Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Smith (Decided September 30, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Published) which stands for the proposition that in a DWI test-refusal case, the State does not have to prove that the officer requesting the breath test is properly certified to operate the testing equipment (i.e. the Data Master breath testing machine).

In Smith, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Ava Thadette Smith with one count of refusal to submit to a breath test, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1) (2020), for refusing to submit to an evidentiary breath test after Smith was lawfully arrested based on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

The deputy testified at trial that after placing Ms. Smith under arrest for DWI and bringing here to the Chisago County Jail, she informed Ms. Smith that refusal to submit to a breath test is a crime by reading her the statutorily required breath-test advisory.  After providing Smith an opportunity to contact an attorney, the deputy asked her if she would take a breath test. Smith refused, stating that she did not believe the breath-test machine would be accurate.

The deputy testified about her training in DWI enforcement, including field sobriety testing and roadside DWI investigation. The deputy stated that she received “all the standard training for DWI.” But the deputy did not specifically testify that she was trained to administer breath tests, nor did the deputy say that she was trained to operate the breath¬testing machine.

The Defendant was convicted by the jury of DWI Test Refusal and on appeal, she argued that the evidence was insufficient because the state did not prove that the deputy who requested that she submit to a breath test was fully trained to administer the test per Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51 (2020) (the implied-consent statute).

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, stating:

"On appeal, Smith relies on subdivision 7(c) of the implied-consent statute, which provides that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 7(c). We are not persuaded that the state must prove a would-be test administrator’s training as an element of refusal to submit to a breath test."

"By its plain language, the training requirement in subdivision 7(c) governs a person who is “administering a breath test”—not a person requesting a breath test. That language makes clear that a breath-test administrator’s training comes into play only if a breath test is administered. Moreover, the rest of subdivision 7(c)—which limits liability for persons “drawing blood” at the direction of an officer—likewise applies only if a blood test occurs. Id. (providing that certain “qualified person[s] drawing blood at the request of a peace officer for the purpose of determining the concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating substance [are] in no manner liable in any civil or criminal action except for negligence in drawing the blood”). And when subdivision 7 is read as a whole, the other subparts govern circumstances in which a test takes place, not scenarios in which a test is requested and refused. See id., subd. 7(a) (defining who may draw blood), (b) (providing that “[t]he person tested has the right to have someone of the person’s own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any tests administered”). Thus, whether read in isolation or in the context of the statute as a whole, the plain language of the breath-test training requirement set forth in subdivision 7(c) controls how a test must be performed—and therefore applies only if a test is, in fact, administered. See Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d at 287; Robinson, 921 N.W.2d at 758. We are therefore unconvinced that this requirement is relevant if a breath test is refused."

***

"In sum, we hold that the requirement set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51, subdivision 7(c), that “[t]he person administering a breath test must be fully trained in the administration of breath tests pursuant to training given by the commissioner of public safety[,]” is not an element of the crime of refusal to submit to a breath test under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(1). As a result, the state was not required to prove that the deputy who would have administered Smith’s test, if Smith had not refused that test, was properly trained in the administration of breath tests. Smith’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim therefore fails."

Moral Of The Story: Just say 'yes" to the test!

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Peach v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Decided September 23, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that if you are not valid to obtain a driver's license in the State where the DWI was committed, you are not valid to obtain a driver's license in Minnesota.

Mr. Peach had three prior DWI's from Minnesota when he committed a fourth DWI in Wisconsin in 2021.  The Wisconsin conviction resulted in a "lifetime revocation" of his Wisconsin privilege to drive a motor vehicle.

In 2023, Mr. Peach applied for a Minnesota driver's license and sought to enroll in the Interlock program which would allow him to have an interlock-limited license. The application was denied because his driving privilege was still revoked in Wisconsin.

Mr. Peach filed a challenge in district court to the denial of his Minnesota license request but the district court sustained the application denial.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court noting:

"Because appellant had three prior DWI offenses, under Wisconsin law he received a “lifetime” revocation of his driving privileges, and because appellant’s driving privileges have been revoked in Wisconsin, he may not apply for a driver’s license in Minnesota. See Minn. R. 7410.5500, subp 2 (“If an applicant’s driving privileges are withdrawn in any other state and the applicant applies for a driver’s license in Minnesota, then the applicant’s driving privileges must be reinstated in all other states before the applicant is eligible for driving privileges in Minnesota . . . .”)."

"Appellant argues that this is an “absurd” result because, if he had committed his fourth offense in Minnesota instead of in Wisconsin, he could enroll in IID. That may be true; persons who are convicted of a fourth Minnesota DWI offense are not necessarily convicted of violating Minn Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9), and, if the statute they did violate is among those specified in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d) (listing those eligible for the IID program), they are eligible to enroll."

"But it is also true that courts may presume the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2022). The legislature’s determination that persons with outstanding license revocations in other states should not be allowed to obtain a Minnesota license through the IID program is not absurd. “[C]onvictions of another state should generally be recognized in the forum state . . . [unless] strong public policy interests of the forum state provide sufficient reason to override the general rule of recognition.” State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 537, 539 (Minn. 2006)".

***

"It is equally true that this court “cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” Martinco v. Hastings, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 1963). Thus, whether appellant would be entitled to enroll in IID if his fourth offense had been committed in Minnesota is irrelevant; his offense was committed in Wisconsin, is not included in Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 4(c), (d), and this court cannot sua sponte include it."

Moral Of The Story:  If you are going to drink, stay home.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Marshall (decided September 9, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a search warrant is still valid if probable cause for its issuance still exists after the illegally obtained allegations in the warrant have been excluded.

In Marshall, the Defendant was stopped by the police and as the officer approached the driver's side window, the officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Another officer arrived at the scene to assist.  

Marshall exited the SUV at the first officer’s request. As the first officer spoke with Marshall outside the SUV, he smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Marshall’s person. The first officer asked whether there was marijuana in the car, and Marshall said “no.” The first officer then asked, “When was the last time it was in there?” and Marshall responded, “It was not. . . never in there . . . like four hours ago we all was just chilling.” The first officer inferred that “chilling” “implied that [Marshall] was using marijuana hours earlier.” The first officer observed that Marshall’s pupils were “constricted,” which made him “concerned about impairment” by a drug other than marijuana.

The first officer seated Marshall in the squad car and searched Marshall’s SUV. In the “main area” of the SUV “where [Marshall] was sitting,” the first officer “observed there was some marijuana debris” and “a cup” with “a cough syrup or medicine odor, along with pop inside of it.” The first officer also found a backpack with “an empty prescription bottle” that “appeared to be a cough syrup.” The other officer found another prescription bottle in the backseat. The first officer returned to the squad car and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, noting how Marshall’s pupils “reactfed] to light.”  The first officer saw the “presence of nystagmus, which led [him] to believe there might be . . . [a] narcotic involved.”

The first officer brought Marshall to the police station, read Marshall his Miranda rights, and asked if he would agree to “a full drug recognition evaluation” (DRE). Marshall agreed. Based on the DRE, the first officer suspected that Marshall was impaired by a stimulant, a narcotic analgesic, and cannabis. 

The first officer applied for a warrant to obtain a blood or urine sample from Marshall. The district court issued the warrant, and, after chemical testing, Marshall’s blood-test results showed the presence of oxycodone, oxymorphone, and cannabis.

The state charged Marshall with fourth-degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2020), for operating a vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance.  Marshall moved to suppress “all evidence specified in the notice by the prosecuting attorney” and to dismiss the case, arguing that there was “no reasonable suspicion for the expansion of the stop” and “no probable cause for the search of [Marshall] and/or [his] vehicle.”

The District Court granted the Defendant's motion to suppress concluding that “constricted pupils and the smell of marijuana on the person” did not “create a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the car.” The district court also rejected the state’s arguments that Marshall consented to the search of his backpack, reasoning that Marshall asked only “if the officer could retrieve his stuff from the car.”  The district court therefore concluded that the items found in the search of the SUV should be suppressed and excluded from the warrant affidavit.

The district court did not consider the result of the HGN test in the back of the squad car but concluded that the DRE was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because it “would never have happened but for the smell of the cups, the cough syrup, [and] the eye check.” The district court determined that the search-warrant affidavit should have excluded any reference to the “marijuana debris and two Styrofoam cups with what appeared to be pop and a medicine like odor coming from it,” the “empty bottles of a prescription liquid medication,” and the DRE. The district court ruled that the “warrant as rewritten is inadequate and would not be signed by a reasonable magistrate reviewing just the evidence that is admissible”; therefore, the district court suppressed Marshall’s blood-test results and dismissed the case.

The State appealed the district court ruling and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court stating:

"In its ruling suppressing the blood-test evidence, the district court concluded that law enforcement did not have probable cause to search Marshall’s SUV based only on the smell of burnt marijuana and the first officer’s observation of Marshall’s constricted pupils. It consequently also concluded that the evidence obtained from that search—marijuana debris, the medicine-like odor emanating from the foam cups, and the empty prescription bottles for liquid medication—were not properly included in the warrant application because they were obtained unlawfully."

"...we conclude that the warrant application includes other facts that did not derive from the challenged search of Marshall’s SUV and which are independently sufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant."

"In Minnesota, even if the application for a search warrant includes information that the issuing magistrate should not have considered, the warrant nonetheless may be supported by probable cause based on facts that were obtained independently of the tainted information."

***

"Similarly, and as alleged here, if a warrant application includes information that was impermissibly obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, exclusion of the evidence obtained through the search warrant is not required if the application also contains lawfully acquired evidence that is independently sufficient to support issuance of the warrant. State v. Hodges, 287N.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Minn. 1979). Thus, if we redact from the blood-sample search-warrant application all information obtained from the search of Marshall’s SUV, and if the facts that remain nevertheless establish probable cause, then we may conclude that the warrant was valid regardless of any taint on the redacted information."

"We conclude, however, that the district court erred by excluding the DRE results when evaluating probable cause for the warrant because the DRE was permissibly included in the warrant application based on the independent-source doctrine. The “independent source doctrine . . . will countenance introduction of otherwise illegally-seized evidence if the police could have retrieved it on the basis of information obtained independent of their illegal activity.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted)."

"Marshall’s constricted pupils, the odor of burnt marijuana on Marshall’s person and from the SUV, and Marshall’s statement about “chilling” from which the officer inferred recent marijuana use—all of which the first officer observed before the SUV search—more than adequately supported the officer’s initial suspicion that Marshall was impaired and more than adequately supported the officer’s request that Marshall participate in the DRE following his arrest on the outstanding warrant. The record thus establishes that law enforcement could have—and very likely would have—sought to determine whether Marshall had been driving while impaired by requesting a DRE, regardless of whether his SUV had been searched. Accordingly, it was error for the district court to reject the DRE results in its evaluation of probable cause for the search warrant."

"Having determined that the DRE was, at a minimum, validly supported by the first officer’s observations of Marshall’s constricted pupils, the odor of marijuana on his person and from the SUV, and Marshall’s recent use of marijuana, we finally consider whether the facts in the warrant application—minus the information derived from the SUV search— are sufficient to establish probable cause for blood-sample search warrant.

“Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Onyelobi, 932 N.W.2d at 281 (quotation omitted). Considering the validly obtained information in the search-warrant affidavit, we are satisfied that they establish a fair probability that a sample of Marshall’s blood would disclose evidence of a crime. We therefore conclude that the search warrant was supported by probable cause irrespective of whether the application properly included information obtained from the SUV search. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to suppress the blood-test results."

Moral Of The Story: Do not submit to a DRE.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is Jensen v. Commissioner of Public Safety, (Decided July 22, 2024, Minnesota Court Of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that 2 hours after arrest is the outer limit for the pre-test right to counsel in a DWI case.

In Jensen, the Defendant was stopped at 10:50 p.m. and was subsequently arrested for a DWI. At approximately 12:15 a.m., the deputy read the Defendant the implied-consent advisory and informed him of his right to contact an attorney. Mr. Jensen elected to contact an attorney. The deputy gave the Defendant a telephone and two different attorney-telephone books, and helped Defendant make several calls. The Defendant also watched the deputy use a county computer to search for attorneys based on his precise requests.

After approximately 34 minutes of phone time, around the time when the two-hour alcohol-testing period would expire, the deputy told appellant that his time to contact an attorney was almost over. At approximately 12:50 a.m., the deputy helped appellant make another phone call before ending phone time. Appellant failed to contact an attorney and refused to take the chemical-breath test. Consequently, appellant’s license was revoked.

The license revocation was sustained by the district court and on appeal the Defendant argued his pre-test right to counsel was not vindicated.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagree with the Defendant and upheld the license revocation stating:

"Appellant argues that he was not given (1) enough time to contact and receive a return call from counsel at 12:33 a.m., (2) personal internet access, (3) a cellphone, and (4) adequate assistance by law enforcement. To support his argument, appellant first seeks to distinguish this case from two cases that affirmed the determination that the drivers’ right to counsel was vindicated when the drivers received even less phone time than he did. See Parsons v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 488 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Minn. App. 1992); Umphlett v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995). We are not persuaded, as both cases undermine, rather than support, appellant’s argument."

"Appellant was given a telephone, two different attorney-telephone books, and 34 minutes to contact an attorney. The deputy used a computer to search for specific attorneys at appellant’s request, and appellant knew his time was limited. Finally, the deputy waited until the two-hour-testing limit was about to expire before ending phone time after giving appellant several warnings. Although here, phone time began at approximately 12:30 a.m., the Parsons court determined that 40 minutes was reasonable at 1:33 a.m. when the driver was (1) provided a telephone and directories, (2) allowed to call anyone she wanted, (3) able to speak with a non-lawyer friend, and (4) aware that her phone time was limited. See Parsons, 488 N.W.2d at 501-02. The facts here are not fundamentally different from those in Parsons, despite appellant’s inability to contact anyone. And appellant points to no binding authority that requires officers to wait until a driver contacts an attorney before ending phone time."

"Second, appellant implies that the facts here are unlike those in Umphlett, in which this court determined that the driver’s right to counsel was vindicated when he was given a telephone and a phone book, understood his time was limited, and chose to make only two phone calls at 9:00 p.m. See Umphlett, 533 N.W.2d at 639. He argues that, unlike Umphlett, he never chose to stop calling attorneys and that his efforts were frustrated by the deputy’s undue concern for obtaining a chemical-breath test. We are not persuaded. The deputy was allowed to balance the need for an accurate sample with the time he had given appellant to contact an attorney, and determine that, because the two-hour testing window was about to expire, he had provided appellant with reasonable time and resources. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(3) (2022) (stating that driver’s right to consult counsel “is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test”); see also Kuhn, 488 N.W.2d at 842 (recognizing that time under arrest bears on probative value of test)."

"Appellant also argues that, because the deputy did not read the implied-consent advisory until an hour and twenty-seven minutes after stopping him, he should have been afforded extra time to contact an attorney. We disagree. We have previously stated that there is no “absolute timeline during which the implied-consent statute may be invoked” because doing so would be “impractical.” State v. Padilla, No. A07-689, 2008 WL 1868064, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Apr. 29, 2008) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 18, 2008); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential authority may be cited for its persuasive value)."

"Under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in determining that the deputy vindicated appellant’s limited right to counsel."

Moral Of The Story: Time is not on your side.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minneapolis DWI Attorney F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Martinez (Decided June 17, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that prior DWI's cannot be proven by a written summary of existing conviction records.

In Martinez, the Defendant was charged with Second Degree DWI and the complaint alleged Mr. Martinez had two previous DWI convictions, making the current charge a gross misdemeanor.

Martinez had a jury trial. At the beginning of the trial, and outside of the jury’s presence, the prosecutor informed defense counsel and the district court that he intended to introduce a “summary” of Martinez’s prior convictions under rule 1006 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. During the trial, the prosecutor called a paralegal as a witness. The paralegal testified that she had requested information about Martinez’s prior convictions and received “[approximately 50 to 60 pages” of material. She identified exhibit 5 as “a summary of the criminal convictions that [she] requested for this case.”  The prosecutor then asked the paralegal, “Would you mind reading for the jury Number 1 and Number 2 on that document?” But defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The prosecutor offered exhibit 5 into evidence. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted the exhibit which stated: "1. On July 10, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-837. 2. On September 28, 2018 Rosalio Martinez was convicted of DWI...in Steele County Court File Number 74-CR-18-1670".

The Defendant was convicted of Second Degree DWI and on appeal he argued that exhibit 5 constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his constitutional right of confrontation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the Defendant and reversed the conviction, stating:

" Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” the defendant. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Minn. Const, art. I, § 6; see also State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2010) (noting that confrontation claims are analyzed the same under the federal and state constitutions). These provisions are often referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from being offered for the truth of the matter asserted when the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant. Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). An appellant alleging a violation of the Confrontation Clause must show that “the statement in question was testimonial, the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and the [appellant] was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” Id.

"Turning to the first element of a Confrontation Clause violation—whether the evidence was a testimonial statement—the “critical determinative factor ... is whether it was prepared for litigation.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309 (citing State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement ‘with an eye toward trial.’”) State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he central considerations are . . . whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.”)). If a document is prepared “for authentication purposes” and not “for providing evidence in litigation,” it is nontestimonial. State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018)."

"Martinez argues that exhibit 5 is a testimonial statement because it was prepared for litigation. We agree. The record shows that the state prepared the summary of Martinez’s prior convictions to be used at trial as substantive evidence of those convictions. The paralegal for the prosecutor’s office testified that she obtained records concerning Martinez’s prior convictions. The summary—which includes a case caption—purports to be the state’s summary of those convictions. At trial, the state introduced the summary in evidence to prove the prior-conviction element of its case. Indeed, the summary was the only evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions."

"The state contends that the summary is a nontestimonial record “that authenticates other kinds of certified copies of public records,” as was the document at issue in our Noor decision. But we are not persuaded. In Noor, the state introduced a “certificate of order sent” into evidence—a document that certified the authenticity of a Department of Public Safety order revoking Noor’s driver’s license and confirming that the order had been mailed to Noor. Noor argued on appeal that the “certificate of order sent” was a testimonial document for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 650. We rejected that argument, determining that the document was nontestimonial because “(1) United States Supreme Court precedent suggests documents introduced for authentication purposes, instead of to prove a fact, are nontestimonial; (2) an examination of Minnesota caselaw reaches the same result; and (3) the certificate is duplicative of nontestimonial documents.” Id. at 654."

"Our rationale in Noor or does not apply here. The summary was not introduced to authenticate other evidence. It was introduced to prove a fact—that Martinez had prior qualifying convictions. Moreover, the summary was not duplicative of nontestimonial documents. The summary was the sole evidence of Martinez’s prior convictions presented at trial. Given these circumstances, the summary was testimonial. Accord Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (determining that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial because their “sole purpose . . . was to provide prima facie evidence of’ an element of the offense); State v. Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that a firearm trace report introduced to prove firearm ownership was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 2009); State v. Weaver, 733 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. App. 2007) (determining that a lab report introduced to prove the cause of death in a murder trial was testimonial), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007); Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307, 309 (determining that a lab report introduced to prove that a substance was cocaine in a drug-sale trial was testimonial)."

"The parties do not dispute that the remaining two elements of a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in this case—that the summary was offered as proof of Martinez’s prior convictions and that Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross- examine the declarant.  Because the summary was a testimonial document offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and Martinez did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the admission of the summary in evidence violated Martinez’s constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, there was plain error."

"There is also no dispute that the erroneous admission of the summary affected Martinez’s substantial rights. To convict Martinez of second-degree DWI test refusal, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had “a qualified impaired driving incident” within ten years of his refusal. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (“A person who violates section 169A.20, subdivision 2 . . ., is guilty of second- degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed.”) .03, subd. 3(1) (‘“Aggravating factor’ includes . . . a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.”) (2020). And the only trial evidence that Martinez had a qualified impaired driving incident was exhibit 5—the summary. There is a reasonable likelihood that the admission of the summary into evidence substantially affected the verdict. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634."

"Because the admission of the summary into evidence was plain error that affected Martinez’s substantial rights, Martinez has satisfied the first three elements of our plain- error standard of review. But before we address the error, we must determine whether doing so will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted)."

“‘[W]hen there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the . . . error,’ the result would be different,” affirming a conviction would “adversely affect the public’s confidence in the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 256 (quoting State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2014)). Here, without the summary of Martinez’s convictions, the state would not have been able to satisfy an element of second-degree DWI test refusal. But for the error, the result of Martinez’s trial would have been different. We therefore conclude that reversing Martinez’s conviction and remanding for a new trial will “ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 255."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes its best not to summarize.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Attorney, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

  

Minneapolis DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Moore (Decided May 28, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that a jury instruction is not improper unless it materially misstates the law.

In Moore, the Defendant was arrested for DWI and the police applied for a search warrant for the Defendant's blood or urine.  As the deputy worked to submit the warrant, Defendant asked to go to the bathroom. The deputy advised Mr. Moore to wait so he could give a urine sample. Moore became increasingly agitated, continuing to ask to use the bathroom and threatening to urinate in the back of the squad car. After appellant’s repeated threats to urinate on the floor of the squad car, the deputy allowed him to use the bathroom in the emergency room at about 3:40 a.m.

At 3:49 a.m., minutes after they returned to the squad car, the deputy received the signed warrant from the judge, and the Defendant orally refused to submit a blood sample.

The deputy then transported appellant to the law-enforcement center for the Defendant to provide a urine sample. There, the deputy offered the Defendant a bottle of water, which Moore refused. The Defendant bought a can of pop from a vending machine and drank some of it. The deputy suggested to the Defendant several times that he try to urinate, but Moore responded that he did not have to because he had urinated so recently. The Defendant went into the bathroom twice but did not provide a urine sample. The deputy deemed the Defendant to have refused to consent to a urine test at 4:49 a.m.

The Defendant was charged with DWI Refusal to submit to testing and was convicted of same by a jury. On appeal, the Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion because the jury instructions “told the jury the State had prove[d] the refusal element” by instructing them, over counsel’s objection, that a “failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.” 

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction noting:

"The state charged appellant under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2020), which states, “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test... of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant.” In State v. Ferrier, this court considered whether a person could refuse to submit to a chemical test without orally stating their refusal. 792 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding sufficient circumstantial evidence supported determination appellant refused to submit to a test by conduct when she had been given between six and fifteen glasses of water and made three attempts to produce urine sample over three hours), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). We noted that the statute requires a volitional act; “the statute does not criminalize inability to perform the steps necessary for testing.” Id. Nevertheless, we held that “[a] driver may refuse to submit to chemical testing by words or conduct. We highlighted that “actual unwillingness to submit to testing must be proved.” Id. at 101. “Depending on the total circumstances, failure to perform the necessary steps for testing may be circumstantial evidence of refusal by conduct.” Id. at 102.

"Here, the district court instructed the jury on the fourth element of the crime as follows:

Fourth, [appellant] refused to submit to a blood and urine sample. A failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.

A refusal to submit to chemical testing includes any indication of actual unwillingness to complete the testing process as determined from the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances. Actual unwillingness to submit to testing must be proved."

"Appellant challenges the statement, “A failure to complete the entire test is a refusal.” However, “[i]f the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly state the law in language that can be understood by the jury, there is no reversible error.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). When the jury instruction for the fourth element is read “as a whole,” the jury had to determine whether the state had proved “[a]ctual unwillingness to submit to testing.” Because the jury instructions “as a whole” accurately stated the law, the district court did not abuse its discretion."

Moral Of The Story: Mostly right is good enough.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minneapolis DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.

Minnesota DWI Lawyer F. T. Sessoms Blogs on Minnesota DWI: This Week's Featured Minnesota DWI Case

The Minnesota DWI Case Of The Week is State v. Vredenburg (Decided May 13, 2024, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Unpublished) which stands for the proposition that out-of-court statements are admissible to establish the element of probable cause in a DWI test refusal case.

In Vredenburg, the police encountered the Defendant, apparently impaired, causing a disturbance near her former boyfriend’s home before later seeing her car driving away from the area. Police momentarily lost sight of the car, but soon saw it parked and found Vredenburg walking nearby with the key to the car in her pocket. Police arrested her on suspicion of impaired driving and the state charged her with chemical-test refusal. Vredenburg appealed from her test-refusal conviction, arguing that admitting evidence of statements provided by a bystander violated both the evidentiary rule prohibiting hearsay and Vredenburg’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.

A man reported to Rochester police that his former girlfriend, Mickela Vredenburg, was outside his house yelling and hitting his front door. Officers arrived and found Vredenburg. They noticed that she smelled of an alcoholic beverage, she slurred her speech, and her balance was unstable. An officer offered to drive Vredenburg home, but she declined. She told the officers that she had not driven there and that she had already arranged for a ride. She walked away.

Officers left but were soon dispatched to return. Vredenburg was at the house again, this time reportedly banging her head against the back door. Police did not find her at the house. But they knew she drove a black Ford Edge, and about a block away an officer saw a car of that description speeding past. The officer turned onto a different street, attempting to intercept the Ford. She soon found the Ford parked on the street, empty and situated partially in the grass, near two townhomes.

The officer stopped immediately behind the Ford and beside a bystander who was standing in the street. She got out and asked the bystander, “Did you see where that woman went?” The bystander, who lived nearby, said, “Yeah, she went right straight through there,” pointing between two townhomes. The officer walked in the indicated direction but did not immediately find Vredenburg. She returned to the bystander and questioned her further about what she had seen, asking for a description of the driver.

Meanwhile, other officers found Vredenburg walking in a direction away from where the officer had found her parked car. Vredenburg denied that she had been driving, but the officers were not persuaded. They arrested her on suspicion of drunk driving, and, searching her after the arrest, found the key to the parked Ford.

The Defendant was taken to the Olmsted County detention center where she was asked to submit to chemical testing.  Ms.Vredenburg refused testing and was subsequently charged with 3rd Degree DWI Refusal. The Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating:

"We are unconvinced by Vredenburg’s challenge to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s statements to the officer. Vredenburg is correct that hearsay statements are generally inadmissible at trial. See Minn. R. Evid. 802. She is also correct that, relatedly, testimonial out-of-court statements are generally not admissible unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004); State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764-65 (Minn. 2021). But these prohibitions are inapplicable here. An out- of-court statement repeated at trial is not hearsay unless it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). And identically, “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; see also Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2013). Vredenburg’s evidentiary and constitutional challenges to the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the bystander’s out-of-court statements therefore fails if the statements were admissible for some other reason."

"We have no difficulty concluding that the challenged statements were offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. The supreme court has explained that “[Refusing a chemical test is not a crime . . . unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had ‘probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2010)). The bystander’s statements to the officer supported the officer’s suspicion that Vredenburg had just driven the car that the officer found parked. Officers may rely on eyewitness statements to establish reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to arrest. See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 888, 891 (Minn. 1988) (holding that police had “sufficient information to reasonably suspect that the driver of the car in question was intoxicated” based on a gas-station attendant’s report to police “that he had observed an intoxicated driver leave the gas station”). The bystander’s statements about Vredenburg exiting the car and walking away from it were therefore admissible to prove a circumstance that establishes probable cause to suspect her of impaired driving. In other words, the bystander’s statement that Vredenburg was driving was not offered as substantive evidence that she was in fact driving, but to support the conclusion of police that they had probable cause to believe that she had been. Because the statements were admissible to provide the officer’s basis for probable cause, which is a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it was not subject to exclusion by either the rule prohibiting hearsay or the Confrontation Clause."

Moral Of The Story: Sometimes a woman scorned feels the fury.

If you or a loved one have been charged with a Minnesota DWI, feel free to contact Minnesota DWI Lawyer, F. T. Sessoms at (612) 344-1505 for answers to all of your Minnesota DWI and DUI questions.