The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided June 17, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that prior DWI's cannot be proven by a written summary of existing conviction records.
In Martinez, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI and the complaint alleged Mr. Martinez had two previous DWI convictions, making the current charge a gross misdemeanor.
Martinez had a jury trial. At the beginning of the trial, and outside of the jury’s presence, the prosecutor informed defense counsel and the district court that he intended to introduce a “summary” of Martinez’s prior convictions under rule 1006 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. During the trial, the prosecutor called a paralegal as a witness. The paralegal testified that she had requested information about Martinez’s prior convictions and received “[approximately 50 to 60 pages” of material. She identified exhibit 5 as “a summary of the criminal convictions that [she] requested for this case.” The prosecutor then asked the paralegal, “Would you mind reading for the jury Number 1 and Number 2 on that document?” But defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The prosecutor offered exhibit 5 into evidence. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted the exhibit which stated: "1. On July 10, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-837. 2. On September 28, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-1670".
The Defendant was convicted of Second Degree DWI and on appeal he argued that exhibit 5 constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his constitutional right of confrontation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the Defendant and reversed the conviction, stating:
" Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” the defendant. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Minn. Const, art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (noting that confrontation claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions). These provisions are often referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from being offered for the truth of the matter asserted when the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant. Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). An appellant alleging a violation of the Confrontation Clause must show that “the statement in question was testimonial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the [appellant] was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” Id.
"Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor ... is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”)). If a document is prepared “for authentication purposes” and not “for providing evidence in litigation,” it is nontestimonial. State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018)."
"Martinez argues that exhibit 5 is a testimonial statement because it was prepared for litigation. We agree. The record shows that the state prepared the summary of Martinez’s prior convictions to be used at trial as substantive evidence of those convictions. The paralegal for the prosecutor’s office testified that she obtained records concerning Martinez’s prior convictions. The summary—which includes a case caption—purports to be the state’s summary of those convictions. At trial, the state introduced the summary in evidence to prove the prior-conviction element of its case. Indeed, the summary was the only evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions."
"The state contends that the summary is a nontestimonial record “that authenticates other kinds of certified copies of public records,” as was the document at issue in our Noor decision. But we are not persuaded. In Noor, the state introduced a “certificate of order sent” into evidence—a document that certified the authenticity of a Department of Public Safety order revoking Noor’s driver’s license and confirming that the order had been mailed to Noor. Noor argued on appeal that the “certificate of order sent” was a testimonial document for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 650. We rejected that argument, determining that the document was nontestimonial because “(1) United States Supreme Court precedent suggests documents introduced for authentication purposes, instead of to prove a fact, are nontestimonial; (2) an examination of Minnesota caselaw reaches the same result; and (3) the certificate is duplicative of nontestimonial documents.” Id. at 654."
"Our rationale in Noor or does not apply here. The summary was not introduced to authenticate other evidence. It was introduced to prove a fact—that Martinez had prior qualifying convictions. Moreover, the summary was not duplicative of nontestimonial documents. The summary was the sole evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions presented at trial. Given these circumstances, the summary was testimonial. Accord Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (determining that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial because their “sole purpose . . . was to provide prima facie evidence of’ an element of the offense); State v. Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that a firearm trace report introduced to prove firearm ownership was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 2009); State v. Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. App. 2007) (determining that a lab report introduced to prove the cause of death in a murder trial was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007); Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307, 309 (determining that a lab report introduced to prove that a substance was cocaine in a drug-sale trial was testimonial)."
"The parties do not dispute that the remaining two elements of a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in this case—that the summary was offered as proof of Martinez’s prior convictions and that Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross- examine the declarant. Because the summary was a testimonial document offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the admission of the summary in evidence violated Martinez’s constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, there was plain error."
"There is also no dispute that the erroneous admission of the summary affected Martinez’s substantial rights. To convict Martinez of second-degree DWI test refusal, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had “a qualified impaired driving incident” within ten years of his refusal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (“A person who violates section 169A.20, subdivision 2 . . ., is guilty of second- degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed.”) .03, subd. 3(1) (‘“Aggravating factor’ includes . . . a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.”) (2020). And the only trial evidence that Martinez had a qualified impaired driving incident was exhibit 5—the summary. There is a reasonable likelihood that the admission of the summary into evidence substantially affected the verdict. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634."
"Because the admission of the summary into evidence was plain error that affected Martinez’s substantial rights, Martinez has satisfied the first three elements of our plain- error standard of review. But before we address the error, we must determine whether doing so will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted)."
“‘[W]hen there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the . . . error,’ the result would be different,” affirming a conviction would “adversely affect the public’s confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 256 (quoting State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2014)). Here, without the summary of Martinez’s convictions, the state would not have been able to satisfy an element of second-degree DWI test refusal. But for the error, the result of Martinez’s trial would have been different. We therefore conclude that reversing Martinez’s conviction and remanding for a new trial will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 255."
Moral Of The Story: Sometimes its best not to summarize.
If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.
