Minneapolis DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Roehler (Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished, Decided April 4, 2016) which stands for the proposition that if the police obtain a warrantless blood draw as permitted under binding appellate precedent, then even if the precedent is overturned, the test result is permissible as the officer was acting in "good faith".

In Roehler, the Defendant was involved in a head-on collision in Minnesota when he crossed the centerline of Highway 34 and collided with a van traveling in the opposite direction.  The van driver was killed and its two other passengers were injured. Roehler was seriously injured and was transported by ambulance to be airlifted for treatment in Fargo, North Dakota.

A warrantless blood draw was taken from Mr. Roehler at the hospital which revealed a blood alcohol level of .05.  At trial, a BCA expert extrapolated back to the time of the accident and estimated at the time of said accident, the Defendant's blood alcohol level was between .08 and .14.

The Defendant was convicted of all the charges and he appealed his conviction.  While Roehler's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely, ruled that dissipation of alcohol in the blood does not constitute a per se exigency that permits a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment, and that exigency must be decided on a case-by-case basis with reference to the totality of the circumstances.

The Court of Appeals reversed Roehler's conviction based upon the McNeely decision and the prosecution sought further review from the Minnesota Supreme Court.  The Minnesota Supreme Court then sent the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the test result evidence should be suppressed if the police were acting in "good faith".

In today's decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals notes that at the time of Roehler's blood draw, the Minnesota Supreme Court had held (in State v. Shriner) that, "a nonconsensual blood draw was a reasonable search that could be made without a warrant because the rapid dissipation of alcohol created an exigent circumstance that provided an exception to the warrant requirement." So at the time of Roehler's accident, the binding appellate precedent of Shriner permitted a warrantless blood draw in an accident involving suspected criminal vehicular homicide.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals then explains that, "In its recent opinion in Lindquist, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a narrow good-faith exception to the warrant requirement when a police officer "acts in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent" and "the binding precedent. . . specifically authorize[s] the behavior."

Since the accident occurred while State v. Shriner was still good law (i.e. before the United States Supreme Court ruling in McNeely), the Minnesota Court of Appeals then held, "Despite the factual differences between this case and Lindquist, we nevertheless conclude that law enforcement was acting under the limited good-faith exception set forth in Lindquist, and the warrantless blood draw taken from Roehler at the hospital was lawful."

MORAL OF THE STORY: The police can violate the Fourth Amendment as long as they do so in good faith.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided March 7, 2016, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that an attorney does not "aid and abet" in the crime of refusal-to-submit-to-alcohol-testing if he merely explains the consequences of refusing to take a test.

In Johnson, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and was taken to the Hennepin County Jail.  The Petitioner was read the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory and was informed of her right to counsel prior to testing.  The Petitioner exercised her right to counsel and subsequently submitted to a Data Master breath test with a final reported value of .18.

The Petitioner challenged the revocation of her license arguing (among other things) that her pre-test right to counsel was not vindicated because the aiding-and-abetting statute prevents an attorney from advising a driver of all the testing consequences.

[It should be noted that an individual who is arrested for a first-time DWI and who tests at .16 or more, would be better off refusing to submit to testing rather than taking the test. Why? Because: (1) a first-time refuser can get a limited license after 15 days; (2) if the charge is reduced to a 4th Degree misdemeanor DWI, his license will be fully reinstated in 30 days; (3) even if the refuser pleads guilty to the crime refusal, his license will be fully reinstated in 90 days; and (4) no "whiskey plates" are issued.

On the other hand, a first-time DWI offender who tests .16 or more will: (1) lose their license for a year with no limited license available; (2) all of their registered vehicles will be required to have "whiskey plates"; (3) if the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor DWI, the license revocation remains one year.]

In Johnson, the Petitioner claimed that she did not receive meaningful attorney consultation because the aiding-and-abetting statute prevented the attorney from advising her that if may be in her best interests to refuse a test because test refusal is a crime.

The District Court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the aiding-and-abetting statute states:

"Every person who commits or attempt to commit, conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of any act declared in this chapter to be an offense, whether individually or in connection with one or more other persons or as principal, agent, or accessory, is guilty of that offense, and every person who falsely, fraudulently, forcibly, or willfully induces, causes, coerces, requires, permits, or directs another to violate any provision of this chapter is likewise guilty of that offense." 

The Court of Appeals then held, "But an attorney does not induce, cause, coerce, require, permit, or direct a driver to violate a DWI law by informing the driver of the consequences of test refusal.  The supreme court has recognized that the 'choice to submit or refuse to take a test may be a difficult one'. (citation omitted). And a driver makes that choice after consulting with an attorney who 'functions as an objective advisor who could explain alternative choices'. (citation omitted). Thus, providing information, including information on test refusal, is not the equivalent of aiding and abetting a driver in violating the the DWI law.  The district court did not err in concluding Johnson's pre-test right to counsel was vindicated."

Moral Of The Story: If You Get Arrested For A DWI, Call A DWI Lawyer Before You Take The Test To Help Decide What To Do!!!!

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Joecks (Decided February 29, 2016, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police search of the Minnesota Driver's License Database.

In Joecks, the Defendant was driving a car in Hutchinson, Minnesota, (where everybody knows everybody).  A local police officer saw Joecks driving, and based upon his past encounters with the Defendant, the officer believed Joecks' did not have a valid driver's license.  The officer then ran a license check and found that Joeck's license was revoked.  The officer then stopped Joeck's vehicle and subsequently placed him under arrest for DWI.

The Defendant challenged the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the officer had no right to run a check of his driver's license status.  The District denied the Defendant's motion to suppress and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:

"The constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are not triggered unless a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 860 (Minn. 2006). A person has a legitimate expectation of privacy when he has 'an actual subjective expectation of privacy' that 'society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' Id. (quotations omitted). Joecks did not present evidence that showed that he had a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to the driver's-license database. And even if we assume that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the database maintained by the state, his expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. One of the purposes of the driver's-license database is to inform law-enforcement agencies about drivers whose license or driving privileges have been revoked. Given this purpose, which requires that law-enforcement agencies have access to the database, Joeck's expectation of privacy is not reasonable.  Therefore, no constitutional protection against a search of the database was triggered."

Moral Of The Story: Don't Break the Law Before You Break The Law.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is Torgerson v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided January 25, 2016, Unpublished, Minnesota Court of Appeals) which stands for the proposition that a breath test result will be deemed "reliable" even if the fuel cell on the DataMaster breath machine has been turned off.

In Torgerson, the Petitioner was arrested for a DWI and agreed to submit to a breath test at the police station where he tested over the legal limit of .08. The Petitioner challenged the revocation of his license noting that the DataMaster has two breath-alcohol measuring devices contained within the machine, i.e. : (1) infrared measuring device and, (2) a fuel cell measuring device.  And since the fuel cell measuring device on the machine was turned off, the Petitioner argued that with the fuel cell disabled, the scientific procedures necessary to ensure an accurate and reliable alcohol concentration test were not performed and that the revocation should, therefore, be rescinded.

The District Court sustained the revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, stating:

"A breathalyzer test reading conducted by a certified operator may be admitted into evidence if it is established that the machine was in proper working order and the chemicals in proper condition. Once a prima facie showing of trustworthy administration has occurred, it is incumbent on the opponent to suggest a reason why the test was untrustworthy." (citation omitted)

"Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 11 (2014) defines 'infrared or other approved breath-testing instrument' as 'a breath-testing instrument that employs infrared or other technology and has been approved by the commissioner of public safety for determining alcohol concentration.'  Minn. R. 7502.0425, subs. 2 (2015) states 'the DataMaster DMT-G is approved by the commissioner for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration of a breath sample, proved that the sample is analyzed using either the unit's infrared technology or the unit's infrared technology in conjunction with its fuel cell technology'".

"The district court found no evidence that the DataMaster results are not accurate and reliable because the fuel-cell option was disabled and ruled that, rather than merely point to an alleged defect, appellant must demonstrate that the alleged defect actually affected the test results.'

The Court of Appeals then ruled that, "The DataMaster DMT-G with Fuel Cell Option is an approved instrument for analyzing a breath sample, using either the unit's infrared technology, or the infrared technology in conjunction with the fuel-cell technology. The officer who conducted the test was a certified operator; the machine was in proper working order; and there was no indication that the chemicals were not in proper condition...Thus, the state satisfied its burden for an admissible breath test."

Moral Of The Story: Good Enough For Government Work.

If you or someone you know has been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case of the Week is State v. Fawcett (Decided January 11, 2016, Published, Minnesota Court of Appeals) which stands for the proposition that if the police obtain a warrant to obtain a blood sample, they do not need to obtain a separate search warrant to have the blood sample analyzed for other drugs by the BCA Lab.

In Fawcett, the Defendant ran a red light and was hit by another vehicle.  When the police arrived, they noticed the Defendant smelled of alcohol and Ms. Fawcett admitted drinking at the local VFW.  Because the crash involved possible injuries to the occupants of the other vehicle, the police sought and obtained a search warrant which authorized a blood sample to be taken from Fawcett and be "forwarded to an approved lab for testing."

The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) subsequently issued a toxicology report stating that Fawcett's blood contained no alcohol and that an additional toxicology report would follow.  A second BCA report indicated the presence in Fawcett's blood of THC and Alprazolam, both of which are controlled substances.

The Defendant was charged with Criminal Vehicular Operation and Fawcett moved to suppress all evidence of the presence of drugs in the blood sample.  The district court granted Fawcett's motion to suppress the evidence finding that the blood sample was lawfully obtained under the search warrant and that testing the blood for alcohol was lawful but that testing the blood for the presence of drugs was unlawful.

On appeal by the State, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding:

Once a blood sample has been lawfully removed from a person's body, a person loses an expectation of privacy in the blood sample, and a subsequent chemical analysis of the blood sample is, therefore, not a distinct Fourth Amendment event. The district court considered that such a rule necessarily means that a person's blood could 'thereafter be tested without a warrant for any purpose at any time, such as future drug testing or DNA comparisons.' Although such circumstances are not before us, we note that Schmerber dictates that a standard of reasonableness controls and that an unnecessary invasion of privacy interests would most certainly raise concerns of reasonableness. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S. Ct. at 1834;  We conclude that in this case the test for controlled substances does not raise concerns of reasonableness.

Because we conclude that the chemical analysis of a lawfully obtained blood sample is not a distinct Fourth Amendment event requiring a warrant, we need not consider whether the search warrant in this case was sufficiently particular or whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless chemical analysis of Fawcett's blood. If the state lawfully obtains a blood sample for the purpose of chemical analysis, then a chemical analysis of the sample that does not offend standards of reasonableness is not a separate search requiring a warrant."

So even though there was no probable cause to search the Defendant's blood for drugs, the Court of Appeals in today's ruling, finds that probable cause to search for one drug equals probable cause to search for all drugs. 

Sigh.