Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Donner (Decided June 10, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a defendant need only make a prima facie showing to be entitled to a jury instruction.

Mr. Donner was arrested for a DWI on August 7, 2016 after driving home from a nightclub.  He testified at trial that someone slipped him a drug and that he was entitled to an involuntary intoxication jury instruction.

Mr. Donner testified he ordered a club soda at a night club while his friend went to the dance floor.  Mr. Donner had been in a car accident roughly a week before the arrest, and so, following his doctor’s recommendation, he did not have any alcoholic beverages to drink that night. He was also carrying about $300 in cash because he had been paid the same day.

Defendant testified that after his friend went to dance, he was approached at the bar by a woman he did not know. He purchased a drink for this woman. After chatting with this woman, appellant left his club soda at the bar while he went to the bathroom, and then came back and continued his conversation with the same woman at the bar for approximately 20 or 30 more minutes.

Mr. Donner then ended this conversation and joined his friend on the dance floor. After a short time, he “started to feel funny,” so he went back to the bar to buy a bottle of water. At this point, Donner noticed that most of the $300 in cash he had been carrying was gone. After looking and asking around for his missing money, the Defendant got upset and decided to leave the club.

R.A., a security guard at the parking lot Donner parked at, testified that appellant walked to the garage around 2:00 a.m. on August 7, 2016. Defendant appeared drunk, and R.A. told him to take a nap before driving. A.S., a second security guard at the parking garage, testified that he saw Defendant get into his car, sit without driving for four or five minutes, start driving, and almost immediately hit a parked car. R.A. then called 911 to summon the police.

Officer Ross Blair was one of the officers who responded to the call. When Officer Blair arrived, Defendant was asleep in his car and had to be woken up. Officer Blair testified that appellant showed signs of intoxication and failed multiple field sobriety tests, but did not smell like alcohol. Defendant also took a preliminary breath test for the presence of alcohol which did not detect any alcohol in appellant’s system. Police arrested Defendant based on his failed sobriety tests and took him to get tested for the presence of other chemicals in his system.

Police obtained a warrant for Defendant's blood, had a sample taken at a nearby hospital, and sent it to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension to be tested for the presence of intoxicants. The test revealed that Defendant had a significant amount of alprazolam, more commonly known as Xanax, in his system. The therapeutic range for alprazolam is between .02 and .06 milligrams per liter, while the testing revealed appellant had a concentration of .074 milligrams per liter in his bloodstream. Appellant was eventually charged with second-degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2016), and careless driving in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2 (2016).

At trial, Defendant did not contest the fact that he drove while impaired, but testified that he did not knowingly consume any intoxicating substances the evening of his arrest. At the close of evidence, the district court considered whether to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Though the district court noted that it was a “close call,” it elected not to include this instruction, concluding that Defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case.

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals justifiably reversed the district court.  It appears that the district court did not know the meaning of prima facie. Or, as stated by the Court of Appeals:

"It is beyond dispute that a party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is evidence to support it.” State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 578 (Minn. 1977). If an instruction is “warranted by the facts and relevant law” it must be given. State v. McCuiston, 514 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. June 15, 1994); see also State v. Moser, 884 N.W.2d 890, 905 (Minn. App. 2016) (noting that once a defendant meets “a burden of production by making a prima facie showing that the defense applies,” the district court must give a jury instruction on an affirmative defense)."

"A prima facie showing is that which is “based on what seems to be true on first examination, even though it may later be proved to be untrue.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1382 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “prima facie”). “[T]he defendant’s burden of making a prima facie showing that would entitle him to a jury instruction and the defendant’s burden of proving to the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence each element of the defense proffered are two separate inquiries.” State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 250 n.2 (Minn. 1999)."

***

"We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, appellant did establish a prima facie case for the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on involuntary intoxication."

Moral Of The Story:  While appearances may be deceiving, they are enough to get you a jury instruction.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Haugen (Decided May 28, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that your pre-test right to counsel is not violated if you make no attempt to contact an attorney.

In Haugen, the Defendant was arrested by the state patrol in Beltrami County for DWI and was taken to the jail where he was read the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, informing Mr. Haugen of his right to counsel prior to testing.  Mr. Haugen asked to speak with an attorney, and the trooper provided a telephone and phonebooks. Haugen used neither, but refused to submit to testing until he spoke with his attorney. The trooper deemed appellant’s conduct a test refusal.

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging his right to counsel had been violated.  The District Court denied the motion concluding that appellant failed to make a good-faith effort to contact an attorney. The court found that, after appellant was offered a telephone and phonebooks, he did not use them, but rather “argued that he would not be able to reach an attorney due to the hour.” And when the trooper pointed out that appellant could at least try, appellant argued that he needed a Minneapolis phonebook. The trooper indicated that appellant could use the phonebooks in the room, and appellant became upset because he did not have access to his cellphone, which purportedly contained his attorney’s contact information.

On appeal, Mr. Haugen asserted that the trooper’s act of supplying “two local Beltrami Phonebooks” was insufficient, and the trooper was obligated to conduct an Internet search to find the contact information for his Minneapolis-based attorney.  The Court of Appeals rejected the claim stating:

"Appellant cites no caselaw to support his assertion that the trooper was obligated to provide additional phonebooks or conduct an Internet search. The limited right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing “is vindicated when the driver is provided with a telephone and given reasonable time to contact and talk with an attorney.” Duff v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 560 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Minn. App. 1997). The trooper was only required to allow and facilitate appellant’s right to counsel, he was not required to ensure that appellant “received the best or even proper counsel.” Butler v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 348 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 1984). The trooper provided appellant with a telephone and phonebooks, and appellant failed to make a good-faith effort to contact an attorney. Appellant’s right to counsel was vindicated."

The result may very well have been different had the Defendant supplied the officer with the name of the Minneapolis attorney he was seeking to reach as previous case law states the police must allow an individual to call long distance to reach a specified Minneapolis attorney. 

Moral Of The Story:  If you want to get something done, do it yourself!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Peterson (Decided May 6, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which, once again, stands for the proposition that if you have been drinking and driving and make it home do not open your door!

In Peterson, Minnesota State Trooper Jon Wenzel followed the Defendant to his home after observing an equipment violation and some speeding.  

Peterson parked his truck in his home driveway, immediately exited, and walked quickly toward his front door. Wenzel pulled into the driveway and parked. Wenzel saw Peterson look directly at him and keep walking. Wenzel stepped out of his car, identified himself as a state trooper, and loudly told Peterson to stop because “I need to talk to you.” Wenzel testified that Peterson’s wife, M.P., also saw him as Peterson climbed the steps to his porch. The couple went inside and locked the door.

Wenzel had not activated his emergency lights, in part because he intended to “advise [Peterson] of the equipment violation.” Based on Peterson’s behavior in the driveway, Wenzel testified that he believed that “there might be something other than speeding] or an equipment violation that would cause [Peterson] to try to evade” police.

Wenzel opened the storm door, knocked on the front door, “announced himself,” and said he needed to speak to Peterson.  Peterson's wife eventually answered the door and said that she would see if her husband would come to the door.

Wenzel saw Peterson open a beer can as he walked toward and opened the front door. While they stood in the doorway, Wenzel observed that Peterson had an “unsteady gait,” “sort of swayfed],” had “very slurred” speech, and his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Wenzel testified he smelled an “overwhelming odor of alcohol” coming from Peterson.

Wenzel asked Peterson to come outside and speak with him, and told Peterson that he would be arrested for obstruction of legal process if he did not cooperate. Peterson refused and Wenzel grabbed Peterson’s arm. Peterson resisted and began backing away from the doorway and toward the living room. Wenzel testified that his foot may have been on the threshold as he grabbed Peterson. Peterson, with M.P. ’s assistance, forcefully pulled away from Wenzel, who called for an on-scene deputy to back him up. Together, Wenzel and the other deputy moved Peterson outside the home

After doing some field tests and obtaining a .198 reading on a preliminary breath test, Mr. Peterson was arrested for DWI.  The Defendant was taken to the police station where he subsequently refused to submit to testing.  

Mr. Peterson was charged with felony DWI and he challenged the validity of his arrest asserting the trooper was not in "hot pursuit"when Peterson entered his home.  The State in its response claimed that the trooper was in hot pursuit but on appeal, the Court of Appeals declined to address the issue finding instead that the arrest lawfully began in the doorway of the Peterson home.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that "Absent exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter an individual’s home to make a warrantless arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382 (1980). The doorway of one’s home, however, has been held to be a public place for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment."..."Once a police officer has begun to arrest a person in a public place, that person may not retreat into their home to thwart an arrest."
***
"Wenzel had probable cause to arrest Peterson for DWI. As Peterson stood in his doorway, Wenzel observed multiple indicia of intoxication within a very short time after Peterson stopped driving. When these observations are considered together with Peterson’s evasive behavior and his refusal to cooperate with Wenzel, we conclude that Wenzel had probable cause to arrest Peterson for DWI."
***
"Because the record supports the district court’s factual findings that Wenzel began to arrest Peterson while he was in the doorway of Peterson’s home, we conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous. Because Wenzel began to arrest Peterson in the doorway, Peterson could no longer flee back into his house to thwart the arrest."

Moral Of The Story:  A man's home is his castle so don't open the door for the police!

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Platt v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided April 29, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you act like a jerk, you will get jerked around.

In Platt, the Petitioner was arrested for DWI and the arresting officer obtained a search warrant for a sample of Mr. Platt's blood or urine. Platt refused to submit to blood testing and said that he would submit to urine testing, but demanded time and water in order to provide the sample. Over the next hour, the officer would check in to see if Platt was prepared to give the sample, but Platt repeatedly indicated that he needed more time. In all of his interactions with the officer, Platt was insulting and profane, frequently shouting over the officer. The officer determined that Platt’s conduct amounted to test refusal, and so informed the commissioner of public safety, leading the commissioner to revoke Platt’s license.

Platt filed a challenge to the license revocation in district court arguing that : (1) his license cannot be revoked as the officer did not read him the statutorily mandated advisory and (2) that his right to due process was violated as he was not told that his refusal to submit to testing was a crime.

The district court upheld the license revocation and on appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed noting that they need not decide the merits of Mr. Platt's arguments as there are a long line of cases which hold that a driver's misbehavior constitutes a waiver of rights under the implied consent law. Or, as stated by the Court:

"Drivers who are arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated have a duty to avoid frustrating the implied-consent testing process. State v. Collins, 655 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003). When a driver’s conduct prevents officers from completing the implied-consent procedure, the driver is deemed to have waived his or her rights under that process. See State v. Busch, 614 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that a driver who frustrated the implied consent process by his silence had waived his right to an attorney). Thus, where a driver prevented an officer from reading the implied-consent advisory by “screaming, swearing, making accusations of rape, and insisting that she would not listen,” the driver could be convicted for test refusal even though the implied-consent advisory was not read and she was never provided with an opportunity to contact an attorney. Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 658. Although Collins and Busch address the limited right to counsel, their rationale applies here. See id.; Busch, 614 N.W.2d at 259-60; see also Sigfrinius v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 378 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that a driver’s conduct frustrates administration of the test where his conduct is “calculated to avoid any ‘suspension’ of his license”). Accepting Platt’s argument that implied consent cases also apply to Minn. Stat. § 171.177, a driver receiving a warrant advisory may not frustrate the advisory and then contest the revocation because the advisory was not given."

Moral Of The Story:  If you have been arrested, don't make matter worse for yourself by being a jerk.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Rusthoven which stands for the proposition that if you act like you have something to hide, you are going to get searched by the police.

In Rusthoven, the Defendant was stopped for speeding in Swift County, Minnesota. When Deputy Hoffman approached the Defendant's truck, he noticed Mr. Rusthoven was, "very fidgety and very agitated".  When Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven if he was under the influence of a controlled substance, Rusthoven became “even more agitated.”

The deputy returned to his squad car to look up Rusthoven’s driver’s license. The search revealed that Rusthoven’s license was restricted, requiring that, if any drugs were found in his system, his license would be invalidated. The deputy returned to speak with Rusthoven and observed that, "his arms were constantly moving, just back and forth, up and down. He would take his hat over [sic] very quickly and put it on very quickly and he was always, you know, it appeared that he was always digging around inside the vehicle or moving his arms inside the vehicle."

Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit the vehicle, but Rusthoven refused. This made the deputy “fairly nervous.” The deputy waited to take further action until a second deputy arrived.

When a second deputy arrived, Deputy Hoffman asked Rusthoven to exit his vehicle again. After several requests from both deputies, Rusthoven did so. Deputy Hoffman performed a pat-down search for weapons and thought that he felt a methamphetamine pipe in Rusthoven’s front pocket. Deputy Hoffman told Rusthoven that he was under arrest.

A search warrant was obtained to get a sample of Rusthoven's blood. The blood tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mr. Rusthoven was charged with felony DWI and he moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing the deputy did not have a reason suspicion to expand the stop and conduct a pat-down for weapons.  The district court denied Rusthoven’s motions, finding that each expansion of the stop was justified.  

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court, stating:

"To be constitutional, “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). The supreme court has summarized Terry as follows: “[E]ven in the absence of probable cause, the police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted); accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)."

***

"Based on the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. The deputy observed indicia of drug use and found that Rusthoven’s license was restricted from prior drug use. In addition, Rusthoven was unwilling to cooperate with the deputies’ requests to exit the vehicle. Based on those facts, combined with Rusthoven’s “erratic and agitated” movements, including “digging around inside the vehicle,” “moving his arms inside the vehicle,” and “fidgeting with everything,” the deputy reasonably believed that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous. At that point, given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Hoffman possessed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Rusthoven was armed and dangerous, justifying a pat-down frisk for weapons."

Moral Of The Story:  If you get fidgety, the cops will get frisky!


If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Shaw (Decided April 15, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a fish house, within the curtilage of a home, is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

In Shaw, the police received a report that the Defendant hit a utility pole with his vehicle and then left the scene.  The police were given the license plate number of the vehicle and they used this information to go to the Defendant's residence.  When the police arrived at the home, they came in contact with the Defendant's mother who told them that Defendant was not in the residence.  She refused to allow the police to search the home.  Defendant's mother did consent to a search of the garage.

The police searched the garage but did not find Shaw. The deputies observed Shaw’s vehicle, the one involved in the accident, parked in the grass behind the home. They noted that the engine was warm to the touch, indicating that it had recently been driven, and a deputy testified that he also observed patches of dead grass indicating that a vehicle had been parked in the backyard at other times. Behind the home, the deputies also found an old, dilapidated fish house with grass growing around it. The grass in front of the fish house was matted down, indicating that someone had recently entered it. A deputy approached the fish house and called out for Shaw, who did not respond. The deputy opened the door to the fish house and discovered Shaw inside. Shaw subsequently failed field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of DWI.

The Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence arguing that the fish house was a constitutionally protected area which the police could not enter without a warrant.  The district court denied the motion but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"In State v. Larsen, the supreme court considered whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a fish house. 650 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. 2002)....The supreme court considered “the nature of the premises [in Larsen]—a fish house, erected and equipped to protect its occupants from the elements and often providing eating, sleeping, and other facilities—as providing privacy for activities recognized and permitted by society.” Id. at 149 (quotation omitted). The supreme court noted that “[w]hile clearly not a substitute for one’s private dwelling, during the period of occupancy important activities of a personal nature take place” within a fish house. Id. The supreme court concluded that Larsen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his fish house."  

But in this case the Court of Appeals held that Larsen does not apply as, "The record here does not suggest that Shaw was living in the fish house. Moreover, a dilapidated, overgrown fish house located in the backyard of a residence does not provide “eating, sleeping, and other facilities” as a fish house located on a lake would. Id. This case is distinguishable from Larsen, and therefore Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fish house."

The Court of Appeals further ruled, however, that:

"The “land immediately surrounding and associated with the home,” the curtilage, is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984). To determine whether an area is located within the curtilage of the property, appellate courts look to “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection."

"The United States Supreme Court has identified four relevant factors to use when determining whether a disputed area falls within the curtilage:

[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
[2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 
[3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and 
[4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.

"The fish house was located in the backyard of a residential, single-family home. “The backyard and driveway of a home are often considered to be within the curtilage of a home.” State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2018). Like the defendant in Chute, Shaw “does not live on a large piece of rural property” but rather “lives in a single-family home.” See id. Thus, the first Dunn factor—proximity to the home—weighs in Shaw’s favor."

"The record is less clear regarding the remaining Dunn factors. There was no testimony as to whether the property was enclosed by a fence, shielded by trees, or otherwise protected from observation. “The curtilage of a home, however, need not be completely shielded from public view.” Id. at 585. Thus, the second and fourth factors are neutral. As to the third Dunn factor, one deputy testified that it appeared from patches of dead grass that a vehicle had been parked in the backyard before, and the deputies discovered Shaw’s vehicle parked in the backyard that day. This indicates that Shaw may have used the backyard as a place to park his vehicle, and this kind of use is “closely related to the home and associated with the privacies of life.” See id. (concluding that portion of defendant’s backyard where he had parked a camper was curtilage). Therefore, this factor weighs in Shaw’s favor."

"In sum, consideration of the Dunn factors demonstrate that the backyard in which the fish house was located was within the curtilage of Shaw’s home, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and the deputies therefore were required to obtain a warrant to search the fish house..."

Moral Of The Story:  Even if something fishy is going on, the police still need a warrant to enter the house! 

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Kelly (Decided April 1, 2019, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a driver, in making a turn, does not have to turn into the lane closest to the centerline.

In Kelly, an Eden Prairie police officer observed the Defendant's truck stopped at a red light at the intersection of Singletree Lane and Prairie Center Drive.  Singletree Lane runs from east to west and has two eastbound lanes and two westbound lanes, divided by a grass median. Similarly, Prairie Center Drive runs from north to south and has two northbound lanes and two southbound lanes, also divided by a grass median.  Kelley’s truck was stopped in the left-most lane of the westbound portion of Singletree Lane. That lane is the only lane from which a left-hand turn onto Prairie Center Drive can be legally made, and there are no markers extending the lanes through the intersection onto Prairie Center Drive.

Kelley’s turn signal was activated, indicating his intent to make a left-hand turn onto southbound Prairie Center Drive. Officer Streiff testified that when the light turned green, he watched Kelley’s truck make “a wide turn and actually turn into the far right lane, not the near lane when making the left hand turn.” Upon exiting the intersection, Kelley completed his turn.  Officer Streiff testified that he believed the wide left turn was a traffic violation, so he initiated a traffic stop.  

Mr. Kelly was drunk and was subsequently arrested for 2nd Degree DWI.  He moved to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges arguing arguing that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable basis for the stop because his left turn was legal. 

The District Court denied the Defendant's Motion but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating:

"Kelley does not dispute that he did not turn into the inner portion of the lane when completing the left turn. Instead, he argues that the district court and the officer erred in relying on Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) to conclude that he violated a traffic law. He asserts that the district court and the officer misinterpreted the statute because “Minnesota law does not dictate which lane of the roadway being entered that a left turn must be completed in."

***

"The relevant portion of the left-turn statute provides that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:

(b) Approach for a left turn on other than one-way roadways shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the centerline thereof, and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the centerline of the roadway being entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection. Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b).

"The first sentence of subdivision 1(b) provides guidance as to how one should approach the intersection to make a left turn and requires that approach for a left turn, on other than one-way roadways, be made in the portion of the roadway nearest the centerline. Id. Here, there is no dispute that Kelley complied with this requirement."

***

"The plain language of the statute required Kelley, after entering the intersection, to leave the intersection to the right of the centerline of Prairie Center Drive. The statute does not require that a left turn be completed in the inner-most, closest, or nearest lane “to the right of the centerline of the roadway being entered.” Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b). Both of the southbound lanes on Prairie Center Drive are to the right of the centerline, and Kelley’s turn into the outer lane, which was on the right side of the median, complied with this portion of the statute."

"The state argues that the second sentence of the subdivision required Kelley to turn into the inner-most lane of the roadway being entered because there was nothing obstructing Kelley’s ability to complete the turn in the inner-most lane. The state relies on the language in the second sentence of subdivision 1(b), which provides that “[w]henever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.” Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b)."

"Given these plain-language meanings and the statutory definition of intersection, the “whenever practicable” provision in the statute only refers to a driver’s conduct when going through the intersection, not when completing the turn. Consequently, Kelley was not required to turn into the inner-most lane because it was “practicable” for him to do so. Because the statute does not require which lane of the roadway being entered a left turn must be completed in, the district court erred by concluding that Kelley was required to turn into the inner-most lane of Prairie Center Drive."

Moral Of The Story:  People may often make a wrong turn in life but the lane chosen does not really matter.

If you or a loved one have been arrested for a Minnesota DWI, or are facing a DWI forfeiture of your motor vehicle, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI questions.