 0.08.

Ms. McIntyre filed a challenge to the license revocation arguing that the test result was not sufficiently accurate to find that she was over the legal limit.  An employee of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's breath lab testified for the defense that uncertainty ranges may be applied to the average of the two DataMaster testing results. She testified that with Mclntyre's test results, there was an 81.92 percent possibility that her test result was over 0.08.

The district court found that the implied consent statute did not require consideration of the margin of error for breath test results; that Mclntyre had supplied two breath tests, each with a blood alcohol content exceeding 0.08; and that the test was properly administered on a machine that had passed diagnostic and control tests. 

On appeal, Ms. McIntyre argued that the testing was unreliable because of the uncertainty measurement calculations applied.  Unfortunately, the Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed with her argument stating:

"Mclntyre points out that the BCA expert testified that an uncertainty range was applied to the average of the two testing results, and the average of Mclntyre's two samples was 0.0835, which would mean an actual range of 0.0736 to 0.0934. But Mclntyre's argument based on the uncertainty range of testing is similar to alleging that alcohol concentration must be proved within a certain margin of error. We have held, in assessing the results of an alcohol testing instrument, that '[t]he Commissioner of Public Safety is not required to prove an alcohol concentration . . . within some alleged margin of potential error.' Dixon v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 372 NW.2d 785, 786 (Minn. App. 1985).  We agree with the district court that Mclntyre's argument based on the uncertainty range fails. We also note that the BCA expert testified that a probability had been calculated for Mclntyre's test results, and the possibility that her test result was over 0.08 was 81.92%. This is sufficient to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in implied-consent hearings."

Moral Of The Story: Never have one for the road as it is likely to put you over the legal limit.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Jensen (Decided August 7, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that swearing can help justify a seizure by the police.

In Jensen, a Hopkins police officer saw a vehicle stopped in the middle of an intersection.  Both doors of the vehicle were open and he observed the driver, Camille Jensen, kneeling over her friend, who was lying on the ground.  As the officer approached the car, he saw Jensen helping her friend into the passenger seat.  The officer saw vomit on the ground and he heard one of the people say, "Fuck, is that the cops?"  The officer asked both occupants for identification and he detected indicia of intoxication coming from Ms. Jensen, including the strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech and watery eyes.

After failing field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test, Ms. Jensen was placed under arrest and subsequently tested at .20 on the Data Master Machine at the police station.  Jensen moved to suppress the evidence claiming the police had no basis to ask for identification and any subsequent observations/evidence must be suppressed.

The District Court denied the motion to suppress determining that Jensen was not improperly seized because her act of parking in the middle of an intersection was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. The court further ruled that the car's location, coupled with Jensen's presence with a drunk friend at that time of the morning and the  overheard statement of "Fuck, is that the cops?" also provided the officer with reasonable suspicion that Jensen was engaged in criminal activity.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court noting:

"Not all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures: Persons found under suspicious circumstances are not clothed with a right of privacy which prevents law-enforcement officers from inquiring as to their identity and actions. The essential needs of public safety permit police officers to use their faculties of observation and to act thereon within proper limits. It is not only the right but the duty of police officers to investigate suspicious behavior, both to prevent crime and to apprehend offenders."

***

"But if a police officer requests identification and asks the driver to leave a vehicle, the officer must have specific and articulable facts which, together with reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."

In this case, "the totality of circumstances here supported a reasonable basis for Officer Cady to suspect criminal activity. When Officer Cady encountered Jensen's vehicle at 1:41 a.m., it was parked in the middle of an intersection, and both occupants had left the vehicle. The passenger was admittedly intoxicated, had vomited, and needed a ride home. One of the two vehicle occupants uttered an expression of dismay at the presence of police. From these facts, Officer Cady could reasonably suspect the following criminal activity to support his asking Jensen for identification: (1) Jensen may have violated the law by parking her car in the middle of an intersection; (2) the time of night, the choice of location to stop a vehicle, the admitted inebriation of the passenger, and the expletive-filled expression of dismay at realizing they had been noticed by police suggested that Jensen could be under the influence; and (3) the expression of dismay, alone, was suggestive of some sort of nefarious conduct. Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Jensen's motion to suppress the evidence obtained after she was asked for identification."

Moral Of The Story:  It is never a good idea to swear when the police draw near!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Prigge (Decided July 31, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that a driver, arrested for DWI, is not guilty of carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol if the weapon is not, "on or about the person's clothes or person".

In Prigge, the Defendant was arrested in Maple Grove, Minnesota for DWI and during an "inventory search" of Mr. Prigge's vehicle, the police found a a loaded handgun in the bottom of the vehicle's center console compartment.  

The state charged appellant with several offenses, including carrying a pistol while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.7142, subdivision 1, subsection 4. Prigge moved to dismiss the charge for lack of probable cause. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the facts were insufficient to support probable cause because Prigge was not carrying the pistol on or about his clothes or his person, and the statute's prohibited conduct did not extend to a pistol in the center console compartment of a vehicle.

The State appealed the District Court's ruling but the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court noting:

"Minnesota Statutes section 624.7142, subdivision 1, subsection 4, provides that '[a] person may not carry a pistol on or about the person's clothes or person in a public place' while under the influence of alcohol. The question presented is whether having a loaded pistol in the center console compartment of a vehicle constitutes 'carrying a pistol on or about the person's clothes or person.'"

"In State v. Larson, this court considered the definition of the term "carry" in the context of the same statute. 895 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. App. 2017). Larson, relying on standard dictionary definitions, held that a plain reading of the word 'carry' includes transporting or conveying a pistol on one's person, even if the pistol is unloaded and in a case. Larson held that section 624.7142, subdivision 1, subsection 4, prohibits carrying a pistol in a public place while under the influence of alcohol when the pistol is unloaded and hand-carried in an enclosed and secure gun case."

"Neither the dictionary definition nor our decision in Larson answers the precise question in this case: whether the term 'carry' includes situations in which there is no physical nexus between a person or the person's clothes and the pistol. We answer this question by reading section 624.7142 in conjunction with its companion statute, Minnesota Statutes section 624.714 (2016)."

Section 624. 714 states:

"A person . . . who carries, holds, or possesses a pistol in a motor vehicle ... or on or about the person's clothes or the person, or otherwise in possession or control in a public place . . . without first having obtained a permit to carry the pistol is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. A person who is convicted a second or subsequent time is guilty of a felony."

"By its plain language, section 624.714 prohibits a person from carrying, holding, or possessing a pistol in a motor vehicle, or on or about the person or the person's clothes, or otherwise possessing or controlling the pistol in a public place. By contrast, section 624.7142 prohibits only carrying a pistol on or about the person's clothes or person, and does not include carrying, holding, or possessing a pistol in a vehicle. Moreover, unlike section 624.714, section 624.7142 does not broadly prohibit other "possession or control."2 Because section 624.7124 uses different language than section 624.714, we must assume that the legislature intended them to apply to different conduct. The plain statutory language of section 624.714 prohibits a much broader range of conduct than section 624.7124. If the legislature intended the prohibition under section 624.7124 to extend to carrying, holding, or possessing a pistol in a motor vehicle or otherwise possessing or controlling the pistol, it could have done so by using the language it selected for section 624.714. It did not. And it is not the prerogative of this court to add language that is not present in the statute or supply what the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks."

"Given the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the phrase to 'carry a pistol on or about the person's clothes or person' in Minnesota Statutes section 624.7142, subdivision 1, subsection 4, requires a physical nexus between the person or the person's clothes and the pistol. It is undisputed that there was no physical nexus between Prigge's person or clothes and the pistol found in the vehicle's center console.  Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the charge for lack of probable cause.

Moral Of The Story: If you are packing, don't be drinking!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Mahoney and McCarthy (Decided July 17, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that the presumption of admissibility of a Data Master test result does not prevent the defense from challenging the accuracy or reliability of the test.

In Mahoney and McCarthy, the appeals were consolidated and in their respective cases, each appellant provided two breath samples after being suspected of driving while impaired in 2015. The results were obtained from the DataMaster DMT-G, a breath-testing instrument approved by the commissioner of public safety.,Mahoney's breath samples registered at 0.129 and 0.125, with a final value of 0.12 alcohol concentration. He was charged with second-degree driving while impaired. McCarthy's breath samples registered at 0.106 and 0.100, with a final value of 0.10 alcohol concentration. He was charged with fourth-degree driving while impaired, driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more.

Appellants consolidated their cases and moved to suppress the individual test results, arguing that the results were not scientifically valid or reliable. The district court held a two-day pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the test results.  

The district court found that the individual breath test results were not foundationally reliable under Rule of Evidence 702. But the district court did not suppress the test results, concluding that Minnesota Statutes section 634.16 "moves all issues of reliability from pretrial litigation to the fact-finder at trial," thus creating "blanket admissibility."

After the district court denied appellants' motions to suppress, the parties agreed to stipulate to the state's evidence (including the individual test results) and submit the matter to the district court for a trial under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4.  

After being found guilty by the district court, the appellants argued to the Appellate Court that the district court erred by determining, as a matter of law, that Minnesota Statutes section 634.16 requires the results of an approved breath test be admitted into evidence.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals in its ruling affirmed the district court stating:

"According to Minnesota Statutes section 634.16, the results of an approved breath test are admissible in evidence without foundational expert testimony. The statute provides as follows:

In any civil or criminal hearing or trial, the results of a breath test, when performed by a person who has been fully trained in the use of an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument ... are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that an infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument provides a trustworthy and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath."

"We do not interpret this language in a vacuum. Rather, as appellants acknowledge, we are guided by our interpretation of an identical statute, which applies to the admission of blood-analysis test results. State v. Pearson. 633 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn. App. 2001)."

In Pearson the court held that the legislature may enact statutes that shift the burden of proof by creating rebuttable presumptions.  "Accordingly, while the statute in Pearson provided that the evidence 'shall be admissible,' Minn. Stat. § 634.15, this court concluded that the statute 'merely establishes a presumption of reliability that the driver may choose to rebut with live testimony.' Id. at 86 (emphasis added). As the court noted: 'A defendant in a criminal case may challenge the accuracy or reliability of the test by subpoenaing the laboratory assistant or BCA analyst to testify.. . allowing the court the opportunity to determine if the admission of the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.'"

"Here, the district court appropriately interpreted the statute consistently with Pearson.  The court found that the commissioner established a prima facie case that the DataMaster DMT-G tests are reliable, a finding unchallenged by appellants. The burden then shifts to petitioners in a license-revocation proceeding to dispute the test's validity and trustworthiness."

"Despite this backdrop, appellants argue that the district court's decision to admit the DataMaster DMT-G test results—after the pretrial determination that the test measurements lacked foundation—makes the test results unassailable and interferes with the judicial function. We disagree. Once a prima facie case of reliability is established, that case may be disputed by producing specific evidence that the test results were invalid. But Pearson does not require that this opportunity to dispute the test results occurs in a pretrial setting, as appellants appear to suggest. Rather, as the district court ruled, the statute 'moves all issues of reliability from pretrial litigation to the fact-finder at trial.'"

"Appellants chose not to challenge the results of the DataMaster DMT-G at trial. Instead, they stipulated to the state's evidence and proceeded to a court trial where they were ultimately found guilty. Because the district court did not err in its interpretation of section 634.16 or in its corresponding decision to admit the individual breath test results at trial, we affirm."

Moral Of The Story:  One should rarely, if ever, waive the right to a jury trial!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Miller (Decided June 26, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a court cannot order a stay of imposition of sentence in a DWI case.  

In Miller, the Defendant pled guilty to felony DWI and the presumptive sentence for this offense was a stay of execution of 42 months in prison.  Before sentencing, Miller filed an informal letter brief, moving the district court to stay imposition of the presumptive sentence. The state opposed Miller's request, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(b), prohibited a stay of imposition of a sentence for first-degree DWI offenses.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court stayed imposition of Miller's sentence, ordered him to serve a staggered jail sentence of 300 days, and placed him on probation for seven years. In its order, the district court acknowledged that this sentence was prohibited by Minn. Stat. § 169.276, but stated, "It is not the role of the legislature to mandate sentences to the courts." 

Apparently, the Court of Appeals disagreed as they reversed the stay of imposition, noting:

"The legislature is vested with the power to define criminal conduct and to determine the punishment for such conduct, including providing for mandatory sentences.  This power includes setting 'the limits of discretion vested in the courts in the imposition of the sentence.' The judiciary is vested with the power to impose the final sentence for a criminal violation 'within the limits prescribed by the legislature'."

"Miller argues that Minn Stat. §§609.135 (2014) and 609.11, subd. 8(a) (2014), authorize a district court to stay imposition of a sentence in this case. Section 609.135 provides that except "when a mandatory minimum sentence is required by section 609.11, any court may stay imposition or execution of sentence." Minn. Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a). Because a mandatory minimum sentence under section 609.11 is not required here, Miller contends that the statute authorized the district court to stay imposition of his sentence."

"But chapter 169A contains specific provisions regarding mandatory sentencing for DWI offenses. Indeed, a person convicted of first-degree DWI is "subject to the mandatory penalties described in section 169A.276." Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 2. Section 169A.276 provides that the mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree DWI is imprisonment for not less than three years. Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(a). 'The court may stay execution of this mandatory sentence . . ., but may not stay imposition or adjudication of the sentence or impose a sentence that has a duration of less than three years.'"

"Here, the more specific statute is section 169A.276, subdivision 1(b), because it expressly addresses felony-level DWI sentences. In contrast, section 609.135, subdivision 1(a), which authorizes a stay of imposition of sentence, applies when a mandatory minimum sentence is not required by section 609.11. But section 609.11, subdivision 8(a), states that it applies only to "mandatory minimum sentences established by this section," which are specific to dangerous weapon, firearm, and drug offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subds. 4-5a (2014). We conclude that section 609.135 does not apply to sentencing for convictions of felony DWI offenses and chapter 169A exclusively governs sentencing of DWI offenses."

"The plain language of section 169A.276 limits a district court's discretion and prohibits a district court from staying imposition of sentence for this offense. Thus, we reject Miller's argument that the district court had discretion to stay imposition of sentence."

Moral Of The Story:  If you manage to get convicted of four dwi's in 10 years, you are going to forever have a felony conviction on your record.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Hunn (Decided June 19, 2017, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that there is no "pre-test" right to counsel when the police fail to read to the Defendant the "Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory".

In Hunn, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and was taken to the Mower County police station.  The arresting officer had reason to suspect that the Defendant had consumed drugs so the officer asked the Defendant if he would take a urine test and the Defendant agreed. The officer did not read respondent the implied-consent advisory or advise respondent that he had a limited right to speak to an attorney before testing.1 On April 8, the deputy received respondent's test results, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.04 and the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine.

The State charged the Defendant with second-degree DWI (any amount of schedule I/II drugs), no proof of insurance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant moved to suppress the evidence and dismiss the complaint on a number of grounds, including the officer's failure to read the implied-consent advisory and the invalidity of respondent's consent to testing. The district court suppressed the urine-test results based on the deputy's failure to read respondent the implied-consent advisory, including his failure to advise respondent of, and vindicate, his limited right to counsel prior to submitting to testing.

The State appealed the district court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, stating:

"In granting respondent's suppression motion, the district court relied on language from the implied-consent law, which provides that an individual "must be informed . . . that the person has the right to consult with an attorney, but that this right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test." Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(a)(4) (2014). The district court also cited Friedman for the following propositions: (1) a driver has a right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing under the right-to-counsel clause in article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution and (2) a driver must be informed of this right and a police officer must assist in its vindication. Based on this reasoning, the district court suppressed the test results, due to the deputy's failure to read the implied-consent advisory, and declined to otherwise determine whether respondent's consent to the test was voluntary."

***

"The state maintains that the district court's conclusion was erroneous, arguing that the limited right to counsel under Friedman is inapplicable here because respondent was not read the implied-consent advisory and, therefore, did not face immediate revocation of his driver's license. We agree and conclude that the district court erred in suppressing the test because respondent never faced a possibility of immediate sanctions under the implied-consent law when deciding whether to consent to the urine test."

***

"Here, as in Nielsen, and unlike the facts presented in Friedman, the deputy did not read respondent the implied-consent advisory or seek chemical testing under the implied-consent law. This distinction from the facts of Friedman is significant. As a result, respondent's decision regarding whether to consent to testing never carried a possibility of immediate license-revocation sanctions or criminal prosecution for test refusal. Instead, respondent only "faces the traditional [criminal] penalties for driving under the influence, and imposition of those penalties only after a jury trial at which he has the right to counsel." Nielsen, 530 N.W.2d at 215. Accordingly, "[t]he process of chemical testing in this case was merely an investigatory stage which necessarily preceded the decision to prosecute." Id. (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833 (noting that ticket or tab charge, usually issued after test is performed, is equivalent to formal complaint))."

"Because respondent was not read the implied-consent advisory, and, therefore, never faced immediate sanctions under the implied-consent law for test refusal, we conclude that there was no violation of the Minnesota Constitution's right-to-counsel clause that required the district court to suppress the chemical-test results."

Moral of the Story: If An Officer Asks You To Submit To A Blood Or Urine Test, Tell The Officer To Get A Search Warrant!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.